Himachal Pradesh High Court
Mandir Thakurdwara vs Shiv Karan Singh & Ors on 18 September, 2019
Author: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 624 of 2007 .
Reserved on: 12.09.2019 Date of decision: 18.09.2019.
Mandir Thakurdwara .....Appellant/Plaintif Versus Shiv Karan Singh & Ors. .....Respondents/defendants Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.
No. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Appellant/Plaintif: Mr. Bhupender Gupta, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. Janesh Gupta, Advocate.
For the Respondents/Defendants: Mr. Surender Verma, Advocate.
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge Plaintif is the appellant, who aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned first Appellate Court, whereby, it reversed the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court and dismissed the suit of the plaintif, has filed the instant appeal.
The parties hereinafter shall be referred to as the 'plaintif' and 'defendants'.
2. Case of the plaintif was that the land in suit measuring 6 kanals 3 marlas as detailed in head note of the 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 2 plaint was owned and possessed by the plaintif. The defendants were never inducted as tenants over the land in suit nor came in .
possession thereof. The land belonged to idol and the entries in the name of defendants in the revenue record as tenant in the column of cultivation were wrong, illegal, null and void to law and had been made at the back of the plaintif. On the basis of the wrong entries, the defendants started threatening to interfere in
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r to the suit land and it is then that the plaintif came to know about the wrong entries, hence the suit for declaration and injunction.
The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement, wherein, it was alleged that they were in possession of the land in suit as tenants and had become owners after operation of H. P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. Legal objections regarding limitation, non-joinder of necessary parties, locus standi, cause of action, estoppel and jurisdiction were also raised.
4. In replication, the plaintif controverted the allegations of the defendants and re-affirmed and reiterated the averments made in the plaint.
5. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed:-
1. Whether the plaintif is owner in possession of the suit land and the entries in the revenue record showing the defendant as tenant are illegal, wrong, null and void?OPP ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 3
2. Whether the plaintif is entitled to the relief of injunction as prayed?OPP .
3. Whether the suit is within limitation?OPP
4. Whether suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD
5. Whether the plaintif has no cause of action?OPD
6. Whether the plaintif is estopped to file this suit by his act and conduct?OPD
7. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit?OPD
8. Relief.
6. Learned trial Court after recording evidence and evaluating the same, decreed the suit of the plaintif, as prayed for.
7. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the defendants filed an appeal before the learned first Appellate Court, who vide its judgment and decree dated 31.08.2007 allowed the appeal, constraining the plaintif to file the instant appeal
8. On 18.07.2008, the appeal came to be admitted on the following substantial questions of law:-
1. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has recorded erroneous and perverse findings holding the suit filed by plaintif-appellant to be barred by limitation by invoking Article 58 of Limitation Act which was not attracted in the facts of the present case?
2. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has acted in an erroneous and perverse manner by putting reliance on the provision of Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, the provision of which had no applicability to the controversy in the suit? Has not the Lower Appellate Court recorded ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 4 erroneous findings by applying the maxim "once a tenant always a tenant", especially when the defendants failed to .
prove the creation of tenancy in their favour in a lawful manner?
3. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has committed a grave error of law and jurisdiction in putting reliance on the revenue entries and raising presumption of truth by rejecting the testimony of the plaintif-appellant and also ignoring the basic proposition of law that the entries in the name of defendants or their predecessors were not proved to be lawfully substituted?
4. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has committed grave error of law and jurisdiction by ignoring the case pleaded by the plaintif-appellant that the alleged right of tenancy could never be created by the Mahant of the temple who had also limited interest, which property is in the shape of "debutter's property" or a "trust property"? Has not the Lower Appellate Court recorded erroneous findings by holding that pleadings of plaintif-appellant were self contradictory?
Substantial Question of Law No. 49. At the outset, it needs to be noticed that the learned Trial Court after placing reliance on the judgment of the Privy Council in Ram Charan Dass vs. Naurangi Lal and others, AIR-1933 Privy Council 75 held that since the property belongs to an institution, therefore, no power vested with the Mahant to create a permanent lease in respect of the land in suit in favour of the defendants or their predecessors. However, the learned Appellate Court set aside the findings, that too, by recording a very strange reason that there is nothing on file to ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 5 prove that Mahant of an institution had ever created any permanent lease in respect of the land in favour of the .
predecessor-in-interest of the defendants. This finding, to say the least, is perverse and based upon complete misreading of the pleadings and evidence on record.
10. Ext.D-5 is the copy of jamabandi for the year 1951- 52 wherein Pohlo predecessor-in-interest of the defendants alongwith Behari is recorded in possession of land in suit alongwith other land comprised in Khasra Nos. 980, 985, 994, 1045, 1049 and 1050 as tenants on payment of Bataee under Ram Dass Chella as Malik Adna in which Hakam and others are recorded as 'AALA MALIK'. The entries in Ext. D4 copy of Misal Haquiat Isteymal also reveals that said Behari and Pohlo are recorded in possession of Khasra Nos. 1045 and 1049 alongwith other Khasra Nos. 973, 980, 981, 982, 984, 985, 994, 1050 and 1051 under Ram Dass Chella on payment of Galla Bataee "CHOTHAEE'.
11. The ordinary meaning of 'Chella' is disciple and, therefore, land essentially vests and is owned by the institution i.e. The Thakurdwara.
12. The issue in question has been considered in detail by this Court (Coram: Justice P. K. Palli, J.) in RSA No. 478 of ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 6 1989, title Thakarji Maharaj and others vs. Dhani Ram, decided on 01.07.1997, wherein it was observed as under:
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"14. The learned first appellate Court in the impugned judgment has certainly gone wrong to observe that the onus to prove that the Mahant did not have the authority to alienate the property, lay upon the plaintif. It is too well-known that a Mahant has no right or authority to alienate the property which is attached to the institution except for legal necessity. No such necessity has been even remotely suggested by the defendant, least proved.
14. Even a property is acquired by an individual who belongs to a particular sect or fraternity, the acquisition so made is to be considered as the acquisition of that religious or charitable institution to which he belongs. A person who enters religious fraternity, severs all connections with his natural family and is not entitled to inherit the property as a heir in his own family.
15. A religious Trust, the management, the office and the property attached to the institution cannot be alienated by the office-holder of the institution for the time being. The office-holder may, in the given situation, be called a Mahant, Mohitmim, Manager, Gadinashin, spiritual head of the Muth, a Granthi, Matwali or a Sujdanashin.
16. The office-holder has a very restricted right of alienation and if at all a situation of that kind arises, it has to be seen whether there was unavoidable necessity warranting such type alienation or not.
17. If it is proved that the alienation was entered into for the benefit of the deity or for defending hostile litigation, a case may be made out to support such alienation. If an alienation is held to be illegal, it may, in ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 7 the given situation, be a ground for the removal or expulsion of the office-holder from his status.
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18. A Mahant possesses wide powers of administration in respect of the property that is attached to the temple, 'Dera', 'Math' or 'Thakardwara' by virtue of the office he holds. He holds the institution and its properties in the position of a Trustee and like a guardian of an infant minor. The property held by him is to be utilized for the purposes of the institution to fulfill the aims and objects for which it has been so founded. The Mahant has vast powers which are manifested in respect of collection of rents and profits, earnings from oferings and a wide discretion in the application of funds.
19. A Mahant, as a head of the institution and being in-
charge of its afairs in his capacity as such can, no doubt, incur debts and borrow money for the upkeep and maintenance of the customary rituals and ceremonies as well as for the preservation of the Trust property.
20.The Judicial Committee in Hunooman Persaud Mussamat Babooee (1856) 6 M.I.A. 393 has defined the power and authority of a Mahant in regard to the alienation of the property as analogous to that of a manager for an infant minor. It was further held that he has no power to alienate the debutter property except "in a case of need or for the benefit of the estate."
21. It may also be noticed that needs to be emphasised that a Mahant has no right to grant a permanent lease what to talk of outright sale. It has been held by their Lordship of the Privy Council in the case reported in AIR 1933 Privy Council 75, (Ram Charan Das vs. Naurangi Lal and others) that an alienation by Mahant of property belonging to mutt is good and efective for life time of such Mahant and adverse possession of alinee begins only on his death or removal and not from the date of ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 8 alienation. At page 78 it has been observed that a Mahant is at liberty to dispose of the property of a mutt during the .
period of his life and a grant purporting to be for a longer period is good to the extent of Mahant's life interest. Whatever the intended duration of the attempted grant may be, it is good but good only for the limited period indicated. It, thus, follows that the property attached to the institution in the real sense belongs to the idol installed therein. Even the building consisting of brick, mortar and earth where the idol is installed, belongs to it. Since, the idol in the very nature of things is unable to manage its afairs, it has to work through a human agency who would be the Mahant or office-holder of the institution in the given situation. A Mahant, admittedly, cannot delegate his powers.
22. In my considered view, even a long lease at a fixed rent cannot be termed as an act of good management.
Even short leases should be proved to have been entered into for the benefit of the endowment and a lease on a fixed rent for a long time can certainly not be held to be for the benefit of the endowment for augmentation of a variable rent from time to time. A lease created in complete derogation of this rule, would amount to breach of duty on the part of the Mahant who is the custodian of the Trust. It is also a settled proposition that where the succession to the 'GADI' has devolved from 'Guru' to 'Chela', the presumption is that the institution and the property is dedicated to religious use and the property, even if it is recorded in the personal name of the Mahant, will not belong to him but would belong to the institution of which he is Mahant for the time being.
13. Similar issue came up for consideration before another Coordinate Bench of this Court (Justice Sandeep Sharma, ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 9 J.) in Smt. Urmil Gupta vs. Commissioner, AIR 2017 HP 183, wherein the ratio of the judgment is in tune with that of Dhani .
Ram's case (supra) and it has been specifically held that "Mohatmim has no power to alienate debutter property except in case of need or for benefit of the estate."
14. It would be apposite to refer to the relevant observations, which read thus:-
16. In the present case, even if facts/averments, as contained in plaint, are taken to be correct, one Ramanuj, who was 'Mohatmim', created a permanent lease in respect of the suit land in favour of the plaintif by executing a lease deed Ex. PW-2/A for leased money at the rate of Rs.100/- per annum. 'Mohatmim' Ramanuj, at the time of leasing out property, was acting like the guardian of temple and as such he had no authority, whatsoever, to lease out property belonging to the Deity.
It is well settled that property given for maintenance of religious worship and of charities connected with it is inalienable and the powers of 'Mohatmim' or a Mahant to alienate debutter property is analogous to that of a manager for an infant heir. 'Mohatmim' has no power to alienate the property except for his need or for benefit of the estate.
17. Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Sridhar Suar and another vs. Shri Jagan Nath Temple and others, AIR 1976 SC 1860, which has also been taken note of by the learned first appellate Court, has categorically held that it is beyond the powers of a manager to grant a permanent lease at a fixed rent I the absence of unavoidable necessity; for, to fix the rent, though adequate at the time in perpetuity, in lieu of giving the endowment the benefit ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 10 of an augmentation of a variable rent from time-to-time would be a breach of duty on the part of the manager. It .
has been specifically held that the 'Mohatmim' has no power to alienate debutter property except in case of need or for benefit of the estate. Hon'ble Apex Court has further held in the aforesaid judgment that 'Mohatmim' is not entitled to sell the property for the purpose of investing the price of it so as to bring in an income larger than that derived from the property itself. Nor can he, except for legal necessity grant a permanent lease of debutter property, though he may create proper derivative tenures and estates conformable to usage.
18. It would be profitable to take note of the following paras of the judgment supra:
"14. Now assuming without holding that the Sanand amounted to a lease, it cannot even then be held to be valid as permanent alienation of the temple debutter properties prohibited. The position is stated thus at page 489 of Mulla's Treatise on Principles of Hindu Law (11th Edition):
"The power of a shebait or a mohunt to alienate debutter property is analogous to that of a manager for an infant heir as defined by the Judicial Committee in Hunooman Pershad vs. Mussamat Babooee 6 MIA 393. As held in that case, he has no power to alienate debutter proerty expect in a case of need or for the benefit of the estate. He is not entitled to sell the property for the purpose of investing, the price of it so as to bring in an income larger than that derived from the property itself. Nor can he, except for legal necessity grant a permanent lease of debutter property, though he may create proper derivate tenures and estates conformable to usage."
15. Once the ratio of the aforesaid judgments is absolutely clear then, judicial comity, discipline, concomitance, pragmatism, poignantly point, per force to observe constitutional propriety and adhered to the decision rendered by the Coordinate Bench, more particularly, when I see no reason to ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 11 disagree with the view taken in the aforesaid judgments. Thus, what stands settled is that the power of Shebait, Mohitmim or a .
Mahant to alienate deity's property is analogous to that of a Manager for an infant heir and he has no power to alienate such property except in case of need for the benefit of the estate, which is not the fact situation obtaining in the instant case.
16. Even in the jamabandi Ext.P1 for the year 1988-89, the suit land is recorded in the ownership of the plaintif and defendants and are recorded in possession of the land as non-
occupancy tenant. Thus, it stands proved on record that tenancy in question was created by Mahant of the temple, but then in absence of any legal necessity such tenancy could not have been created.
17. Now, adverting to the plea of tenancy, it needs to be noticed that there is no presumption of tenancy and the same has to be proved in accordance with law.
18. This question has been dealt with in detail by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Mangsharoo vs. Sarfu, 2011 (3) HLR 1413, wherein it was observed as under:-
" 16. Adverting to the first question dealing with the affidavit Ex.PW-1/B and Ex.DA, a number of submissions have been made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. The sale deed has been upheld by the learned trial Court and I do not see any cogent reason to difer with that finding. In-fact, it is a registered document and ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 12 there is nothing on record to establish/show that the plaintif is not owner of the suit land. Ex.PW-1/A which is .
same as Ex.DA, is an affidavit executed by Amerpur before the Compensation Officer, Rohru. It states that Amerpur son of Sarnu in some proceedings, titled: Madan son of Mangal Dass son of Usfu and Sarfu son of Karmu. I find that it does not talk about tenancy rights or all that it records is that Sarfu has given 15 bighas 19 biswas of land in Khasra No.59, Khata-Khatauni No.15/28 to Mangal Das s.How and in what circumstances the Court used this as interpreting to mean that there was actually tenancy on the land, is not clear. Adverting to the sale deed Ex.PW-1/A it shows that the possession of the land sold has been delivered to the plaintif herein. In these circumstances, I find that two Courts below have been remiss in holding that this document itself constitutes the starting point/creation of any tenancy.
Question Nos.2 and 5:
17. In question No.2, both the parties have cited a number of judgments in support of their contentions.
Before adverting to the facts, the law cited by learned counsel may be considered. Learned counsel for the appellant relies upon the decision of the Lahore High Court in Girdhari Ram and others vs. Qasim and others, AIR 1936 Lahore 461, holding:-
"... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... I am aware of the fact that it is the practice of revenue authorities in this province to record a person, who is in possession of land without any ostensible title thereto, in the column of cultivator describing him as a tenant-at-will, and that sometimes a remark is added mentioning the grounds on which the person in possession claims to be in possession. No presumption of tenancy necessarily arises in such cases, but in the present case there is something more than that."
(p.462)
18. In Relhu Ram vs. Than Singh and others, 1966 (LXVIII) P.L.R.866 again the Court holds:-
::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 13"5. Mr.Nehra then sought to contend that the defendants had established on the present record .
that they were the tenants of the land in dispute.
Again on this matter there is a concurrent decision on a question of fact by the courts below which is binding on me in second appeal. Moreover, there is no evidence that any rent was being paid by the defendants to the plaintifs. As a matter of fact the entry is that they are paying no rent because of assertion of ownership. Therefore, the documentary evidence clearly shows that the entry that the tenants are non occupancy tenants is clearly erroneous. It is well known that the revenue authorities when they find a person in possession of the land without any right normally record him as a tenant irrespective of the fact whether he is a tenant or not. Non-payment of rent negatives existence of relationship of landlord and tenant. This was so held in Kanwar A. Ahmed Khan v. The Union of India, (1954)56 P.L.R.468:-
"The relationship of landlord and tenant comes into existence as the result of an agreement, express or implied. It may be implied from the acts and conduct of the parties which indicate that the landlord intended to divest himself of the possession of the premises and that the tenant intended to assume possession thereof. One of the most important circumstances from which this inference may be drawn is the payment of rent, for although rent is not an essential, it is a normal incident of tenancy, and the fact that a person in possession of the premises paid rent to the owner thereof indicates to an extent at least that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties. On the other hand the fact that no rent was paid would lead one to a contrary conclusion and negative the existence of such relationship." (pp.868-869)
19. In Maman Singh vs. The Resident Magistrate, Gohana and others, 1965(LXVII) P.L.R. 161, the Court holds:-
::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 14"5. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... It is well-settled that in deciding whether a person is a tenant, we have not to look to the entries in the column of cultivation in the .
jamabandi because that column only gives the name of the person in occupation, irrespective of the capacity in which he is occupying the land. On the contrary we have to look to the column of rent because it is the entries in that column which go to show as to whether the person is occupying the land as a tenant, and if so, on how much rent, or whether he is occupying the land in any other capacity. See Ghulam Murtaza v.Nagina, A.I.R.1930 Lah.991, Puran v.Kure, 57 P.L.R.,57 and Sher v.Phuman Ram, 1942 P.L.R. 497. .... ... ... ... ... ... ..."
(p.163)
20. To similar efect is the judgment of the Punjab High Court in Shri Tarlok Singh vs.Shri Harnam Singh and Another, 1974 P.L.J. 396, holding that the non-payment of rent negatives the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant, the entries in cultivation column and in the rent column are to be read together in order to ascertain the rights of the parties, entries in Khasra Girdawari do not attach presumption of truth and in case of any conflict in the entries in the copies of Khasra Girdawari with the copies of Jamabandi, the Patwari has to be examined for explaining the discrepancy. Similar is the decision in Ajmer Singh and Another vs. Surjit Singh and others, 1992 PLJ 311, holding that a person reflected in cultivating possession of the suit land in the revenue record without mentioning any rent being paid does not establish the relationship of landlord and tenant. In fact, the Court held:-
"7. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Non-payment of rent negatives the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant. Thus, the case set up by the first appellate Court that the defendants were in permissive possession cannot be sustained either on facts or in law."
21. Last case relied upon by the appellant is Kanshi Ram and Others vs. Rawat Singh and others, 1 972 P.L.J. 580. The Court holds:-
::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 15"2. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... It was nobody's case that these vendees were setting up any adverse possession or .
hostile title. The vendees were not claiming any better rights than those of tenants and they had actually paid a substantial amount to the owner in acknowledgement of his superior title or right of ownership in the land. The simple fact that the column of rent does not mention any lagan or rent would not imply that we can force on these persons who have been described as muzaras ghair maurusi the superior title or the ownership rights that they had never claimed. The expression "muzaras ghair maurusi" has to be given its ordinary meaning unless the entries in the column of rent were found to be inconsistent with the meaning to be assigned to the entries in the column of occupation. All the rulings cited before me by the counsel for the plaintif- pre-emptor are on altogether diferent facts. In Maman Singh v. The Resident Magistrate, Gohana and others, 1965 P.L.R. 161, Rulhu Ram v.Than Singh and others, 1966 P.L.R. 866 and Annamalai Goundan v.Venkatasami Naidu and others, A.I.R. 1959 Madras 354, the person who was in possession and who was described as a tenant-at-will in the column of cultivation was claiming better rights and could show entries in the column of rent in support of his plea of prescriptive title or better rights and could show entries in the column of rent in support of his plea of prescriptive title or better rights in the land. The entries in the column of rent in our case do not suggest that the person in possession was anything over and above a tenant-at-will as described in the column of cultivation and the person in possession does not claim any rights which could be described as hostile to the true owner. The words `muzaras' or `ghair maurusi' or `tenant-at-will' in the column of cultivation have, therefore, to be given their ordinary meaning and there is nothing in the entries in the column of rent to suggest that this description of the person in possession was incorrect. In fact, the person in possession does not claim to have any better rights than that of a tenant-at-will. The Courts are not entitled to make out a case for the parties which had not at all been pleaded by them. ... ... ..
19. Bearing in mind the aforesaid exposition of law, no doubt, the revenue record Ext. D-4 does show the defendants to be in possession on payment of Galla Bataee but then there is no ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 16 receipt or other documentary evidence brought on record to prove the plea of tenancy on payment of Galla Bataee.
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20. Now proceeding to determine the question of ownership by the defendants by conferment of propriety rights under the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, it needs to be observed that the property admittedly belongs to idol, who is perpetual minor and, therefore, no propriety rights qua its property can be conferred on any person in terms of sub Sections 8 and 9 of Section 104, which reads as under:-
(8) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (9), nothing contained in sub-section (1) to (6) shall apply to a tenancy of landowner owner during the period mentioned for each category of such landowners in sub-section (9), who,-
(a) is a minor or unmarried woman, or if married, divorced or separated from husband ow widow; or
(b) is permanently incapable of cultivating land by reason of any physical or mental infirmity; or
(c) is a serving member of the Armed Forces; or
(d) is the father of the person who is serving in the Armed Forces, up to the extent of inheritable share of such a member of the Armed Forces on the date of his joining the Armed Forces, to be declared by his father in the prescribed manner.
(9) In the case of landowners mentioned in clauses (a) to
(d) of sub-section (8), the provisions of sub-sections (1) to (6) shall not apply:-
(a) In case of minor during his minority and in case of other persons mentioned in clauses (a) and
(b) of sub-section (8) during their life time;
(b) in case of persons mentioned in clauses (c) and (d) sub-section (8) the period of their service in the Armed Forces subject to resumption of land by such persons to the extent mentioned in first proviso to clauses (d) and (dd) of sub-section (1) of section 34 ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 17 Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply to such land which is either owned by or is .
vested in Government under any law, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, and is leased out to any person."
21. Accordingly, the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the plaintif.
Substantial Questions of law No. 1 to 322. Once question No. 4 is answered in favour of the plaintif and against the defendants, then other questions are rendered academic. However, adverting to question No. 1 regarding limitation, even the learned first Appellate Court has specifically in para 24 of its judgment held that the plaintif to be the owner of the suit land. Once that be so, then the suit could not have been barred by limitation by invoking the provisions of Article 58 of the Limitation Act or rather in the given circumstances when the plaintif was admittedly the owner, it was incumbent upon the defendants to prove a better title or raise a plea of adverse possession. Once these pleas are not raised, the mere fact that the revenue entries are in favour of the defendants is of no avail and could not have formed the basis for computing the period of limitation.
23. As regards question No. 2 regarding the applicability of the provisions of Section 8 of the Punjab Security of Land ::: Downloaded on - 29/09/2019 04:31:02 :::HCHP 18 Tenures Act, 1953, I really fail to understand from where and how the provisions of the Act have been invoked and then applied to .
the facts of the present case, more particularly, when it was not even the case set up by either of the parties.
The Substantial questions of law are answered accordingly.
24. However, before parting it needs to be noticed that even though a photo copy of the judgment passed by this Court in Dhani Ram's case (supra) is found in the records of the first Appellate Court, but I really wonder why no reference to the same was made by the learned first Appellate Court especially when the issue in question was squarely covered by the said judgment.
25. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned first Appellate Court are set aside and that of learned Trial Court are restored. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
18th Sept., 2019 (Tarlok Singh Chauhan)
(sanjeev) Judge
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