Allahabad High Court
Ravindra Kumar Agrahari vs Union Of India (Uoi) on 15 December, 1999
Equivalent citations: 2000CRILJ3028
Author: V.K. Chaturvedi
Bench: V.K. Chaturvedi
JUDGMENT O.P. Garg, J.
1. The horny central part of this writ petition pertains to the question whether the possession and circulation of counterfeit currency notes falls with the orbit of an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of 'public order' and to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community or only that of breach of law and order' made punishable under the ordinary criminal law of the land. The controversy has cropped up in the wake of the following profile of the case.
2. Thirty currency notes-each of Rs. 500 denomination totalling to Rs. 15,000/- were given by the Yogendra Pratap, resident of Maharwa District Rupen Dei, Nepal to his sister's son Alok Kumar, resident of an Pakad, P.S. Kotwali, district Maharajganj on 22-5-1999 for being exchanged by the currency notice of smaller denominations. Alok Kumar got the change of Rs. 5000 (ten notes of Rs. 500 each) from Mahendra Munish son of Prabhunath Chiuraha, P.S. Kotwali, Maharajganj and took the change of Rs. 6000/- (12 notes of Rs. 500 each) from the petitioner-Ravindra Kumar Agrahari and similarly got the change of eight notes of Rs. 500 (Rs. 4000) from other shop keepers. On the same day, the petitioner, it is alleged, passed on 12 notes of Rs. 500 each to Brij Behari Shah of Shah Iron Stores, Plaza Market near Bus Station, Maharajganj with a view to partly wipe off the outstanding amount of Rs. 6800/- on account of the purchase of iron bars on credit. Brij Behari Shah refused to accept the said notes as he suspected them to be counterfeit and informed of the fact to the local police, Kotwali, Maharajganj. The 12 notes of Rs. 500 each were seized from the possession of the petitioner and they were sent for examination by the specified Branch of the Reserve Bank of India, Kanpur on receipt of latter dated 25-5-1999 from the Reserve Bank of India, Kanpur that all the 12 notes were counterfeit, crime case No. 236 of 1999 under Section 489-A/489-B/489-C, 419 and 420, IPC was registered against the petitioner at P.S. Kotwali, Maharajganj. The petitioner along with other accused persons were taken in custody and sent to jail. The petitioner was, however, subsequently released on bail. The sponsoring authority, i.e. Sri Viswajeet Mahapatra, Superintendent of police. Maharajganj submitted a report dated 26-6-1999 enclosing therewith the relevant documents indulging statements of various witnesses, copies of the general diaries and the F.I.R. to indicate that the petitioner after being released on bail, has again engaged himself in the circulation of coutnerfeit currency notes with the result credibility with regard to the genuineness of the dia currency notes has gone down. We would do well to quote the specific words used by the sponsoring authority:
^^?kVuk ds ?kfVr gksus ls tu ekul esa Hk;] ng'kr ,oa vlqj{kk dk okrkoj.k O;kIr gks x;k gS] vke ukxfjd tkyh uksVkssa ds voS/k /kU/ks ds dkj.k 500 ds lgh uksVksa dks Hkh Lohdkj ugh dj jgs gSaa] vkSj rks vkSj ipkl :i;s ds uksVksa dks Hkh ysus ls yksx 'kafdr gSa A tkyh uksVksa ds voS/k O;kikj ls Hkkjrh; vFkZ O;oLFkk fNUu fHkUu gks jgha gS A blls tu&ekul esa izpfyr Hkkjrh; uksVksa ds izfr fo'oLuh;rk ea fxjkoV vk jgh gS ftlls yksd&O;oLFkk dsk vuqj{k.k dqizHkkfor gks x;k gS A** On receipt of the above report of the sponsoring authority, an order of detention under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the NSA') was passed by the District Magistrate, Maharajganj on 27-6-1999 and the grounds in support of the detention order required to be communicated under Section 8 of the along with detention order were served on the petitioner on 29-6-1999. The grounds of detention contained the details of facts and documents, as have been submitted by the sponsoring authority. Preventive order of detention was approved by the State Government and after receipt of the recommendations of the Advisory Board under Section 11 of the Act on 13-8-1999 the matter of the petitioner was again reviewed by the State Government and it confirmed the detention order under Section 12(1) of NSA on 18-8-1999 for a period of 12 months.
3. The petitioner made a representation against the detention order on 3-7-1999 which was forwarded by the District Magistrate to the State Government on 4-7-1999. On receipt of the representation on 5-7-1999, it was processed and examined and ultimately rejected on 10-7-1999, the communication of which was sent through Radiogram on 11-7-1999.
4. By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is prayed that a writ, order or direction in the nature of Habeas Corpus be issued to the respondents to set the petitioner at liberty.
5. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged. Heard Sri D. S. Misra, assisted by Sri P.S. Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri K.N. Pande appearing on behalf of the Union of India and Sri Mahendra Pratap, learned A.G.A. on behalf of the State of U.P., District Magistrate and Superintendent of Jail, Gorakhpur.
6. Sri D. S. Misra, with his usual eloquence urged that activities for which the petitioner has been detained are such which are not 'prejudicial' to the maintenance of 'public order' within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the NSA and that for the alleged solitary offence, he can appropriately be dealt with under the ordinary criminal law of the land. In substance, the primary submission on behalf of the petitioner appears to be that it is not a case of disturbance of 'public disorder' or resorting to activities prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community but barely of breach of 'law and order' and, therefore, the District Magistrate was not justified in passing the order of preventive detention in the circumstances of the case.
7. Before adverting to the question that it is a case of breach of 'law and order', and not of 'public order' we would, at the very threshold, explode the myth that solitary/ single instance of criminal activity does not give rise to 'public disorder' or is not sufficient to brand the act as prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services. Normally, it is for the detaining authority to have the subjective satisfaction about the apprehension of the breach of 'public order' and even one single instance may be sufficient to satisfy him in that regard depending upon the nature of the incident. In certain circumstances, even a single incident may disturb tranquillity and even tempo of life of the community. This aspect of the matter came to be considered in the case of Alijaan Mian v. District Magistrate (1983) 4 SCC 301 : (AIR 1983 SC 1130). The observations made in the said case have been reiterated in all the subsequent decisions. Ayya v. State of U.P. (1989) 1 SCC 374 : (AIR 1989 SC 364), it was observed that a single instance of activity tending to harm 'public order' might, in the facts and circumstances of its commission, reasonably supply justification for the satisfaction as to legitimate apprehension of a future repetition of similar activity to the detriment of the 'public order'. In Bimla Rani v. Union of India 1989 SCC (Cri) 756, following Ayya's case (supra), it was observed that the question is whether the incident had prejudicially affected the 'public order'. In other words, whether it affected the even tempo of life of the community. The question passed in Bimla Rani's case (supra) was answered more appropriately and with clarity in the case of Attorney General of India v. Amratlal Prajivandas AIR 1994 SC 2179, wherein the Apex Court ruled that it is beyond dispute that the order of detention can be passed on the basis of a single act. The test is whether the act is such that it gives rise to an inference that the person would continue to indulge in similar prejudicial activities. It cannot be said as a principle that one single act cannot be constituted the basis for detention. Now the law as it stands firmly embedded is that multiplicity of the criminal acts is not necessary to pass an order of preventive detention. If the solitary incident by itself gives rise to disturbance of 'public order' or is prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services, within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the NSA the detaining authority having been satisfied of its further repetition, may legitimately pass an order of preventive detention with a view to preserve even tempo of the life of the community.
8. The other limb of the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that where the petitioner can adequately be dealt with and punished under the ordinary criminal law an order of preventive detention should not be passed. It was pointed out that in the instant case, Crime No. 236 of 1999 under Sections 489-A/489-B/489-C, 419/420,1.P.C. has already been registered at P.S. Kotwali, Maharajganj and is under investigation and if the petitioner is ultimately found guilty, he shall be convicted and sentenced. It was argued that since the petitioner has been granted bail in the criminal case, the District Magistrate has passed the order of preventive detention with a view to frustrate the order of bail granted in his favour and with an avowed object to continue him in jail. A faint suggestion also appears to have been made that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to go on. Maintenance of public and social order is one of the obligations of the State, punishment to offender and prevention of offence are the two modes of its maintenance. The fact that the detenu could be tried in a criminal Court for commission of offence is immaterial because his liability to be tried in a Court of law cannot debar the authority from detaining him if his acts bring him within the purview of the relevant provisions of the statute. The matter was specifically dealt with by the Apex Court in Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal AIR 1974 SC 2154, in which distinction between 'preventive detention' and 'punitive incarceration' was brought out thus (at. page 2160) :
The power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised,in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution.
In Bankatlal v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1975 SC 522 : (1975 Cri LJ 439) dealing with the case of adulteration of food stuffs as prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life the community, it was observed that where the malaise is outgrown and malignant, the preventive 'radiotherapy' sanctioned by the Act can properly be applied. It is here that the distinction between the concepts of preventive detention and punitive incarceration comes in for importance.
9. As regards the contention that the criminal proceedings as well as proceedings for preventive detention could not go together, the matter came to be considered with all specificity in Alijan Mian's case (supra) in which it was pointed out that preventive detention is an anticipatory measure arid does not relate to an offence while the criminal proceedings are to punish a person for an offence committed by him. They are not parallel proceedings. In the circumstances, the pendency of criminal prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention nor is an order of preventive detention a bar to prosecution. It is for the detaining authority to have subjective satisfaction whether in a particular case there are sufficient materials to place a person under preventive detention in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order'.
10. Sequel to the above submission, a passing reference may also be made to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no offence was made out against the petitioner as the counterfeit currency notes were passed on to him in exchange of currency notes of smaller denominations by one Alok Kumar and believing them to be the genuine currency notes, he passed them on to Brij Behari Shah to liquidate the outstanding balance against him. It is not necessary for us to go into the question if offence under Sections 489-A/489-B/489-C, 419/420, IPC were made out against the petitioner or not. Section 3(2) of the NSA nowhere requires that the powers could be exercised only if the offence is committed and not otherwise. As was observed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Deepak Sharma v. District Magistrate Aligarh 1989 (37) ACC 200, the power of detention is to be exercised if the detaining authority is satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner, prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of 'public order' or to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, it was necessary to detain that person. There could be a situation where a person by his act was likely to prejudice the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. It would be the lookout of the regular criminal Court to see if and what offence was made out by such act. The only concern of the detaining authority is to see that the alleged acts prejudiced the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.
11. Even though there is no bar to pass an order of preventive detention against a person, who is arraigned of a criminal charge, the law of preventive detention, which is a hard law, has to be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardized unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant law. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1984 SC 1334 : (1984 Cri LJ 909) as well as Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1986 SC 2173 : (1986 Cri LJ 2042), the view taken by the Apex Court was that the law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law, it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail unless the materials available are such as would satisfy the requirement of the legal provisions authorizing such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal Court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinizing validity of an order of preventive detention, which is passed in very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal Court. In para 25 of the report in Bankatlal's case (supra), a guideline was laid down for the exercise of power by the detaining authority. It reads as follows (at pages 528-529; of AIR) :
25. One broad test therefore, for the exercise of the power which the detaining authority may usefully keep in view, particularly in a case of adulteration of foodstuffs, is : 'whether the material before it about the activities of the person sought to be detained in the proximate past and present, is such as to enable it to make a reasonable prognosis of the probability of that person to behave similarly in the future.' The nature and process of the activity, its magnitude, its impact on the public generally and the incidence of the evil in the locality or in the State generally, are some of the relevant factors which the authority may usefully take into consideration in arriving at its satisfaction.
In A.K. Roy v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 710 : (1982 Cri LJ 340), the question of satisfaction of detaining authority received the attention of the Apex Court. It observed that the detention, it must be remembered, is based not on facts proved either by applying the test of preponderance of probabilities or of reasonable doubt. The detention is based on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that it is necessary to detain a particular person in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain stated objects. The basis imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not apply to the 'subjective satisfaction' component of imprisonment for reasons of internal security, was the observation earlier made by Apex Court in Gulam Hussain v. Police, Commissioner Calcutta AIR 1974 SC 2336 (sic). Undoubtedly, the firmness of the above legal position cannot be disputed.
12. Now we come to the moot controversy raised by Sri Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner with reference to the provisions of Section 3(2) of the NSA. It was pointed out that under the said provision an order with respect to any person for detention may be passed with a view to preventing him from acting, in any manner, prejudicial:
i) to the security of the State;
ii) to the maintenance of public order, and
iii) to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.
13. It was urged that these three categories are mutually exclusive and the detaining authority has to be satisfied on facts as to under which of the three grounds mentioned above, a person is required to be detained. According to Sri Mishra, the detaining authority, in the instant case, has exhibited a sense of mental vacillation as is reflected from his slippery satisfaction about the ground for which the petitioner was to be detained. The submission of Sri Mishra, in nutshell is that, if at all, the petitioner could be detained under the third ground i.e., with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community and not under the second ground of maintenance of 'public order'. The detention order, as said above, has been passed in the case of the petitioner to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of'public order'. Now the question is whether the petitioner could be detained by the District Magistrate only under the third ground as has been suggested by learned counsel for the petitioner.
14. The scope of expression 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community' came to be considered and interpreted by the Apex Court in the oft quoted case of A.K. Roy v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 710 : (1982 Cri LJ 340). The Supreme Court observed that which supplies and services are essential to the community can easily be defined by the legislature and, indeed, the legislations, which regulate the prices and possession of essential commodities either enumerate those commodities or confer upon the appropriate Government the power to do so. Pursuant to the said observations, the Government of India issued a notification dated 8-2-1982 specifying sixteen supplies and services as 'supplies and services' essential to the community for purposes of Section 3(2) of the NSA. At SI. No. (xi), any service in connection with or in relation to Bank and at SI. No. (xiv) any service in any mint or security press have been specified. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, since the currency notes fall within the aforesaid two categories of essential supplies and services notified by the Government of India, the District Magistrate should have passed the detention order against the petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community instead of passing it for the maintenance of 'public order' and since the District Magistrate has not passed the order under the appropriate ground, it cannot be easily concluded that he has formed an opinion in a mechanical manner without looking to the real allegations and the material against the petitioner. We have given thoughtful consideration to this aspect of the matter. Had the District Magistrate used one or other of the grounds in the alternate, for example, 'public order' or 'security of State' or 'maintenance of supplies and services' the detention order would have certainly failed in law as in that case it could be concluded that he was doubtful about the facts or the grounds on which the petitioner was to be detained. Either/or ill fits into Section 3(2) of the NSA. A man may be detained on grounds (a) and (b) but not (a) or (b). In Section 3, the cumulative not the alternative is the tenor of the order. Where, however, the disjunctive 'or' is used instead of conjunctive 'and', it would mean that the detaining authority was either not certain whether the alleged activities of the petitioner endangered public order' or the essential 'supplies and services' or it did not seriously apply its mind to the question whether such activities fall under one head or the other and merely reproduced mechanically the language of Section 3. When the detenu is not told whether his alleged activities set out in grounds of detention fell under one head or the other or both, it would be difficult for him to make an adequate and effective representation against the order of detention. Had it been a case of using the alternatives, due care was to stand negatived and the order would certainly fail. In the instant case, the detaining authority has not used the alternatives. He has detained the petitioner on the second ground as in his opinion the acts of the petitioner were prejudicial for the maintenance of 'public order". Even though the acts committed by the petitioner or the apprehended acts were likely to prejudice the maintenance of essential supplies and services, the detaining authority could have passed the order under the second ground, i.e., maintenance of 'public order'. Sometimes the offending acts may overlap in either of the three classes and on account of its remifications on the society as a whole or at least on a section of it, every possible situation cannot be brought under watertight classification and a set of test to deal with them cannot be laid down. The concentric concepts of 'security of 'State', 'public order' and maintenance of essential supplies and services' may have a common epicentre. If the detaining authority felt that it was necessary to detain the petitioner on the ground that his activities affected or were likely to affect both 'public order' and the 'security of State", it would use conjunctive 'and', and not the disjunctive 'or' in reciting its satisfaction.
15. The controversy now boils down to this : whether or not the detaining authority was justified in passing the order of detention against the petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of 'public order' or it was incumbent upon him to have detained him with a view to prevent him from acting prejudicially to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. 'Public order' is not necessarily disturbed by panicking the community by show of force though normally, in a case of infraction of law or use of open force, the disturbance is so sudden and grave that commotion and panic immediately follows; when violence is advocated, it spontaneously tends to disturb the even tempo of life of the society as a whole thereby prejudicially threatening the maintenance of 'public order'. While the various criminal acts leading to 'public disorder' in the society are obtrusive and obvious, certain potential surreptitious and secret unlawful activities may be strikingly prejudicial to the 'public order'. More serious and of wide spectrum are the cases where the 'public order' is disturbed in a clandestine and silent manner. Sometimes the impact of particular criminal activities may telescope each other. Economic destabilization is deadly poison for healthy existence of a developing country. Certainly, economic disorder, in contradistinction to the criminal activities backed by use of force, results in serious prejudice to 'public order'. Detention is not illegal merely because the order of detention is passed only to prevent the detenu from acting prejudicially to the maintenance of 'public order' though the detaining authority, on the basis of available materials could also detain him for his activities prejudicial to maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, (see R. Lallawama v. District Magistrate Lunglsi (Mizoram) 1984 Cr LJ 101 (Gau).
16. The expressions 'law and order' and 'public order' do not admit of any precise definition. The Courts have given such varying interpretations that even after a lapse of more than a quarter century it cannot be said with certainty as to which activity of a criminal will fall within the ambit of the expression 'public order'. We do not propose to burden the judgement with repeated citations, as we have done so in our earlier decisions in Criminal Misc. Writ No. 34770 of 1999 Sanjay Singh v. State of U.P. Habeas Corpus Writ No. 33888 of 1999 : (2000 All LJ 638) Udai Veer Singh v. State of U.P. decided 14-10-1999 : (2000 All LJ 294) Habeas Corpus Writ No. 38159 of 1999 Rajiv Vashistha v. State of U.P. decided on 1-12-1999 : (2000 All LJ 743) and Habeas Corpus Writ No. 35384 of 1999 Sant Singh v. District Magistrate Varanasi decided on 6-12-1999 : (2000 All LJ 682) and feel contented by laying down the basic difference, which has emerged from the various decisions. The point whether an act amounts to breach of 'law and order' or 'public order' solely depends on its extent and reach to the society. If the act is restricted to particular individuals or group of individuals, it breaches the 'law and order' problem but if the effect of reach and potentialities of the act is so deep as to affect the community at large and/or the even tempo of the community then it becomes a breach of the 'public order'.
17. In a recent decision of the Apex Court in Tarannum v. Union of India AIR 1999 SC 1015 : (1998 Cri LJ 1414) a reference was made to its earlier decision in Smt. Angoori Devi for Ram Ratan v. Union of India AIR 1989 SC 371 : (1989 Cri LJ 950) in which the Apex Court had the occasion to consider the fine distinguishing feature between 'public order' and 'law and order'. It observed as follows (at page 373; of AIR) :
The impact on 'public order' and 'law and order' depends upon the nature of the act, the place where it is committed and motive force behind it. If the act is confined to an individual without directly or indirectly affecting the tempo of the life of the community, it may be a matter of law and order only. But where the gravity of the act is otherwise and likely to endanger the public tranquillity, it may fall within the orbit of the public order. This is precisely the distinguishing feature between the two concepts.
The observations in Harpreet Kaur (Mrs.) Harvinder Singh Bedi v. State of Maharashtra 1992 AIR SCW 835 are worth quoting (at pages 841-842) :
Crime is a revolt against the whole society and an attack on the civilisation of the day. Order is the basic need of any organised civilised society and any attempt to disturb that order affects the society and the community. The distinction between breach of 'law and order' and disturbance of 'public order' is one of degree and the extent of reach of the activity in question upon the society. In their essential quality, the activities which affect 'law and order' and those which disturb 'public order' may not be different but in their potentiality and effect upon even tempo of the society and public tranquillity there is a vast difference. In each case, therefore, Courts have to see the length, magnitude and intensity of the questionable activities of a person to find out whether his activities are prejudicial to maintenance of 'public order' or only 'law and order.
18. The same act in a given setting may appertain to 'law and order' while in a changed setting may be in the realm of 'public order'. To ascertain whether the order of detention is valid or is liable to be vacated, it is not advisable to blindly follow the guidelines in a different case. The problem arising in each case, must be considered on its own facts and in the proper setting. To import the ratio of a case vitally connected with facts thereof is bound to have misleading results. Unshackled and uninfluenced with a particular decision we proceed to examine, with reference to the well established parameters and guidelines, whether the activity of possession and circulation of counterfeit currency is prejudicial to the maintenance of 'public order'. The term counterfeit' means likeness or resemblance, intended to deceive, and to be taken for that which is original and genuine. It means to make something falsely and fraudulently in imitation or the semblance of that which is true. A person is said to counterfeit who causes one thing to resemble another thing, intending by means of that resemblance to practise deception, or knowing it to be likely that deception will thereby be practised. Counterfeit does not connote an exact reproduction of the original counterfeited : the difference between the original and the counterfeit is not limited to a difference existing only by reason of faulty reproduction. A person who counterfeits cannot, for instance, escape conviction on the ground that he has deliberately made a small alteration in the design or omitted a letter from the superscription surrounding the design or distinguishing figure. If the designs are particularly identical, the mere substitution of a different word in the spurious mark to that in the original, cannot take the spurious mark out of the category of a counterfeit trade mark and bring it within the category of a false trade mark only, especially when the object of a person manufacturing the spurious article bearing the counterfeit trade mark is to deceive unwary purchaser into the belief that they are purchasing the real article Ordinarily, counterfeit implies the idea of an exact imitation; but for the purpose of the Indian Penal Code, there can be counterfeiting even though the imitation is not exact and there are differences in detail between the original and the imitation so long as the resemblance is so close that deception may thereby be practised.
19. Genuine currency is of vital importance to the human existence in a civilized society. Counterfeit currency is an antithesis of the economic order. Possession and circulation of counterfeit currency undoubtedly is an anti-social and anti-national activity. It poses serious threat to the economy and thereby to the security of nation. On account of such activities the economic health and growth of the nation is impeded. Such activities destabilise the national economy and are injurious to the economic development of the nation. The entire fiscal discipline of the country is bound to be disrupted and shattered, if counterfeit currency is floated in the market. By possessing and circulating the forged or counterfeit currency notes, using them as genuine, a crisis of confidence is generated as the credibility of the genuine national currency is shaken. People become shaky and are in the grip of fear while accepting even the genuine currency notes, lest they may not be deceived. The subversive activities affecting the economy of the country, at large, are prejudicial to the maintenance of 'public order'. Such a situation in the country is to be tackled in a most determined and effective way. To eliminate or at least minimise such activities, effective and firm action against those who are undermining and discrediting the foundation of our social and economic structure is required. The menace of the economic offenders came to be analysed by Apex Court in the case of Dwarka Prasad Sahu v. State of Bihar AIR 1975 SC 134 : (1975 Cri LJ 221) as well as Satva Dev Prasad v. State of Bihar AIR 1975 SC 367 : (1975 Cri LJ 419). It was observed that economic offenders are a menace to the society and it is necessary in the interest of the economic well being of the community to mercilessly stamp out such pernicious, antisocial and highly reprehensible activities which are causing havoc to the economy of the country and inflicting untold hardships on the common man and the Court would, therefore, naturally be loath to interfere with an order of detention which is calculated to put an economic offender out of action by way of social defence.
20. A faint suggestion came to be made on behalf of the petitioner that the detaining authority has failed to apply his mind to the material which was placed before him and that the detention order was passed in a routine and casual manner. Sri Misra pointed out that in the grounds required to be communicated under Section 8 of the NSA, the actual date has not been mentioned though '...6.1999' has been mentioned. The grounds were annexed with the order of detention, a copy of which has been brought on record with the rejoinder affidavit as Annexure R.A.I. A perusal of this order would indicate that the District Magistrate signed, sealed and issued the order on 27-6-1999. In the representation which the petitioner has made to the State Government, a copy of which is Annexure 3 to the writ petition, the order of detention dated 27-6-1999 has been mentioned. The dispute with regard to the date of detention or the date on which the grounds were signed is nothing but hair-splitting. It was also urged that in the light of the material placed before the detaining authority, the order of detention should have been passed under the third, i.e., to prevent the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of 'supplies and services essential to the community' and not under the second clause with regard to the maintenance of 'public order'. This aspect of the matter has already been dealt above. Sri D. S. Misra placed reliance on the three decisions of this Court, namely, Rajendra v. State of U.P. 1989 All LJ 817, Pawan Kumar Pandey v. Adhikshak Karagar Faizabad 1993 UPCRR 557 and Ramakant Yadav v. Superintendent District Jail, Azamgarh 1993 UPCRR 501 to support the contention that the detention order was passed on non-existent fact and consequently illegal. We have thoroughly scanned the decisions aforesaid and find that they are not applicable on all fours to the facts of the present case. In the instant case, the petitioner had already been granted bail in case Crime No. 236 of 1999 under Sections 489-A/489-B/489-C, 419/ 420, IPC and it was only after the release of the petitioner on bail that the District Magistrate taking' into consideration the material forwarded by the sponsoring authority came to the conclusion that the petitioner has indulged in circulation of the counterfeit currency notes thereby disturbing 'public order'.
21. It is true that the personal liberty is more cherished than all other freedoms taken together. Detention without trial is a serious matter and the order of detention must be justified by the detaining authority, whenever human liberty is in peril and justice is threatened, the citizen should receive the fullest protection from the Court within the four corners of Article 22 of the Constitution benignantly stretched and all the safeguards of the NSA liberally interpreted, of course, within the legitimate limit. This is one aspect of the matter when we view the rights of individual who is in our focus. The liberties and the privileges which an individual enjoys are, however, subject to the larger interest of the society. Though the liberty of an individual under our Constitution is very sacrosanct and authorities concerned have a constitutional duty to respect the same, the concept of individual liberty should not be so stretched to such unreasonable extent to force the detaining authority to sacrifice the national interest or the 'public order'. If the detaining authority feels satisfied in passing the detention order, the facts which impelled him to take such a drastic step cannot be sifted or probed by this Court since it has a limited role in the matter of examining validity or otherwise of the detention order. This Court does not sit in appeal over the detention order and it is not for this Court to go into and assess probative value of evidence available to the detaining authority. In this connection a reference may be made to the decisions of the Apex Court in State of Gujarat v. Adam Kasam Bhayya AIR 1981 SC 2005 : (1981 Cri LJ 1686), Ayya alias Ayub (supra), U. Vijay Laxmi (Mrs.) v. State of Tamil Nadu 1995 SCC (Cri) 176, and the decision of this Court in Vijay Pal alias Pappu v. Union of India 1996 (33) ACC 741. In a recent decision in Ahmad Nassar v. State of Tamil Nadu 1999 (98) JTSC 252 : (AIR 1999 SC 3897) the Apex Court has taken the view that when one's liberty is to be curtailed on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority with area of interference by the Court being limited, then within this limitation Court must see in the privileged areas that the detaining authority does not stretch illegitimately in exercise of its jurisdiction. Though the jurisdiction of the Court in the matter is limited with regard to the scanning of the facts which led to the satisfaction of the detaining authority it cannot be asserted or argued that the detention order is beyond the pale of scrutiny. Within the ambit of the constricted powers, the Court is empowered to spell and cull out the materials and facts to ascertain justification for passing the detention order. It is all the more necessary in view of the fact that the law cherishes the individual liberty and guards it jealously.
22. After waiting through the material available on record, we are of the opinion that the detaining authority legitimately drew his subjective satisfaction that the petitioner who has once been committed to jail under the ordinary criminal law of the land in connection with Crime case No. 236 of 1999 under Section 489A/489B/489C, 419/420, IPC in which he has been released on bail, has not given up his nefarious criminal activities and was indulging in forging and circulating the counterfeit currency. The very nature and magnitude of the activities of the petitioner were such that unless they were interdicted by a preventive detention order, the activities were likely to be repeated. The repetition of such activities till the petitioner .is tried and interdicted in a criminal trial, cannot effectively be prevented except by his detention.
23. Economic order is the basic need of any organized and civilized society. Circulation of counterfeit currency is having an increasingly deleterious effect on the national economy and thereby a serious effect on security of the State. It has come on record that the currency notes of Rs. 500 denomination were being smuggled from Nepal, a neighbouring country. There are certain highly vulnerable areas where such activities of considerable magnitude are clandestinely organised and carried on. In the chain of illegal activities a number of persons, known and unknown, are cocooned from public gaze. Their activities are masked behind multifold layers. They, in course of time, have come to establish their relations with the criminals in the neighbouring country. The criminals concerned with such activities are posing a real and grave threat to out democratic polity. If this malaise is allowed to go unchecked, the very edifice of our nation will be eroded. It is bound to cast a long shadow on our national economy. The vicious circle is eating into the very vitals of our nation. More than even before there is an imperative need for combating the evil adopting drastic measures to root out this cancerous growth before this malignancy spreads further. There is an urgency to adopt reactive steps to check circulation of counterfelt currency by immobilising the persons engaged in such activities. We have no hesitation in our mind that here it is a case in which on the basis of the facts and circumstances, stated above, and the material placed before him, the District Magistrate could reasonably be satisfied that unless the petitioner is detained, he was likely to continue the activity of circulating the counterfeit currency in future playing have with public life and thereby eroding public faith in our political and financial institutions. One cannot escape from the finding that the activities of the petitioner were highly prejudicial to the maintenance of 'public order' and, therefore, his detention, in the circumstances, was justified.
24. Right to make representation against order of detention is fundamental right. In a series of decisions, the Apex Court has, on a construction of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, has held that the representation made should be considered expe-ditiously by the Government. The petitioner was provided all necessary material with a view to enable him to make effective representation. He did make a detailed and effective representation which ultimately was rejected with all expedition. There was no delay in the disposal of the representation of the petitioner at any level.
25. In the result, the petitioner has not been successful in challenging the detention order on any ground, whatsoever. His detention is clearly in accordance with the procedure as established by law. The writ petition fails and is dismissed.