Madras High Court
K.A. Kunjalu vs V.V. Jose on 3 August, 1993
Equivalent citations: (1993)2MLJ454
ORDER Abdul Hadi, J.
1. Even though civil miscellaneous petitions are posted before me today, by consent of both the counsel, C.R.P., itself is taken up for disposal.
The defendant has preferred this civil revision petition against the order in I.A. No. 1564 of 1992 allowing the amendment of the money decree passed on 24.7.1992. The said I.A. was filed by the respondent/plaintiff. In the said LA. the amendment sought for is mentioned as follows:
The rate of interest as mentioned in the decree is an apparent error while drafting the decree. After having pronounced the judgment as prayed for, the plaintiff is entitled to contract rate of interest from the date of suit till realisation. The prayer in the plaint is also specific to that effect. Therefore it is just and necessary that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to amend the decree with 24 per cent interest from the date of suit till realisation.
The said I.A. was no doubt filed under Section 152, C.P.C.
2. The only question involved is whether the above referred to amendment of the decree is in accordance with the judgment that was given in the suit O.S. No. 610 of 1988. The prayer in the suit is as follows:
to pass a decree against the defendant in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 1,71,933 with future interest at the same rate on the principal sum of the suit". The "same rate" referred to above is 24% since in the preceding paragraph of the plaint where details of valuation are given, after mentioning the principal sum of Rs. 1,00,000 it is mentioned that interest at 24% per annum from 9.7.1985 to 8.7.1988, the date of the suit is claimed. So according to the prayer in the plaint, from the date of suit till realisation 24% per annum is claimed as contractual rate of interest. As against this prayer in paragraph 10 of the judgment, the conclusion reached is as follows:
While so, the decree as drafted, grants interest at the rate of 6% from the date of the suit till the date of realisation. Aggrieved by the said decree, the respondent/plaintiff filed the abovesaid I.A. No. 1564 of 1992. But aggrieved by the abovesaid order granted in the I.A. the defendant has preferred the present civil revision petition.
3. Even at the very outset I posed the question to the respondent's counsel as to how an application to amend the decree would lie in the present case and is it not necessary to amend the judgment itself, if the plaintiff contends that he should have been given interest at the rate of 24% from the date of the suit. To that the learned Counsel for respondent no doubt submits that the judgment has granted decree as prayed for and that since the prayer is at the rate of 24% per annum from the date of suit, the decree alone has to be amended and not the judgment. But I am unable to agree with this submission of the counsel for respondent. First of all, the judgment does not say absolutely that the suit is decreed as prayed for. In the above referred to extracted portion of paragraph 10 of the judgment, it is only mentioned that What it means is that as prayed for by the plaintiff the future interest is granted at 6% per annum. Nowhere it is stated that the suit has been decreed as prayed for. Only with reference to interest in the above referred to extracted portion it is stated that 6% interest is granted as prayed for by the plaintiff. No doubt the plaintiff did not pray for 6% interest, but the plaintiff prayed for 24% interest from the date of the suit, as already indicated from the relevant paragraphs of the plaint.
4. It is well known that with reference to interest pendente lite, that is from the date of suit till the date of the decree, it is left to the discretion of the court to come to a decision as to what is the reasonable rate of interest and then grant it. (vide also Mahabir Prasad v. Burgn . The relevant language used in Section 34, C.P.C. is the court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree.
So with reference to interest pendente lite the court in its judgment must have said in the present case. what is the reasonable rate of interest to be allowed for the abovesaid period, But in the present case, there is absolutely nothing in the judgment as to how the abovesaid discretion has been exercised by the court below. In fact the judgment, even according to the counsel for respondent is totally silent about this aspect. When there is such an omission on the part of the court below, with reference to the grant of interest pendente lite, it is. the judgment, if at all, which has to be corrected, either under Section 152, C.P.C. or Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. or by filing a regular appeal, whichever course is in accordance with law. Without doing that, the respondent has filed the present petition to amend the decree. The decree can only be drafted in accordance with the judgment. The judgment only grants 6% interest. It does not speak of 24% interest anywhere.
5. No doubt, the learned Counsel for Respondent relies on M. Appa Rao v. V.L. Varadaraj , but the said decision only says that the contract rate of interest has to be awarded till the date of decree unless it would be inequitable. So even according to this decision the court must give a finding whether or not the contract rate of interest is equitable. No such finding has been given by the court below in the judgment. So, if at all, the judgment alone has to be corrected as indicated above and therefore necessarily this revision petition has to be allowed, after setting aside the impugned order. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the civil revision petition is allowed. The respondent/plaintiff is at liberty to take necessary further action in the matter in accordance with law. 6. I shall also express that it is unfortunate that the court below has not applied its mind at all when it delivered its judgment regarding the grant of interest pendente lite. Because of the said fault on the part of the court below, the respondent/plaintiff suffers.