Orissa High Court
Janaki Bohidar And Others vs Pradip Kumar Bohidar And Others on 6 April, 2001
Equivalent citations: AIR2002ORI101, AIR 2002 ORISSA 101, (2001) 4 CIVLJ 523 (2001) 92 CUT LT 414, (2001) 92 CUT LT 414
Author: P.K. Misra
Bench: P.K. Misra
JUDGMENT P.K. Misra, J.
1. This civil revision is directed against the reversing order passed by the Addl. District Judge, Bolangir, directing grant of Succession Certificate in favour of opposite party No. 1. Opposite party No. 1 filed application under section 317 of the Indian Succession Act before the Subordinate Judge, Bolangir, for grant of Succession Certificate on the basis of a Will allegedly executed by Braja Bihari Bohidar. There is no dispute that the aforesaid Braja Bihari Bohidar was a bachelor. Opposite party No. 1 is a nephew of Braja Bihari, being son of one brother. The petitioners who were arrayed as opposite parties are respectively the widow and two sons of deceased's brother and the brother of Braja Bihari. There is no dispute that Braja Bihari died on 2-9-1987. Opposite party No. 1 claims that Braja Bihari had executed the Will on 4-5-1979 and bequeathed all his property in favour of opposite party No. 1. The present petitioners have tiled objection denying the execution of the will by the deceased. It was also pleaded that the Will had been obtained by exercise of undue influence and had not been duly attested by the attesting witnesses.
2. The Subordinate Judge rejected the application for grant of Succession Certificate on the ground that due execution of the Will including the due attestation had not been proved and many suspicious circumstances had not been explained. The present opposite party No. 1 filed appeal which has been allowed by the appellate authority on the finding that due execution of the Will including the attestation had been proved and the alleged suspicious circumstances had neither been pleaded nor proved properly.
3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners had placed reliance upon the oral evidence adduced on behalf of present opposite party No. 1 and has tried to assail the findings of the lower appellate court particularly, the finding regarding the due attestation of the Will. He has submitted that various suspicious circumstances which had been noticed by the trial court, having not been explained, the genuineness of the Will should have been disbelieved.
4. The trial court bad observed that the Will was said to have been executed at 2.00 a.m. and there was no satisfactory explanation as to why it was executed at an odd hour of the night. This by itself does not appear to be a suspicious circumstance. Every person has got his own peculiar habit. Even o.p.w. No. 3, who is a relation of the deceased and an advocate had stated that the executant had disclosed before him that the Will had been prepared and signed by the executant at 2.00 a.m. .
5. The trial court also observed that the attesting witnesses appear to have signed in a different ink. The lower appellate court has not accepted this reasoning of the trial court on the ground that without the aid of an expert, it is always risky to rely upon the comparison by the Court itself. Though such reasoning of the lower appellate court may not be considered as sacrosanct as in many cases such comparisons are made by the court itself, it cannot be said that any jurisdictional error has been committed by the lower appellate court by refusing to discard the attestation on the ground of alleged difference in the inks used.
6. The trial court had also referred to the evidence of the attesting witnesses, namely p. ws. 1 and 3 and found certain contradictions in their evidence and had disbelieved about the attestation of the document. It is, of course, true that p. w. 1 had not categorically stated that the executant had signed the Will in his presence and he himself had signed the Will in presence of the executant. Similarly, there is some discrepancy in the evidence relating to sequence of arrival of p. ws. 1 and 3 at the place of execution. The lower appellate court has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 353 (Naresh Charan Das Gupta v. Paresh Charan Das Gupta and another) and come to a conclusion that the entire evidence considered as a whole indicates that the executant had signed in presence of the attesting witnesses and the attesting witnesses bad signed in presence of the executant. The learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the decision repotted in 62(1986) C. L. T. 360 (Srimati Bewa and another v. Kasinath Chandra Behera and another) and contended that in the absence of specific evidence to the effect that the executant had signed in presence of the attesting witnesses and the attesting witnesses had signed in presence of the executant, it cannot be said that there was due execution of the Will. In A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 363 (supra), it had been observed :--
"It cannot be laid down as a matter of law that because the witnesses did not state in examination-in-chief that they signed the Will in the presence of the testator, there was no due attestation. It will depend on the circumstances elicited in evidence whether the attesting witnesses signed in the presence of the testator. This is a pure question of fact depending on appreciation of evidence."
In the present case, though it has not been stated so by the witnesses in so many words, a perusal of the evidence of the two witnesses, namely p. ws. 1 and 3 leaves no room for doubt that the executant who himself had scribed the Will had signed it in presence of the witnesses and thereafter the witnesses had signed in his presence. The conclusion reached by the lower appellate court is a pure conclusion of fact as observed in the aforesaid Supreme Court decision and even though the higher court might be inclined to take a different view of the evidence that by itself is not a ground to interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Will is unnatural as there is no reason as to why the other relatives of the same degree have been excluded. It is also contended that there is no reason as to why the mother of Braja Bihari who was alive at the time of execution of the Will had not been given any property. The lower appellate court has relied upon the fact that the present opposite party No. 1 was staying with the deceased who was a bachelor and was looking after him whereas the other relations, like brother and nephew were living separately. It is, thus, quite evident that opposite party No. 1 was having more cordial relationship with the executant. The lower appellate court has observed that there is no definite evidence before the court as to when the mother of the deceased had died. In fact, in the objection filed by the present petitioners, it was not indicated that the Will was unnatural and nothing had been left in favour of the mother of the executant. Even, nothing has been indicated in the objection that the mother was alive in 1979 when the Will was executed. On the other hand, the genealogy furnished by the present petitioners indicates as if the mother of Braja Bihari, the executant, had died prior to 1979. It is significant to note that in the written submission filed by the petitioners in this Court, the date of death of the mother of the deceased, Braja Bihari has been indicated to be 1976. A witness, on behalf of present opposite party No; 1 has stated as if the mother of Braja Bihari had died about twentyfive years back. It is, of course, true that there is a stray statement indicating as if the mother of Btaja Bihari was alive on the date of execution of the Will. But merely on the basis of such a stray statement, it is not possible to come to a conclusion that in fact, the mother of Braja Bihari was alive on the date of execution of the Will so that non-giving of any ptoperty to the mother can be considered as a suspicious circumstance, particularly in the absence of any plea whatsoever on this aspect. Apart from the pleading that the Will was forged and obtained by fraud, coersion and tbe executant was not in sound disposing state of mind and there was suspicion regarding the execution of the Will as the same was not registered, it was never indicated that the Will was unnatural on the ground that the mother and other relations of the executant had not been given any property. In aforesaid view of the matter, the conclusion of the lower appellate court cannot be characterised as pervese or without basis.
8. Non-registration of the Will by itself cannot beconsidered as a suspicious circumstance, as has been rightly observed by the lower appellate court. The trial court had observed that opposite party No. 1 had taken a leading part in execution of the Will and as such the Will must be viewed suspiciously. It appears that opposite party No. 1 who was staying with the executant, was deputed for calling p, w. 1, one of the attesting witnesses. The Will was executed in the own residential house of the executant. Merely because the opposite party No. 1 was deputed to fetch an attesting witness, it cannot be said that he had taken a leading part in the execution of the Will. This aspect has been considered by the lower appellate court and even though there may be scope for coming to a different conclusion, it can hardly be said that any jurisdictional error has been committed by the lower appellate court.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also contended that application for Succession Certificate under section 317, C.P.C., is not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in sections 57, 58 and 218 of the Succession Act. For the aforesaid purpose he has relied upon the decisions reported in 1972 (2) C. W. R. 1451 (Amrutlal Majhi and others v. Japi Sahuani and others) and 1978 (1) I. L. R. Cuttack 24 (Mst.) Pratima Padhanei v. Narayan Padhan and others). These decisions had been rendered in the context of section 213 which provides that an unprobated Will cannot be utilised in court of law and in the aforesaid context it was held that a Will is not required to be probated in Bolangir district or some other place. The decisions nowhere lay down that even though it is not mandatory to get such will probated, no application can be filed for obtaining Succession Certificate on the basis of the Will.
10. It was also submitted that the application filed before the Subordinate Judge was not maintainable. Such a point was not raised before any of the courts below. It is apparent that a notification has been issued authorising the Subordinate Judge to receive applications for grant of probate or letters administration or Succession Certificate.
11. Learned counsel for the opposite parties has rightly contended that the lower appellate court has reversed the decision of the trial court after discussing the various facts and circumstances of the case and even though another court could have come to a different conclusion on the basis of the evidence on record and possibly could have agreed with the view of the trial court, it cannoc be said that any jurisdictional error has been committed nor it can been said that jurisdiction has been exercised with any material irregularly. Law is well settled that wrong appreciation of evidence'is not a ground to interfere with the finding rendered by the court below, in exercise of jurisdiction under section 115, C. P. C. . The scope of interference in a civil revision is very much restricted, as has been observed by the Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 2324 (M/s, D. L. F. Housing and Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh and others), A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 153 (Pandurang Dhondi Chougule and others v. Maruti Hari Jadhav and others), A. I. R. 1973 S. C, 76 (The Managing Director (N.I.G ) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad and another v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase and Stores) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad ), and several other decisions. Even though the discussion of the lower appellate court may not appear to be satisfactory, there is hardly any scope for interference with the conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate court.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the civil revision, which is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to cost of the present civil revision.
Revision dismissed.