Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Ex. Const. Dalip Singh vs Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi Through on 9 January, 2015
Central Administrative Tribunal Principal Bench New Delhi O.A.No.1964/2011 Order Reserved on: 13.11.2014 Order pronounced on 09.01.2015 Honble Shri V. Ajay Kumar, Member (J) Honble Shri V. N. Gaur, Member (A) Ex. Const. Dalip Singh S/o Sh. Shiv Ram Yadav R/o Vill. & P.O. Sanali, PO Mundawar Distt. Alwar (Raj.) Applicant (By Advocate: Sh. Sourabh Ahuja) Versus 1. Govt. of NCT of Delhi through The Chief Secretary New Sectt. New Delhi. 2. The Commissioner of Police Delhi Police, Police Headquarters I.P.Estate New Delhi. 3. Dy. Commissioner of Police IIIBn., DAP, Vikaspur, Delhi Police New Delhi. Respondents (By Advocate: Ms. Manashi Pathak for Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat) O R D E R By V. Ajay Kumar, Member (J):
The applicant, a Constable in Delhi Police, filed the OA questioning the impugned Annexure A1 Order dated 06.04.2011 in ordering that the applicant be dealt with departmentally under the provisions of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980 for a charge pertaining to the year 1996, on the ground of abnormal and inordinate delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings against him.
2. The charge levelled against the applicant vide the impugned Annexure A1 reads as under:
It is alleged against Constable Dalip Singh, No.7688/DAP (PIS No.28861104) that on 30/07/96 at around 8 p.m. he alongwith with his accomplices assaulted and killed one Pradeep Kumar S/o Jorawar Singh R/o Village Sanoli, Distt: Alwar, Rajasthan with a `Lathi when he was returning from his farms towards his home in his native village. He voluntarily caused hurt and killed him due to personal enmity. In this regard a case vide FIR No.171, dated 31/07/96 u/s 302/341/34 IPC, PS Mundawar, Distt: Alwar, Rajasthan was registered against him and his other companions on the complaint of Shri Sumer Singh S/o Shri Sohan Lal, R/o Village Sanoli, Distt: Alwar, Rajasthan. His other companions in this crime were arrested on different dates but he escaped and remained absconded. The case was challenged on 24/09/1998. Later on he was arrested on 05/11/1998 and supplementary charge sheet was filed against him. After the trial, he and his other accomplices were convicted for a punishment of life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5000/- each by the Honble Court of Alwar (Rajasthan) on 26.02.2002.
3. After the above referred FIR was registered against the applicant, he was placed under suspension vide Order dated 04.09.1996. After the applicant was convicted by the Trial Court vide Judgement dated 21.01.2002, he was dismissed from service vide Order dated 17.10.2008 (Annexure A2) under Clause (a) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. The appeal of the applicant against the said dismissal order was rejected on 29.01.2009. The OA No.925/2009, filed by the applicant against his dismissal, was allowed and in compliance of the same, he was reinstated into service, however, again placed under suspension.
4. Shri Sourabh Ahuja, the learned counsel for the applicant, would strenuously contend that the respondents were aware of the fact of involvement of the applicant in the criminal case on 04.09.1996 itself, i.e., when they initially suspended the applicant, and hence initiating the disciplinary proceedings against him after an inordinate, abnormal and unexplained delay of more than 14 years, is illegal, arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice and of the constitutional guarantees conferred on the applicant, and hence, the same is liable to be quashed. The learned counsel placed reliance on various judgements of this Tribunal and of the Honble Apex Court in support of his contention.
5. Per contra, Ms. Manashi Pathak for Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat, the learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the respondents are empowered to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against a delinquent officer either immediately after his involvement in a criminal case or after the criminal proceedings against him came to an end. Since the applicant was convicted by a competent criminal court, and since the said conviction is subsisting as on today, as the criminal appeal filed against the said conviction is still pending, there is no illegality in issuing the impugned order.
6. The present OA was earlier disposed of by this Tribunal vide its order dated 12.01.2012, as under:
5. Thus, we are of the view that instead of quashing the impugned charge-sheet dated 06.04.2011, ends of justice would be duly met if the departmental proceedings initiated pursuant to order dated 06.04.2011 is held in abeyance till the outcome of the criminal appeal filed by the applicant before the High Court. Ordered accordingly. OA shall stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms. No costs.
7. However, in WP(C) No.4186/2012, the Honble High Court of Delhi by its order dated 17.05.2013, while restoring the OA, observed as under:
1. Learned counsel for the respondent states that the respondent does not press the point with respect to parity with ASI (Exe.) Ram Khilari Meena; and thus with consent of parties we dispose of the writ petition setting aside the impugned order dated January 12, 2012 passed by the Tribunal disposing of OA No.1964/2011. But since other issues have been raised by the respondent which have not been touched upon by the Tribunal, we restore OA No.1964/2011 requiring the Tribunal to re-decide the said Original Application with respect to other contentions which are pleaded by the respondent. We make it clear that the Tribunal would not go into the issue of respondents parity with ASI Ram Khilari Meena for the reason respondent gives up said plea pertaining to parity claimed.
8. Heard Shri Sourabh Ahuja, the learned counsel for the applicant and Ms. Manashi Pathak proxy of Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat, the learned counsel for the respondents and have perused the pleadings on record.
9. The Honble Apex Court in a recent Judgement in Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P.Education Society and others, (2013) 6 SCC 515 held as under:
Enquiry at belated stage:
14. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is de hors the limitation of judicial review. In the event that the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question, must be carefully examined, taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges involved therein. The Court has to consider the seriousness and magnitude of the charges and while doing so the Court must weigh all the facts, both for and against the delinquent officers and come to the conclusion, which is just and proper considering the circumstances involved. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all relevant facts, and balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is infact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the said proceedings are allowed to be terminated, only on the ground of a delay in their conclusion. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma & Anr., AIR 1987 SC 943; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Anr., AIR 1990 SC 1308; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570; State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, AIR 1998 SC 1833; M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3475; Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, AIR 2007 SC 906; The Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Ors. v. Prabash Chandra Mirdha, AIR 2012 SC 2250; and Chairman, LIC of India & Ors. v. A. Masilamani, JT (2012) 11 SC 533).
10. In view of the aforesaid categorical declaration of law by the Honble Apex Court with regard to the inquiry at belated stage, i.e., a chargesheet or show cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by the Court on the sole ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, we do not find any merit in the submissions made on behalf of the applicant. The applicant also failed to show any extraordinary circumstances which warrant interference of this Tribunal with the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant at this stage.
11. In view of the aforesaid latest Judgement of the Honble Apex Court whereunder, the complete case law on the subject of delay in initiation or completion of disciplinary proceedings, including the decisions cited by both sides, were considered, we are of the view that there is no necessity to discuss the same again.
12. In the circumstances and for the aforesaid reasons, the OA is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
(V. N. Gaur) (V. Ajay Kumar) Member (A) Member (J) /nsnrvak/