Jharkhand High Court
Shaikh Ali Baksh vs The State Of Jharkhand on 26 September, 2022
Author: Ananda Sen
Bench: Ananda Sen
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) No. 2084 of 2019
Shaikh Ali Baksh............ Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi
3. The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi............ Respondents
......
Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ananda Sen ......
For the Petitioner : Mr. Saurabh Shekhar, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Sharbhil Ahmad, AC to SC(Mines)-1 ......
6/26.09.2022 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents.
2. The petitioner, in this writ application, has challenged the order dated 29.06.2017 (Annexure-7), passed by Respondent No. 3, whereby Respondent No. 3 has inflicted punishment of stoppage of two annual increments with cumulative effect upon the petitioner for alleged misconduct.
Further, the order dated 06.11.2017, passed by the Appellate Authority, has also been challenged, whereby the departmental appeal preferred by the petitioner, has been dismissed.
3. The facts lie in a narrow compass. The petitioner happens to be a Revenue Karamchari. Admittedly, a proceeding was initiated against the petitioner alleging therein that he submitted an enquiry report in a proceeding initiated for mutation of land, wherein he has given report that one Samir Kumar Mahato is legal heir of Mahavir Mahato but, in fact, a complaint was received later on which suggested otherwise. This is the sum and substance of the complaint.
4. Admittedly, proceeding was initiated and Inquiry Officer was appointed. Thereafter, second show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and, after, complying with the provision of natural justice, the petitioner was inflicted punishment of stoppage of two annual increments with cumulative effect.
5. Counsel for the petitioner raised a point that the aforesaid act of the petitioner cannot said to be a misconduct. He submits that at best it can be said to be the negligency and bonafide mistake on the part of the petitioner. As per him, the said report was on the basis of an affidavit sworn by said Samir Kumar Mahato. He contends that after his report was submitted to the higher authority, i.e. the Circle Inspector and the Circle Officer, they also independently passed the order mutating the land in favor of Samir Kumar Mahato, but surprisingly, both officers were not -2- proceeded against and only the petitioner has been punished in the departmental proceeding.
6. Counsel appearing on behalf of the State submits that the charges are specific and the petitioner should have been diligent in performing his duties. He submits that later on a complaint was received that Samir Kumar Mahato was not the legal heir of Mahavir Mahato, which clearly suggests that the petitioner has not performed his duties in fair manner and was not diligent or cautious in performing his duties.
7. Thus, the question, falls for consideration in this writ application, is whether the allegation levelled in the charge sheet can be a misconduct committed by the petitioner. Admittedly, the petitioner acted upon an affidavit, which was presented before him. Considering the affidavit, which was sworn by Samir Kumar Mahato, he proceeded and submitted a report before his higher authority only to the effect that Samir Kumar Mahato is the legal heir of Mahavir Mahato. It is not the case where he himself on his own volition, had arrived at the aforesaid conclusion. Rather he had some basis to arrive at some conclusion, i.e. the affidavit. Thus, it can be said that he was negligent as he did not further enquire into the matter, which he should have, but this act cannot said to be an act of indiscipline or misconduct to initiate a departmental proceeding.
8. There is nothing in the charge sheet to suggest that the petitioner has gained something or he had done this for evil and malicious purpose. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Punjab State Civil Supplies Corp. Ltd.
- versus- Sikander Singh, reported in (2006) 3 SCC 736", after relying on the several judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Para-21 has held as follows:-
"21. It is now well settled that negligence simpliciter may or may not amount to misconduct. In Union of India v. J. Ahmed (1979) 2 SCC 286, this Court stated the law thus: (SCC p. 293, para 11) The High Court has noted the definition of misconduct in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary which runs as under:
'Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive; acts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct.' In industrial jurisprudence amongst others, habitual or gross negligence constitute misconduct but in Utkal Machinery Ltd. v. Shanti Patnaik3 in the absence of the Standing Orders governing the employee's undertaking, unsatisfactory work was treated as misconduct in the context of discharge being assailed as punitive. In S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India4 the manner in which a member of the service discharged -3- his quasi-judicial function disclosing abuse of power was treated as constituting misconduct for initiating disciplinary proceedings. A single act of omission or error of judgment would ordinarily not constitute misconduct though if such error or omission results in serious or atrocious consequences the same may amount to misconduct as was held by this Court in P.H. Kalyani v. Air France, Calcutta5 wherein it was found that the two mistakes committed by the employee while checking the load-sheets and balance charts would involve possible accident to the aircraft and possible loss of human life and, therefore, the negligence in work in the context of serious consequences was treated as misconduct. It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge of duty attached to public office would ipso facto constitute misconduct. There may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such as to be irreparable or the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high. An error can be indicative of negligence and the degree of culpability may indicate the grossness of the negligence. Carelessness can often be productive of more harm than deliberate wickedness or malevolence".
9. I find that charges are specific and cannot be said that the charges are vague, but the said charges which has been levelled against the petitioner cannot be said to be misconduct to initiate departmental proceeding or to punish the petitioner.
10. Thus, considering the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and since it is held that it cannot be said to be misconduct to initiate a departmental proceeding, this writ application is allowed. The punishment order dated 19.06.2017, as contained in Annexure-7 as well as the order dated 06.11.2017, passed by the Appellate Authority as contained in Annexure-9, are hereby set aside and quashed. The petitioner is entitled for all the consequential benefits after quashing the order, by which he punished.
11. Thus, this writ application stands allowed.
(Ananda Sen, J) Mukund/-cp.2