Karnataka High Court
M/S Tata Motors Body Solutions Limited vs The Additional Labour Commissioner ... on 24 February, 2025
Author: Ravi V.Hosmani
Bench: Ravi V.Hosmani
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733
WP No. 103284 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI V.HOSMANI
WRIT PETITION NO.103284 OF 2024 (L-RES)
BETWEEN:
M/S. TATA MOTORS BODY SOLUTIONS LIMITED,
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS TATA MARCOPOLO MOTORS
LIMITED) GARAGE ROAD, MUMMIGATTI POST,
DHARWAD - 580 011,
REPRESENTED BY ITS HEAD - HUMAN RESOURCES,
SRI RAVI KULKARNI, AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
RESIDENT OF DHARWAD
... PETITIONER
Digitally signed
(BY SRI S.N. MURTHY, SERNIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI SHIVAKUMAR S. BADAWADAGI, ADVOCATE)
by
MALLIKARJUN
MALLIKARJUN RUDRAYYA
RUDRAYYA KALMATH
KALMATH
Date:
2025.02.24
17:36:50 +0530
AND:
1. THE ADDITIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER (IR),
KARMIKA BHAVANA, DAIRY CIRCLE,
BANNERGHATTA ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 029.
2. THE DEPUTY LABOUR COMMISSIONER,
BELAGAVI REGION, BELAGAVI
KARMIKA BHAVAN, MAJAGAON ROAD,
ITI COMPOUND, UDAYAMBAG,
BELAGAVI - 590 008.
3. TATA MARCOPOLO KARANTHIKARI KARMIC UNION
HOSAYELLAPURA, NEAR CHARANTIMATH GARDEN,
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733
WP No. 103284 of 2024
R.R.COLONY, 2ND CROSS, DHARWAD - 580 001.
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI SANJAY SINGHAVI, SENIOR COUNCEL FOR SRI RAJASHEKHAR BURJI, ADVOCATE FOR R3;
SRI P.N. HATTI, HCGP FOR R1 AND R2) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH AND SET ASIDE THE VARIOUS MODIFICATIONS/ AMENDMENTS/ ADDITIONS/ DELETIONS, MADE BY THE FIRST RESPONDENT HEREIN TO THE FOLLOWING CLAUSES a. CLAUSE NO.20 - "LEAVE" b. CLAUSE NO.26
- " AGE OF RETIREMENT" c. CLAUSE NO.21(ii) - "TRANSFER" d. CLAUSE NO.32 - "SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH CERTAIN CASES" e. CLAUSE NO.29(cxx) "MISCONDUCT- THREATENING AND OBSTRUCTING ANY CO-EMPLOYEE OF THE COMPANY ON THEIR WAY TO WORK OR WAY BACK HOME." f. CLAUSE NO.29(cvi) - "MISCONDUCT - FAILURE TO SHOW PROPER CONSIDERATION, COURTESY OR ATTENTION -TOWARDS CUSTOMERS, VISITORS, OFFICERS AND/OR OTHER EMPLOYEES." g. CLAUSE NO.29(cviii) - "MISCONDUCT - PRINTING/DISTRIBUTING STATEMENTS ON SOCIAL MEDIA". h. CLAUSE NO.2(xx) -
"DEFINITION OF HABITUAL". i. CLAUSE NO.12 - "SHIFT WORKING".
j. CLAUSE NO.30(iii) - "PENALTIES FOR MISCONDUCT (SUSPENSION WITHOUT WAGES)." k. CLAUSE NO.42(ii) - "ACCIDENTS' LEAVE/COMPENSATION." l. CLAUSE NO.31(ii) - "PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH ACTS OF MISCONDUCTS AND SUSPENSION PENDING ENQUIRY." m. CLAUSE NO.46(i) - "GENERAL - EX- GRATIA AND INCREMENT PAYMENTS." n. CLAUSE NO.22(viii) - "TERMINATION OF SERVICE AND DISCHARGE - REMOVAL OF NAME FROM MUSTER ROLLS." o. CLAUSE NO.22(ii) - "TERMINATION OF SERVICE AND DISCHARGE - ABSENCE MORE THAN 10 DAYS - LOSS OF LIEN ON EMPLOYMENT". p. CLAUSE NO.46(ii) - "GENERAL - -3-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 REPRESENTATIONS FROM POLITICAL AND COMMUNAL BODIES,"- MORE - FULLY DETAILED IN THE GROUNDS URGED HEREINABOVE, IN THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 01.04.2024 AT "ANNEXURE-T" TO THIS WRIT PETITION IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 03.09.2024, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER, THIS DAY THE COURT, MADE THE FOLLOWING:
CAV ORDER (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI V.HOSMANI) Challenging order dated 01.04.2024 passed by respondent no.1 ('Appellate Authority' for short) approving various modifications/amendments, addition/deletions to Certified Standing Orders of petitioner - company, this writ petition is filed.
2. Brief facts as stated are that petitioner is a Company engaged in business of Bus body building at its factory at Dharwad with 1216 workmen on its rolls ('Petitioner' for short). And that as per provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act' for short), petitioner has its Standing Orders, which was certified in year 2009 ('CSO' for short), as per Annexure-A. It was stated respondent no.3 - -4-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 Union having a section of its workmen as its members ('Union' for short), applied to respondent no.2 ('Certifying Authority' for short) for amendment of various provisions of Certified Standing Orders as per Annexure-B. It was stated, same were totally baseless. Hence, petitioner filed objections as per Annexure-C. Petitioner also filed separate application under Section 10 (2) of Act as per Annexure-D, for amendment of certain provisions of its CSO. Union filed objections against same as per Annexure-E. Same was followed by petitioner filing rejoinder as per Annexure-F.
3. After hearing parties, Certifying Authority passed common impugned order on 15.06.2022, as per Annexure-G, virtually considering only amendments sought by Union and denying all amendments sought by Petitioner. It was submitted said order was totally contrary to law and illegal. Hence, as provided under Section 6 of Act, Petitioner filed Appeal before Appellate Authority.
4. On 08.12.2022, Appellate Authority passed order remitting matter back to Certifying Authority for fresh consideration. Since, said order was passed without hearing appeal, it was challenged by Petitioner in W.P.no.100017/2023. -5-
NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 Same was allowed on 14.02.2023, remitting appeal back to Appellate Authority for fresh consideration in accordance with law, after affording opportunity to parties.
5. Thereafter, Union filed objections against appeal by making false and flimsy allegations against Petitioner, in response to which Petitioner filed rejoinder. On 27.04.2023, Appellate Authority held appeal was filed within period of limitation. Thereafter, Union filed additional statement of objections opposing appeal on merits, followed by Petitioner's rejoinder. After hearing parties, Appellate Authority has passed impugned order on 01.04.2024, leading to this petition.
6. Sri SN Murthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri Shivakumar S. Badawadagi, advocate for Petitioner submitted impugned order was contrary to law and unsustainable passed arbitrarily.
7. It was submitted, Clause 26 of CSO stipulated age of retirement at 58 years. Though, Union sought for raising it to 60 years, said clause provided for modification by any binding agreement, settlement, award between Employer and Workmen. But Appellate Authority allowed amendment without any reasons.
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8. It was submitted, said Clause would be very vague as it leads to different age of retirement for different workmen. In fact, age of retirement in appointment order is 58 years. If present amended Clause is taken, it would mean that all those whose appointment order says 58 years, age of retirement will be 58 years. And therefore sought for restoring Clause by rejecting amendment sought for.
9. It was submitted Clause no.20 of CSO was with regard to Leave, wherein existing Standing Order provided 15 days privilege leave, 5 days casual leave and 10 days sick leave. Petitioner had sought amendment for reduction of sick leave from 10 days to 5 days, as workmen now covered under Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 ('ESI Act' for short) would be entitled to substantial leave under ESI Scheme. However, Management and Union had agreed under Settlement to have 15 days privilege leave, 5 days casual leave and 8 days sick leave and sought for passing order to this effect.
10. It was submitted Clause no.21 (ii) of CSO was with regard to Transfer. Under impugned order, Appellate Authority restricted right of transfer by Employer to within State of Karnataka, which was arbitrary when admittedly Petitioner had -7- NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 number of manufacturing units in different parts of country and there would be need to transfer workmen even outside State. Amendment would jeopardize functioning of Petitioner. Therefore, prayed for restoring original clause.
11. It was submitted, Clause no.32 of CSO was with regard to Suspension Allowance. While existing clause stated no wages shall be paid in case of suspension arising out of workmen facing criminal trial. It was submitted, in case of criminal offence, on conviction by a Court of Law, Management could straight away impose appropriate punishment, without conducting any enquiry. This is negated by deleting clause and replacing it with totally new clause under which Management will have right to suspend workmen accused in a Court of law for any criminal offence or an offence involving moral turpitude until disposal of trial. It was submitted, amended clause would require Petitioner to pay subsistence allowance, even in case workman gets involved in criminal offence not in connection with employment, virtually for no fault of Management, till criminal case is disposed of. It was submitted, same would be contrary to object prescribing subsistence allowance, which was -8- NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 for sustenance during pendency of disciplinary proceedings and prayed for restoration of original Clause no.32.
12. It was submitted Clause no.29 of CSO enumerated acts of misconduct. Petitioner has sought for amendment for addition of misconducts by insertion of sub-clause (cxx) in Clause 29. It was submitted, Appellate Authority did not consider need for safeguards against acts of misconduct by workmen, especially during strikes or lockout, when workmen obstruct and beat other workmen, supervisors and officers while going to factory to work or on their way back home after work.
13. Likewise, there was need for insertion of sub- clauses (cvi) and (cvii) in Clause 29 of CSO. It was submitted, clause (cvi) was with regard to showing proper consideration, courtesy or attention towards customers, visitors, officers and/or other employees of Petitioner and clause (cvii) was with regard to printing or distributing or making false and vicious statements through electronic/social media against Company and its officers. It was submitted, in present times, social media would provide occasion for misuse/abuse to put up derogatory posts against Petitioner, its officers, executives etc. -9- NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 To safeguard against same, inclusions were necessary and rejection was without any reasons.
14. It was submitted Clause no.30 (iii) of CSO is about suspension without wages. It was submitted existing clause provided for suspension without wage for 30 days as punishment for misconduct, which is reduced to not more than 3 days. It was submitted, mere 3 days of suspension will not have any impact on workman. Therefore, sought for restoration of original clause.
15. It was submitted Clause no.12 of CSO was about Shift Working. It was submitted, in Objections filed by Union, they had conceded for retention of original clause and therefore sought for restoration of original Clause 12.
16. It was submitted Clause no.42 of CSO was about incapacity of workmen due to accident. It was submitted, in existing clause, if workman was incapacitated as a result of an accident arising out of and in course of employment, he would be entitled to pay during period he remained incapacitated, upto 3 months and leave with pay for further period of 3 months at discretion of Management. However, in amendment approved, Appellate Authority has made it mandatory for
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 payment of wages who suffers accident for full period of his incapacity and entire medical expenses to be borne by Company, which runs contrary to statutory provisions of ESI Act and Employees Compensation Act, 1923 ('EC Act' for short), wherein provisions for benefits of injured workman on account of accident suffered in course of and out of employment were defined. Therefore, amendment certified casting huge financial burden on Management even beyond statutory liabilities was untenable and liable to be set aside.
17. It was submitted Clause no.31 (ii) of CSO was about time limit for submission of reply to Charge-sheet/Show- cause notice.
18. It was submitted, existing clause provided for period of 72 hours for submission of reply, which is amended by removing time limit in entirety, thereby empowering charge- sheeted workman to dilate disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, prayed for restoration of original clause.
19. It was submitted Clause no.42 of CSO was about insertion of Clause 46 (i) to CSO with regard to granting increments and ex-gratia payments and Clause 46 (ii) about representation from political or communal bodies.
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20. Insofar as Clause 46 (i), it was submitted claim for grant of increments or ex-gratia cannot be as a matter of right or part of terms of employment and same was only with intention to avoid disputes. Likewise, Clause 46 (ii) merely clarifies that Management will not entertain any representation from political or communal parties proposing to speak on behalf of workers. This is meant to keep factory workmen and factory away from political and communal issues, which if entertained would render very working of factory impossible. Therefore, rejection of said clauses was without justification and sought for allowing same.
21. In support of his submissions, learned Senior Counsel relied on ratio in MC Raju v. Executive, Karnataka Vidyuth Karkhane Limited reported in ILR 1983 Kar. 189:
"23. In the context of the fourth contention claiming a right to extension of service, I may also observe that the grant of extension is a discretionary power to be exercised in individual cases having due regard to the criteria laid down for giving the grant of extension and no one can claim extension as of right. See Kailash Chandra v. Union of India [A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1346 paragraph 7]."
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024
22. And in Karnataka Employers Association and Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (WA.Nos.2304-2309/2018 & c/m disposed of on 01.10.2020) :
"10. It is clear that since the Certified Standing Orders of these appellants have not been modified so as to incorporate the enhanced age of superannuation; the direction issued above would not have been issued by the learned Single Judge to these petitioners/appellants herein. However, there was also an interim order of stay of the same granted in these appeals by a Coordinate Benches of this Court.
11. Since we are permitting the appellants to withdraw these writ appeals, the certified Standing Orders if have not been modified so as to incorporate the enhancement of the age of superannuation the aforesaid direction would not apply to them.
12. But what emerges from the above is the fact that when the impugned Notification dated 27.03.2017 do not apply to these appellants without having any cause of action or being aggrieved by the same, these appellants approached this Court and are now seeking withdrawal of the writ petitions/writ appeals. They are also seeking liberty to assail the Certified Standing Orders if they are so amended by the incorporating the enhanced age of superannuation."
23. On other hand, Sri Sanjay Singhavi learned Senior Counsel for Sri Rajashekar Burji, advocate for respondent no.3 submitted as per Section 3 (3) of Act as applicable within State
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 of Karnataka provides that any Standing Order adopted must be, as far as practible be in conformity with Model Standing Orders ('MSO' for short), with provision for deviation when practicability calls for it but in interests of fairness and reasonableness (Section 4). It was further submitted, with amendment to Clause 15-A of Model Standing Orders framed under provisions of The Karnataka Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Rules, 1961 ('Rules' for short), had statutorily increased age of retirement to 60 years. It was further submitted, as early as in year 1964, Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of GM Talang v. Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd., reported in 1964 SCC OnLine 271, held age of retirement should be fixed at 60 years referring to report of Normus Committee, which had recommended for increasing age of retirement of workmen in all industries to 60 years.
24. It was submitted Division Bench of this Court in The Management of M/s. Grasim Industries Ltd., v. The General Secretary Harihar Polyfibers Employees Union (W.A.no.100250/2021 and c/m disposed of on 05.07.2022), and learned single Judge in Management of Hindalco Industries Ltd., Belagavi v. General Secretary, Indal
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 Employees Union and others, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine Kar 1678; Federal Mogul Goetz India Pvt. Ltd. v. Addl. Labour Commissioner, reported in 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3757, upheld similar claim. Thus, learned Senior Counsel sought to justify amendment sought and granted in respect of Clause 26 of CSO dealing with age of retirement.
25. Learned Senior Counsel sought to justify amendment to respective clauses individually. Insofar as Clause 20 of CSO dealing with leave, it was submitted Certifying Authority and Appellate Authority had granted 10 days of sick leave per year after hearing both sides. It was submitted, no settlement between Union and Management could override Standing Orders, relying on decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharatiya Kamagar Karmachari Mahasangh v. Jet Airways Ltd., reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 872 and Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, reported in (1974) 3 SCC 330.
26. It was submitted, amendment certified to Clause 21
(iii) limited transfer of workmen from one unit of company to any unit of company, within Karnataka was just, fair, and proper and in tune with ratio laid down in Divgi Metal Wares
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 Employees v. Divgi Metal Wares Ltd., reported in 2009 SCC OnLine Kar 1004.
27. It was submitted, Clause 32 was about procedure for dealing with certain cases, which read as follows:
"Special procedure for dealing with certain cases: Notwithstanding anything contained in these Standing orders, the management shall have the right to suspend the workmen accused in a court or law of any criminal offense or any offense involving moral turpitude until the disposal of the trial.
"No wages shall be paid for such suspension, irrespective of result of the criminal trial. No enquiry is necessary before taking any disciplinary action in cases where the workman has been convicted by the Court of Law for any offense involving moral turpitude or the management is satisfied for the reasons to be recorded in writing that it is impracticable or inexpedient for reasons of security; the workman may be dismissed/discharged without enquiry."
28. It was submitted, under MSO there were only two forms of suspension, either as punishment, in which case, it could not exceed 4 days or pending enquiry for which subsistence allowance would be payable. And MSO permitted passing of disciplinary orders without inquiry. It was submitted, power to suspend was to be used only when Management was satisfied that it was impracticable or inexpedient to retain
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 delinquent employee in establishment. And security cannot be reason for dispensing with inquiry. And, if Management dismissed any worker without inquiry, they would still have opportunity of establishing charge before labour Court/tribunal. Therefore, there was no need for amendment of said clause.
29. It was further submitted, criminal trial stood on different footing than departmental inquiry. In both it was necessary to arrive at proper conclusion and both could be held simultaneously. As such, punishing workmen only on basis of being accused of criminal offence was uncalled for. Hence, amendment was not good in eyes of law.
30. In support of his submission, he relied on decisions in case of Depot Manager, APSRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, reported in (1997) 2 SCC 699, Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. Noida and Ors., reported in (2007) 10 SCC 385, Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. v. G. Shekhar, reported in ILR 2002 Kar 1069, wherein Courts discussed in length, distinction between departmental proceedings qua a criminal trial, to hold, criminal proceedings are a result of violation of a duty, accused owes to society at large whereas departmental enquiry proceedings delve into question of whether conduct of
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 delinquent employee warrants change in his/her service conditions. Therefore, rejection of amendment was justified.
31. Further, amendment of Clause 29 (cxx) of CSO was for inclusion of additional misconducts i.e. "Threatening and obstructing physically or otherwise any co-employee of company from getting into factory or getting out of factory or on their way home from factory or on their way to factory from their houses or any place near or around their houses, during period of strike, partial lockout or otherwise". Additions sought would enlarge scope of misconducts outside factory premises, which would not be warranted and drew support from ratio in case of Glaxo Laboratories Ltd v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, reported in (1984) 1 SCC 1, wherein it was held:
"16. Reference was also made to Central India Coalfields Ltd., Calcutta v. Ram Bilas Shobnath [AIR 1961 SC 1189 : (1961) 1 LLJ 546 : 19 FJR 302] in which scope and ambit of Standing Order 29(5) came up for consideration before this Court. The Industrial Tribunal had held that the alleged misconduct had taken place outside the working hours as well as outside the pit where the respondent had to discharge his duties and accordingly he could not be punished under Standing Order 37. This Court while allowing the appeal of the employer observed that "normally this standing order would apply to the behaviour on the premises where the workmen discharge their duties and
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 during the hours of their work". It was further observed that "it may also be conceded that if a quarrel takes place between workmen outside working hours and away from the coal premises that would be a private matter which may not fall within Standing Order 29(5)". This Court then observed that in the special circumstances of this case it is clear that the incident took place in the quarters at a short distance from the coal-bearing area. If the incident occurred in the quarters occupied by the workmen who were working in a nearby coal bearing area, one can safely conclude that the incident occurred in the vicinity of the establishment and that was the governing factor which swayed the decision. And the decision was reached as specifically stated in the special circumstances of the case while leaving no trace of doubt about the normal approach in law to the construction of a standing order that it would apply to the behaviour on the premises where the workmen discharge their duties and during working hours of their work. This clearly imports time-place content in the matter of construction. This decision would rather clearly indicate that the misconduct prescribed in a standing order which would attract a penalty has a casual connection with the place of work as well as the time at which it is committed which would ordinarily be within the establishment and during duty hours.
17. Reference next was made to Lalla Ram v.D.C.M. Chemical Works Ltd. [(1978) 3 SCC 1 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 396 : AIR 1978 SC 1004 : (1978) 3 SCR 82 : (1978) 1 LLJ 507] In that case one Shyam Singh, who was Assistant Security Officer of the respondent Company in discharge of his official duty attempted to prevent an encroachment and unauthorised construction on the immovable property belonging to the company by appellant Lalla
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 Ram, who in turn manhandled the Assistant Security Officer, hurled highly provocative invectives at him and his companions, and bade them to quit on pain of dire consequences. The facts have their own tale to tell. Assistant Security Officer while performing his duty preventing unauthorised encroachment of the property belonging to the company was manhandled. There should be no doubt in the mind of anyone that the incident occurred on the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof. It may, however, be mentioned that in this decision, there is no reference to the decision of this Court in Mulchandani Electrical and Radio Industries Ltd. case [(1979) 4 SCC 565 : AIR 1979 SC 1049 : (1979) 3 SCR 373] .
18. Reference was also made to Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [AIR 1965 SC 155 : (1964) 7 SCR 555 : (1964) 2 LLJ 113] . This case should not detain us for a moment because the standing order with which the Court was concerned with in that case in terms provided "that without prejudice to the general meaning of the term "misconduct", it shall be deemed to mean and include, inter alia, drunkenness, fighting, riotous or disorderly or indecent behaviour within or without the factory". Mr Shanti Bhushan, however, urged that the judgment does not proceed on the construction of the expression 'without' in the relevant standing order but the ratio of the decision is that purely private and individual dispute unconnected with employment between the workmen cannot be the subject-matter of enquiry under the standing order but in order that the relevant standing order may be attracted it must be shown that the disorderly or riotous behaviour had some rational connection with the employment of the assailant and the victim. Approaching the matter from
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 this angle, it was urged that in the present case the charge-sheet under clauses 2(c) to 2(h) clearly and unmistakably alleged that the 'loyal workmen' were threatened with dire consequences with a view to frightening them away from responding to the duty and this provides the necessary link between the disorderly behaviour and the employment both of the assailant and victim. Even where a disorderly or riotous behaviour without the premises of the factory constitutes misconduct, every such behaviour unconnected with employment would not constitute misconduct within the relevant standing order. Therefore, even where the standing order is couched in a language which seeks to extend its operation far beyond the establishment, it would none the less be necessary to establish causal connection between the misconduct and the employment. And that is the ratio of the decision, and not that wherever the misconduct is committed ignoring the language of the standing order if it has some impact on the employment, it would be covered by the relevant standing order. In order to avoid any ambiguity being raised in future and a controversial interpretation question being raised, we must make it abundantly clear and incontrovertible that the causal connection in order to provide linkage between the alleged act of misconduct and employment must be real and substantial, immediate and proximate and not remote or tenuous. An illustration would succinctly bring out the difference. One workman severely belaboured another for a (sic) duty on the next day. Would this absence permit the employer to charge the assailant for misconduct as it (sic) had on the working in the industry. The answer is in the negative. The employer cannot take advantage to weed out workmen for incidents that occurred far away from his establishment."
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32. Insofar as Clause no. 29 (cvi) of CSO, petitioner sought to add following as additional misconducts:
i.e. "Failure to show proper consideration, courtesy or attention towards customers, visitors, officers, and/ or other employees of the company."
33. It was submitted, due to over-vagueness, said clause would be prone to misuse and target specific workman. Hence authorities had rightly denied additional Clause 29 (cvi) as misconduct in certified Standing Orders.
34. Insofar as amendment sought to Clause no.2 (xx) of CSO which was definition of 'habitual' was by addition of "habitual means involving repetition of an act or omission for minimum two times within a period of six months from date of first act or omission". Same was allowed with modification i.e. by adding expression "minimum three times within period of twelve months from date of first act or omission involving minor misconducts only". It was submitted, petitioner had not urged any grounds questioning same, thereby conceding to amended clause.
35. It was submitted, amendment allowed to Clause no.12 of CSO about shift working, was also not challenged. But
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 insofar as Clause no.30 (iii) of CSO, dealing with penalties for misconduct, Certifying Officer allowed amendment with modifications, by reducing period for which an employee could be kept under suspension without enquiry. Certifying Authority has rightly modified this clause limiting said power to not more than three days and same was challenged.
36. Insofar as Clause no.42 (ii) dealing with "Accidents Leave/Compensation", Certifying Authority rightly modified said clause to protect workmen, not covered under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 ('WC', for short) and ESI Act, in case any such workman met with accident while on duty.
37. It was submitted, Clause no.31 (ii) of CSO was about procedure dealing with misconduct and enquiry. Prior to amendment, workman was provided only 72 hours to file reply to Charge-sheet/Notice, which was inadequate. Considering need for securing documents/records from employer to submit proper reply, said restriction was removed by certifying authority and confirmed by appellate authority. As removal of restriction was in interest of principles of natural justice, no interference was warranted.
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38. It was submitted amendment sought by Management to Clause no.29 (cvii) was for inclusion of certain acts as misconducts. It was submitted, amendment disallowed was:
Clause 29 (cvii) "Printing and/or distributing and/or making any false or vicious statements through electronic/social media in respect of the company or its officers or customers or visitors or employees or other individuals."
39. It was submitted, said clause was an outright violation of freedom of free speech and expression guaranteed to every citizen under Article 14 and Article 19 of Constitution of India. It was submitted, as apprehended, in case any defamatory or false propaganda is committed by any workman, same could be dealt with under existing laws and if found necessary, Management had right to pursue same before competent forum/authorities, instead of widening definition of 'misconduct'. In support of his submissions, reference was made to ratio in Sujit TV v. Fertiliser and Chemical Travancore Ltd. [WP(C)no.13438/2021 disposed of on 18.06.2024].
40. It was submitted, Management sought amendment of Clause 46(i) of CSO dealing with increments and ex-gratia payments, to clarify that same could not be claimed as a right
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 and would be subject to discretion of Management, amendment certified empowered Management to frame Service Rules amend and alter same from time to time and stipulating that it would be responsibility of workmen to follow same. Learned Senior Counsel relied on decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Vegetable Products Limited v. Their Workmen, reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 146.
41. It was submitted, increments or ex-gratia payments were always governed by contract of employment and ID Act and authorities were in error in subjecting them to CSO, by Workmen v. Kettlewell Bullen and Co. Ltd., reported in (1994) 2 SCC 357.
42. Insofar as Clauses 22 (ii) and (viii) dealing with termination of service and discharge, it was submitted in private service there was no lien to any particular post, therefore certifying authority rightly deleted it. Moreover, same was inconsistent with Act and Rules and amounted to contracting out statutory procedural protection of notice before proceeding with disciplinary action in case of abandonment of service and which right was upheld in Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan and Anr., reported in (1998) 6 SCC 538. It
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 was submitted, said amendment being contrary to principles of natural justice deserved culling.
43. Insofar as amendment to Clause 46 (ii), it was submitted, said clause was to stipulate that Petitioner would not entertain representations from political or communal bodies to speak on behalf of workers. It was submitted, such a clause did not have any statutory basis either in Act or Rules, besides clause being vague. Terms of employment being governed by contract of employment and by Model Standing Orders, any clauses not included in MSO and which are vague, cannot be incorporated in CSO. Therefore, Certifying Authority rightly denied amendment. Besides, said clause was open for abuse as it would empower petitioner to denote any Union or Association of workers as "political or communal" and refuse to entertain them.
44. Insofar as contention that impugned orders suffered from lack of adequate reasons, relying on decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and Ors., reported in (2009) 4 SCC 240, it was submitted, general duty to give reasons though was a
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 safeguard against non-application of mind, arbitrariness and to maintain confidence in judicial/quasi-judicial bodies and was an essential requirement of rule of law, same would not apply strictly to Appellate Authorities in cases where they confirmed orders passed by original authority. It was submitted, as Appellate Authority had specifically dealt with each clause individually challenge against same only on said ground would be too hyper technical and require rejection.
45. Heard learned counsel and perused writ petition record.
46. From above, present petition arises out of respective applications filed by Petitioner - Management and respondent Worker's Union for amendments to CSO.
47. In its application at Annexure-D dated 12.11.2021, petitioner-Management sought for amendment to sub-clauses
(i) to (iii), (v), (xvi), (xxiii), (xxx) to (xxxiv) of Clause 2, sub- clauses (vi) to (ix) of Clause 3, sub-clauses (iii) to (v) of Clause 7, sub-clauses (iii) to (vi) of Clause 14, sub-clauses (i) to (viii) of Clause 19, Clause 20, sub-clauses (x) to (xxi) of Clause 22, Clause 24 (A), sub-clauses (xiv), (xxvii), (lxxxi), (cvi) to
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 (cxxiii) of Clause 29, sub-clause (iv) of Clause 31 and sub- clauses (i) to (vi) of Clause 46.
48. While in its application for amendment at Annexure- B dated 17.02.2021, Union has sought amendment of sub- clauses (v), (xi), (xx), (xxii), (xxv), (xxvi) and (xxvii) of Clause 2, sub-clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) of Clause 3, sub- clauses (i), (ii) of Clause 4, sub-clauses (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) of Clause 5, sub-clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) of Clause 6, sub-clauses
(i), (ii) of Clause 7, sub-clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (v), (vi) of Clause 8, sub-clauses (i), (ii), (iii) of Clause 9, sub-clauses (i), (iv),
(v), (vi), (vii) of Clause 10, Clause 11, sub-clauses (i) to (x) of Clause 12, Clause 13, sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of Clause 14, Clause 16, Clause 19, Clause 20, sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of Clause 21, sub-clauses (i), (ii), (v) to (xii) of Clause 22, sub- clauses (Ai) to (Avii) of Clause 24A, Clause 24C, 24D, sub- clause (i) of Clause 25, Clause 26, sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of Clause 27, Clause 28, sub-clauses (i) to (cv) of Clause 29, sub- clauses (iii) to (vii), (ix) of Clause 30, sub-clauses (i) to (iv), (va), (vb), (vi) to (xii) of Clause 31, Clause 32, sub-clause (i) to (xv) of Clause 34, Clause 35, sub-clauses (i) to (xxii) of Clause 36, Clause 37, Clause 38, Clause 39, sub-clauses (i) to
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(v) of Clause 43, apart from provision for liability of Manager and for deletion of training scheme altogether.
49. From pleadings as well as in submissions, parties have disclosed consensus insofar as following clauses:
i) Clause 12: Though Union sought amendment of Clause-12 of CSO, and same was allowed, they have later agreed for giving up current amendment.
ii) Clause 20: There is agreement between Management and Union for provision of 15 days privilege leave, 5 days casual leave and 8 days sick leave.
50. And that challenge of impugned orders by Petitioner-Management is limited to amendments certified/refused in respect of following clauses:
i) Clauses 2(xx): about definition of 'habitual';
ii) Clauses 12: about shift working; settled as noted above;
iii) Clauses 20: about leave: settled as noted above;
iv) Clauses 21(ii): about 'transfer';
v) Clauses 22(ii) and (viii): about 'termination of
service and discharge';
vi) Clauses 29 (cvi), (cviii) and (cxx): for addition
of 'misconducts'.
vii) Clauses 30(iii): about penalties for misconduct (suspension without wages);
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024
viii) Clauses 31(ii): about procedure for dealing with acts of misconduct and suspension pending enquiry;
ix) Clauses 32: about special procedure for dealing with certain cases;
x) Clauses 42(ii): about Accidents
Leave/Compensation;
xi) Clauses 46(i) and (ii): about Ex-gratia, incremental payments and General Representations from Political Parties and Communal Bodies.
51. As there is consensus between parties insofar as Clause 12 and 20, scope of writ petition would be confined to examining legality of impugned orders in respect of remaining clauses.
52. Learned Senior Counsel on both sides have urged various arguments supported by authorities on each clauses also, impugned orders were challenged on common grounds such as non-application of mind and lack of reasoning. Since a decision on these contentions, if goes in favour of petitioner would dispense with dealing with each of clauses on merits, for sake of convenience, said contention is taken up first.
53. It is settled law that while passing orders on applications for amendment of CSO by Certifying Authority
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 being Original Authority is required to assign reasons which would disclose application of mind. Even appellate authority dealing with an appeal against order passed by Certifying Authority would require to assign some reasons even if it is confirming order passed by Original Authority.
54. Perusal of order at Annexure-G passed by Certifying Authority would reveal that in respect of several clauses common reason assigned either for allowing/rejection of amendment is that amendment sought 'does or does not appear to be appropriate' without addressing merits of respective claims hints at non-application of mind.
55. However, some reasons are assigned in respect of some clauses requiring clause by clause examination. In respect of Clause 21 (ii) which deals with transfer of employees, clause prior to amendment provided for transfer of an employee even to units of Petitioner outside Karnataka State. When Union sought for its deletion, Certifying Authority approved deletion by stating that it was based on conclusion about amendment to Clause 6. But Clause 6 was about service conditions and amendment sought by Union was rejected as
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 being without any basis, Thus, reason assigned would appear irrelevant or non-application of mind.
56. Insofar as amendment to Clauses 22 (ii) and (viii) reason assigned for acceptance of amendments sought by Union was absence of clear objections and amendment sought appearing appropriate. Perusal of Annexure-C would reveal that Petitioner had sought Union to disclose reasons along with supporting material for amendment separately in respect of each clause, but, which does not appear to have been provided. Therefore conclusion that amendment sought appeared appropriate would appear perverse if not non-application of mind.
57. In case of Clauses 29 (vi) and (viii) only reason assigned is amendment sought by Union is appropriate without any other basis and as such would appear either whimsical or non-application of mind.
58. Insofar as Clause 29 (xx), petitioner did not seek any amendment. When as per reasons assigned by Certifying Authority amendment sought by Union was rejected, Petitioner cannot maintain grievance on this count.
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59. Insofar as amendment sought by Management by insertion of New Clauses 29 (cvi) to (cxxiii) for addition of specific acts as misconducts, rejection is on common reason that already there were 105 definitions of misconduct which were in conformity with MSO and additions sought were covered within existing definitions. Even prima facie look at additions sought would indicate that reason assigned was without application of mind.
60. Insofar as amendment to Clauses 30 (iii), 31 (ii), 32 and 42 (ii), only reason assigned is amendment sought by Union is appropriate and as such be a case of non-application of mind.
61. Insofar as Clause 46 (ii), Annexure-C would reveal that Petitioner sought amendment by insertion of sub-clauses
(i) to (v) to Clause 46. But impugned order at Annexure-G, certifying authority has not dealt with them at all. Therefore, rejection would call for interference.
62. It is not in dispute that only Petitioner-Management preferred appeal against order passed by Certifying Authority at Annexure-G. Bare perusal of impugned order passed by Appellate Authority at Annexure-S would reveal that
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 amendment sought were tabulated, with first column mentioning existing clause in CSO, second column enumerating said clause after order passed by Certifying Authority, third column enumerating objections of Management or grounds for challenging amendment and last column enumerating such clause as certified by Appellate Authority. But, without assigning reasons.
63. Though, learned Senior Counsel for Union contended it was not necessary to assign elaborate reasons by Appellate Authority for concurring with conclusions of Original Authority, but, order passed by Appellate Authority is lacking any reasoning, which would be unpardonable even as per ratio laid down in Jagdish Sharan Vashney's case (supra). As such, impugned order passed by Appellate Authority would require to be quashed.
64. Thus, it is seen that Appellate Authority which under Section 6 of Act is empowered to deal with amendments to CSO as extensively as Certifying Authority, it has passed impugned order apparently without assigning any reason, instead of dealing with contentions of contesting parties on each of clauses, which in exercise of power under Art.226 of
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 Constitution of India would not be proper when authorities under Act have failed to exercise powers instilled on them under statute, I deem it appropriate to remit matter back for fresh consideration, but taking note of requirements of law as well as by detailed consideration of rival contentions on each clause, referring to relevant material and assigning cogent reasons for each conclusion.
65. And though under above circumstances, a remand to original authority would appear to be appropriate, taking note of extensive powers of Appellate Authority under Section 6 of Act, it is found appropriate to remit matter back to Appellate Authority by directing it to pass appropriate orders afresh.
66. Since, challenge by Petitioner - Management was not on all Clauses and there has been consensus insofar as Clauses 12 and 20, remand would be confined only in respect of such clauses.
67. For aforesaid reasons, writ petition is allowed in part, impugned order dated 01.04.2024 passed by respondent no.1 - Appellate Authority at Annexure-S is quashed to limited extent as stated above; matter stands remitted back to
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3733 WP No. 103284 of 2024 Appellate Authority to reconsider and pass orders afresh taking note of observations made herein and in accordance with law.
Since all parties are represented, they shall appear before Appellate Authority without awaiting fresh summons/notices on 01.04.2025. It is clarified that contentions of both parties are kept open and they are also reserved liberty to produce any material in support of their contentions.
And insofar as Clauses 12 and 20 of CSO, Certifying Authority shall pass necessary orders certifying Clauses 12 and 20 as per consensus between parties, expeditiously.
SD/-
(RAVI V.HOSMANI) JUDGE GRD CT:PA LIST NO.: 1 SL NO.: 52