Delhi District Court
Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust vs Pawan Kumar on 23 August, 2024
IN THE COURT OF SH. MANISH JAIN
ACJ-CUM-CCJ-CUM-ARC, NORTH DISTRICT,
ROHINI DELHI
RC ARC No. 21/2016.
CNR No. DLNT030000562014.
Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust
Through its Authorized Representative
Shri Pohkar Mal Garg & Shri Shardhanand Aggarwal
17, 19 & 19A, Main Bazar, Narela, Delhi-110040
......Petitioner
VERSUS
Pawan Kumar
S/o Sh. Jivan Dass
C/o Shop No. 1 in property no. 17, 19 & 19A
Shri Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust
Main Bazar, Narela, Delhi-110040
.....Respondent
Date of Institution : 06.06.2014
Date of reserving the order : 04.06.2024
Date of pronouncement : 23.08.2024
ORDER ON LEAVE TO DEFEND
1. The petitioner, by way of present petition, is seeking eviction of respondent from the shop no. 1 in property bearing no. 17, 19 & 19A, Pana Udyan, Main Bazar, Narela, Delhi-40 as shown in red colour in the site plan RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 1 / 18 annexed with the petition (hereinafter referred to as "tenanted premises") under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as "DRC Act").
2. Briefly stated, the case of the petitioner is that the petitioner is a charitable trust and owner of tenanted premises in which respondent was inducted as a tenant vide rent agreement on 01.02.1998 at a monthly rent of Rs 1,500/- exclusive of all charges. It is stated that the petitioner/ trust is indulged in public service and vide resolution dated 25.05.2014, the trust gives the trust premises to people at large for different purposes i.e. marriage/ religious/ tehrvi functions, yoga, bhandara etc. It is stated that the property in question consists of four shops on ground floor, out of which shop no. 1 is under use and occupation of respondent. It is submitted that petitioner wishes to open an Ayurvedic Clinic and a Homeopathic Clinic in the property in question which requires around 800 sq ft space in total as one room/ shop is required each for Doctor, medicines, compounder and waiting room for patients and thus, the petitioner requires 6 rooms/ shops for fulfilling both the above requirements. It is submitted that the petitioner does not have any other suitable accommodation available to meet out the requirements and thus, the petitioner bonafidely requires the tenanted premises to carry out the public services and in the public interest.
3. Notice of the petition was sent to the respondent in the prescribed format which was duly served on the RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 2 / 18 respondent, in response to which the respondent filed his leave to defend application accompanied by affidavit.
4. The respondent filed leave to defend application inter-alia on the following grounds :-
i. Section 22 of DRC Act over-rides Section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act in so far as ground of bonafide requirement is concerned.
ii. Petitioner is not the owner/ landlord of the tenanted premises and ancestral properties cannot be sold and the same can only be sold by Karta for legal necessity. iii. The petitioner is already stated to be in possession of a vacant accommodation in property in question i.e. one hall admeasuring 42' X 25' on ground floor; open space on ground floor; one commercial hall admeasuring 20' X 32' with gallery of ground floor; 6 commercial rooms of different measurements on ground floor; covered varanda on ground floor; shop no. 4; three rooms on ground floor including 4 commercial rooms and one Commercial hall; open space; covered varanda & two commercial rooms on first floor of the property.
iv. It is further stated that petitioner is owner and in possession of many other vacant properties bearing no. 231, 97, 19A, Pana Udyan, Narela, Delhi in the close vicinity and the same can be used to meet the said requirement of petitioner.
v. The petitioner does not intend to establish any clinics, as stated and on this pretext, merely seeks to get the tenanted premises vacated to let the same at higher RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 3 / 18 rates.
5. Petitioner filed reply to the application for leave to defend wherein the averments made by the respondent in his application for leave to defend has been denied. It is further stated that no triable issue has been raised by the respondent in his application for leave to defend.
6. Arguments heard. Record perused.
7. In order to succeed in a petition for eviction filed under section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the petitioner must establish that:
i. He is the owner and landlord in respect of the tenanted premises.
ii. He requires the premises bonafide for himself or for any member of his family dependent upon him. iii. He has no other reasonably suitable accommodation.
8. The respondent has argued that the present petition is not maintainable under Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act, and the petition should have been filed under Section 22 DRC Act. It is argued that the petitioner in a trust and the legal issue with respect to the maintainability of an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act by a juristic person is subject matter of a reference vide order dated 22.12.2017 in RC. REV. 18/2016 titled as 'K.S. Bhandari v. M/s International Security Printers Pvt. Ltd'. It is stated that since the matter is pending before the larger bench, the petition shall not be decided in favour of petitioner.
RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 4 / 189. In this context, order dated 02.06.2023 pronounced by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in RC.REV. 257/2022 in the case titled as Bhaskar Refractories and Stoneware Pipes Pvt. Ltd. vs Ishwar Industries Ltd. is relevant, the extract of which is reproduced hereinbelow:
"33. Though the abovementioned judgments are in relation to issues pending before the larger Bench of the Supreme Court, in my opinion, they show that even during such pendency, the other courts may and should continue to decide the cases and applying the law as it then prevails. This is so, as mere pendency of a reference before the larger bench does not denude the other courts of their jurisdiction to decide on the lis before them. Similarly, merely because of the pendency of the above proceedings before the Supreme Court and before this Court, Respondent 1 cannot be said to be bound to necessarily hold its hands and not exercise the jurisdiction otherwise vested in it under the statute. Maybe, it would have been prudent for Respondent 1 to have awaited the outcome of the abovereferred petitions before the Supreme Court and before this Court, however, merely for its decision not to wait, the impugned order cannot be said to be without jurisdiction or so perverse so as to warrant to be quashed by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction.
15.2. The law as it stands today recognises the right of a corporate entity to maintain a petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, for its bona fide need. In this regard, it would relevant to refer to the decision of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Ravinder Kumar Verma v. Laxmi Narayan Mandir Nirman Sabha & Anr., 2016 SCC OnLine 6024. The relevant extract of the said judgment reads as under:
16. A conjoint reading of two Sections i.e. Section 14(1)(e) and Section 22 of the DRC Act does not show that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act or a public institution cannot apply for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
Reference may be had to the judgment of this court in the case of Bhim Sen Batra v. Shreyans Buildwell Pvt. Ltd.. That was a case in which a petition was filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act by the RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 5 / 18 landlord stating that the landlord Company was incurring losses and is seeking to revamp its business and requires the place occupied by the tenant for building proper infrastructure and office to be used by its employees. An objection was raised that if a company or body corporate requires the premises for the use of its employees, Section 22 of the DRC Act would apply and not Section 14(1)
(e) of the DRC Act. This court rejected the contention. The court was of the view that the earlier judgments rendered prior to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Satyawati Sharma (dead) by LRs v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 287 which made Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act applicable to commercial tenancies also would not help the tenant presently.
17. Similarly, in the case of Satnam Kaur v. Ashlar Stores P. Ltd., this court held as follows:-
"9. This Court in the case of Chunni Lal v. University of Delhi reported in 1970 RCR 742 drew a distinction between Sections 14 and 22 of DRC Act in the following terms:
...The relationship of Sections 14 and 22, therefore, is that all landlords are able to apply under Section 14 but only the landlords who are corporate bodies or public Institution are entitled to apply under Section 22. This necessarily means that such corporate and public institution landlords have been given the ordinary grounds under Section 14 and additional grounds under Section 22. This accords with their position of being primarily similar to natural persons and sometimes being different from them. I therefore, find that the corporate and public institution landlords are entitled to the ordinary grounds of eviction under Section 14 like other landlords and also to the special grounds of eviction under Section 22 which are peculiar to the corporate and public institution landlords and that Section 22 does not deprive the corporate and the public institution landlords form the benefit of Section 14.
10. Consequently, in my view, an eviction petition can be filed by a Private Limited Company under Section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act for residence of its Chairman and Directors."
18. The above view was reiterated by this court in the case of Canara Bank v. T.T. Ltd. (2014) 214 DLT 526."
RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 6 / 18(Emphasis Supplied)
10.The Hon'ble High Court in a judgment reported as "Chunni Lal Vs. University of Delhi, 1977 RCR 742" has held that :
"The relationship of sections 14 and 22, is that all landlords are able to apply under section 14 but only the landlords who are corporate bodies or public institution are entitled to apply under section
22. This necessarily means that such corporate and public institution landlords have been given the ordinary grounds under section 14 and additional grounds under section 22. This accords with their position of being primarily similar to natural persons and sometimes being different from them, that the corporate and public institution landlords are entitled to the ordinary grounds of eviction under section 14 like other landlords and also to the special grounds of eviction under section 22 which are peculiar to the corporate and public institution landlords and that section 22 does not deprive the corporate and the public institution landlords from the benefit of section 14."
11.Hon'ble High Court has very categorically held that pendency of an issue before the larger bench does not preclude the court subordinate to the High Court to decide the matter as per the existing law. In view of the above, the argument raised by the respondent that the present petition is not maintainable under Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act is not tenable in law.
12.Another contention raised by the respondent is that the landlord cannot terminate the tenancy in any circumstances by virtue of clause no. 5 of the rent agreement, which is reproduced hereinbelow-
"5. That the tenancy shall not be terminated under any circumstances, even if a new body takes over the charge of the Management of Har Narain Charitable Trust."RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 7 / 18
The reliance of the respondent over the rent agreement is an admission of the execution of the rent agreement between the parties. The rent agreement relied upon by the respondent is an unregistered agreement and accordingly, the same cannot be relied upon. Even otherwise, Section 14 DRC Act is a special provision giving certain grounds of eviction to the landlord. Any agreement entered into between the parties cannot override the law prevailing in the country. Accordingly, the reliance of the respondent on clause no. 5 of the rent agreement is misplaced and is against the law.
13. It is also argued by the respondent that the petitioner is not the owner/ landlord of the demised premises. At this juncture, it is pertinent to mention here that the Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as "Shanti Sharma & Ors. Vs. Ved Prabha & Ors", AIR 1987 SC 2028 had held that:-
"The word 'owner' has not been defined in this Act and the word 'owner' has also not been defined in the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be is that ownership means absolute ownership in the land as well as of the structure standing thereupon. Ordinarily, the concept of ownership may be what is contended by the counsel for the appellant but in the modern context where it is more or less admitted that all lands belong to the State, the persons who hold properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some term from the Govt. or the authorities constituted by the State and in this view of the matter it could not be thought of that the Legislature when it used the term 'owner' in the provision of Sec. 14(1)(e) it thought of ownership as absolute ownership. It must be presumed that the concept of ownership only will be as it is understood at present. It could not be RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 8 / 18 doubted that the term 'owner' has to be understood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase 'owner' thereof has to be understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is that where the person builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction, the only thing necessary for him to prove is bona fide requirement and that he is the owner thereof, In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term 'owner' is vis-a- vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant."
14.Same was the ratio of decision given in "Jiwan Lal Vs. Gurdial Kaur & Ors." 1995 RLR 162.
15.The abovesaid judgments were further followed in case titled as "Rajender Kumar Sharma & Ors. Vs. Leela Wati & others, 155 (2008) DLT 383".
16.Further, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi made important observations in the decision given in the case titled as "Ramesh Chand Vs. Uganti Devi, 157 (2009) DLT 450", wherein it has been held that:-
"It is settled preposition of law that in order to consider the concept of ownership under Delhi Rent Control Act, the Court has to see the title and right of the landlord qua the tenant. The only thing to be seen by the Court is that the landlord had been receiving rent for his own benefit and not for on behalf of someone else. If the landlord was receiving rent for himself and not on behalf of someone else, he is to be RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 9 / 18 considered as the owner, howsoever imperfect his title over the premises may be. The imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot stand in the way of an eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act, neither the tenant can be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has been paying rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates estoppel against such a tenant. A tenant can challenge the title of landlord only after vacating the premises and not when he is occupying the premises. In fact, such a tenant who denies the title of the landlord, qua the premises, to whom he is paying rent, acts dishonestly........"
17.The respondent herein in para no. 23 of his application for leave to defend has stated "That the petitioner is also not entitled to have the suit premises from the respondent since the lease created in favour of the respondent is a perpetual lease, the rent was not meant to be increased".
18.The fact that lease was created by the petitioner in favour of the respondent has not been disputed. Therefore, by virtue of Section 122 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (erstwhile Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872), a tenant is estopped from challenging/questioning the ownership of the landlord during the subsistence of tenancy especially when the respondent has admitted his tenancy in his pleadings or testimony. Further, Section 119 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (erstwhile Section 114 of Indian Evidence Act) is very clear which states that the court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks to have happened and the regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 10 / 18 public and private business.
19. Another contention raised by the respondent is that the petition has not been filed by the authorised persons and Sh. Pokhar Mal Garg and Sh. Shraddhanand Agarwal are not the trustees of the petitioner and accordingly, the petition is not maintainable.
20.It is observed that petitioner along with the petition has filed the documents substantiating the factum of formation of trust; execution of the Trust Deed and Supplementary Trust Deed; Sh. Pohkar Mal Garg being one of the founding members and taking the responsibility of Joint Secretary and a Resolution being passed in favour of Sh. Pokhar Mal Garg and Sh. Shraddhanand Agarwal duly authorising them to institute the present petition. In contrast, respondent has only filed a site plan; a receipt and possession letter alongwith his application for leave to defend. No other document has been filed by the respondent which can be considered for deciding the present petition.
21.It is trite law that the averments made by the respondent has to be substantiated with the documents. Mere bald averments that the petition has not been filed by authorised persons is not tenable in law.
22.It is claimed by the petitioner that the demised premises is required bonafidely for opening a Homeopathic Clinic as well as Ayurvedic Clinic. It is submitted that two rooms/ RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 11 / 18 shops are required for doctor, two rooms/ shops are required for medicines and compounder and two rooms/ shops are required as waiting rooms for patients, thereby requiring six rooms/ shops in total. It is further claimed by the petitioner that no alternate suitable accommodation is available with the petitioner for the above stated purpose.
23.As far as ground of bonafide requirement by the public institution for furtherance of its activities is considered, it was observed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as Bhawani Shankar vs Nand Lal And Ors on 7 September, 2021 that-
"The essential ingredients which a landlord is required to show for the purpose of getting an eviction order for bona fide needs are (i) the petitioner is the owner/landlady of the suit premises
(ii) the suit premises are required bona fide by the landlord for himself/herself and any of his/her family members dependent upon him/her. (iii) the landlord/landlady or such other family members have no other reasonable suitable accommodation."
24.In Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353, it was held that the landlord is the best Judge of his requirement and Courts have no concern to dictate to the landlord as to how and in what manner he should live. The bona fide personal need is a question of fact and should not be normally interfered with.
25.Similarly, in Abid-ul-Islam Versus Inder Sain Dua, 2023 (Delhi HC), it was reiterated that there has to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non- availability of a RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 12 / 18 reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Such reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlord and not the tenant.
26.In case titled as Anil Bajaj and Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja, (2014) 15 SCC 610:
"It would hardly require any reiteration of the settled principle of law that it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the property belonging to the landlord should be utilised by him for the purpose of his business. Also, the fact that the landlord is doing business from various other premises cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted premises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted premises for his own business."
27.In Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan [(1979) 1 SCC 273] it was held that the words "reasonable requirement"
undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire.
28.Similarly, in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222], the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with the aspect of bona fide requirement has said that the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, refers to a state of mind prevailing with the landlord. The only way of peeping into the mind of the landlord is an exercise undertaken by the judge of facts by placing himself in the RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 13 / 18 armchair of the landlord and then posing a question to himself -- whether in the given facts, substantiated by the landlord, the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest.
29.Harking back, it is contended by the petitioner that the area required by the petitioner for opening the Clinics will be sufficient in case the respondent is evicted from the demised premises. Naturally, people who would be visiting the clinic are going to be people of different age or who would be in some form of physical discomfort and seeking medical facilities. It is only natural to assume that in such a situation, premises located on ground floor would be much better suited for the purported purpose of the petitioner. Hence, premises on the ground floor would certainly serve the purpose of the petitioner in a better manner.
30.Reference can be made to case titled as Uday Shanker Upadhayay Vs Navin Maheshwari, 2009 (14) Scale 103, wherein it was held that the ground floor is the best premises to start any business.
31.In case titled as Sarla Ahuja Vs. United Insurance Company 1998(8) SCC 119 it was held that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms for the landlord as to how and when he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. It was further held that when the landlord asserts that he required his building for his own occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bonafide.
RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 14 / 1832.Therefore, by applying the ratio of abovesaid judgments and in view of the discussions made above in the light of entire material placed on record, it can very well be said that the petitioner has been able to prove bonafide need. Once it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that need is really bonafide, then adverse inference cannot be drawn. Hence, this court is of the view that need of the petitioner is bonafide, which the petitioner has proved on record.
33.The respondent has next contended that the petitioner has alternate accommodations which are sufficient for the purpose mentioned. The said fact has been vehemently denied by the petitioner thereby claiming that the properties mentioned by the respondent are not owned by the petitioner trust.
34.In this context, as discussed above, mere bald averments that petitioner owns certain other properties will not be sufficient. Respondent needs to substantiate the same by documents, which has not been done in the present case. Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as Om Prakash Bajaj v. Sh. Chander Shekhar, 102 (2003) DLT 746, has observed that:
"Suitability of the alternate premises cannot be determined by mere counting the rooms. But it has to determine keeping in view the totality of facts, the nature of need pleaded by the landlord, his and his families standard and style of life and the purpose to which the landlord wants to actually put it after coming it into possession. The landlord has right to choose which of the accommodation is required by him for himself and for his family members."RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 15 / 18
35.It was next argued on behalf of the respondent that petitioner wants to get the premises in question evicted for ulterior motives and would misuse the same after eviction for its gain. The said apprehension is already taken care of in the DRC Act itself by our Parliamentarians who have already considered possibility of misuse in the hands of unscrupulous landlords and thereby inserted Section 19 of DRC Act which reads as follows:-
"Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises and the premises are not occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the premises are held, within two months of obtaining such possession, or the premises having been so occupied are, at any time within three years from the date of obtaining possession, relet to any person than the evicted tenant without obtaining the permission of the Controller such tenant can be put back to the premises or can be paid such compensation as the Controller thinks fit."
36.Hence, if the requirement of landlord is not bonafide and abuses the process of the court; obtains an order of eviction; subsequently lets out the property or sells the same, in such cases tenant can always apply for restitution under section 19 of the DRC Act.
37.Another contention raised by the respondent is that Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act is only applicable with respect to residential premises and since the property in dispute is commercial in nature, the present petition is not maintainable.
38.In this context, Satyawati Sharma (Dead) By Lrs vs Union Of India & Another AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 3148 RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 16 / 18 is relevant, the extract of which is reproduced hereinbelow:-
"38. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only.
39. However, the aforesaid declaration should not be misunderstood as total striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties nor the learned counsel argued that Section 14(1)(e) is unconstitutional in its entirety and we feel that ends of justice will be met by striking down the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e) so that the remaining part thereof may read as under :-"that the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation."
While adopting this course, we have kept in view well recognized rule that if the offending portion of a statute can be severed without doing violence to the remaining part thereof, then such a course is permissible. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla vs. Union of India (AIR 1957 SC 628) and Bhawani Singh vs. State of Rajasthan [1996 (3) SCC 105]. As a sequel to the above, the explanation appearing below Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act will have to be treated as redundant."
39. Since there exists no difference qua residential or commercial properties for the application of Section 14(1)
(e) DRC Act, the argument raised by the respondent is not tenable.
RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 17 / 1840.In view of the above discussion, court is of the considered opinion that respondent has failed to raise any triable issue vide his leave to defend application. The application for leave to defend is dismissed.
41.Since the application seeking leave to defend has been dismissed, the petitioner is entitled for an eviction order. Accordingly, eviction order is passed in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent directing the respondent to vacate the tenanted premises i.e. shop no. 1 in property bearing no. 17, 19 & 19A, Pana Udyan, Main Bazar, Narela, Delhi-40 as shown in red colour in the site plan annexed with the petition, in terms of Section 14(1)(e) r/w Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The petitioner, however, shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of this order.
No order as to costs. File be consigned to Record Room.
Digitally signedAnnounced in Open Court on 23.08.2024. by MANISH MANISH JAIN JAIN Date:
2024.08.23 14:33:18 +0530 (Manish Jain) ACJ-CCJ-ARC-North Rohini Court-23.08.2024 RC ARC No. 21/2016 Harnarain Dass Charitable Trust VS Vinod Kumar Page 18 / 18