Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Nisha vs Govt. Of Nctd on 9 December, 2025
1
Item No.5/C-2
MA. No. 4825/2025
in
CP No. 941/2025
In
OA No. 2313/2019
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
MA. No. 4825/2025
in
CP No. 941/2025
In
OA No. 2313/2019
This the 9th Day of December,2025
Hon'ble Mr. R.N.Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Shri. B.Anand, Member (A)
SMT. NISHA
W/O LATE SH. VINOD KUMAR
T-235A,26-B BALJEET NAGAR,
WEST PATEL NAGAR,
NEW DELHI-110008.
......Applicant
(By Advocate: None)
Versus
1.SHRI NIKHIL KUMAR, SECRETARY,
HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE,
GNCTD
DELHI SECRETARIAT
9TH LEVEL, A WING, I P ESTATE
NEW DELHI-110002.
2. SHRI MANOJ KUMAR,
MEDICAL SUPERINTENDENT
DIRECTOR,
BHAGWAN MAHAVIR HOSPITAL
H-4/5, GURU HARI KISHAN MARG, PITAMPURA, DELHI-110034.
...Respondents
(By Advocate : Mr. Amit Yadav with Dr. Monika Bhargava)
NEHA Digitally signed by
NEHA SHARMA
Date: 2025.12.16
SHARMA17:06:17+05'30'
2
Item No.5/C-2
MA. No. 4825/2025
in
CP No. 941/2025
In
OA No. 2313/2019
ORDER (ORAL)
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J) There is no representation on behalf of the applicant.
2. The present CP has been filed willful defiance of the directions of the Tribunal contained in the order dated 23.09.2022 in the captioned OA.
3. The applicant had filed an accompanying Miscellaneous Application No. 4825/2025 seeking condonation of delay of 754 days in filing of the captioned CP.
4. When the CP and MA both were listed on 11.11.2025, this Tribunal was of the prima facie view that the present CP is barred by limitation.
5. Despite the fact that the applicant had filed the captioned MA seeking condonation of delay, learned counsel for the applicant sought time and requested an adjournment to 17.11.2025. On 17.11.2025, the matter was again adjourned at the request of the learned Government Counsel appearing for the petitioner/applicant. Thereafter, the matter was listed on 26.11.2025, when there was no representation on behalf of either party.
6. The matter was again listed on 08.12.2025, subsequently, however, once more, there was no appearance on behalf of the NEHA Digitally signed by NEHA SHARMA Date: 2025.12.16 SHARMA17:06:17+05'30' 3 Item No.5/C-2 MA. No. 4825/2025 in CP No. 941/2025 In OA No. 2313/2019 petitioner. Accordingly, the matter has now been taken up for consideration.
7. Learned Counsel for the respondents, Mr. Yadav, submits that the present contempt petition is not maintainable. He argues that there is no provision under the applicable law providing for condonation of delay in the filing of a contempt petition, and therefore the present CP, being barred by limitation, is liable to be dismissed.
8. In support of his submission, he places reliance on the judgment dated 17.09.2025 of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Contempt Case No. Cont. CAS (C) 1414/2025, CM APPL. 59131/2025, CM APPL. 59132/2025 titled Dr. Sunil Kumar V/s Union of India and Ors. wherein the Hon'ble High Court, after considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Tirupati Rao v. M. Lingamaya, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1764. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the judgment in the case of Dr. Sunil Kumar (supra) read as follows:-
"14. Once again, admittedly the petitioner never took any steps for initiating proceedings within the prescribed statutory period of one year under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 qua the order dated 08.12.2021. In view thereof, the present petition qua the order dated 08.12.2021 being beyond limitation, is also not maintainable.
15. Be that as it may, this Court cannot undermine the legislative intent in fixing the said prescribed statutory period of limitation of one year in the Contempt Act by the legislature. The same, being mandatory, has a significant relevance. In fact, it is a settled position of law that the Courts ought not to entertain contempt proceedings initiated after expiry of the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt Act however, to supplant the aforesaid view, it is felt appropriate to refer to NEHA Digitally signed by NEHA SHARMA Date: 2025.12.16 SHARMA17:06:17+05'30' 4 Item No.5/C-2 MA. No. 4825/2025 in CP No. 941/2025 In OA No. 2313/2019 the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah1 wherein it has been held as under:
"53. Reverting to the point of limitation, even in case of a petition disclosing facts constituting contempt, which is civil in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1764 nature, the petitioner cannot choose a time convenient to him to approach the Court. The statute refers to a specific time limit of one year from the date of alleged contempt for proceedings to be initiated; meaning thereby, as laid down in Pallav Sheth (supra), that the action should be brought within a year, and not beyond, irrespective of when the proceedings to punish for contempt are actually initiated by the high court.
54. An action for contempt - though instituted through a petition or an application - is essentially in the nature of original proceedings, as held by this Court in High Court of Judicature at Allahabad v. Raj Kishore Yadav43; a fortiori, a prayer for condonation of delay in presenting the petition/application alleging contempt would not be maintainable. The express negative phraseology used in section 20 of the Act, as a legislative injunction, places a fetter on the court's power to initiate proceedings for contempt unless the petition/application is presented within the time- frame stipulated therein. However, since section 20 also uses the expression "date on which the contempt is alleged to be committed" as the starting point of the period of one year to be counted for reckoning whether the petition/application has been presented within the stipulated period, the high courts ought to be wary of crafty and skilful drafting of petitions/applications to overcome the delay in presentation thereof. ... ...
55. The Act, which is a special law on the subject of contempt, does not expressly or by necessary implication exclude the applicability of sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act. This Court, in State of West Bengal v. Kartick Chandra Das44 has held that in terms of section 29(2) of the 1963 Act, provisions contained in section 5 of the 1963 Act can be called in aid by a party who seeks condonation of delay in presentation of an appeal under section 19(1) of the Act. Similarly, in exceptional cases, provisions like sections 12, 14, 17, 22, etc. of the 1963 Act could be invoked to seek exemption from the law of limitation, which is distinct from condonation of delay. In an appropriate case, it would be open to the party who has not petitioned the court within the period of one year, as stipulated in section 20 of the Act, to seek exemption from the law of limitation in line with the principle flowing from Order VII Rule 6, CPC45, by showing the ground upon which such exemption is claimed. We have no hesitation to hold that in a case where a civil contempt is alleged by a party by referring to a "continuing wrong/breach/offence" and such allegation prima facie satisfies the court, the action for contempt is not liable to be nipped in the bud merely on the ground of it being presented beyond the period of one year as in section 20 of the Act. Applicability of the principle underlying Order VII Rule 6, CPC for granting exemption would only be just and proper having regard to the object and purpose for which the jurisdiction to punish for contempt is exercised by the courts if, of course, the court is satisfied that benefit of such an exemption ought to be extended in a given case. At the same NEHA Digitally signed by NEHA SHARMA Date: 2025.12.16 SHARMA17:06:17+05'30' 5 Item No.5/C-2 MA. No. 4825/2025 in CP No. 941/2025 In OA No. 2313/2019 time, it must be remembered that the court cannot grant exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. Inspiration in this regard may be drawn from the decision of the Privy Council in Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh46. However, as observed earlier, contempt proceedings being in the nature of original proceedings, akin to a suit, application of section 5 of the 1963 Act to seek condonation of delay is excluded.
56. A caveat needs to be added here. For a "continuing wrong/breach/offence"
to be accepted as a ground for seeking exemption in an action for contempt, the party petitioning the court not only has to comprehend what the phrase actually means but would also be required to show, from his pleadings, the ground resting whereon he seeks exemption from limitation. Should the party fail to satisfy the court, the petition is liable to outright rejection. Also, the court has to be vigilant. Stale claims of contempt, camouflaged as a "continuing wrong/breach/offence" ought not to be entertained, having regard to the legislative intent for introducing section 20 in the Act which has been noticed above. Contempt being a personal action directed against a particular person alleged to be in contempt, much of the efficacy of the proceedings would be lost by passage of time. Even if a contempt is committed and within the stipulated period of one year from such commission no action is brought before the court on the specious ground that the contempt has been continuing, no party should be encouraged to wait indefinitely to choose his own time to approach the court. If the bogey of "continuing wrong/breach/offence" is mechanically accepted whenever it is advanced as a ground for claiming exemption, an applicant may knock the doors of the Court any time suiting his convenience. If an action for contempt is brought belatedly, say any time after the initial period of limitation and years after the date of first breach, it is the prestige of the court that would seem to become a casualty during the period the breach continues. Once the dignity of the court is lowered in the eyes of the public by non-compliance of its order, it would be farcical to suddenly initiate proceedings after long lapse of time. Not only would the delay militate against the legislative intent of inserting section 20 in the Act (a provision not found in the predecessor statutes of the Act) rendering the section a dead letter, the damage caused to the majesty of the court could be rendered irreparable. It is, therefore, the essence of justice that in a case of proved civil contempt, the contemnor is suitably dealt with, including imposition of punishment, and direction as well is issued to bridge the breach. ... ..."
9. In view of the above legal position and the discussion hereinbefore, the present CP and the accompanying MA seeking condonation of delay are not maintainable and deserve to be dismissed. NEHA Digitally signed by NEHA SHARMA Date: 2025.12.16 SHARMA17:06:17+05'30' 6 Item No.5/C-2 MA. No. 4825/2025 in CP No. 941/2025 In OA No. 2313/2019
10. Accordingly, the Contempt Petition as well as Miscellaneous Application No. 4825/2025 are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Shri B. Anand) (R.N.Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)
/arti/
NEHA Digitally signed by
NEHA SHARMA
Date: 2025.12.16
SHARMA17:06:17+05'30'