Delhi High Court
Goodyear India Ltd. vs B.B. Jain & Ors. on 14 September, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1998VIIAD(DELHI)95, 75(1998)DLT620
Author: Arun Kumar
Bench: Arun Kumar, Manmohan Sarin
JUDGMENT Arun Kumar, J.
1. The appellant M/s Goodyear India Limited (hereinafter referred to as the tenant) has filed the present appeal against the judgment and decree dated 7th April, 1998 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Delhi, whereby the suit of the plaintiffs/respondents (hereinafter referred to as the landlords) for possession of the suit premises was decreed. The suit premises is an office - cum - godown on the ground floor and mezzanine floor of House No. XI/4239-A/1 (plot No. 2), 1 Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, Delhi. The premises was initially let out at a monthly rent of Rs. 1,445. The tenancy was renewed from time to time.
2. As per the plaint, the last agreed rent of the premises was Rs. 6,400/- per month besides water, electricity and house tax charges. The month of tenancy was as per the English Calender month starting from first day of every month and ending with last day of the month. The tenancy was terminated by a notice dated 10th November, 1989, calling upon the tenant to vacate the demised premises and deliver its vacant possession to the landlords by the midnight of 31st December, 1989. The plaintiff landlords also claimed damages for use and occupation of the premises after the expiry of tenancy at the rate of Rs. 8,666.67 p. per day from 1st January, 1990. The learned trial Judge decreed the suit for possession of the plaintiff by his impugned judgment. On the question of quantum of damages/manse profits an inquiry under Order XX, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been ordered.
3. The learned Counsel for the tenant raised the following points in support of the appeal:
(1) Relying on a letter dated 10th October, 1988, Ex. No. DW - 2/2. It was urged that the said letter resulted in a lease for at least three years and the plaintiff could not have filed the present suit on 2nd January, 1990.
(2) The said letter dated 10th October, 1988 read with oral evidence led by the tenant gave rise to a contract of lease for three years, whereby the rent of the premises was increased to Rs. 6,400/- per month. Since the landlords backed out from the said contract of lease for three years and sought to terminate the tenancy w.e.f. 31st December, 1989 and filed the present suit on 2nd January, 1990, the tenant was released of its obligation to pay the increased rent @ Rs. 6,400/- per month. Relying on Section 51 of the Contract Act, the learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that in these circumstances the tenant would be entitled to revert to the previous agreed rent between the parties, i.e. Rs. 3,445/- per month. Taking the rent to be Rs. 3,445/- per month the tenancy would be covered under the Delhi Rent Control Act and, therefore, the suit of the landlords was not maintainable.
(3) The promise spelled out in the letter dated 10th October, 1988 created an estoppel against the landlords and they were not entitled to terminate the tenancy before the expiry of the period of three years.
(4) The notice terminating tenancy was defective and, there fore, invalid in law.
4. At the time of hearing the learned Counsel for the appellant made available to the Court the copies of the pleadings in the suit and the relevant documents and portions of oral evidence on record.
5. Since the entire case of the tenant practically rests on the letter dated 10th October, 1988, we consider it appropriate to reproduce the same:
"Shri Prem Chandra Jain 1, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi- 110002.
Dear Sir, Subject: Our Delhi Branch Premises - Rent.
This has reference to your joint representation with Mrs. Kund Prabha Jain and Mrs. Swayam Prabha Jain dated December 11, 1987 and the subsequent discussions your B.B. Jain had with us on the subject.
As discussed and agreed in the joint meeting held between your Mr. B.B. Jain, our Mr. B.K. Gupta and the undersigned on July 31, 1998, as a very special case, we are pleased to increase the rental of our above branch premises to Rs. 10,000/- per month effective July, 1, 1988. This increase of Rs. 4,775/- per month is granted as a good gesture from Good Year management in view of the cordial relations between us and it is understood that there will be no further request from your end for a rent revision for atleast three years from now.
Kindly write to us as to how the monthly rental is to be apportioned between the three owners so that we shall arrange to pay the arrears as well as the future rentals accordingly.
Thanking you and assuring you of our best cooperation at all times.
Very truly yours, for GOOD YEAR INDIA LIMITED Sd/-
P.S. Sarma Finance Director."
6. At the outset, we may clarify that the figure of increased rent mentioned in this letter as Rs. 10,000/- covers two separate tenancies for different portions in the property in suit. It was not disputed before us by either party that the rent of the suit premises was increased to Rs. 6,400/- per month.
7. The first question for consideration is that does this letter give rise to a lease for a period of three years, Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that a lease for a period of one year or more has to be through a registered instrument. In view of this specific provision of the Act, this letter or any oral evidence in support of this letter spelling out any understanding between the parties cannot give rise to a lease. The period involved is three years and the lease has to be through a registered document. The learned Counsel for the tenant tried to place reliance on Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and on that basis urged that it amounted to a lease for three years. We are afraid that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be pressed into service in the facts of the present case in the absence of any writing signed by the landlords or on their behalf. The letter relied upon by the tenant is written by the tenant itself. It is addressed to one of the landlords, therefore, Section 53-A is not attracted. Reference is invited to Biswabani Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Santosh Kumar, .
8. Coming to the second point about applicability of Section 51 of the Contract Act in view of the alleged breach of promise by the landlords, could the tenant revert back to the rental of Rs. 3,445/- per month. It is to be noted that the letter under consideration refers to rent. It does not refer to the period of tenancy being extended by three years. The subject of the letter is 'Rent'. Further the crucial words are" ... it is understood that there will be no further request from your end for rent revision for at least minimum three years from now". This, at best means that for three years the landlord will not ask for further increase in the rent. It does not contain any promise from the landlord that the tenancy will not be terminated before three years. As a matter of fact on 10th October, 1998, the tenant enjoyed the protection under the Delhi Rent Control Act and, therefore, it would have never thought of termination of tenancy by the landlord at any time. The Rent Control Act protected the tenancy and the tenant had no fear of being asked to quit. In these circumstances the tenant would not have bothered for laying down any specified period of lease. This letter has to be read in that context. Thus the argument of reciprocal promises under a contract has no foundation and the tenant cannot invoke Section 51 of the Contract Act. It follows from this that the rent of the suit premises being Rs. 6,400/- per month, the tenant could not set up a plea that the suit was barred under the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act.
9. The point regarding promissory estoppel stands answered in view of what has already been stated. There was no promise from the side of the landlord that they will not disturb the tenant till the expiry of a specified period. The letter relied upon by the tenant in this behalf is only promise from the side of the tenant to increase the rent and also it states the understanding on the part of the tenant that the landlord will not ask for further increase of rent for at least three years. The landlord never asked for any increase of rent after the said letter. Therefore, this letter cannot be taken to create any promissory estoppel against the landlord. Moreover, there can be no estoppel against a statute. The landlord exercised his right conferred by the amendment of the Delhi Rent Control Act. A statutory right cannot be curtailed on the basis of a plea of promissory estoppel.
10. The learned Counsel for the tenant tried to rely upon some oral evidence led by the tenant in support of the alleged understanding created by the aforesaid letter Ex. DW-2/2 dated 10th October, 1988. It was further argued on behalf of the tenant that the landlord did not lead any evidence to rebut the same. The answer of the landlord is emphatic and clearly knocks off this argument. The answer is that in the written statement the case of the tenant throughout was that it was a tenant in perpetuity. The tenant's case was not based on this letter to say that there was a tenancy for at least three years after the said letter. In the absence of a plea of tenancy for three years based on the said letter, the landlord did not have to lead any evidence in this behalf.
11. So far as the argument regarding the notice being defective is concerned, the learned Counsel for the appellant merely mentioned the point but did not press the same in view of the decisions of this Court upholding the validity of such notices. The argument suggesting invalidity was that the notice terminated the tenancy immediately and not at the end of the month. This argument has no merit because the substance of the notice has to be seen and so read the termination of tenancy was with effect from the end of the last date of the month. This pleas has to be considered in the light of settled law that the notices have to be read liberally with a view to uphold the same and not with a view to find faults in them.
12. The result is that we do not find any merit of substance in any of the points raised on behalf of the appellant/tenant. The appeal fails and is dismissed in limine.