Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 20.03.2026 vs Of on 8 May, 2026
2026:HHC:15392
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 32 of 2016
.
Reserved on: 20.03.2026.
Decided on : 08.05.2026
Jai Pal ....... Petitioner
Versus
of
State of H.P. .... Respondent
Coram
rt
The Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the Petitioner : Mr Mohinder Verma,
Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 17.12.2015 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Shimla, District Shimla camp at Rohru, (learned Appellate Court) vide which judgment of conviction dated 06.12.2011 and order of sentence dated 08.12.2011 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1, Rohru, H.P. 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 22026:HHC:15392 (learned Trial Court) were partly modified. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) .
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences of punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that Hira Lal (PW1) had gone to rt Chirgaon to purchase the articles on 21.02.2009. He was going to Chirgaon Bazaar to fetch the labourers at about 1:30 PM, when a Bolero camper bearing registration No. HP-10A-1183, being driven by Jai Pal (the accused), came at high speed and hit the informant. The accident occurred due to the high speed of the vehicle and the negligence of the accused. The matter was reported to the police, and an entry (Ext.PW8/A) was recorded in the Police Station. Head Constable Bharat Singh (PW10) went to the hospital to verify the correctness of the information. He recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW1/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW10/A) was registered. HC Bharat Singh (PW10) filed an application (Ext.PW10/C) for the medical examination of the injured. Dr Sanjay Vishwas (PW12) examined the injured and found that he had sustained grievous ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 3 2026:HHC:15392 injuries which could have been caused within more than half an hour of the examination. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW12/A). He advised X-rays. HC Bharat Singh (PW10) visited the spot and .
prepared the site plan (Ext.PW10/D). He seized the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-10A-1183 vide memo (Ext.PW9/A).
HC Sanjeev Kumar (PW11) mechanically examined the vehicle of and found that there was no mechanical defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW11/A).
rt Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its case. Hira Lal (PW1) is the informant/victim. Ravinder (PW2), Ati Ram (PW3), Ranjit Saini (PW4), Mohan Singh (PW5) and Prem Singh (PW6) are the eyewitnesses. Bhim Singh (PW7) was told about the incident and accompanied the injured to the hospital.
::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 42026:HHC:15392 Constable Gian Singh (PW8) proved the entry in the daily diary.
Jaswant Lal (PW9) witnessed the recovery of the Bolero. HC Bharat Singh (PW10) investigated the matter. HC Sanjeev Kumar .
(PW11) mechanically examined the vehicle. Dr Sanjay Viswas (PW12) examined the injured/victim. SI Ramphal Yadav (PW13) signed the FIR and partly investigated the matter.
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5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), admitted that he rt was driving the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-10A-1183 on 21.02.2009 at about 1:30 p.m. at Chirgaon Bazaar. He denied the rest of the prosecution's case. He stated that he was falsely implicated in this case and that the witnesses falsely deposed against him. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.
6. The learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses proved that the accused had reversed his vehicle at a high speed and hit the injured, who sustained simple and grievous injuries. Minor contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses were not sufficient to discard them, as they were bound to come with time. He had failed to take care before reversing the vehicle, which led to the accident. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused of ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 5 2026:HHC:15392 the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC as follows:
.
Sections Sentences 279 of the Indian The accused was sentenced to Penal Code undergo simple imprisonment for three months.
of 337 of the Indian The accused was sentenced to Penal Code undergo simple imprisonment for three months.
rt Section 338 of the The accused was sentenced to Indian Penal Code undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹500/-, and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month.
All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Shimla, District Shimla, Camp at Rohru (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused had reversed his vehicle without taking care, which led to the accident. The ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 6 2026:HHC:15392 informant had sustained simple and grievous injuries. He was rightly convicted by the learned Trial Court. However, an excessive sentence was imposed. Hence, the learned Appellate .
Court modified the sentence as under:
Sections Sentences 279 of the Indian The accused was sentenced to of Penal Code undergo simple imprisonment for three months.
rt 337 of the Indian The accused was sentenced to Penal Code undergo simple imprisonment for three months.
Section 338 of the The accused was sentenced to Indian Penal Code undergo simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹500/-, and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month.
All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate the material on record. The prosecution's story is highly improbable. Ravinder (PW2), Ati Ram (PW3) and ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 7 2026:HHC:15392 Mohan Singh (PW5) admitted that Chirgaon Bazaar had a huge rush due to Shivaratri on the day of the accident. Ravinder (PW2) stated that the accused was driving the vehicle at a slow speed, .
and Mohan Singh (PW5) stated that there was a traffic jam in the bazaar. These statements showed that the vehicle was being driven at a normal speed and was trapped in a traffic jam. This of falsifies the prosecution's case regarding the high speed of the vehicle. The accused is a first offender, and the benefit of the rt Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to him.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
9. I have heard Mr Mohinder Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.
10. Mr Mohinder Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. It was duly proved by the statements of the prosecution witnesses that there was a huge rush in the bazaar and a traffic jam. Therefore, the accused could not have reversed his vehicle at high speed. Both the learned Courts below failed to ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 8 2026:HHC:15392 appreciate this aspect. The learned Courts below had convicted and sentenced the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC. Section .
338 of IPC is an aggravated form of Section 337 of the IPC, and the accused could not have been sentenced for committing a minor and major offence against the same person in the course of of the same transaction. The sentence imposed by the learned Courts below is excessive, and the benefit of the Probation of rt Offenders Act was not provided to the accused. The accused is a first offender, and such a benefit should have been extended to him. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
11. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Courts below have concurrently held that the accused had reversed his vehicle at a high speed, causing injuries to the informant/victim. These are pure findings of fact, and this Court should not interfere with the pure findings of fact while exercising revisional jurisdiction. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.
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12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
.
13. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:
(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional of court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: -
rt "10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short "CrPC") vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 10
2026:HHC:15392
14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
.
"14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an of error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this rt Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) "12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 11
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13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory .
order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case of substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC."
15. rt It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to re-
appreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
"12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)
5. ... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 12 2026:HHC:15392 of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has .
already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding of that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ..."
rt
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) "14. ... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-
consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 13 2026:HHC:15392 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where .
the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction."
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16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) rt 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:
"16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.
Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative."
17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:
"27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 14 2026:HHC:15392 evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a .
jurisdictional error.
28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court."
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18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
19. rt The informant/victim Hira Lal (PW1) stated that he was going to fetch the labour at 1:30 PM, when a Bolero camper bearing registration No. HP10A-1183 hit him, and he sustained injuries. He admitted in his cross-examination that the date of the incident was a Shivaratri and there was a huge rush. He denied that there was a traffic jam on the date of the incident. He denied that he was intoxicated and had fallen.
20. Ravinder (PW2) stated that he was driving the bus bearing Registration No.7502 on the date of the incident. The bus was parked on the roadside. The bus had developed some defect, and he was trying to rectify it, when a Bolero camper bearing registration No. HP-10A-1183 came to the spot. The vehicle stopped near the bus. The driver reversed the vehicle and hit a ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 15 2026:HHC:15392 pedestrian, who sustained injuries. He admitted in his cross-
examination that the date of the incident was a Shivaratri and there was a huge rush in the bazaar. He admitted that the .
accused was driving the vehicle towards the left side of the road in a normal manner. He could not say how the informant had sustained injuries. He volunteered to say that the rear portion of of the vehicle must have hit him.
21. Ati Ram (PW3) stated that he was going to the Bazaar rt on 21.02.2009 at about 1:30 p.m. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-10A-1183, being driven by the accused, came to the spot.
The accused suddenly reversed the vehicle and hit the pedestrian Hira Lal (PW1). Hira Lal sustained injuries on his legs. He admitted in his cross-examination that there was a huge rush on the date of the accident. The injured person was walking on the left side of the road. He admitted that the accused was driving the vehicle at a normal speed. He denied that there was no negligence on the part of the accused.
22. Ranjit Saini (PW4) did not support the prosecution's case, and he was declared hostile. He stated that he was not aware that the accused had reversed his vehicle and hit the ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 16 2026:HHC:15392 injured. He denied that he was making a false statement because he was a close friend of the accused.
23. Mohan Singh (PW5) stated that he had gone to the .
Chirgaon bazaar on 21.02.2009. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-10A-1183 came at a high speed. The driver stopped the vehicle and suddenly reversed it. The vehicle hit the informant of Hira Lal, who sustained injuries. He admitted in his cross-
examination that there was a huge rush in the bazaar and there rt was a traffic jam. He was at a distance of about 35 meters from the place of the accident. He came to know subsequently that the accused was driving the vehicle.
24. Prem Singh (PW6) stated that he was driving a vehicle bearing registration No. HP-63-1684 on 21.02.2009. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-10A-1183, being driven by the accused, came to the spot. A private bus was parked towards the other side of the road, and the driver was trying to rectify a defect. The accused suddenly reversed the vehicle and hit the informant, who sustained injuries. He admitted in his cross-
examination that there was a huge rush on the date of the incident, and there was a traffic jam. He admitted that his vehicle and the vehicle of the accused were trapped in a traffic jam. He ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 17 2026:HHC:15392 admitted that the speed of the vehicle being driven by the accused was normal, and he was driving the vehicle towards the left side of the road. He could not say that the informant was .
intoxicated on the date of the incident.
25. It is apparent from the statements of the witnesses that they have consistently stated that the accused was driving of the vehicle on the date of the accident. This fact was not disputed in the cross-examination. The accused also admitted in his rt statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that he was driving the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-10A-1183 on 21.02.2009 at about 1:30 PM.
26. The witnesses also stated consistently that the accused had suddenly reversed the vehicle and hit the informant.
The Central government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulation 1989 to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 31 provides that no driver of a motor vehicle shall cause the vehicle to be driven backwards without first satisfying himself that he will not thereby cause danger or undue inconvenience to any person. Therefore, the driver of a vehicle is under a statutory duty not to reverse it unless he is sure that his doing so would not cause danger or inconvenience to any person. The witnesses ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 18 2026:HHC:15392 admitted that there was a huge rush in the bazaar due to Shivratri. The rush in the bazaar would necessitate taking the extra precautions before reversing the vehicle, because in case of .
a rush, the chance of injury to any person increases. Therefore, the accused was supposed to take care before reversing his vehicle that the reversing of the vehicle would not cause any of injury to any person or damage to any property. The accused did not state in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the rt Cr.P.C that he had taken such a precaution. He had also not suggested to any of the prosecution witnesses that the road was clear before he had started reversing the vehicle. Therefore, there was a violation of the Rules framed by the Central government, which was the proximate cause of the accident. The accident would not have occurred had the accused taken care before reversing his vehicle to ensure the safety of the people walking on the road.
27. It was submitted that the witnesses admitted in their cross-examination that the accused was driving the vehicle at a normal speed. This admission will not help the accused because the precise negligence against the accused is that he had failed to ensure the safety of the pedestrians before reversing the vehicle as required under Rule 31 of the Rules of the Road Regulations. In ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 19 2026:HHC:15392 these circumstances, the speed of the vehicle is not material, and the accused cannot claim any benefit from the statements made by the prosecution witnesses that the speed of the vehicle was .
normal.
28. It was submitted that Prem Singh (PW6) stated that he was driving his vehicle behind the vehicle of the accused, of hence the accused could not have reversed his vehicle. This submission will not help the accused. The witness Prem Singh rt (PW6) has nowhere stated that his vehicle was right behind the vehicle of the accused. Therefore, it was possible for the accused to reverse his vehicle and cause injury to Hira Lal (PW1) walking on the road. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from his testimony by the defence.
29. The witnesses consistently stated that Hira Lal had sustained injuries in the accident. Dr Sanjay Vishwas (PW12) examined Hira Lal and found that he had sustained simple and grievous injuries. He was not cross-examined at all, which means that his testimony is not disputed by the defence.
Therefore, it was duly proved on record that Hira Lal had sustained simple and grievous injuries in an accident which was caused by the negligence of the accused.
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30. The learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC. Section 338 of the IPC deals with negligently .
causing grievous hurt to a person, whereas Section 337 of the IPC deals with negligently causing simple hurt to a person. Thus, Section 338 of the IPC is an aggravated form of Section 337 of the of IPC. In the present case, the simple and grievous hurt was caused to Hira Lal. Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code prohibits the rt punishment of a person for the commission of a minor offence when he has been punished for committing a major offence in the course of the same transaction. It was laid down in Rajesh v.
State of M.P., 2010 SCC OnLine MP 178: (2010) 3 MP LJ 706 that a person sentenced for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC cannot be sentenced for committing an offence punishable under Section 337 of the IPC as the former is a major offence in relation to the latter. It was observed at page 707:
"9. In the facts of the present case and after going through the entire evidence available on record, I am of the opinion that the applicant is entitled to the benefit of such judgment. As per the evidence, a higher degree of negligence has not been fully established; therefore, the judgment passed by the two Courts below convicting the applicant for the offence under sections 304-A and 337 of the Penal Code, 1860 is hereby set aside. It is to be ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 21 2026:HHC:15392 observed here that section 71 of the Penal Code, 1860 specifies that if the accused/applicant has been punished for the higher offence, for the same offence, a conviction is not required to be passed...."
31. Therefore, learned Courts below erred in sentencing .
the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 337 and 338 of the IPC, and the sentence for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 337 of the of IPC is to be set aside.
32. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of rt Offenders Act was not granted to the accused, and such a benefit should have been extended to him. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A of IPC. It was observed:
"11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country", the saturation of accident toll was not even ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 22 2026:HHC:15392 half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus :
"Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, .
must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces."
12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C., to remain in force although the High Court too had of confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment rt for six months besides imposing a fine.
13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted, he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, ::: Downloaded on - 09/05/2026 11:40:13 :::CIS 23 2026:HHC:15392 particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles."
33. A similar view was taken in Thakur Singh v. State of .
Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 208, wherein it was observed: -
6. Learned counsel lastly made an alternative plea that the Probation of Offenders Act may be applied to secure his job. This Court has held in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana [(2000) 5 SCC 82] that the Probation of Offenders of Act cannot be invoked in cases involving rash or negligent driving of the bus resulting in the death of human beings."
34. This position was reiterated in State of Punjab v.
rt Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: -
13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208].
35. Therefore, it is impermissible to grant the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to a person convicted of driving a vehicle in a rash and negligent manner.
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36. Learned Appellate Court has already reduced the sentence of the accused to simple imprisonment for three months, which cannot be said to be harsh, and no further .
interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned Appellate Court.
37. No other point was urged of
38. In view of the above, the present revision is partly allowed, and the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court, as rt modified by the learned Appellate Court, for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 337 of the IPC is set aside.
Subject to this modification, the rest of the judgments and order are upheld.
39. The records of the learned Courts below be returned along with a copy of the judgment of this Court.
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