Karnataka High Court
Jayamma (Smt.) vs General Manager (Personnel), ... on 30 August, 1995
Equivalent citations: [1996(74)FLR2407], 1996(2)KARLJ373
ORDER M.F. Saldanha, J.
1. Petitioner who is a worker with the respondent-Corporation has challenged an order dated 8-5-1995 whereby she has been transferred from Channapatna to Kanakapura. The main contention raised is that the petitioner is a member of the Executive Committee of the Union which represents the rights of 550 workers and that since she had raised certain issues and demands of behalf of the workers and since she is an active worker of the union that the management has hit back at her and transferred her out of Channapatna. Petitioner's learned Advocate has relied on the charter of demands and certain other documents that are annexed to the petition and he submits that because of the fact that the management did not concede these demands, that the management has now taken to conciliation. He states that this is the main reason why the petitioner has been victimised. He also submits that even though there is no specific provision or agreement between the management and the union that its office bearers or/executive committee members should not be transferred, that it is a well-settled principle which is now accepted that no such order should be passed in cases of this category of employees because it would amount to a direct infringement on the carrying on of their legitimate trade union activities. Learned Advocate has also made a strong plea on the ground of hardship because he submits that the petitioner's family is staying at Channapatna and that she will be put to grave difficulties if she required to go to the other place. He has placed strong reliance on an earlier decision of this Court in the case of V. Venkatesh v. Management of M/s. Karnataka Silk Industries Corporation Limited and Others wherein, this Court held that a transfer order passed in the month of October 1995 by these very respondents in the case of the General Secretary of the same union was liable to be interfered with and struck down as it was vitiated by mala fides insofar as it demonstrated abuse of authority. The petitioner's learned Advocate submits that the decision in question would also cover the case of the petitioner and that this Court is liable to interfere and strike down the matter in question.
2. Respondents have filed their reply and they have denied the allegations particularly the ones in relation to abuse of power. They pointed out that it is true that the petitioner may be a member of the executive committee and that there is neither a requirement nor an agreement whereunder the executive committee members have to be retained at a particular place. Further-more, it is also submitted that the circumstances in which this Court interfered with the earlier order in October last year were entirely different insofar as on that occasion, the Court came to the conclusion that because of certain other facts, that the order in question was punitive. That decision is sought to be distinguished on the ground that this was a routine administrative transfer and that quite apart from the petitioner two other persons were also transferred at the same time. Apart from this, what is submitted on behalf of the management is that there is no vested right as far as a union leader is concerned that such a person is totally immune from action. Regardless of what may be the situation in a few isolated instances, it is submitted on behalf of the respondents that as far as this category of union leaders is concerned, that the management still has the power to transfer them is such a transfer is considered necessary. In support of this submission, the learned Advocate has relied on a Division Bench ruling of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Kishori Lal Verma v. Hindustan Zinc Limited and Another 1995 II LLJ 35 (Raj.), whether the Court on a detailed consideration of the law, came to the conclusion that even in the case of a transfer conclusion that even in the case of a transfer of a union leader, it cannot be ipso facto concluded as a case of victimisation. The Court took into account several instances where a union leader may be transferred if such a course of action is necessary. As against this position, the petitioner, learned Advocate has relied on an earlier decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of P. Krishna Rao 1984 LIC 131, wherein, the Court did come across a specific instance when a trade union leader had been transferred only on the ground that he had indulged in trade union activities which were found unpalatable to the management. In such a situation, the Court struck down the transfer order on the ground that it was vitiated by mala fides. I do concede that as far as trade union leaders are concerned, one needs to take note of the fact that since they are required to do the unpleasant job of agitating on behalf of their co-workers and sometimes, virtually having to stick their necks out, they are certainly very vulnerable and that therefore if an order is passed in the case of a trade union leader that a Court would be required to very carefully scrutinise the facts in order to ascertain as to whether the order is free from mala fides.
3. The facts of the present case indicate that the petitioner was transferred to Channapatna at her own request in the year 1993. The management decided in the year 1995 to transfer as many as 27 persons one of whom was the petitioner. It is for a variety of reasons that these transfers were affected and to my mind, while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court will not question the management's right to transfer as this is an exigency of service unless express mala fides are pleaded and are established. I have taken note of the fact that even though there were several agitations in relation to the demands, that the main office bearers have not been transferred and that therefore it would be impossible to hold that the petitioner who is only an Ex-Committee Member was signed out for victimisation on the ground of trade union activities. Apart from this. I have ascertained from the learned Advocate who represents the respondents and he informs me that the respondents have indicated in their reply that the petitioner's husband and home are located at Kanakapura which was why when the transfers were made, she has been repatriated to that place. Also, he demonstrates that the two places are not far apart and that therefore the petitioner is not prejudiced in the least. Having carefully examined the material placed, I am unable to hold that the transfer order vis-a-vis the present petitioner is in any way vitiated by mala fides. In the absence of this being established, no valid ground survives on the basis of which it can either be challenged or interfered with. In the circumstances, the petitioner fails and stands disposed of.