Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Sh. S.P. Singh vs Union Of India Through on 26 May, 2015
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi.
RA-135/2015
MA-1714/2015 in
OA-401/2012
New Delhi this the 26th day of May, 2015.
Honble Mr. G. George Paracken, Member (J)
Honble Mr. Shekhar Agarwal, Member (A)
Sh. S.P. Singh,
Ex. Director ESIC,
R/o 474, New Govind Puri,
Kanker Khera,
Meerut Cantt-250001. . Review Applicant
Versus
Union of India through:
1. Secretary,
Ministry of Labour & Employment
(Social Security Division-I)
Shram Shakti Bhawan,
Rafi Marg, New Delhi.
2. Chairman,
ESI Corporation,
Ministry of Labour & Employment,
(Social Security Division I)
Shram Shakti Bhawan,
Rafi Marg, New Delhi-1.
3. Director General,
ESI Corporation,
Panch deep Bhawan,
CIG Marge, Kotla Road,
New Delhi-1. .. Respondents
O R D E R (By Circulation)
Mr. Shekhar Agarwal, Member (A) This review application has been filed for review of our order dated 08.01.2014 passed in OA-401/2012 by which the O.A. was dismissed.
2. It is noticed that this applicant had earlier filed review application No. 23/2014 for review of the same order. This was dismissed by us vide our order dated 20.02.2014 in circulation. Now, second review application has been filed. However, repeated review applications cannot be entertained as laid down in Rule-17(4) of Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, which reads as follows:-
(4) When an application for review of any judgment or order has been made and disposed of, no further application for review shall be entertained in the same manner. Thus, this Review Application is not maintainable.
3. Moreover, we notice that the order of which review has been sought was passed on 08.01.2014. This Review Application has been filed after a gap of almost more than one year and five months much after the prescribed period of 30 days. Thus, it is inordinately delayed and hence barred by limitation.
4. We also notice from the various grounds taken by the review applicant that he is not pointing out any error in the judgment apparent on the face of the record. Instead of that he is questioning our findings and is trying to re-argue the matter. This cannot be permitted in a review application. If the applicant is aggrieved by our findings, appropriate course of action available to him would be to approach higher judicial forum.
5. While considering the scope of review, Honble Supreme Court in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma Vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389 referred to an earlier decision in the case of Shivdeo singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 has observed as under:-
It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which is inherent in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all matters or errors committed by the Subordinate Court. 5.1 Similarly in the case of Ajit Kumar Rath Vs. State of Orissa and Others, AIR 2000 SC 85 the Apex Court reiterated that power of review vested in the Tribunal is similar to the one conferred upon a Civil Court and held:-
The provisions extracted above indicate that the power of review available to the Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order 47. The power can be exercised on the application on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. It may be pointed out that the expression any other sufficient reason used in Order 47 Rule 1 means a reason sufficiently in the rule.
Any other attempt, except an attempt to correct an apparent error or an attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Tribunal under the Act to review its judgment. [Emphasis added] 5.2 In the case of Gopal Singh Vs. State Cadre Forest Officers Assn. and Others [2007 (9) SCC 369], the Apex Court held that after rejecting the original application filed by the appellant, there was no justification for the Tribunal to review its order and allow the revision of the appellant. Some of the observations made in that judgment are extracted below:-
The learned counsel for the State also pointed out that there was no necessity whatsoever on the part of the Tribunal to review its own judgment. Even after the microscopic examination of the judgment of the Tribunal we could not find a single reason in the whole judgment as to how the review was justified and for what reasons. No apparent error on the face of the record was pointed, nor was it discussed. Thereby the Tribunal sat as an appellate authority over its own judgment. This was completely impermissible and we agree with the High Court (Justice Sinha) that the Tribunal has traveled out of its jurisdiction to write a second order in the name of reviewing its own judgment. In fact the learned counsel for the appellant did not address us on this very vital aspect.
6. In view of the above, this Review Application is dismissed on the ground of limitation as well as on merits in circulation.
(Shekhar Agarwal) (G. George Paracken) Member (A) Member (J) /Vinita/