Gauhati High Court
Heramba Kumar Sarma And Etc. Etc. vs State Of Assam And Ors. on 6 September, 1989
Equivalent citations: AIR 1991 GAUHATI 1, (1990) 1 GAU LR 1
JUDGMENT A. Raghuvir, C.J.
1. The State Government of Assam on July 7, 1989 promulgated Rules for Admission to the 356 seats of First Year M.B.B.S. and B.D.S. Courses at Dibrugarh, Gauhati and at Silchar Medical Colleges. The earlier Rules of 1974 were repealed and applications were invited to be filed on or before July 25, 1989 which was later extended to August 4, 1989. In the promulgated new Rules ten seats are reserved for Meghalaya, Mizoram one, Arunachal Pradesh one, Nagaland one and in the balance of 343 seats reservations are specified for Scheduled Castes 7%, Scheduled Tribe (Plains) 10%, Scheduled Tribes (Hills) 5%, sons and daughters dependent of Ex-servicemen and serving brother, sister defence personnel from Assam -- 3 seats, sons and daughters dependent brother or sister and grandson or grand-daughter of freedom fighters of the State -- 2 seats, sons and daughters, brothers and sisters of the martyers of Assam Movement -- 2 seats, children of tea garden and ex-tea garden communities/ tribes -- 3 seats, O.B.C. including M.O.B.C. -- 15% of the total available seats, and sons and daughters of serving or retired doctors of Government of Assam -- 6 seats. The Rules defined some words and phrases -- General Seats, Available Seats and Admission tests and where the tests are to be held is to be specified by the authorities. For the purpose of interpretation a Saving Clause is incorporated in the Rules. A bond is prescribed in Schedule II to the Rules to be executed by all those who seek admission to the Colleges.
2. On publication of the Rules two public interest writ petitions were received by the Court and one writ petition is filed of that nature. In four of the writ petitions some rules are assailed as ultra vires of the Constitution. In Civil Rule 1216/89 the petitioner is Nazma Begum Choudhury who was educated at Dimapur in Nagaland. Her uncle owns business establishments at Dimapur. She passed her H.S.L.C. Examination from the Holy Cross School at Dimapur in 1985, She prosecuted her Pre-University Course at Lady Kean College, Shillong and passed in 1987 with 65.6% of marks. She is now studying in B.Sc. She asserts her father is a permanent resident of Assam in Village Harikhai under Karimganj district of Assam. She seeks a declaration that Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (b) of R. 3 is violative of her fundamental rights Under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
3. Civil Rule 1215/89 is by Khasruzzaman Choudhury, a student at Dimapur, who prosecuted his P.U. (Science) Course at Kohima College and passed in 1989 with 81.3%. He seeks a declaration that Rule 3(b)(iii) be struck down.
4. In Civil Rule 1211/89 the petitioner is Vijaya Singh who studied up to Class VIII standard in Golaghat Convent School. Later she joined Birla Balika Bidyapeeth, Pillani (Rajasthan) and further later joined M. G. College, Kanpur, from where she passed intermediate examination with 59.5% marks. In this petition she seeks Rules 3, 4 and 10 and 13 be declared ultra vires and her application be considered without reference to the above Rules.
5. In Civil Rule 1240/89 a large number of residents of the western part of Assam aver to have been concerned in the delay of admission to medical colleges. Heramba Kumar Sarma has filed the Civil Rule 1165/89 as guardian-ad-litem of his younger brother without even the name of his brother. He seeks a direction that admission test be not held. Other averments made in the petition were not pressed.
6. Civil Rule 1003/89 is by Achut Chan-dra Goswami, Dinesh Sarma, Chitra Barman and Ratul Thakuria. The four seek the classes for medical colleges be held from August, 1989. Civil Rule 1157/89 is by Moni Pathak and Jaideo Pathak. The petitioner No. 1 Moni Pathak completed in 1989 her H.S.S.L.C. (10 + 2) conducted by Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal. She passed in First Division with distinction in Chemistry, Biology and Hindi securing 73.5% out of 800 marks. She studied in the Guru Govind Singh Khalsa English Medium School, Jabalpur from Class XI to Class XII. The second petitioner is a Lecturer in the Department of Chemistry in D. R. College, Golaghat. He is resident of Golaghat for 22 years and is the father of Moni Pathak. The two seek to annul Rule 3(b)(iii) of the Rules.
7. The Director of Medical Education, Planning and Research, Assam averred that 15% of total numbers of seats are reserved for All India category and 85% are reserved for Assam State Category of applicants to the three Medical Colleges. The various sub-clauses to Rule 3 were introduced to protect the interest of applicants who have had studied in the. local institutions of Assam. As regards the admission test the Director averred students from numerous Universities and institutions with different syllabus apply for admission in the State therefore Admission test became a necessity. In Assam itself there are more than one University and more than one examining agency for Degree Examination, Higher Secondary Education Council conducting higher secondary examination, Central Board of Higher Secondary Education also conducting higher secondary examination. Therefore, the State thought it fit to have entrance examination to determine respective merits of candidates who seek admission in the Colleges. Merits of the entrance examination would be judged from the performance of a candidate in Physics, Chemistry and Biology. As to other reservations made he averred a sizeable population in the State are Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Backward Classes therefore reservations are made. As to the delay in commencing the academic studies he recounted in 1983-84 the academic year commenced on 27th December, 1984, 1984-85 it was commenced on September 28, 1984, 1985-86 on October 11, 1985, 1986-87 on August 21, 1986, 1987-88 on 12th November, 1987 and 1988-89 on 31st December, 1988. These varied dates were not the result of any inaction on the part of the educational authorities. The variations were impelled by exigencies of events in the respective years otherwise academic year commences in July or August of every calendar year.
8. It is averred for years 1983-84, 1984-85, 1985-86 and 1987-88 admissions were settled by interview. Admission tests he stated cannot be held in all districts except at three places where there are three medical colleges. As respects the bond in the Rules it is stated the State thought fit the applicants to execute a bond making obligatory for the applicants to serve the State in rural areas for three years and in default to pay a sum of Rs. 30,000/- by way of compensation.
9. From the above averments we have to decide two questions-- (1) the constitutionality of Rule 3 which touches the eligibility of applicants, and, (2) the legality of Admission test whether it can be held by the Selection Board. Rule 3, excluding the provisos, reads as under :
"3. Conditions for Admission and Eligibility for Appearing in Admission Test.
The candidates fulfilling the following conditions shall be eligible for admission to the first year M.B.B.S./B.D.S. Course in any of the Medical Colleges and the Regional Dental College of Assam.
(a) He/She must be a citizen of India.
(b) His/Her parents must be permanent residents of the State of Assam as per the criteria adopted for the purpose from time to time and he/she shall have to furnish a Certificate to that effect along with the application. .
(ii) His/Her parents must have been residing continuously in the State of Assam for at least 20 (twenty) years preceding the last date fixed for the submission of the application.
(iii) He/She must have studied for a period of 3 years in an Institution within the State of Assam preceding the last date fixed for submission of the application:"
10. As respects the above Clause (b) questions are raised by all the petitioners as to the Constitutionality of Sub-clause (iii). No question was raised as to Clause (ii) of the Rule. The petitioners argued many candidates are likely to be rejected under sub-clause three as in many cases applicants did not complete the 10 plus 2 education in Assam, the 10 being High School Leaving Certificate Examination and 2 being Higher Secondary Examination.
11. On a reading of clause three with Sub-clauses (it) is not capable of any certain meaning. See an applicant to have studied three years in the State. A candidate may fail in the Higher Secondary Examination once and if the year if failure is tacked on the course of two years the Rule can be satisfied. We hold that is not what was intended by the State. The intention is applications (applicants) to have had 10 + 2 studied in Assam for both the courses.
12. The question for consideration is whether the State Government can prescribe and make it obligatory for an applicant to have studied in College or School as a condition of eligibility. The answer to that issue is covered in many decided cases of the Supreme Court. We refer the cases in brief as there is very long and impressive literature in the decisions of the Courts. In the case of Kumari Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 35 for the first time reservation in medical colleges requiring institutional qualifications was considered and it was held the Central Government runs the medical colleges therefore that Government to lay down the criteria for eligibility. "From the very nature of things it is not possible to throw the admission open to students from all over the country. The Government cannot be denied the right to decide from what sources the admission will be made. That essentially is a question of policy and depends inter alia on an overall assessment and survey of the requirements of residents of particular territories and other categories of persons for whom it is essential to provide facilities for medical education. If the sources are properly classified whether on territorial, geographical or other reasonable basis it is not for the Courts to interfere with the manner and method of making the classification" (Para 9). In Jagdish Saran v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 820 the entire gamut of reservations was reviewed. The reservations were considered a necessary evil. The apex Court was finally not in a position to answer the question therefore directed the Central Government to form a Committee and the Committee with the assistance of Universities to submit a report. Notwithstanding the direction no Committee was formed and the subject-matter of reservation was allowed to rust. Four years later in another case, AIR 1984 SC 1420, Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, the subject of reservation was reviewed. By that time a Medical Review Committee submitted a report to the Government of India. The suggestions made by the Committed and also the Government of India's view point both were available before the apex Court in that case. There was consensus 25% seats should be reserved for All India category of students and 75% is to be left open for the State's category. The recommendation of the Indian Medical Council was student for postgraduate training should be selected strictly oh merit judged on the basis of academic record in the undergraduate course. All selection post-graduate studies should be conducted by the Universities. The Medical Education Review Committee felt "all admissions to the post-graduate courses in any institution should be open to candidates on All India basis and there should be no restriction regarding domicile in the State/UT in which the institution is located." The Government of India's view point was: "So far as admissions to the institutions of post-graduate colleges and special professional colleges is concerned, it should be entirely on the basis of All India merit subject to constitutional reservations in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes." The apex Court held: "But, having regard to broader considerations of equality of opportunity and institutional continuity in education which has its own importance and value, we would direct that though residence requirement within the State shall not be a ground for reservation in admissions to postgraduate course, a certain percentage of seats may in the present circumstances, be reserved on the basis of institutional preference in the sense that a student who has passed M.B.B.S. Course from a medical college or University, may be given preference for admission to the post-gradutate course..." The Court finally ordered 30% seats should be reserved for All India category and 70% is left open for the State authorities and hoped the formula solved the problem. There was many a difficulties which were not foreseen in this order.
13. In Dr. Dinesh Kumar v. Motilal Nehru Medical College; Allahabad, AIR 1986 SC 1877 it was noted 30% though desirable was not capable of implementation. Finally it was ordered: "In the All India Entrance Examination, unless the States of. Andhra Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir agree to make not less than 15% of the total number of seats for the M.B.B.S./B.D.S. course and not less than 25% of the total number of seats for the post-graduate courses in their respective medical colleges or institutions available for admisson on the basis of All India Entrance Examination". This formula was to be implemented from 1988-89. In a Bombay case in State of Maharashtra v. Minoo Noazer Kavarana, (1989) 2 SCC 626 : (AIR 1989 SC 1513) a difficulty arose with reference to 85% allocated to the States. The State Government as a policy in that case it was held can fill up 85% of the seats in the manner they liked.
14. Now this history of institutional preference shows State is entitled to determine the admission so far as 85% is concerned but as respects 15% no State is to allocate All India category of applicants. The learned Advocate General argued in 1989 Rules this dicta of the Supreme Court is not violated by the State of Assam. He argued under Sub-clause (i) Permanent Resident Certificate is to be obtained and under Clause (ii) the parents of applicants should be residents of Assam. In this regard a decision by this Court in Ramapada Dhar v. State of Assam, reported in (1989) 1 Gauhati LR 117 considered guidelines for Permanent Resident Certificate issued on October 22, 1976 and on October 7, 1982 and instruction of May 21, 1986 were noted. These were issued by the Chief Secretary in that two types of persons were contemplated who can be accorded P.R.C. certificates (a) a person who along with parents and forefathers continuously resided in Assam for a minimum period of 50 years, and (b) a person who has continuously resided in Assam for a minimum period of 20 years. Both the types are entitled to P.R.C. In the instant Rule 3(b)(i) the first category is concerned, an applicant also should satisfy that the applicant's parents also to have resided in Assam for 20 years. We have earlier referred the instant Clause is not assailed in any writ petition.
15. In considering the constitutionality of Clause (iii) we experienced difficulty. It is common knowledge many parents plan out education of children after the children have obtained High School Leaving Certificate Examination. Thereafter students migrate to seller institution for Higher Secondary Education. In the context of that phenomenon the necessity of Sub-clause (iii) is to be juxtaposed. The intention of the State if applicants to have studied High School and Higher Secondary Education in Assam. We have the issue as to why three years rule is incorporated. Students not having studied for three years are not eligible for admission. What is the basis of the Rule. There is nothing except to limit the merit so that few are made eligible as in the Rule or in evidence aliunde there is nothing else to support the intention of the State. During the debate we expected the State to amend the sub-clause or to delete it as this Court in an interlocutory order on July 24, 1989 suspended the sub-clause.
16. In the case of AIR 1980 SC 820 and AIR 1984 SC 1420, the Supreme Court having cited the view points of Medical Council and that of the Central Government directed to implement the Rule of 30% and 70% and later amended the same to 15% and 85%. The power to issue such direction was exercised under the new dimension of Art, 14 discovered in the case of E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555. This we are mentioning to discover powers of this Court. We have traced the history of institutional preference in that the State Government can select candidates who have studied in the State of Assam. Looked at from that perspective we see no vice in the rule of three years. The only aspect the State Government did not consider is that many students, if not all, who have passed the High School Leaving Certificate Examination in Assam may not have known as to the study of Higher Secondary Course in Assam. For the year 1988-89 we hold the rule of three years therefore may not be insisted so far as this year is concerned by the Selection Board. We read it down exercising power as has been done in Jagdish Pandey v. The Chancellor, University of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 353 (in Para 8) wherein with reference to powers of the Chancellor, University Of Bihar, Bhagalpur at Ranchi the apex Court said: "We do not however think that the legislature intended to give such an arbitrary power to the Chancellor. We are of opinion that Section 4 must be read down and if we read it down there is no reason to hold that the legislature was conferring a naked arbitrary power on the Chancellor."
17. The next question is as to the necessity of Admission test. In the Rules a Selection Board is constituted by the Government who will hold the test examination. The petitioners assailed the test as superflous, unnecessary and argued the test in the Higher Secondary Education is sufficient to determine the merits of the applicants. The results having been announced in recent past therefore it is contended the admission test is superflous.
18. This contention is resisted by the State showing in Assam there are two Universities -- Gauhati University and Dibru-garh University, and two Boards -- Assam State Higher Secondary Council and Central Board of Secondary Education. These two institutions are the bodies which hold examination for Higher Secondary Education. Applicants from these institutions are for 85% seats. Besides candidates from NEHU can apply, candidates from Meghalaya can apply, candidates from Arunachal Pradesh can apply and Mizoram and Nagaland both are affiliated to NEHU. The applicants are also from other parts of India. All these candidates are for 15% seats. The learned Advocate General therefore argued that it cannot be said there is one common standard for all these institutions. He argued this aspect of the matter prompted to introduce Admission test. In Dr. Dinesh Kumar v. Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad, AIR 1985 SC 1059 the Supreme Court observed in para 6: ".... It would not only be unfair and unjust but also contrary to the equality clause of the Constitution to grant admissions to 50% non-reserved seats in the post-graduate courses by mechanically comparing the marks obtained by the students at the M.B.B.S. Examination held in different Universities where the standard of judging would necessarily vary from University to University and would not be uniform. If admissions were to be made on this basis, a less meritorious student appearing in the M.B.B.S. examination held by a University where the standard of evaluation is liberal would secure a march over a more meritorious student who appears in the M.B.B.S. examination where the standard of making is strict.....There can be no doubt that in order to meet the demands of the equality clause, the admissions to 50% non-reserved seats for the post-graduate courses must be made on the basis of comparative evaluation of merits of the students through an entrance examination....". After this dicta of the apex Court, we do not think there is any scope left for further consideration on the legality of admission test. The contention of the petitioners as to the necessity of Admission test fails.
19. We now turn to the legality of Rule 10 which runs as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules the Government shall have the power to give direction to the Selection Board in the matter of preparation of the Selection List for the admission to the Medical Colleges and Regional Dental College". The Selection Board is authorised to publish the select list in order of merit on the basis of the result of the Admission Test. Having regard to the clear language employed in Rule 4 there is hardly any necessity to support this clause with the Savings clause. The learned Advocate General stated occurred (sic) some faux pas (sic) in this regard. The State intended to have a savings clause for removal of difficulties. Rule 13 of 1970 Rules was to the following effect: "The Government shall have power to pass order not inconsistent with the Rules to remove difficulties for which there is no express provision in the Rules". A more elaborate Rule was found in 1974 Rules. In that Rule 16 reads: "The Government shall have power to pass order not inconsistent with the Rules to remove difficulties for which there is no express provision in the Rules." The State intended to have a Saving Clause of the above nature in the instant Rules and by mistakes Rule 10 is incorporated. Having regard to this representation we only refer to the case in Jalan Trading Co. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1967 SC 691 (in para 21 at page 703) where it is held: "But Section 37 which authorises the Central. Government to provide by order for removal of doubts or difficulties in giving effect to the provisions of the Act, in our judgment, delegates legislative power which is not permissible. Condition of the applicability of Section 37 is the arising of the doubt or difficulty in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. By providing that the order made must not be inconsistent with the purposes of the Act, Section 37 is not saved from the vice of delegation of legislative authority. The Section authorises the Government to determine for itself what the purposes of the Act are and to make provisions for removal of doubts or difficulties. If in giving effect to the provisions of the Act any doubt or difficulty arises, normally it is for the legislature to remove that doubt or difficulty. Power to remove the doubt or difficulty by altering the provisions of the Act would in substance amount to exercise of legislative authority and that cannot be delegated to an executive authority. Sub-section (2) of Section 37 which purports to make the order of the Central Government in such cases final accentuates the vice in Sub-section (1), since by enacting that provision the Government is made the sole Judge whether difficulty or doubt had arisen in giving effect to the provisions of the Act, whether it is necessary or expedient to remove the doubt or difficulty, and whether the provision enacted is not inconsistent with the purposes of the Act." We hold as to publication of the select list the Government have no power to issue instructions and if they intend to exercise power in the nature of removal of difficulties such a power the Government may exercise as in Rule 16 of 1974 repealed Rules.
20. The next question which requires consideration is the legality of Rule 13 under which an applicant is to execute, a bond. The petitioner in Civil Rule 1211/89 vehemently opposed Rule 13 and argued there was no necessity for such a Rule even if there is dearth of doctors in Assam. It is common knowledge large tracks are inhabited by tribal people and meagre medical facilities are available. To tide over such difficulty if the State Government incorporated Rule 13 we are unable to sec there is any vice in the Rule.
21. Finally we come to contentions in some of the writ petitions as respects numerous reservations in Rule 8. The learned Advocate General for Meghalaya in Civil Rule No. 1165/89 forcefully contended barring reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes where provisions are incorporated under the Constitution no other reservation should be made either to the sons and daughters of martyers of Assam Movement or freedom fighters of the State. The learned Advocate General of Assam argued there is no necessity to consider the sustainability of these Rules now in these cases. He further argued where issues are not warranted by facts the Court should be reluctant to decide issues. In support of the contention Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 is relied upon. In that case in para 16 it is held: "We have referred to these respective arguments just to indicate the extent of the field which has been covered by learned counsel who assisted us in dealing with the present petitions. As this Court has frequently emphasised, in dealing with constitutional matters, it is necessary that the decision of the Court should be confined to the narrow points which a particular proceeding raises before it. Often enough, in dealing with the very narrow point raised by a writ petition wider arguments are urged before the Court, but the Court should always be careful not to cover ground which is strictly not relevant for the purpose of deciding the petition before it. Obiter observations and discussion of problems not directly involved in any proceeding should be avoided by Courts in dealing with all matters brought before them, but this requirement becomes almost compulsive when the Court is dealing with constitutional matters. That is why we do not propose to deal with the larger issues raised by the learned Counsel in the present proceedings, and we wish to confine our decision to the narrow points which these petitions raise."
22. We have in our mind a decision of the American Supreme Court in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, (1935) 80 Lawyers' Edition at page 688 wherein Justice Frankfurter culled out earlier decisions and formulated seven principles: 1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such question "is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature-could transfer to the Courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act". Chicago and G.T.R. Co. v. Wellman, (1891-92) 36 Law Ed 176, 179, Compare Lord v. Veazie, (1847-50) 12 Law Ed 1067; Atherton Mills v. Johnston, (1921) 66 Law Ed 814, 815. 2. The Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it." Liverpool, N. Y. and P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Comrs., (1883-84) 28 Law Ed 899, 901; Abrams v. Van Schaick, (1934) 79 Law Ed 278; Wilshire Oil Co. v. United States, (1934) 79 Law Ed 1329. "It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case." Burton v. United States, (1904) 40 Law Ed 482, 485. 3. The Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied." Liverpool, N.Y. and P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Commrs., (1883-84) 28 Law Ed 899. Compare Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, (1927) 72 Law Ed 218.4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Siler v. Louisville and N.R. Co., (1908) 53 Law Ed 753, 757; Light v. United States, (1910) 55 Law Ed 570, 575. Appeals from the highest Court of a State challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent State ground. Berea College v. Kentucky, (1908) 53 Law Ed 81, 85. 5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Tyler v. Judges of Ct. of Registration, (1900) 45 Law Ed 252; Hendrick v. Maryland, (1914) 59 Law Ed 385, 390. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained. Colambus and G. R. Co. v. Miller, (1930) 75 Law Ed 861, 865, 866. In Fairchild v. Hunghes, (1921) 66 Law Ed 499, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, (1922) 67 Law Ed 1078, the challenge of the Federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens. 6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a Statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits. Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Atty. Gen. (Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Garland), (1887) 31 Law Ed 527; Wall v. Parrot Silver and Copper Co., (1916) 61 Law Ed 1229, 1230, 1231; St. Louis Malleable Casting Co. v. George C. Prendergast Constr. Co., (1922) 67 L. Ed 351. 7. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided", Growell v. Benson, (1931) 76 L. Ed. 598, 619.
23. We agree with the contention of the learned Advocate General of Assam as in this group of cases the facts do not warrant consideration of the numerous reservations in Rule 8. For the aforesaid reason we keep the question open to be considered in more appropriate case whenever necessity arises.
24. To sum up we read down Sub-clause
(iii) of Clause (b) of Rule 3 not to enforce so far as 1989 academic year is concerned. In all other respects the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.