Punjab-Haryana High Court
Maruti Suzuki India Limited vs Presiding Officer on 9 November, 2010
Author: Ranjit Singh
Bench: Ranjit Singh
CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6181 OF 2009 :{ 1 }:
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
DATE OF DECISION: NOVEMBER 09, 2010
Maruti Suzuki India Limited, New Delhi
.....Petitioner
VERSUS
Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Gurgaon and
another
....Respondents
CORAM:- HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgement?
2. To be referred to the Reporters or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
PRESENT: Mr. Harsh Aggarwal, Advocate,
for the petitioner.
Mr. Pankaj Jain, Advocate,
for respondent No.2.
****
RANJIT SINGH, J.
Maruti Suzuki India Limited has filed this writ petition to challenge the award passed by Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal- cum-Labour Court, Gurgaon, on the ground that application filed by the workman under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short, "the Act") as allowed by the Labur Court was not maintainable and hence, the impugned award can not be sustained. Plea in support of this submission is that there was no settled right of the workman, which could be computed under Section 33-C(2) of the Act CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6181 OF 2009 :{ 2 }:
and also on the ground that claim was only maintainable under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter called "the Wages Act") and accordingly the only Court competent to entertain such a claim was under the Wages Act in view of the bar contained in Section 22 of the said Act.
Respondent No.2-workman was working as Technical in Assembly-I Department of petitioner Company. He is alleged to have indulged in unlawful labour activities. The workman is accused of deliberately slowing down the production by idling away his time and so was accused of giving half day production only. The workman was issued a warning. Over all production rate of the Company deteriorated drastically. The workman rather became habitual in giving 50% production. Some part of the work staff also toed his line and, thus, there was reduction in output to the whooping extend of 50%. The respondent-workman was paid half the wages as per the production output for those days. He, therefore, filed a petition under Section 33-C(2) of the Act on 21.8.2002, seeking payment of the unpaid amount.
The petitioner-Company submitted a reply to the claim made by the respondent-workman. The parties led evidence before the Labour Court. Respondent-workman admitted in his affidavit tendered as evidence that he was given a warning letter on 7.8.2001. The petitioner concern also filed evidence in the form of an affidavit on 5.12.2006. The Labour Court accordingly held the respondent- workman entitled to a sum of Rs.2887.43 P alongwith interest @ 9% from the date the amount was due to the date of realisation. This award is now put to challenge by the petitioner-Company.
CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6181 OF 2009 :{ 3 }:
The main submission by learned counsel for the petitioner relates to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to give the award under Section 33-C(2) as already noticed. The counsel submits that Section 33-C(2) is a executory in nature. Since the respondent-workman was not entitled to wages for the duration of `go slow' tactics adopted by the workman, the counsel submits that it was not a case of deduction of wages, rather respondent-workman was not entitled to the same and the Company had responded to the claim on merits on these lines. Reference is made to the warning letters issued to the respondent-workman to substantiate the plea raised by the petitioner-Company.
While allowing the claim, the Labour Court has observed that the employment of respondent-workman was not in dispute. There was also no dispute that he was paid half the salary for the disputed period. As per the workman, he had worked for full days, in response to which the petitioner's plea was that the workman had resorted to `work to rule' and had, thus, deliberately slowed down the production. He was accused of not completing the assigned job and accordingly, it is stated that he was paid for the work done.
While adjudicating the rival contentions, the Labour Court relied upon the case of Central Bank of India Vs. P.S.Rajagopaian, (1964) 3 SCR 140, to observe that word `benefit' used in Section 33-
C(2) of the Act is not only confined merely to non-monetary benefits but it takes in all kinds of benefits, which may be monetary as well as non-monetary. The Labour Court, in my view, has rightly viewed that the case of the respondent-workman was for claim of unpaid dues from the petitioner-Company, which had been denied to him without CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6181 OF 2009 :{ 4 }:
any valid and cogent reasons. The judgements relied upon by the petitioner Company were rightly distinguished and the claim of the respondent-workman allowed.
Besides the judgments referred to before the Labour Court, the counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Haryana State Co-operative Supply and Marketing Federation Ltd. And another Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court Rohtak and another, 2009 (2) SCT 787. This was a case where the workman had filed an application under Section 33-C(2) asking for equal pay for equal work. This Court accordingly held that claim for equal pay for equal work can not be adjudicated first time in the proceedings under Section 33-C(2). It is further observed by the Court that the Tribunal can award only claim, which are available to the workman on the basis of any rule, settlement, order or award. The workman would also be entitled to minimum wages notified but not to the allowances. The ratio of this judgment, thus, does not appear to be attracted to the facts in the present case.
On the other hand, counsel for the respondent-workman has referred to large number of precedents in support of his plea that the application under Section 33-C(2) in this case was clearly maintainable. The counsel has referred to Nityanand M.Joshi and another Vs. The Life Insurance Corporation of India and others, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 209, R.B.Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co.Pvt.Ltd. Vs. The Labour Court, Nagpur and others etc., AIR 1972 Supreme Court 451, Chief Mining Engineer, M/s East India Coal Co., Ltd., Bararee Colliery Dhanbad Vs. Rameshwar and CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6181 OF 2009 :{ 5 }:
others, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 218, The Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. P.S.Rajagopalan etc., AIR 1964 Supreme Court 743, and Punjab State Electricity Board, The Mall, Patiala and another Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patiala and others, and 1997 (4) Recent Service Judgment 580.
In Nityanand M.Joshi's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court took a view that where applications are filed by the employees against the employer for computing in terms of money the benefits of holidays and the recovery of amount and there is no award or settlement under which the benefit of holidays has already been computed, the case securely falls within sub-section (2) of Section 33-C. While drawing distinction between the provisions of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 33-C, the Court has held:-
"It is plain from the wording of sub-section (1) and sub- section (2) of S.33C that the former sub-section deals with cases where money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA, while the latter sub-section deals with cases where a workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed ini terms of money. In the present case applications were filed by the employees against the respondent for computing in terms of money the benefit of holidays and for recovering the amount. This case falls squarely within sub-section (2), of Section 33C. There is no award or settlement under which the CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6181 OF 2009 :{ 6 }:
benefit of holidays had already been computed." In R.B.Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co.Pvt. Ltd.'s case (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with an issue regarding lay of and whether compensation under Section 25-C of the Act was payable to the worker and also as to the quantum of compensation. The workman in this case had filed application under Section 33-C(2) for claiming this compensation for the period he had been laid of. The plea on behalf of the management was that no compensation shall be paid to a workman, who had been laid of, if he does not present himself to work and the issue arose for consideration about the ambit of Section 33-C of the Act. The objection was that reference under Section 10(1)(d) was the appropriate remedy. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while going into this aspect referred to the earlier precedent i.e. Central Bank of India's case (supra), where the court had gone at length into the legislative history of Section 33-C and had turned down the contention put forward on behalf of the employer that computation under Section 33-C(2) would only be possible where the right of workman to receive the benefit was not disputed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India's case (supra) had observed as under:-
"The claim under S.33-C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry might be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6181 OF 2009 :{ 7 }:
Court by sub-s. (2). As Maxwell has observed "where an Act confers jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution." Accordingly, it was held that S.33-C (2) took "within the purview cases of workmen who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers."
The principal contention urged before the Supreme court in Central Bank of India's case (supra) was one of jurisdiction. The plea was that the Labour Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the application by the employers because the claims of the workman therein were outside the scope of Section 33-C(2). The rival contentions made before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case on behalf of the parties were that sub-section (2) can be invoked by a workman who is entitled to receive from an employer the benefit are specified and right of the workman to receive the benefit has to be admitted and could not be matter of dispute. On the other hand, it was contended that this sub-section is broad enough to take in all cases where workman claims some benefits and wants said benefits to be computed in terms of money. While resisting the said claim if the employer made several defences, then all those defences will have to be tried by the Labour Court under sub-section (2). Plea accordingly was that all questions arising between the workman and the employer in respect of the benefit which they claim to be computed in terms of money would fall within the scope of sub-
CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6181 OF 2009 :{ 8 }:
section (2). The Court had then referred to the complete legislative history of the said provision, which may not need to be noticed in the present case but ultimately came to conclude as under:-
"The legislative history to which we have just referred clearly indicates that having provided broadly for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes on the basis of collective bargaining, the legislature recognised that individual workmen should be given a speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights, and so, inserted S.33-A in the Act in 1950 and added S.33-C in 1956. These two provisions illustrate the cases in which individual workmen can enforce their rights without having to take recourse to S.10(1) of the Act or without having to depend upon their Union to espouse their cause.
Therefore, in construing S.33-C we have to bear in mind two relevant considerations. The construction should not be so broad as to bring within the scope of S.33-C cases which would fall under S.10(1). Where industrial dispute arise between employees action collectively and their employers, they must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act, as for instance by reference under S.10(1). These disputes cannot be brought within the purview of S.33C. Similarly, having regard to the fact that the policy of the Legislative in enacting S.33C is to provide a speedy remedy to the individual workmen to enforce or execute their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude from the scope of this section CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6181 OF 2009 :{ 9 }:
cases of existing rights which are sought to be implemented by individual workmen. In other words, though in determining the scope of S.33C we must take care not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview, we must also bear in mind that cases which fall under S.10(1) of the Act for instance, cannot be brought within the scope of S.34C. (sic 33-C)"
Having held so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court thereafter went on to determine the true scope and effect on a fair and reasonable construction of Section 33-C(2). The Court finally viewed that Section 33-C(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claimed that benefit to which they are entitled, should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by the employer.
In Chief Mining Engineer, M/s East India Coal Co., Ltd., Bararee Colliery Dhanbad's case (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court followed the ratio laid down in Central Bank of India's case (supra) and held that scope of sub-section (2) of Section 33-C is wider than sub-section (1) and the said sub-section was not confined to cases arising under an award, settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A. It is also observed that there was no reason to hold that benefits provided by a statute or a scheme made thereunder without there being any contrary under sub-statute or Section 33-C(2) can not fall within sub-section (2). Consequently, the benefits provided in the bonus scheme, which remained to be computed was held falling under sub-section (2) and the Labour Court was held to have jurisdiction to entertain and try CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6181 OF 2009 :{ 10 }:
such claim, it being a claim in respect of an existing right arising from the relationship of an industrial worker and his employer.
Nearer home, the Division Bench of this Court in Punjab State Electricity Board's case (supra) while upholding the order passed by the Labour Court in regard to payment of arrears of salary due to release of annual increment, pay for suspension period and fixation of pay in revised pay scale has held that in such a situation the Labour Court was justified in entertaining the application under Section 33-C(2) to help the workman who was being denied his rightful dues.
In view of the authoritative pronouncements as noticed above, there is hardly any scope for entertaining a view that application under Section 33-C(2) would not be maintainable when a workman is denied his rightful wages. Even if there was some dispute between the employer and employees in regard to the quantum of wages payable, the same could have been adjudicated by the Labour Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 33-C (2) as has been viewed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Bank of India's case (supra), which is a decision by a Constitutional Bench. The claim of the respondent-workman was based on an existing right arising from a relationship of employer and employee and the dispute, if any, was for not paying the wages on account of the act of slow down on the part of the respondent-workman. The Labour Court could well go into this aspect and has indeed done so to hold that the workman had performed work during the disputed period and, thus, the petitioner was not in a competent position to deduct amount from his salary. Nothing could be shown before the CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6181 OF 2009 :{ 11 }:
Court that the respondent-workman had not completed his job. The submission that application under Section 33-C(2) was not maintainable in this case, thus, can not be accepted in view of the clear law position that would emerge from the judgements noticed above. The submission made by the counsel for the petitioner in this regard, thus, is rejected.
Learned counsel for the petitioner then contends that Section 22 of the Wages Act would be a bar for making a claim under Section 33-C(2) of the Act and would, thus, plead that claim could only be filed under Section 15 of the Wages Act. To rebut this contention, the counsel for respondent No.2 has referred to Inder Singh and others Vs. Labour Court, Jullundar and another, 1969 Lab.I.C. 1126. The Division Bench of this Court has clearly held that neither Section 24 of the Wages Act nor Section 22 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of Labour Court to entertain and adjudicate upon an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The relevant observations are as under:-
"The Labour Court is a judicial or at least a quasi-judicial Tribunal but not a Civil Court and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court not having been barred by the express provision of either Section 22 of the 1936 Act or Section 24 of the Wages Act, it is against the well settled canons of interpretation of statutes to imply any such bar to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court which is not created by any statute."
Reference is also made to Municipal Committee, Tarn Taran Vs. State of Punjab and others, 1967 LLJ 568. In this case, CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6181 OF 2009 :{ 12 }:
the issue was whether failure to pay minimum wages fixed could lead to reference of a dispute under Section 10(1)(d) before the Industrial Tribunal or not. Validity of the reference made in this regard to the Labour Court was challenged in the writ petition. The contention raised on behalf of the Municipal Committee was that the proper remedy of the employee was to make an application under Section 20 of the Wages Act within the time allowed and not a reference under Section 10(1)(d). The Court has viewed that claim which could have been determined by the authority under the Wages Act could also be decided under the provisions of the Act. It has even been held that though a limitation was prescribed under the Wages Act but the authorities under the Act were not bound by the same because no such limitation was prescribed in the later Act. The Court has also observed that the provisions of Section 22 of the Wages Act are similar to those of Section 24 of the Minimum Wages Act. Section 24 of the Minimum Wages Act also made a provision that no Court shall entertain any suit for recovery of wages insofar as the sum so claimed forms the subject of application under Section 20, which has been presented by or on behalf of the plaintiff etc. Section 24(d) says that no Court shall entertain any suit for recovery of wages, which could have been recovered by an application under Section 20. The words 'Court' and `suit' are defined under the Minimum Wages Act.
The meaning of the word `Court' was held to be varying with the context with which it is used. Reference in this regard is made to Kabul Singh Vs. Ram Singh and others, 1965 PLR 378. It is noticed that word "Court" is not a term of art with fixed meaning but has a variable import indicative of divergent things. A "Court" is CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6181 OF 2009 :{ 13 }:
defined in Coke on Littleton, as a place where justice is judicially administered. Going into the meaning of the word "Court" and as used in Section 24, it is noticed that the same is followed by word "suit". The word "suit" as occurring in Section 22 of the Wages Act (which is similar to Section 24 of the Minimum Wages Act), was defined by Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Farkhundali Nannhay Vs. V.B.Potdar and another, 1962-I L.L.J 51 as under:-
"The word `suit' is a term of art and ordinarily means a proceeding instituted in a civil court by the presentation of a plaint."
Reference is also made to Hans Raj Gupta and others Vs. Official Liquidators of the Dehra Dun, Mussorie Electric Tramway Company Ltd., (1932) 60 I.A. 13, where it is held that word `suit' ordinarily meant and apart from some context must be taken to mean a civil proceedings instituted by the presentation of a plaint. Accordingly, the word `Court' under Section 24 of the Minimum Wages Act was held to mean a `Civil Court'. The Industrial Tribunal can not be called a Civil Court because the proceedings there are not initiated by the presentation of a plaint. It may be observed that everybody has not got a right to get his dispute adjudicated by the Labour Court. It is only when the Government is satisfied in a particular case that an industrial dispute has arisen that a reference is made to the Tribunal for adjudication. Accordingly, it was held that under these circumstances, Section 24 of the Minimum Wages Act does not bar the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate upon the present dispute. Thus, the contention on these lines, as made by the learned counsel for the petitioner also fails and is CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.6181 OF 2009 :{ 14 }:
rejected.
There is, thus, no merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.
November 09, 2010 ( RANJIT SINGH ) khurmi JUDGE