Karnataka High Court
Sri Babu Rao Mahanthappa Shegunasi vs The Director on 21 June, 2022
Author: M. Nagaprasanna
Bench: M. Nagaprasanna
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF JUNE, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.2342 OF 2022
C/W
CRIMINAL PETITION NOS.2343/2022,
2345/2022, 2347/2022, 2348/2022, 2349/2022,
2352/2022, 2353/2022, 2356/2022, 2358/2022,
2360/2022, 2464/2022, 2466/2022, 2468/2022,
2469/2022, 2471/2022
IN CRL.P.No.2342/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
SECRETARY
M/S NAVODAYA VIKASA TRUST (R)
OPP: TST TALKIS
NEAR GANDHI CHOWK
BIJAPUR - 586 101
... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
2
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
20.02.2021 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.60/2021 (PCR NO.52/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE
OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C
BHADRAVATHI (ANNEXURE-A1).
IN CRL.P.No.2343/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
MANAGING TRUSTEE
M/S VIJAYEE-KARNATAKA EDUCATION
& CHARITABLE TRUST (R)
BASAVESHWARA CIRCLE
VIDYANAGAR, SINDAGI - 586 128
BIJAPUR DISTRICT
... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
3
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
20.02.2021 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.64/2021 (PCR NO.56/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE
OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C
BHADRAVATHI (ANNEXURE-A1).
IN CRL.P.No.2345/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
MANAGING TRUSTEE
M/S VIJAYEE-KARNATAKA EDUCATION
& CHARITABLE TRUST (R)
BASAVESHWARA CIRCLE
VIDYANAGAR, SINDAGI - 586 128
BIJAPUR DISTRICT ... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
4
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
20.02.2021 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.58/2021 (PCR NO.50/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE
OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C
BHADRAVATHI (ANNEXURE-A1).
IN CRL.P.No.2347/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
MANAGING TRUSTEE
M/S VIJAYEE-KARNATAKA EDUCATION
& CHARITABLE TRUST (R)
BASAVESHWARA CIRCLE
VIDYANAGAR, SINDAGI - 586 128
BIJAPUR DISTRICT ... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
5
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
20.02.2021 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.56/2021 (PCR NO.48/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE
OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C
BHADRAVATHI (ANNEXURE-A1).
IN CRL.P.No.2348/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
MANAGING TRUSTEE
M/S SUVARNA KARNATAKA EDUCATIONAL
& CHARITABLE TRUST (R)
BHANDARI COMPLEX
SBH MAIN BRANCH COMPOUND
LOHARWADI, M.G. ROAD
RAICHUR - 584 101 ... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
6
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
20.02.2021 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.50/2021 (PCR NO.42/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE
OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C
BHADRAVATHI (ANNEXURE-A1).
IN CRL.P.No.2349/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
SECRETARY
M/S NAVODAYA VIKASA TRUST (R)
OPP: TST TALKIS
NEAR GANDHI CHOWK
BIJAPUR - 586 101
... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
7
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
20.02.2021 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.61/2021 (PCR NO.53/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE
OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C
BHADRAVATHI (ANNEXURE-A1).
IN CRL.P.No.2352/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
MANAGING TRUSTEE
M/S SUVARNA KARNATAKA EDUCATIONAL
& CHARITABLE TRUST (R)
BHANDARI COMPLEX
SBH MAIN BRANCH COMPOUND
LOHARWADI, M.G. ROAD
RAICHUR - 584 101 ... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
8
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
20.02.2021 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.51/2021 (PCR NO.43/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE
OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C
BHADRAVATHI (ANNEXURE-A1).
IN CRL.P.No.2353/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
SECRETARY
M/S NAVODAYA VIKASA TRUST (R)
OPP: TST TALKIS
NEAR GANDHI CHOWK
BIJAPUR - 586 101
... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
9
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
20.02.2021 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.62/2021 (PCR NO.54/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE
OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C
BHADRAVATHI (ANNEXURE-A1).
IN CRL.P.No.2356/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
THE TRUSTEE
M/S KARNATAKA CORRESPONDENCE
EDUCATION FOUNDATION
SECOND FLOOR
OSWAL TOWER
NEAR JUBLEE CIRCLE
DHARWAD - 580 001
... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
10
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
20.02.2021 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.53/2021 (PCR NO.45/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE
OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C
BHADRAVATHI (ANNEXURE-A1).
IN CRL.P.No.2358/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
THE TRUSTEE
M/S KARNATAKA CORRESPONDENCE
EDUCATION FOUNDATION
SECOND FLOOR, OSWAL TOWER
NEAR JUBLEE CIRCLE
DHARWAD - 580 001
... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
11
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
20.02.2021 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.54/2021 (PCR NO.46/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE
OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C
BHADRAVATHI (ANNEXURE-A1).
IN CRL.P.No.2360/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
MANAGING TRUSTEE
M/S VIJAYEE-KARNATAKA EDUCATION
& CHARITABLE TRUST (R)
BASAVESHWARA CIRCLE
VIJAYNAGAR, SINDAGI - 586 128
BIJAPUR DISTRICT
... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
12
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
20.02.2021 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.57/2021 (PCR NO.49/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE
OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C
BHADRAVATHI (ANNEXURE-A1).
IN CRL.P.No.2464/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
MANAGING TRUSTEE
M/S KARNATAKA CORRESPONDENCE
EDUCATION FOUNDATION
2ND FLOOR, OSWAL TOWER
NEAR JUBLEE CIRCLE
DHARWAD - 580 001
... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
13
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN C.C.NO.52/2021 (PCR
NO.44/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE ADDL.
SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C BHADRAVATHI
(ANNEXURE-A1).
IN CRL.P.No.2466/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
MANAGING TRUSTEE
M/S SUVARNA KARNATAKA EDUCATIONAL
& CHARITABLE TRUST (R)
BHANDARI COMPLEX
SBH MAIN BRANCH COMPOUND
LOHARWADI, M.G. ROAD
RAICHUR - 584 101 ... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
14
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
20.02.2021 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.49/2021 (PCR NO.41/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE
OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C
BHADRAVATHI (ANNEXURE-A1).
IN CRL.P.No.2468/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
MANAGING TRUSTEE
M/S SUVARNA KARNATAKA EDUCATIONAL
& CHARITABLE TRUST (R)
BHANDARI COMPLEX
SBH MAIN BRANCH COMPOUND
LOHARWADI, M.G. ROAD
RAICHUR - 584 101 ... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
15
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
20.02.2021 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.48/2021 (PCR NO.40/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE
OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C
BHADRAVATHI (ANNEXURE-A1).
IN CRL.P.No.2469/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
THE TRUSTEE
M/S KARNATAKA CORRESPONDENCE
EDUCATION FOUNDATION
SECOND FLOOR
OSWAL TOWER
NEAR JUBLEE CIRCLE
DHARWAD - 580 001
... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
16
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
20.02.2021 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.55/2021 (PCR NO.47/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE
OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C
BHADRAVATHI AT SHIVAMOGGA (ANNEXURE-A1).
IN CRL.P.No.2471/2022:
BETWEEN
SRI BABU RAO MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
S/O MAHANTHAPPA SHEGUNASI
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
SECRETARY
M/S NAVODAYA VIKASA TRUST (R)
OPP: TST TALKIS
NEAR GANDHI CHOWK
BIJAPUR - 586 101
... PETITIONER
[BY SRI. SRIKANTH PATIL K., ADV.]
17
AND
1. THE DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE DISTANCE EDUCATION
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
2. THE FINANCE OFFICER
KUVEMPU UNIVERSITY
SHANKARGHATTA - 577451
SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.S.V.PRAKASH, ADV.]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT
(ANNEXURE-A) AND THE ORDER TAKING COGNIZANCE
20.02.2021 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.59/2021 (PCR NO.51/2021) PENDING ON THE FILE
OF THE ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C
BHADRAVATHI (ANNEXURE-A1).
THESE CRIMINAL PETITIONS COMING ON FOR
ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
Heard the learned counsel Sri.Srikanth Patil K., appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel Sri.S.V.Prakash, appearing for the respondents.
2. The petitioner and respondents in all these cases are common. The transactions are different. The 18 issue is concerning offences punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
3. The brief facts that led to the petitioner knocking the doors of this Court are as follows:
The petitioner who was Secretary of one M/s. Navodaya Vikasa Trust (R) enters into a memorandum of understanding with Kuvempu
University on 01.01.2011. A complaint is registered by the complainant - Kuvempu University against the office bearers of the Trust on the score that a cheque that was issued on 27.10.2020 for a sum of Rs.2,15,087/- in Crl.P.No.2342/2022 had been dishonoured on account of want of sufficient funds.
This led to registration of a crime invoking Section 200 of Cr.P.C., and for offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. On registration of the crime, the petitioner had knocked the doors of this Court, in the subject petition.
194. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the complaint so registered invoking Section 200 of Cr.P.C., was not even maintainable, as only the office bearers of the Trust are made accused and not the Trust, which had entered into a memorandum of understanding with the respondent -
Kuvempu University and would submit that the complaint itself not being maintainable and any further proceedings taken would be a nullity in law.
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel representing the respondents would submit that the petitioner is an office bearer of a Trust and the signatory to the memorandum of understanding and it is not a Company, as is contended by the petitioner and the Trust need not be made a party to the proceedings for offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and would submit that it is a matter of trial, that the petitioner has to come out clean. He 20 further submits that it is a curable defect and the Trust can be added at any time.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the contentions of respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record.
7. The afore-narrated facts of transaction is not in dispute. A memorandum of understanding is between Directorate of Distance Education, Kuvempu University and Navodaya Vikasa Trust, Bijapur. The petitioner in these petitions is a signatory in the capacity of being Secretary representing the Trust. But the memorandum of understanding has entered into between the Trust and Kuvempu University. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Trust need not be a party to the proceedings.
8. The High Court of Gujarat in the case of Hakkimuddin Taherbhai Shakor (Trustee) and Ors.
Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. disposed on 21 30.03.2017, has considered this issue in elaboration, as to whether a Trust would come within Section 141 of the N.I.Act. The Court holds that the Trust would come within the ambit of N.I.Act and without the Trust being a party, the complaint against the office bearers of the Trust would not be maintainable. The reasons rendered by the learned Judge reads as follows:
"30. Now, let us examine the question as to whether the Trust, either private or public, is a company in terms of Section 141 of the Act. Section 141 of the Act reads as follows:
"Section 141 : Offences by companies:
(1) If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and proceeded against and punished accordingly];
Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.
"Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.22
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attribute to, any neglect on the part of, any director, Manager, secretary, or other office of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation: For the purpose of this section. -
(a) "Company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
(b) "Director", in relating to a firm, means a partner in the firm."
[Emphasis supplied]
31. Admittedly, a Trust is neither a Body Corporate nor a Firm as enumerated in Section 141 of the Act. According to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, a Trust is not an Association of Individuals also, as envisaged in Explanation (a) to Section 141(2) of the Act. In this regard, I may state as to what actually the Legislature intends to mean by the term 'Association of Individuals' came up for consideration before various Courts on number of occasions. But, there is no uniformity in the opinion between various High Courts. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Jagadish Rai Agarwal and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, reported in 2005 (2) BC 497, while considering the scope of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, held as follows:
"....Since the dishonoured cheque was issued by the 1st petitioner as Kartha of the HUF, petitioners 2 to 4, being the sons of 1st petitioner and member of HUF, in view of the Explanation of Section 141 of the Act, like Directors of a Company, can be made liable for the offence under Section 138 of the Act."
32. Similar question arose before the Bombay High Court in the case of The Dadasaheb Rawal Coop v. Ramesh reported in 2009 (2) Mh.L.J. 558. That was also a case where the High Court was called upon to resolve the controversy as to whether a Hindu Undivided Family business will be a Company as explained in Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In 23 paragraph 9 of the judgment, the Bombay High Court has held as follows:
"9. A plain reading of the expression "company" as used in sub clause (a) of the Explanation is that it is inclusive of any body corporate or "other association of individuals". The term "association of individuals" will include club, trust, HUF business, etc. It shall have to be construed ejusdem generis along with other expressions "company" or "firm". Therefore, a joint family business must be deemed as a juristic person like a company or firm. When it is specifically alleged that the respondent Nos.1 and 2 are the joint proprietors/owners of the business of M/s New Sheetal Traders, which is a joint family business of themselves and their son Sheetal, prima facie, they are covered under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in view of the Explanation appended thereto."
33. I had an occasion to deal with a similar question relating to HUF in Arpit Jhanwar v. Kamalesh Jain reported in 2012 (4) CTC 177. The question precisely before this Court was as follows:
"1. A "Hindu Undivided Family ( HUF)" is an "Association of Individuals"; so it is a "company" in terms of Section 141 of the "Negotiable Instruments Act"
and thus, every member of the HUF is vicariously liable for punishment for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act committed by the "Kartha" of the HUF. This is precisely the stand of the complainant, in these cases, which is seriously refuted by the accused. This question is the basis for the instant petitions."
34. The judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and Bombay High Court referred to above were also placed before me by the learned Counsel. But, after having scientifically analysed the provisions of the Act and by having regard to the context in which Section 141 was incorporated, I had to express my inability to agree with the above views expressed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Bombay High Court. According to me, a HUF is not an "Association of Individuals". The said conclusion is based on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramanlal Bhailal Patel v. State of Gujarat reported in 2008 (5) SCC 449. wherein, in paragraph 29 of the said judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
24"29. Normally, where a group of persons have not become co-owners by their volition with a common purpose, they cannot be considered as a 'person'. When the children of the owner of a property succeed to his property by testamentary succession or inherit by operation of law, they become co-owners, but the co- ownership is not by volition of parties nor do they have any common purpose. Each can act in regard to his/her share, on his/her own, without any right or obligation towards the other owners. The legal heirs though co- owners, do not automatically become an 'association of persons/ body of individuals'. When different persons buy undivided shares in a plot of land and engage a common developer to construct an apartment building, with individual ownership in regard to respective apartment and joint ownership of common areas, the co- owners of the plot of land, do not become an 'association of persons/body of individuals', in the absence of a deeming provision in a statute or an agreement. Similarly, when two or more persons merely purchase a property, under a common sale deed, without any agreement to have a common or joint venture, they will not become an 'association of persons/body of individuals'. Mere purchase under a common deed without anything more, will not convert a co-ownership into a joint enterprise. Thus when there are ten co-owners of a property, they are ten persons and not a 'body of individuals' to be treated as a 'single person'. But if the co-owners proceed further and enter into an arrangement or agreement to have a joint enterprise or venture to produce a common result for their benefit, then the co-owners may answer the definition of a 'person'."
35. In the above judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made it very clear that a mere combination of individuals will not constitute an "Association of Individuals". To make it as an "Association of Individuals", in terms of Section 141 of the Act, it is absolutely necessary that the combination of individuals must be on their own volition. Secondly, it is also necessary that such combination of individuals must be with a common purpose. In an HUF, both the above essential requirements are absent inasmuch as an individual becomes a member of the HUF, not on his own volition but by birth. Similarly, there is no common purpose to be carried forward by a HUF. It is for these reasons, I had to hold that a HUF is not a Company in terms of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
2536. Turning back to the Trust, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners would submit that a Trust cannot be brought within the sweep of Explanation 'a' appended to Section 141(2) of the Act at all. Had it been the intention of the Legislature to bring in the term "Trust" also within the sweep of Section 141 of the Act, the Legislature would not have omitted to expressly enumerate the same in the Statute itself, he contended. The absence of specific inclusion by express word the term 'Trust' within the sweep of Section 141 of the Act, according to the learned senior counsel, would only go to show that the Legislature has consciously kept the 'Trust' out of the purview of Section 141 of the Act.
37. In order to substantiate this contention, the learned senior counsel has brought to my notice various penal statutes wherein the term 'Company' has been defined. He would point out that in all these statutes, the term 'Trust' has been enumerated in the list of institutions falling within the definition of the term 'Company'. Let us now consider them one after the other.
38. In "Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984," as envisaged in Section 8 of the said Act, if a person committing an offence under the said Act is a Company, besides the Company, the other office bearers like Director etc., shall also be deemed to be guilty for that offence and shall also be liable to be punished. In this statute, the term "Company" is explained as follows:
"8(2)(a) 'company' means any body corporate and includes a trust, a firm, a society or other association of individuals."
(Emphasis added)
39. Similarly in Section 8(2)(a) of The Prohibition of Capitation Fee Act, 1987 (Government of Maharashtra); Section 13(2)(a) of The Maharashtra Gunthewari Developments (Regularisation, Up gradation and Control) Act, 2001; Section 13(2)(a) of The Goa Coaching Classes (Regulation) Act, 2001; Section 17(2)(a) of The Tamil Nadu Tax on Consumption or Sale of Electricity Act, 2003; Section 23(2)(a) of The Tamil Nadu Groundwater (Development and Manager) Act, 2003; Section 10(1)(a) of The Tamil Nadu Schools (Regulation of Collection of Fee) Rules, 2009; and Section 12 of The Tamil Nadu Uniform System of School Education Act, 2010 while making certain office bearers of a company liable for punishment for the offences committed by the Company, the term 'Company' is explained as follows:
26"Company" means any body corporate and includes a trust, a firm, a society or other association of individuals."
(Emphasis added)
40. The learned senior counsel Mr. A. Ramesh would submit that in all the above enactments the Legislatures have consciously included the term 'Trust' within the meaning of the term 'Company', whereas, in the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Legislature has not expressly included the term 'Trust' within the meaning of the term 'Company' and such omission cannot be said to be an inadvertent omission. On the contrary, according to him, the Legislature has consciously omitted the same.
41. But, this contention, in my considered opinion, deserves only to be rejected for more than one reason. First of all, all the enactments referred to above are all State enactments. Therefore, it is difficult to compare the definition of the term 'company' made in these enactments with the definition of the term 'company' as made in the Negotiable Instruments Act which is a Central Statute. Therefore, let us now see as to how the term 'company' has been defined in similar Central penal Statutes.
42. In the "Explosives Act, 1884 Section 9C deals with 'offences by companies', which reads as follows:
"9C. Offences by companies. -
(1) Whenever an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, or was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall render any such person liable to any punishment under this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge and that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.27
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), where as offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary of other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Explanation. For the purposes of this section,-
(a) "company" means any body corporate, and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
(b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm." This is in pari materia to Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
43. Similarly, in almost all the Central Statutes which also make the Director of the Companies liable for punishment for the offences committed by the Companies, the term 'Company' has been explained verbatim as has been done in Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
44. To illustrate, we may refer to Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Section 25 of the Contracts Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 Section 22C of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 Section 33 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 Section 85 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 Section 149 of the Electricity Act, 2003 Section 47 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution ), 1974, Section 278B of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Section 14A of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, Section 34 of the Drugs and Consmetics Act, 1940 etc., In all these enactments, the definition of the term 'Company' is in pari materia with the term 'Company' as defined in Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Thus, in all the Central enactments, while dealing with the offences committed by companies, the term 'Company' is explained in one and the same manner. No Central enactment, has been brought to my notice where the term 'Trust' has been specifically enumerated in the definition of the term 'Company'.
45. In view of the above, I find it difficult to agree with the learned senior counsel Mr. A. Ramesh that the 28 term 'Trust' has been consciously omitted in Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act alone. It cannot be said that the Parliament was not aware of the existence of 'Trusts' and their activities. It only gives the irrevocable impression that the Parliament would have been satisfied that the definition of the term 'Company' as made in all these enactments will very well take into its ambit the term 'Trust' also and so, there is no need to specifically incorporate the term 'Trust'. That is the reason why, I firmly believe, the term 'Trust' has not been included explicitly in the definition of the term 'Company'.
46. Now, we may examine, whether a Trust will fall within the ambit of 'Association of Individuals' as enumerated in Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
47. As we have already extracted in the earlier paragraphs, in Ramanlal Bhailal Patel v. State of Gujarat reported in 2008 (5) SCC 449, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down two important elements for a group of persons to constitute an 'Association of Individuals' as defined in Section 141 of the Act. To repeat, the combination of individuals should have been on their own volition and secondly the said combination is for a common purpose. If both the above elements are available, then combination of such persons will be an 'association of individuals' in terms of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
48. So far as a Trust having more than one Trustee, there is combination of individuals. The said combination of individuals is on their own volition. If an individual agrees to be one of the Trustees, either by nomination or by election etc., then the combination is on his own volition. Apart from that, there will be at least a minimum of one common purpose in every Trust, which is the obligation imposed on the Trust. Thus, the Trust, being a combination of individuals, is an 'association of individuals' in terms of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Thus, there can be no difficulty in holding that a Trust, having two or more trustees, is undoubtedly a company for the purposes of Section 138 and 141 of The Negotiable Instruments Act.
49. But difficulty will arise in respect of a Trust where there is a single Trustee. If there is a single trustee, obviously there is no combination of individuals 29 and therefore, it will not fall within the ambit of 'association of individuals' so as to constitute a 'company' in terms of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. If it is eventually held that a Trust, having a single Trustee, is not a 'company', then the said Trustee cannot be prosecuted, whereas the Trust alone can be prosecuted for the offence committed by the Trust under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. But, on the contrary, if there are two or more Trustees, for the offence committed by the Trust, as we have concluded above, the Trustees can also be prosecuted provided they were incharge of the day today affairs and conduct of the Trust. If this interpretation is adopted, then it will lead only to absurdity. It is the basic principle of interpretation that an enactment cannot be interpreted so as to result in absurdity. To avoid such absurdity, we have to make purposive interpretation of the provisions of the Act so as to take forward the object of the Act.
50. In this regard, Mr. P.N. Prakesh, the learned Amicus Curiae would submit that the above interpretation sought to be made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners does not reflect the intention of the Legislature behind incorporation of Section 141 to the Act. He would point out that Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act was inserted in the Act w.e.f 01.04.1989, by amending the Act by means of Amendment Act 66 of 1988. This Chapter has been inserted with a view to enhance the acceptability of cheques in settlement of liabilities by making the drawer liable for penalty in case of bounce of cheque due to insufficiency of funds in the account or for the reason that it exceeds the arrangement made by the drawer with adequate safeguards to prevent harassment of honest drawer.
51. According to the learned Amicus Curiae, the explanation of the term 'Company' as made in Section 141 of the Act has to be understood in the context in which the said Chapter was inserted and the purpose which is sought to be achieved by the same. The learned Amicus Curiae would further submit that if the interpretation which is sought to be made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners is accepted, then, it will only defeat the very object of introduction of Chapter XVII in the Act. The learned Amicus Curiae would , therefore, submit that purposive construction alone would be appropriate in the given circumstances.
3052. The learned Amicus Curiae would refer to a text book on "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" by Mr.Guru Prasanna Singh, sixth edition, where the author has observed as follows:
"Rule in Heydon's case; purposive construction :
mischief rule When the material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions the most firmly established rule for construction of such words "of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law)" is the rule laid down in Heydon's case which has "now attained the status of a classic". The rule which is also known as 'purposive construction' or 'mischief rule', enables consideration of four matters in construing an Act : (i) What was the law before the making of the Act, (ii) What was the mischief or defect for which the law did not provide, (iii) What is the remedy that the Act has provided, and (iv) What is the reason of the remedy. The rule then directs that the courts must adopt that construction which "shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy."
53. This Rule was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1955 SC 661, wherein, the Constitution Bench speaking through the then Acting Chief Justice S.R. Das has held in paragraph 23 as follows:
"It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon's case was decided that for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered:
1st- What was the common law before the making of the Act, 2nd What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide, 3rd What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth, and 4th The true reason of the remedy;
and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro 31 privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico."
54. In the instant case, therefore, while interpreting the word 'Company', as explained in Section 141 of the Act, necessarily, the Court has to apply the above Rule and accordingly construe the said term.
55. Before proceeding further with our discussion, let us have a look into yet another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s.Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (1989) 1 SCC 164. That was a case where the Hon'ble Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the clause "means and includes" as employed in Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act , 1957. In that judgment, the question was whether tobacco seed oil and tobacco seed cake will fall within the meaning of tobacco as contained in item 4 of the First Schedule of the Act, which reads as follows:
"Tobacco means any form of tobacco, whether cured or uncured and whether manufactured or not, and includes the leaf, stalks and stems of the tobacco plant, but does not include any part of a tobacco plant while still attached to the earth."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court was mainly concerned with the phrase "means and includes". The contention before the Hon'ble Supreme Court on behalf of the State was that the definition, which covers both the expressions means as well as what it includes, is exhaustive. Since there is no mention of tobacco seed within the definition, it was contended before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that tobacco seed would not fall within the definition. In paragraph 12 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
"12. Looking, therefore, at the terms of the definition more closely, it is quite clear that tobacco seeds do not fall within the second or inclusive part of the definition. This part of the definition is important. It specifically excludes from the definition any part of the tobacco plant so long as it is still attached to the earth. It makes mention only of parts of the plant after it is severed from the earth. It is common knowledge that when a plant is severed from the earth, its parts will comprise of not only the leaves, stalks and stems but also the seeds. Yet the inclusive part of the definition enumerates only the leaves, stalks and stems and, deliberately one should think, avoids mention of seeds."32
56. In Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. v. Coop. Bank Employees Union reported in 2007 4 SCC 685, again the phrase "means and includes" came up for consideration as used in Section 2(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which reads as follows:
"Section 2(bb):Banking company means a banking company as defined in Section 5 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, (10 of 1949) having branches or other establishments in more than one State, and includes [ the Export Import Bank of India] [the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India,] [the Industrial Development Bank of India,] [the Small Industries Development Bank of India established under Section 3 of the Small Industries Development Bank of India Act, 19891 the Reserve Bank of India, the State Bank of India, [a corresponding new bank constituted under Section 3 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act,, 1970 (5 of 1970) [a corresponding new bank constituted under Section 3 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980, and any subsidiary bank], as defined in the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959 (38 of 1959)."
While interpreting the said phraseology, in paragraph 23, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
"23. Section 2(bb) of the ID Act as initially introduced by Act 54 of 1949 used the word "means... and includes"
and was confined to a "Banking Company" as defined in Section 5 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, having branches or other establishments in more than one province and includes Imperial Bank of India. Similarly, Section 2 (kk), which was also introduced by Act 54 of 1949, defines Insurance Company as "an Insurance Company defined in Section 2 of the Insurance Act, 1938 (IV of 1938), having branches or other establishments in more than one province". It is trite to say that when in the definition clause given in any statute the word "means" is used, what follows is intended to speak exhaustively. When the phrase "means" is used in the definition, to borrow the words of Lord Esher M.R. in Gough v. Gough , it is a "hard and fast" definition and no meaning other than that which is put in the definition can be assigned to the same. On the other hand, when the word "includes" is used in the definition, the legislature does not intend to restrict the 33 definition; makes the definition enumerative but not exhaustive. That is to say, the term defined will retain its ordinary meaning but its scope would be extended to bring within it matters, which in its ordinary meaning may or may not comprise. Therefore, the use of the word "means" followed by the word "includes" in Section 2 (bb) of the ID Act is clearly indicative of the legislative intent to make the definition exhaustive and would cover only those banking companies which fall within the purview of the definition and no other."
57. It is the contention of the learned senior counsel Mr. A. Ramesh that as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above two referred to judgments, the phrase "means" and "includes" will clearly indicate the Legislature's intention that the definition is exhaustive and would only cover those institutions as enumerated in Section 141 of the Act. In other words according to the learned senior counsel , the term "Trust" has been consciously omitted to be included within the term "Company" as explained in Section 141 of the Act. Since the phrase "means" and "includes" indicates that the list is exhaustive, the Court, by means of judicial interpretation cannot incorporate the term "Trust" into the definition of the term "Company" as it will amount to virtually amending Section 141 of the Act. The learned senior counsel pointed out that the power to legislate is with the Legislature and it is for the Court to only interpret and enforce but not to legislate.
58. In this regard, I wish to mention that a particular expression is often defined by the Legislature by using the word 'means' or the word 'includes'. Sometimes the words 'means and includes' are used. The use of the word 'means' indicates that the definition is a hard and fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression that is put down in the definition. The word 'includes' when used, enlarges the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the clause declares that they shall include. The words 'means and includes', on the other hand, indicate 'an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions.
59. It is needless to point out that if the words means and includes are used, then the expression 'means' used in the first part (means clause) shall carry its ordinary natural meaning and the same shall not be controlled by the list of things enumerated in the later inclusive clause. Thus, the expression which is defined by 'means' clause shall carry its fullest 34 natural meaning and bring into its ambit everything that falls within the ordinary natural meaning of the expression. If the Legislature wants to bring any other thing within the definition which does not otherwise fall within the ordinary natural meaning of the expression in the 'means' clause then the Legislature will normally enumerate such things in the later 'inclusive' clause. As has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the said list is exhaustive and in general by means of judicial interpretation, no other thing which does not fall within the natural meaning of the expression may be included by the Court.
60. Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act defines the term 'company' by using the words means and includes. As per the explanation a company means a body corporate and firm or association of individuals. Therefore, any person who falls within the ordinary natural meaning of the expression body corporate will be undoubtedly a company. In the later inclusive clause, the Legislature has enumerated two persons viz., 'a firm' or 'association of individuals' which will not fall within the ordinary natural meaning of the expression 'body corporate'. As per the Rule of Interpretation, which we have referred to above, the intention of the Legislature is not to include any other person within the meaning of the term 'company' as the list in the inclusive clause is exhaustive."
61. A Trust, admittedly does not fall within the ordinary natural meaning of the expression body corporate. Similarly, it does not fall within the ambit of a firm also. But as we have already concluded, a Trust having two or more persons will fall within the ambit of 'association of individuals' and thus such a Trust is a company. But a Trust having a single trustee will not fall within the ambit of 'association of individuals' and thus, it may appear that such a Trust is likely to escape from the clutches of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
62. It is the submission of the learned Advocate Mr. P.N. Prakash that such omission of the term 'Trust' in the definition clause of Section 141 is a casus omissus. Indisputably, what is not intentionally omitted by the Legislature and what the Legislature would have intended to mean but not expressly included falls within the concept of casus omissus.
3563. After making a scientific analysis and a comparative study of various enactments, I have already held in the earlier paragraphs of this order that the omission of the expression 'Trust' in the definition clause of Section 141 of the Act is not with an intention to keep the trust out of the purview of Section 138 and 141 the Act. In my considered opinion, going by the purpose for which Section 138 and Section 141 were brought into being by means of amendment to the Negotiable Instruments Act and going by the very fact that a Trust having two or more trustees squarely falls within the ambit of Section 141 of the Act, I have no option but to hold that the Legislature's intention is to have the Trust also to fall within the meaning of the expression 'company', but it has omitted to expressly say so in Section 141 of the Act, which according to me is only a casus omissus.
64. When there is omission to expressly mention the expression 'Trust' within the meaning of the term 'company', by applying the principle of casus omissus, whether this Court could fill up the said gap by reading the expression 'Trust' into the interpretation clause of Section 141 of the Act. In this regard, I may refer to the Constitution Bench Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh reported in 1990 (3) SCC 682, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-
"However, a judge facing such a problem of interpretation can not simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. Lord Denning in his Discipline of Law says at p. 12: "Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsman of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticised. A judge, believing himself to be lettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of 36 Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give 'force and life' to the intention of the legislature."
65. Applying the above law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as I have already concluded, considering the intention of the Legislature while bringing in Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the fact that a Trust having two or more trustees will squarely fall within the ambit of 'association of individuals' which in turn will fall within the meaning of the term 'company', I am of the view that a Trust having a single trustee should also be brought within the definition of the term 'company' and thus the expression 'Trust' should be read into the Explanation 'a' to Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. If this interpretation is not given, certainly Section 138 and 141 of the Act will not have force and life, so far as they relate to a Trust having a single Trustee. Further, if one holds that a Trust having two or more trustees is a 'company' falling within the sweep of Section 138 and 141 of the Act, at the same time a Trust having a single trustee will not fall within the ambit of Section 141 and 138 of the Act, the result, as I have already concluded is only an absurdity. In order to avoid the said absurdity and in order to give force and life to the provisions of Section 138 and 141 of the Act, I hold that the expression 'company' as explained in Section 141 of the Act takes into its ambit a Trust having a single trustee also. In view of this interpretation, I firmly hold, that a Trust, having either a single trustee or two or more trustees, is a 'company' in terms of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
66. My conclusions are summed up as follows:
(i) A Trust, either private or public/charitable or otherwise, is a juristic person who is liable for punishment for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.37
(ii) A Trust, either private or public/charitable or otherwise, having either a single trustee or two or more trustees, is a company in terms of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
(iii) For the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, committed by the Trust, every trustee, who was incharge of the day today affairs of the Trust shall also be liable for punishment besides the Trust."
16. The reasonings assigned by the learned Single Judge are quite commendable and I am in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court. The principles explained in the said decision can be made directly applicable in the present case. In such circumstances, I hold that a Trust, either private or public / charitable or otherwise, is a juristic person who is liable for punishment for the punishable under the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. A Trust, either private or public / charitable or otherwise, having either a single trustee or two or more trustees is a company in terms of Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. For the offence under the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 committed by the Trust, every trustee, who was incharge of the day today affairs of the Trust, shall also be liable for punishment besides the Trust.
17. In the result, this application fails and is hereby rejected.
18. It is needless to clarify that the guilt or innocence of the accused persons shall be decided strictly on the basis of the evidence, that may be led in the course of the trial without being influenced, in any manner, by any of the observations made by this Court in this order. Notice is discharged."
(Emphasis supplied) In the light of the undisputed fact that the Trust is not a party to these proceedings and it stands in the same footing as a Company, the judgments that would consider the Company not being a party becoming a 38 vitiating factor to the proceedings would become applicable to the case at hand as well. It is not a defect that is curable by addition of parties at any point in time, since there can be no vicarious liability without arraigning the Company/Trust as an accused.
9. Therefore, in view of the finding that the complaint itself was not maintainable without the Trust being made a party. I deem it appropriate to terminate the proceedings, qua the petitioners in all these cases.
10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER i. Criminal Petitions are allowed.
ii. The proceedings pending on the file
of the Additional Senior Civil
Judge and J.M.F.C Bhadravathi in
C.C.No.60/2021 in Crl.P.No.2342/2022,
C.C.No.64/2021 in Crl.P.No.2343/2022,
C.C.No.58/2021 in Crl.P.No.2345/2022,
C.C.No.56/2021 in Crl.P.No.2347/2022,
39
C.C.No.50/2021 in Crl.P.No.2348/2022, C.C.No.61/2021 in Crl.P.No.2349/2022, C.C.No.51/2021 in Crl.P.No.2352/2022, C.C.No.62/2021 in Crl.P.No.2353/2022, C.C.No.53/2021 in Crl.P.No.2356/2022, C.C.No.54/2021 in Crl.P.No.2358/2022, C.C.No.57/2021 in Crl.P.No.2360/2022, C.C.No.52/2021 in Crl.P.No.2464/2022, C.C.No.49/2021 in Crl.P.No.2466/2022, C.C.No.48/2021 in Crl.P.No.2468/2022, C.C.No.55/2021 in Crl.P.No.2469/2022, C.C.No.59/2021 in Crl.P.No.2471/2022, stand quashed.
Sd/-
JUDGE KG