Delhi District Court
New Delhi Municipal Council vs M/S Hindustan Trading Co on 24 September, 2020
In the Court of Shri Sanjiv Jain,
District Judge (Commercial Court)03, Patiala House Courts
New Delhi
OMP No. 3763/18
New Delhi Municipal Council,
Palika Kendra, Parliament Street,
New Delhi110001 ... Petitioner
versus
M/s Hindustan Trading Co.
Through its Partner
Sh. S. L. Arora,
R/o P6, Navin Shahdara,
Delhi110032. ....... Respondent
Date of institution : 07.08.2018 Date of reserving judgment : 08.09.2020 Date of decision : 24.09.2020 JUDGME NT
1. This petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (as amended upto date) hereinafter called the "Act" filed by New Delhi Municipal Council is against the award dated 09.09.2016 passed by the Arbitrator Sh. R. S. Godboley.
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2. Briefly, the facts as stated in the petition are that the petitioner i.e. New Delhi Municipal Council had invited Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) for a parking. The respondent i.e. Hindustan Trading Company being the highest bidder was allotted the parking vide letter dated 29.08.2003. The possession of the parking was handed over to the respondent on 30.08.2003.
3. It is alleged that the respondent after three months and sixteen days of taking over the possession of the parking wrote a letter on 17.12.2003 raising an issue of less area of 550 sq. meters in the parking and claimed a refund of the access payment of Rs. 39,262/ paid between 01.09.2003 to 31.12.2003. It also requested for the revision of the licence fee for the remaining period. It is stated that the petitioner then made an enquiry from Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited (DMRC) and wrote to the respondent vide letter dated 25.05.2005 denying the claim of the respondent giving reference of clause 41 of the NIT. The respondent vide notice/letter dated 25.07.2005 requested for the appointment of an Arbitrator and moved an application under Section 9 & 11 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. Sh. R. P. Pandey, the then Additional District Judge, vide order dated 05.10.2005 appointed Sh. D. S. Pawaria as the Sole Arbitrator. The respondent filed a statement of claim for Rs. 10,62,757/. The parties led their evidence and the Arbitrator vide award dated 21.07.2007 after hearing the parties dismissed the claim of the respondent. The respondent then challenged the award under Section 34 of the Act. Sh. Jitender OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 2 of 21 Kumar Mishra, Additional District Judge, set aside the award. The respondent then vide letter dated 13.04.2009 requested the Chairman/Petitioner for appointing another Arbitrator. The Chairman vide order dated 06.10.2009 appointed Sh. R. S. Godboley, the then Director (Estate), NDMC as the Sole Arbitrator. The Arbitrator commenced the proceedings on 27.12.2010. It is stated that vide order dated 19.10.2011, he observed that the department original file having original tender advertisement /documents etc is reported to be missing. The respondent then provided some documents to the Arbitrator. It is stated that no proceedings were held between 19.10.2011 to 01.08.2012 and from 17.01.2013 to 21.07.2015. On 30.07.2015, the respondent filed some additional documents. It is stated that since none appeared on behalf of NDMC/Petitioner in the second arbitration proceedings except on 22.07.2015 and 04.08.2015, the Petitioner/NDMC was proceeded against ex parte vide order dated 21.12.2015. The Arbitrator after hearing the respondent/claimant passed the impugned award dated 09.09.2016. It is stated that on 08.01.2018, when the Baliff and the Decree Holder visited the office of the petitioner, it came to know of the impugned award.
4. It is alleged that the impugned award has been obtained by the respondent/claimant by playing fraud not only on the petitioner but also on the Arbitrator, which is illegal, against the law, rules, facts of the case, perverse and against the public policy and thus liable to be set aside. It is alleged that the ArbitratorII depended on the parties OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 3 of 21 for filing the record of the earlier proceedings instead directly calling the record from the ArbitratorI and the respondent taking advantage of the nonrepresentation of the petitioner not only filed the selected incomplete record of the earlier proceedings but also filed the documents, which were not the part of the transactions. The respondent/claimant purposely did not file the evidence/cross examination of the parties. It is stated that it was admitted by the respondent/claimant during the cross examination before the ArbitratorI that the area 550 sq. meters was taken over by DMRC w.e.f. 15.05.2003 i.e. three months prior to the date of opening of tender and further it was open for the claimant/respondent to visit and survey the parking lot in all respect. It is stated that clause No. 41 of the agreement prohibits the claimant from raising any dispute with respect to the area after three days of the allotment. Further, in the offer letter, area was not mentioned. It is alleged that the ArbitratorII has given the findings contrary to the contract/agreement and the facts, which are not even supported by the documents. He misconstrued the terms & conditions of the Licence Agreement especially the term/condition "AS IS WHERE IS BASIS" contained in the agreement and went beyond the scope of the Arbitration. He passed the award in a mechanical manner, which is not a reasoned one.
5. An application is also filed by the petitioner under Section 34(3) of the Act seeking condonation of delay in filing the petition. It is stated that the petitioner came to know of the execution petition OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 4 of 21 when the Baliff and the respondent/DH visited the office of the petitioner/JD somewhere in January 2018. Thereafter, the record was searched and it was found that the complete record file of the case was not traceable. Sh. R. K. Bhatia, who was M.I. (HQs) at the relevant time was called and the petitioner could lay hands on the execution petition and the OMP (T) 16/2015 earlier filed by the respondent in the High Court of Delhi. It is stated that the petitioner then sought time from the court to reconstruct the file. It applied for the certified copies to different forums, however, till date, the petitioner could not get the record of the earlier arbitration proceedings. The petitioner then decided to file the objections with whatever available record with it. It is stated that it is for this reason, the respondent like contractor is taking advantage of the situation quite possibly with the active connivance of the official of the department, which enabled the respondent to play a calculated fraud firstly by raising the issue of less space allotted for parking and then fabricating the evidence to the disadvantage of the petitioner. It is stated that it is settled law that the fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of the jurisprudence. It is stated that since January 2018, the petitioner is trying to reconstruct the file but it could only collect incomplete record. It is stated that a judgment/order obtained by playing fraud on the Court/QuasiJudicial Authority is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law.
6. It is stated that the petitioner being a Government body is OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 5 of 21 holding public money in its kitty and therefore, is responsible and accountable for spending each and every penny. But, ironically, most of the officials through which it functions are having personal interest. It is stated that considering the said facts, the courts on various aspects have been safeguarding the interests of such bodies, even though, their officials have failed to do so. In this case also, the court must come to the rescue of the applicant/petitioner to save the public money slipping into the wrong hands more particularly when huge public money is involved. It is stated that in case, the reasons given by the petitioner are not accepted, the petitioner would suffer an irreparable injury.
7. The respondent filed the reply to the objection petition stating that the averments made by the petitioner are nothing more than a mere apology for the sordid affairs of the State in its department. It denied the averments made in the petition and stated that the petitioner is only trying to buy time and abuse the process of law just to avoid the execution of the impugned award. It is stated that the parking area was mentioned to be 2550 sq meters, whereas in actual it was less than the same.
8. In response to the application under Section 34 (3) of the Act, it is stated by the respondent that the same is not maintainable. It is stated that reading of Section 34 (3) of the Act would show that the legislation has prescribed a special limitation in preferring the petition under Section 34 of the Act. The aforesaid section makes it OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 6 of 21 clear that maximum period, which can be condoned is 30 days and not thereafter. The total period to prefer a petition under Section 34 of the Act in all probabilities is three months and thirty days. It is stated that the period of limitation to prefer the instant petition had lapsed long back. Reference is made of the case Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department [(2008) 7 SCC 169], wherein, it was held that the language of the Section 34 of the Act mandated a strict adherence to the time period provided thereunder, and the extension beyond the same is not possible under any circumstances. The respondent denied the averments made in the application and stated that the notice of the execution was served on the petitioner but none appeared. Since, the petitioner did not pay any heed to the notice, the court issued the Warrants of Attachment against the petitioner vide order dated 16.12.2017. It is stated that if the averments made by the petitioner are taken to be sacrosanct, even then admittedly the petitioner had the knowledge of pendency of the execution petition in January 2018, while the above petition under Section 34 of the Act has been preferred by the petitioner in the month of August 2018, hence, there is gross delay at the end of the petitioner. Further, the petitioner had received the copy of the arbitral award through speed post in the year 2016 itself, which fact can be gauged from the letter dated 09.09.2016 sent by the ArbitratorII.
9. I have heard Ld. Counsel Sh. Nilesh Sawhney for the petitioner/objector and Sh. Nitin Jain, Ld. Counsel for the OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 7 of 21 respondent/claimant.
10. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner reiterated what has been stated in the petition and the application for condonation of delay. Ld. Counsel referred the case of S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. & Others, 1993 (SLT SOFT) 258 to contend that it is settled proposition of law that a judgment or a decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment / decree by the first court or by the highest court has to be treated as nullity. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings. The principle of finality of litigation cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant of imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. A person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. Ld. Counsel referred the case of Hamza Haji Vs. State of Kerala & Anr, (2006) 7 SCC 416 to contend that basic principle is that the party who secured a decision by fraud cannot be allowed to enjoy its fruits. Reference is also made of the case A. V. Papayya Sastry & Ors Vs. Govt. of A. P. & Ors, (2007) 4 SCC 221 to contend that fraud vitiates all judicial acts whether in rem or in personam. Judgment decree or order obtained by fraud has to be treated as non est and nullity, whether by the court of first instance or by the final court and it can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 8 of 21 revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.
11. Ld. Counsel for the respondent per contra argued that the limitation provided under Section 34 (3) of the Act is strict and parties must satisfy the higher threshold of demonstrating due diligence. Casual explanation of delay cannot suffice and the entire delay must be explained. Ld. Counsel contended that the Government Entities are not entitled to any special treatment or latitude for internal compliances and delay cannot be mechanically condoned as a matter of course when no cogent reasons or documents have been provided to explain the delay. Ld. Counsel referred the case of P. Radha Bai & Ors Vs. P. Ashok Kumar & Anr, 2018 STPL 10892 SC to contend that the purpose of the Arbitration Act was to provide for a speedy dispute resolution process. The statement of objects & reasons reveal that the legislative intent of enacting the Arbitration Act was to provide parties with an efficient alternative dispute resolution system which gives litigants an expedited resolution of disputes while reducing the burden on the courts. Ld. Counsel referred the case of Union of India Vs. Popular Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470 and Consolidated Engineering Enterprises Vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169, whereas it was held that the language of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act mandated a strict adherence to the time period provided thereunder and the extension beyond the same is not possible under any circumstances. Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to an application filed under Section OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 9 of 21 34 of the Arbitration Act. Ld. Counsel submitted that the award has been passed on merits and does not suffer from any infirmity nor any fraud has been played on the petitioner. .
12. I have considered the submissions made by Ld. Counsels for the parties and gone through the award, application and the relevant documents as well as the case laws (supra).
13. The statutory period for filing an application / petition for settingaside the award is provided in sub Section (3) of Section 34 of the Act, which reads as under:
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter."
14. Reading of Section 34 (3) of the Act, leaves no manner of doubt that the period of limitation is three months. If the objections are filed beyond three months, then the delay in filing can be condoned upto a maximum period of 30 days and no more. Condonation of delay in the extended period of 30 days, is at the discretion of the court, provided the party satisfies the court that there was 'sufficient cause' for the delay. Delay in initial filing, OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 10 of 21 beyond 30 days cannot be condoned, even for one day.
15. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Popular Construction Co., 2001 (7) SCC 354 held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 in view of the express inclusion within the meaning of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was held that the court cannot condone delay beyond a period of 30 days and that also only if sufficient cause is shown as to how the applicant/petitioner was prevented from making application within the period of three months and not thereafter. It was observed that the history and the scheme of 1996 Act support the conclusion that the timelimit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge the award is absolute and unextendable by the court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This objective has found expression in Section 5 of the Act, which prescribes the extent of judicial intervention in no uncertain terms. It provides that in the matters governed by this part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this part.
16. In the case of Simplex Infrastructure Limited Vs. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 455, the Supreme Court relied on the judgment in the case of Popular Construction (supra) and held that not a day beyond 120 days from the date of receipt of the award can be condoned by the court.
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17. It was observed in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd Vs. Joint Ventures of Sai Rama Engineering Enterprises, 2019 SCC Online Del 10456 that a reading of these judgments is a pointer to the fact that while in condonation of delay, the courts have been generally liberal but when it comes to Section 34 (3) of the Act, the limitation period is inelastic and meant to be strictly followed.
18. A perusal of record would show that the First Award was passed by Sh. D. S. Pawaria, the Sole Arbitrator on 21.07.2007 on the claim petition filed by the respondent/claimant vide which the claims of the respondent were dismissed. The respondent challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, vide suit no. 228/07. The Additional District Judge vide order dated 19.01.2009 allowed the petition and set aside the award with the observations that the arbitrator was not justified while dismissing the claim petition; that the Arbitrator has ignored entire specific terms of contract; that this court has no option but to interfere with the award of the arbitrator on the ground that it is patently illegal and opposed to the public policy of India; that the respondent (petitioner herein) when agreed for a specific measurement of the site in a contract, then the respondent (petitioner herein) should adhere to the terms of the said contract;
19. It is manifest from the record that in the arbitration proceedings before Sh. D. S. Pawaria and in the objection petition OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 12 of 21 vide no. 228/07, the petitioner had participated.
20. The record reveals that the respondent then approached the Chariman, NDMC for the appointment of the Arbitrator to adjudicate its claim. The Chairman, NDMC appointed Sh. R. S. Godboley, the then Director, (Estate), NDMC as the Sole Arbitrator vide order dated 06.10.2009. The proceedings would show that both petitioner and the respondent had appeared before the ArbitratorII.
21. It is relevant to quote the order dated 19.10.2011 passed by the ArbitratorII:
Present : Sh. M. L. Arora Proprietor, Hindustan Trading Co.
Present : Mr. Bhalla, Sr. Assistant, Enforcement Department.
During the last hearing, Enforcement Department had mentioned that the main file of the case is missing for quite sometime and therefore, they were advised to obtain certified copy of the court file in suit no. 228/07, in which earlier Arbitration award was set aside. This has not been done till date. The representative of the Enforcement Department has, therefore, been directed to obtain the relevant certified copy of the court file in a timebound manner before the next date of hearing.
I have also gone through the order of ADJ (Central)12 dated 19.01.09 vide which earlier Arbitration Award was set aside, which clearly indicates that the original Arbitration file was returned back to the Arbitrator. Therefore, both the parties are directed to provide details of the Arbitrator (including contact no. etc), and efforts should be made to procure the concerned file which would become basis for proceedings in the present Arbitration case. Since the department's original file which may be carrying original tender advertisement / documents etc. is reported missing.
OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 13 of 21 Matter may be listed for further proceedings on 9th Nov. 2011 at 4:00 PM.
22. The record shows that on 01.08.2012, 26.10.2012, 22.07.2015, 30.07.2015 and 04.08.2015, the official of the Department/NDMC had appeared before the ArbitratorII. It was observed by the ArbitratorII vide proceedings dated 12.08.2015 that NDMC is not serious about the arbitration proceedings. He also spoke to the Secretary, NDMC informing about the casual attitude of the Enforcement Department on 03.09.2015. Record further shows that none for the department / NDMC appeared on 12.10.2015 & 21.12.2015 and the department / NDMC was proceeded against ex parte. The ArbitratorII then passed the impugned award on 09.09.2016, allowing the claims of the claimant / respondent holding the petitioner / NDMC liable to pay a sum of Rs. 8,62,757/ along with interest @ 15% w.e.f. 31.10.2005 till actual payment. He also ordered that the signed copy of the award be sent to both the parties through speed post.
23. The respondent then filed the execution of the award vide Ex.
No. 11/17 on 17.01.2017, notice of which was directed to be served on the petitioner / JD for 18.08.2017. The report of the process server reveals that the JD was served of the execution, but none appeared. The Executing Court observing that the JD has been duly served with the notice of the execution petition, directed warrants of attachment against the JD vide order dated 16.12.2017. The record OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 14 of 21 shows that on 03.02.2018, the counsel for the JD had appeared and moved an application under Section 151 CPC. Adjournments were sought from time to time and thereafter, on 13.07.2018, the petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed.
24. Although, the respondent / claimant has claimed that the petitioner was served with the copy of the award immediately after the passing of the award but for the sake of arguments, even if it is assumed that the petitioner was served on 08.01.2018 as stated in the application under Section 151 CPC filed by the petitioner, the petition under Section 34 of the Act has been filed on 07.08.2018 i.e. after about seven months of the receipt of the award.
25. Section 34 (3) of the Act clearly provides a limitation period of three months for filing objections against an arbitral award. The commencement period for computing limitation is the date of the receipt of award. The proviso to Section 34 (3) of the Act enables a court to entertain an application to challenge an award after the three months period is expired but only within an additional period of 30 days but not thereafter. It was held in the case of P. Radha Bai & Ors (supra), that the use of the phrase "but not thereafter" shows that the 120 days period is the outer boundary for challenging an Award. It is not the case that the petitioner was not aware of the arbitral proceedings before the ArbitratorII Sh. R. S. Godboley. The proceedings of the ArbitratorII would reveal that sufficient opportunities were given to the petitioner to defend the claim.
OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 15 of 21 Strangely, the petitioner stopped appearing before the ArbitratorII, which made the Arbitrator proceed against ex parte on 21.12.2015. The petitioner never tried to find out what happened to the arbitration proceedings before the Sole ArbitratorII. Even the petitioner did not appear after the service of notice of the execution petition on 18.08.2017. The counsel for the petitioner appeared on 03.02.2018 on the warrants of attachment issued against the petitioner / JD. Even then, the petitioner did not file the objection petition within the period of 90 days or the extendable period of 30 days and filed this petition under Section 34 of the Act on 07.08.2018 i.e. after about 210 days.
26. The grounds given by the petitioner in the application for condonation of delay that the impugned award has been obtained by playing fraud or that the Arbitrator depended on the parties for filing the record of earlier proceedings instead directly calling the record from the previous ArbitratorI or that the respondent taking advantage of the nonrepresentation of the petitioner filed the selected incomplete record of the earlier proceedings and also filed the documents, which were not the part of the documents, are of no consequence, in view of the fact that the petition under Section 34 of the Act has been filed after three months & thirty days.
27. In the case of P. Radha Bai & Ors Vs. P. Ashok Kumar & Anr, AIR 2018 SC 5013, a question of law arose concerning the applicability of Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 16 of 21 condonation of a delay caused on the account of alleged fraud played on the objector (party challenging the award) beyond the period prescribed under Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act. It was held that once the party has received the award, the limitation period under Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration Act commences. Section 17 of the Limitation Act would not come to the rescue of such objecting party. It was held that merely because the applicant had committed some fraud, it would not affect the respondents right to challenge the Award if the facts entitling the filing of a Section 34 application was within their knowledge. The moment, the respondent have received the Award, three months period prescribed under Section 34 (3) begins to commence. It was incumbent on the respondent to have instituted an application under Section 34 challenging an award. It was observed that the limitation provision in Section 34 (3) also provides for condonation of delay. Unlike Section 5 of Limitation Act, the delay can only be condoned for 30 days on showing sufficient cause. The crucial phrase "but not thereafter" reveals the legislative intent to fix an outer boundary period for challenging an Award. Once the time limit or extended time limit for challenging the arbitral award expires, the period for enforcing the award under Section 36 of the Arbitration Act commences. This is evident from the phrase "where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired". There is an integral nexus between the period prescribed under Section 34 (3) to challenge the Award and the commencement of the enforcement period under Section 36 to OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 17 of 21 execute the Award. It was held that the starting point for limitation under Section 34 (3) would be different from the Limitation Act. It was held that the aforesaid inconsistencies with the language of Section 34 (3) of Arbitration Act tantamount to an "express exclusion" of Section 17 of Limitation Act.
28. In the instant case, the petition filed under Section 34 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 is hopelessly barred by limitation. The proviso to Section 34 of the Act clearly bars the court to entertain the petition, if it is filed beyond the period of 30 days, after the expiry of period of three months from the date of the receipt of the award and when the award comes to the notice of the objector / petitioner.
29. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner is a government body and holding public money in its kitty and is responsible and accountable for each and every penny and the court must safeguard the interest of such body, even though, their officials failed to do so. I find this contention sans merit.
30. In the case of Postmaster General & Ors vs. Living Media India Limited & Anr, (2012) 2 SCC 563, reference was made of the case Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448, wherein, it was observed:
30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the Court's discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 18 of 21 multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation / resettlement is equally and integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest."
31. It was held in the case of Postmaster General (supra)
28...... The Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.
29...... In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
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32. Having examined the entire gamut of facts in the present case, I am of the opinion that there is delay in filing the objection petition, which is beyond a period of 120 days, as prescribed under Section 34 (3) and proviso to the said section of the Act. This court has no power to condone the delay as held by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Popular Construction Co. (supra), Simplex Infrastructure Limited (supra) and P. Radha Bai & Ors (supra). The application for condonation of delay, thus deserves to be dismissed as the delay cannot be condoned.
33. The application seeking condonation of delay is thus dismissed for the aforesaid reasons.
34. Before I end this judgment/order, it needs to be noted that the petitioner herein above is not an individual who did not have a legal back up or the money resources to prosecute its case diligently. It is one of the government department. It should have diligently persuaded the case with the ArbitratorII. In the instant case, a very casual approach has been shown by the department/petitioner. It despite having notice of the arbitral award did not take steps to file the objection petition within the limitation period prescribed under the Act. I am of the view that the officers responsible for such an approach must be taken to task and responsibility should be fixed on them as the government exchequer is involved. The copy of the order be sent to the Administrator, NDMC for appropriate action OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 20 of 21 under intimation to this Court.
35. Since the application for condonation of delay in filing the petition has been dismissed, this petition is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.
36. File be consigned to record room.
Announced in open court today i.e. 24.09.2020 (Sanjiv Jain) District Judge (Commercial) 03 Patiala House Courts, New Delhi OMP No. 3763/18 NDMC Vs. M/s Hindustan Trading Co. Page No. 21 of 21