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Delhi District Court

Judgment Cbi vs Shreekant Jain Etc. on 16 November, 2017

                                      1

      IN THE COURT OF SH. SANJAY KUMAR AGGARWAL
 SPECIAL JUDGE­03, (PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT), CBI,
               TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI.

CBI Case No.: 27285/2016
FIR/RC No.: 3/1981
u/s: 411 IPC, 25(1) r/w 3 & 25(2) 
r/w 14(3) of the Antiquities & Art Treasures Act, 1972.
Branch: CBI/CIU­A/ND

CBI 
Versus
1.

Shreekant Jain r/o B­5, Gulmohar Park, New Delhi.

Presently residing at: 114, Ground Floor, Navjeevan Vihar, New Delhi­110017.

2. Cheddi Lal @ Ramesh  r/o Mohalla Kakrabaghat, PS Khudabad, Allahabad.

.... Proclaimed Offender

3. Kashi Nath r/o 1­F­2, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi.

Presently residing at: E­68, New Ashok Nagar, Delhi­110086.

4. Jhanna Lal r/o 44/202, Ramapura, P.S. Deshashwamedh Varanasi, U.P. .... Expired

5. Ashgar r/o 159, Mohalla South Malaka Allahabad. .... Expired

6. Dulal Chakravarty @ Dinesh .... Proclaimed Offender Date of institution : 01.03.1983 Date on which reserved for judgment : 17.10.2017 Date on which judgment announced : 16.11.2017 Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 2 J U D G M E N T  The   case   of   the   CBI,   in   brief,   is   that   on   receipt   of   an information from Dr. Mrs. D. Mitra, Director General, Archaeological Survey   of   India,   New   Delhi   vide   letter   no.   18/19/81­Ant   dated 13.08.81   addressed   to   the   Director   /   C.B.I/New   Delhi   about   the alleged theft and an attempt to smuggle out 18 antique stone objects and   terracottas,   a   case     R.   C.   3/81­CIU   (A)   was   registered     on 26.08.81 against accused Shreekant Jain S/o Virendra Kumar Jain r/o B­5, Gulmohar Park, New Delhi u/s 411 IPC, 25(1) r/w 3 & 25 (2) r/w 14(3) of the Antiquities & Art Treasure Act 1972.

The   investigation   revealed   that   the   six   accused   S/Sh. Shreekant   Jain,   Ramesh   @   Cheddi   Lal,   Kashi   Nath,   Jhanna   Lal, Ashgar and Dulal Chakravarty @ Dinesh entered into or were parties to a criminal conspiracy to commit theft of antique idols etc. from the ancient temples and to bring the stolen antique objects to Delhi for the purpose of sale and smuggle them out of India in an illegal and unauthorised manner. In pursuance to the said conspiracy accused Kashi   Nath   antique   broker   of   Delhi   had   instructed   co­conspirator accused Shri Ramesh @ Cheddi Lal to supply such antique objects which were available in ancient temples and historical monuments at Allahabad.   Accused Ramesh @ Cheddi, pursuaded his accomplices S/Sh. Jhanna Lal, Dulal Chakravarty and Ashgar, a rickshaw puller of Allahabad to join the conspiracy to commit theft of idol of Goddess Durga from an old temple of Takashakeshwar Mahadev existing in Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 3 Mohalla Dariyabad, Allahabad.  The aforesaid idol of Goddess Durga was shown to Ramesh, Jhanna Lal and Dulal by Ashgar­the aforesaid rickshaw­puller.     Ramesh   @   Cheddi   Lal   visited   Delhi   after   being shown   the   idol   by   Ashgar   and   showed   the   photograph   of   the aforesaid antique idol of Goddess Durga to Shri Kashi Nath of Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi who gave his approval and instructed them to steal it.  In furtherance of the aforesaid conspiracy the accused Ramesh @ Cheddi Lal visited the premises of the said temple of Takashakshewar Mahadev   in   Mohalla   Dariyabad,   Allahabad   alongwith   co­accused Jhanna  Lal   and  Dulal   and  took   fresh  photograph   of  the   aforesaid antique   idol   of   goddess   Durga   in   the   afternoon   of   18.04.81   and decided   to   commit   theft   of   the   aforesaid   idol   in   the   night   of 18.04.1981.  Ramesh @ Cheddi Lal, Jhanna Lal, Dulal Chakravarthy and   Ashgar,   the   aforesaid   committed   theft   of   the   antique   idol   of Goddess  Durga  during the  intervening  night   of 18.04.81/19.04.81 from   the   aforesaid   old   temple   of   Takashakeshwar   Mahadev   in Mohalla Dariyabad, Allahabad.

The investigation further revealed that Shri Ram Chander Pathak­   priest   of   the   aforesaid   temple   lodged   a   written   report   on 19.04.81   at   the   police   station   Attarsuiya   (Allahabad)   against unknown persons concerning theft of the said old idol of Goddess Durga   and   a   case   was   registered   u/s   380   IPC   at   police   Station Attarsuiya,   Allahabad   but   the   IO   of   the   Attarsuiya   police   station could not get any clue and as such closed the investigation for want of evidence /clues.

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 4 Investigation made by the CBI/ S. P. B. / C. I. U (Ant) New   Delhi   established   that   after   committing   the   theft,   accused Ramesh,   Jhanna   Lal,   and   Dulal   transported   the   aforesaid   stolen antique idol from Allahabad to Delhi and sold the stolen property to accused   Shreekant   Jain   through   accused   Kashi   Nath.     Accused Shreekant Jain took the delivery of the antique idol knowing fully well that the idol of Durga was stolen property.

As   per   chargesheet,   investigation   further   revealed   that Shreekant   Jain   got   the   aforesaid   idol   of   Durga   broken/cut   into   4 pieces   from   one   Natwar   Lal   an   artisan   and   kept   the   same  in   VIP suitcase alongwith 14 other antiquities / terrocottas after wrapping and concealing them. Thereafter, accused Shreekant Jain who was holder   of   Indian   passport   No.   P­240868   dated   17.10.80   issued   at New   York   purchased   an   Air   Ticket   and   also   two   excess   baggage tickets on 30.05.81 for the excess baggage to be carried alongwith him on 01.06.81 by Air India Flight no. 101 for his journey Ex­Delhi­ London­New York.  The said accused Shreekant Jain did not proceed abroad by the aforesaid flight and later on 07.06.81 morning directly reached   Palam   Airport   alongwith   the   aforesaid   5   VIP   suitcases containing antique objects concealed therein.  He managed to get a seat by Air India Flight no. 115 dt. 07.06.81 and booked all the 5 VIP suitcases   as   mentioned   above.     The   said   accused   Shreekant   Jain having been cleared for the aforesaid flight, entered the International Departure Lounge Delhi Airport when he found Air Customs Officers around his aforesaid 5 VIP suitcases.

Suspecting that he would be caught and arrested by the Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 5 Air Customs Authorities, he stealthily left the place and managed to abscond to New York subsequently.   The aforesaid 5 VIP suitcases were   opened   by   the   Air   Customs   Authorities,   Delhi   Airport,   New Delhi in the presence of independent witnesses who found 18 objects of stone and terracottas wrapped in cloth and bed sheets etc. and kept   concealed   in   the   said  suitcases  which   were   seized  through  a memo prepared after observing due legal formalities.

Later   on,   all   the   18   objects   were   produced   before   the Director   General,   Archaeological   Survey   of   India,   New   Delhi   for examination   on   30.06.81   who   opined   that   all   the   18   objects including broken parts of the idol of Goddess Durga were antiquities.

That the above facts disclosed commission of offence u/s 120­B r/w 380 IPC by Kashi Nath, Ramesh, Jhanna Lal, Ashgar and Dulal and substantive offences u/s 380 IPC by Ramesh, Jhanna Lal, Ashgar   and   Dulal   aforesaid,   u/s   25(1)   of   the   Antiquities   and   Art Treasures Act 1972 by Shreekant Jain, u/s ­120B r/w 25(1) of the Antiquities & Art Treasure Act 1972 by Ramesh, Kashi Nath, Jhanna Lal an Dulal, u/s 411 IPC by Shreekant Jain, u/s 414 IPC by S/Shri Shreekant Jain, Kashi Nath, Jhanna Lal and Dulal u/s 25(2)  r/w 5 of the Antiquities & Art Treasures Act 1972 by Sh. Ramesh, Jhanna Lal, Kashi Nath and Dulal and u/s 25(2) r/w 14(3) of the Antiquities & Art Act 1972 by Shreekant Jain, Kashi Nath, Ramesh, Jhanna Lal, Ashgar and Dulal.

   The sanction for prosecution u/s 26(1) of the Antiquities Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 6 &   Art   Treasures   Act   1972   issued   by   the   Director   General, Archaeological   Survey   of   India   for   prosecution   of   the   accused persons u/s 25(1) of the Antiquities & Art Treasures Act 1972 was obtained by CBI.  Authorization of the Central Government in favour of the Investigating Officer for instituting prosecution of the accused persons u/s 25(2) of the Antiquities & Art Treasures Act was also obtained as required u/s 26(2) of the Antiquities & Art Treasures Act 1972.  As regarding offences u/s 25(2) r/w 5 and 14(3) of the said Act, a separate complaint was filed.

   The accused Jhanna Lal (A­4) was granted pardon by Ld. C.M.M on 10.02.1983 for being an approver in this case. Accused Ashgar (A­5) has made a confessional statement u/s 164 Cr. P. C. in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st  Class Allahabad confessing his guilt.

After completing investigation, charge­sheet was filed in this Court against both the accused persons namely Shreekant Jain and Kashi Nath for committing various offences under Indian Penal Code 1860 (IPC) and Art & Antiquities Treasures Act, 1972.

Prima facie charges u/s 120­B/380 IPC read with Section 3   of   Art   &   Antiquities   Treasures   Act,   1972  were   framed   against accused   Shreekant   Jain   and   Kashi   Nath.     Further,   charge   u/s 411/414 IPC; u/s 3 read with Section 25(1)& (2) of Art & Antiquities Treasures Act, 1972 and u/s 14(3) read with Section 25(2) of Art & Antiquities   Treasures   Act,   1972   were   framed   against   accused Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 7 Shreekant Jain.   Both  the accused persons did not plead guilty to their respective charges and claimed trial.

In   support   of   its   case,   prosecution   has   examined   18 witnesses in all.  The accused Shreekant Jain examined one witness in his defence namely D1W­1 Sh. Y.K. Midha. 

The PW­1 Smt. Amrita Singh deposed that in year 1981­ 1982, she was posted as Traffic Assistant in Reservation Section of Commercial   Department   of   Air   India,   Scindia   House.   She   further deposed that the passengers were allowed two pieces of baggage for travel   to   New   York   by   Air   India   for   economy   class   and   for   extra baggage, passengers of economy class   were required to pay extra fares. The passengers of economy class were issued ticket for excess baggage only if the extra charges were paid.   She further deposed that as per procedure, payment for excess baggage was used to be made at the City office of Air India. At the airport, the passengers used to show the tickets for excess baggage payment at the time of boarding the plane.  

After  being shown with the photograph of ticket dated 30.05.1981, the PW­1 Smt. Amrita Singh stated that it was issued by Janta Travels GSA for Air India in the name of Mr.Shreekant Jain and the ticket was marked as Mark A. After being shown with the photographs of excess baggage tickets Ex.PW1/A and Ex.PW1/B, she stated that each ticket was for one piece of baggage and the charge for each piece was Rs.900/­ which was paid in cash and each ticket was  issued   in   the   name  of   Mr.S.K.Jain.  After   being   shown  sticker Ex.PW1/C she stated that it was issued by her for travel on 01.06.81.

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 8 The PW­2 Sh.Rahul Sangar was working as Sales Officer in Janta Travels Pvt. Ltd. At H­8­9, Connaught Circus, New Delhi in year   1981.   The   firm   M/s   Janta   Travels   Pvt.   Ltd.   was   working   as General Sales Agents for Air India.  He, after seeing Air India ticket dated 30.05.1981 in the name of Jain/Shreekant Mr., stated that it was an open ticket for journey Delhi­London­New York­London­Delhi consisting of two coupons, one coupon Mark A (Ex.PW2/A) is for journey   Delhi­London   and   another   coupon   Ex.PW1/DA­1   is   for journey London­New York.   He after seeing Form­P relating to the said Air India ticket issued to "Jain/Shreekant Mr." dated 30.05.1981 proved the contents of Form­P Ex.PW2/B.   The  PW­3   Sh.Satish   Kumar  deposed   that   in   the   year 1980­1981, he was posted as Air Customs Officer at Indira Gandhi International Airport (IGI Airport), New Delhi.  At that point of time, Mr.T.Haridas was  the  Superintendent­Air Customs and he  was his supervisor.  During the intervening night of 06.06.81 and 07.06.81, the   PW­3   was   on   duty   at   the   Departure   Hall   at   IGI   Airport.   On 07.06.81, at about 4.00 A.M, luggage was taken for loading in the departing flights in the conveyor belt. There were five suitcases on the   conveyor   belt   and   when   he   tried   to   lift   one   of   the   said   five suitcases, he found that it was unusually heavy.   From the tag, he found out that the said five baggages were to be taken by Air India Flight no.115. Inquiries were made to find out the passenger who was  to  travel in  the  said flight  alongwith those  five  suitcases,  but despite efforts, passenger could not be traced. When they could not trace the passenger, counter of Air India was approached in order to inquire   as  to  whom   the   tags   attached  with  the  said   five  suitcases Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 9 were issued. It was told by the official at the counter that tags had been issued to passenger named Shreekant Jain, as the tags had been issued for heavy luggage.   The information was then given to the Immigration Counter. 

At the Immigration Counter, the Custom Official came to know that passenger, Shreekant Jain as per the Embarkation Card had   checked­in   for   travel,   he   again   searched   for   the   passenger everywhere right up to the plane, but the PW­3 Satish Kumar could not   trace   the   passenger   Shreekant   Jain.   Thereafter,   he   gave   the information   to   their   Superintendent,   Sh.T.Haridas,   who   directed them   to   check   the   baggage   in   those   suitcases.     They   called   two independent   witnesses   namely   Sh.Vijay   Sethi,   Air   Traffic   Assistant and Sh.Sita Ram, one Loader from Air India.  Thereafter, Panchnama was prepared and details were given in the panchnama which was prepared by him in his own handwriting. From all the five suitcases, total 18 pieces of different sculptures were found. The PW­3 Satish Kumar   proved   the   Panchnama   dated   07.06.81   Ex.PW3/A. Panchnama was also signed by independent witnesses.  The articles recovered   were   put   in   the  same   suitcases   from   where  those   were recovered and sealed with Customs seal.

  The   PW­3   Satish   Kumar   further   deposed   that   on 17.06.81, Mr.Dhanpat Rai, Dy.Director or having similar designation in   Archaeological   Survey   of   India   had   come   to   their   office   at   IGI Airport and the articles recovered were sealed in the suitcases were shown to him. Prior to suitcases being opened, two witnesses namely Mr.Subhash   Munjal   from   BCCI   and   another   person   named Mr.Dayanand   Sharma   also   from   BCCI   were   called   to   witness   the Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 10 proceedings. All the suitcases were opened in the presence of both the witnesses, himself and other members of their staff as well as in the   presence   of   Sh.Dhanpat   Rai.   After   the   articles   were   seen   by Sh.Dhanpat Rai, the articles were put in the same suitcases and again re­sealed   with   customs   seal.     He   prepared   the   Panchnama   of   the proceedings   dated   17.06.81   and   photograph   of   panchnama   is Ex.PW3/B bearing signatures of independent witnesses. 

The   PW­3   Satish   Kumar   further   deposed   that   on 30.06.81,  he  had  taken  the articles which were  in the five  sealed suitcases to the office of Archaeological Survey of India near India Gate,   New   Delhi.     He   called   two   witnesses   through   officials   of Archaeological Survey of India and in their presence suitcases were opened.  Goods were shown to the officers of Archaeological Survey of  India,  then the articles were again re­sealed in the presence of witnesses   and   brought   back   to   their   office.   He   also   prepared panchnama on 30.06.81 of the proceedings done by him at the office of Archaeological Survey of India and photograph of the panchnama was   proved   as   Ex.PW3/C   bearing   signatures   of   independent witnesses. He identified the case properties viz. bed­sheets as Ex.P1 to Ex.P5, suitcases as Ex.P6 to Ex.P10, stone/terracotta pieces and one splinter piece as Ex.M1 to Ex.M6 and Ex.M­6A, Ex.M­7 to Ex.M­ 9, brass idols asEx.M10 to Ex.M13, stones/terracotta pieces Ex.M16 to Ex.M27.  

PW­4   Vijay   Sethi  deposed   that   in   the   year   1981   and 1982, he was posted as Traffic Assistant, being employee of Air India at   Palam   Airport,   New   Delhi.     At   that   time   Mr.Haridas   was   the Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 11 Superintendent Customs at the Airport.  Mr. Satish Chaudhary (PW­

3)   was   the   Inspector   (Customs),   who   used   to   be   on   duty   at   the Customs Departure Counter alongwith him.   Mr. Satish Chaudhary (PW­3) was also addressed as Air Customs Officer.  In the month of June 1981, in the night intervening 06.06.81 and 07.06.81, when he was on night duty at the Customs Departure Hall, at about 2.00 or 2.30 A.M, he was instructed by Superintendent (Customs) and PW­3 Satish   Kumar   Chaudhary,   Inspector   (Customs)   to   take   out   5   /   7 suitcases from the conveyor belt for random checking. He asked Sita Ram, Loader of Air India to take out those suitcases, who had done so. Thereafter, PW­3 Inspector (Customs) Mr.Satish Kumar inquired from them for the passenger to whom those suitcases belonged. He informed Mr.Satish Kumar that a S.No. given on the tag put on the baggage and from the list, the S.No. can be tallied with the list of passengers.   The   list   of   passengers   also   used   to   be   provided   to Inspector (Customs) and so he requested Insp. Satish Kumar to tally the S.No. on the tags on the suitcases with the list and found out the name of the passenger of those suitcases. But the passenger could not be found. After all the passengers in the queue for the flight were checked­in, Insp.Satish Kumar Chaudhary, Inspector (Customs) told that one passenger had not reported for the flight at the Customs. They   also   checked   from   the   passenger   list   at   the   Immigration Counter, but one passenger had not reported for check­in, so they gave the clearance for the flight to take off.  

  Thereafter,   Superintendent   (Customs)   Mr.Haridas requested Duty Manager of Air India to spare his services to witness the proceedings in regard to panchnama to be prepared relating to Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 12 the   suitcases   which   were   taken   out   of   the   conveyor   belt   and   the contents   thereof.     He   went   to   the   Departure   Customs   Hall   where proceedings were being done. He signed the panchnama. When he reached the Departure Customs Hall, all the suitcases were opened and some articles like terracotta/stone idols were lying there in the Hall.  He after seeing the panchnama Ex.PW3/A stated that it bears his signatures at point B on all sheets. He had also identified the case properties. He had seen the photographs of Air India tags of both front and reverse side which are Mark­A and Mark­B.  The  PW­5   Ms.Suhas   Vats  deposed   that   in   year   1981­ 1982   she   was   posted   as   Traffic   Assistant   with   Air   India   at International Airport Delhi.   Her duties included flight handling and procedure to be undertaken for flight departure and arrival.   After seeing the photograph of passenger manifest Ex.PW5/A of Air India flight No.115 dated 07.06.81 from Delhi to London and New York, she stated that same were having her initials at point A. She also identified the photograph of the air ticket in the name of passenger Jain/Shreekant/Mr. and the excess baggage tickets as Ex.PW1/A and Ex.PW1/B.  She also stated that the baggage tags seen in photograph Mark­B shows that the passenger was having five bags. After seeing the flight manifest of flight no. AI­115 dated 07.06.81 she stated that the bags are usually put on the scales by the passenger himself. This witness  in   her   cross   examination   by   the   prosecution   admitted   the statement made by her to the CBI Ex.PW5/B from portions A to A to G to G.  She also identified the photographs of the five baggage tags bearing her initials in her handwriting Ex.PW5/C.   The PW­6 Ashok Kumar Sarkar was posted as Assistant Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 13 Station   Superintendent   in   the   Flight   Handling   Administration   at Palam   Airport,   Delhi.     He   stated   that   the   duty   Manager   used   to report to him with regard to the matters relating to flight handling. After seeing the seizure memo dated 08.06.81 Ex.PW6/A, he stated that vide the said memo, he handed over two flight coupons and two excess baggage tickets to the Custom Officer and the signatures of the Custom Officer are at point B on the same in token of the receipt of the same.  

The  PW­7   Shankar   Nath  who   appeared   in   the   Court alongwith his daughter on 24.04.14, but it was stated that he had lost his memory and could not recall anything, accordingly he was discharged unexamined. 

The  PW­8   Dharam   Raj   Sonar  stated   that   in   the   year 1981 he was working as rickshaw puller at Allahabad and at that time   one   person   Asgar   who   was   also   working   as   rickshaw   puller. They used to sit together and he had also asked him if he knew about any old idol in Allahabad as the same would fetch good amount if sold.  The said witness also identified accused Kashinath. He has also deposed that in the month of March­April, 1981 he was shown pieces of broken idol by Asgar for selling, to which he stated that he should sell the same himself.  However, the said witness stated that he has no discussion with the accused Kashinath with respect to the selling of the idols, though he was told by Asgar that Ramesh @ Chedi Lal used   to   steal   the   idols   from   Banaras   and   used   to   sell   the   same through his relative Kashinath who used to get 10% commission on the same. 

The PW­9 Ram Chander deposed that he was resident of Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 14 Darya Bagh, Allahabad in the year 1981. He was doing sewa in the Mandir situated at Darya Bagh named as Tarkeshwar Nath Mandir, also famous as Badha Shivalaya.  He deposed that in the year 1981 there were 5 idols of Lord Shiva, one idol of Lord Hanuman and one idol   of   goddess  Durga  and  also   in  small  form  idols  of  Lord  Ram, Laxman and Sita.  All the above idols are still in the Mandir except of goddess Durga which was stolen in the year 1981. After coming to know   about   the   theft,   all   the   residents   including   this   witness approached   the   Police   Station­Attar   Suiya,   Allahabad.     On   their information the Daroga of the P.S registered an FIR Ex.PW9/X.  He also stated that CBI has also recorded his statement as Ex.PW9/PX.  

The  PW­10   Dhanpat   Rai,   who   retired   as   Director, Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) deposed that in the year 1981 he was posted in Air Customs as DSA from ASI.   As and when Air Customs  Authorities  asked to  sort  out   the   objects  suspected to  be antiquities, the matter was referred to him. He used to check them and thereafter refer the same to Director General, ASI as they were the   final   authorities   under   the   Antiquities   and   Art   Treasures   Act. After seeing the panchnama dated 15.06.81 Ex.PW3/B he stated that these objects were retained by the Customs Authorities, suspecting it to   be   antiquities   and   he   referred   the   same   to   DG,   Archaeological Survey   of   India   for   final   decision   to   declare   whether   they   were antiquities or not. The DG also called the expert advisory committee and   these   objects   were   verified  and  were   found   to  be   antiquities. After seeing the report dated 13.08.81 he identified the signatures of then   DG   D.Mitra   on   the   same   Ex.PW10/A   as   he   stated   that Smt.D.Mitra had died 10 years ago.

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 15 The  PW­11 SI Krishan Murari  was a witness from P.S Attar Suiya, Allahabad, U.P. He stated that he could not trace FIR No.64/1981 u/S 380 IPC despite his best efforts, the relevant reports were proved by him as Ex.PW11/A to Ex.PW11/D. The PW­12 Rabi Kant Sharma has not spoken anything about the accused persons nor has supported the case of prosecution despite being declared hostile by the prosecution.

The  PW­13   Ram   Chander   Yadav  stated   that   he   was resident of Darya Bagh, P.S. Attar Suiya, Allahabad since his birth and prior thereto for last three generations.   There was an idol of goddess Durga in Tarkeshwar Mahadev Mandir near his house in the year 1980.   On one fine morning he found that the same had been stolen. The police also reached there as the information was given to the Police Station.

The PW­14 Sh. Raja Ram Sharma deposed that he was working in M/s B.K.Plastics Ltd., Ghaziabad and there were three / four   owners   /   Directors   of   the   said   company   including   Shreekant Jain   where   he   was   working   as   Accountant,   however   he   did   not support the case of prosecution at all despite being declared hostile.

The  PW­15   Sh.S.L.Mukhi  was   a   retired   Principal Scientific Officer, CFSL, New Delhi. He after examining the specimen signatures and handwriting of accused Shreekant Jain Ex.PW15/A to Ex.PW15/B, has given his report Ex.PW15/C. The PW­16 Sh.R.L.Chugh, retired Judge Incharge, Delhi, who at the relevant time was posted as CMM, Delhi. He after going through   the   relevant   documents   including   the   application   for recording of statement u/S 306 Cr.P.C deposed that one Jhanna Lal Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 16 stated  that  the  same   was moved by the said accused for grant of pardon. The reply was also filed by the CBI, supporting the same. After making discrete inquiries from him, whether the pardon should be granted or not, the report was prepared by him and the PW­16 proved the same as Ex.PW16/A. Thereafter he passed the requisite order   granting   pardon   to   accused   Jhanna   Lal   subject   to   usual conditions as mentioned in his order Ex.PW16/B. The accused duly accepted the tender pardon and in token of the same, put his thumb impression at point C. The  PW­17   A.K.Goswami  deposed   that   he   joined Archaeological Survey of India in July 1974 and retired in July 2012. He   stated   that   in   the  year   1981­1982   he   was   posted   at   Northern Circle,   Agra.   At   that   time   Sh.   Shankar   Nath   was   posted   as Superintendent­Archaeologist Antiquity, Janpath, having the charge of   Agra   office   also.   As   Superintendent­Archaeologist   Antiquity,   his job   was   that   in   case   any   sculpture   is   discovered   during   the excavation or it is recovered after theft or seized by the Customs, he used to verify whether the said sculpture was antiquity or not or was modern and he also used to give report in this regard. He identified the signatures of Shankar Nath, as he had worked with him. He has proved the relevant letters signed by Sh.Shankar Nath as Ex.PW17/A and Ex.PW17/B and also one letter dated 28.02.83 signed by D.Mitra at point A, which is a sanction order Ex.PW17/X. The  PW­18   Piyush   Kumar  at   the   relevant   time   in   the year   1982   was   working   as   JM­I.   He   deposed   after   seeing   a   torn envelop addressed to CMM, Tis Hazari, Delhi, which contained the statement of Asgar u/S 164 Cr.P.C that the application marked to Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 17 him by CJM concerned for recording statement by him bearing his signatures   and   endorsement   thereon.   The   said   application   was proved as Ex.PW18/A and the statement of Asgar recorded by him u/S 164 Cr.P.C was proved as Ex.PW18/B. Thereafter on directions the said statement was sent to Ld.CJM in sealed cover Ex.PW19/X.   After  recording the  statement  of  prosecution  witnesses, statement of accused persons u/S 313 Cr.P.C were recorded.   The accused Shreekant Jain in his statement u/S 313 Cr.P.C stated that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated in this case.  Besides that he stated that he never traveled on Ticket No. 0984400793544 and the same was never issued to him, but traveled   on a different ticket bearing ticket no. 0984400793549, as contained in the P­Form which is the document produced and admitted by the prosecution. He stated that the suitcases were seen by him for the first time in the Court.  The CBI carried out raids at his house in B­5, Gulmohar Park, New Delhi, but nothing incriminating was found against him in the search carried out by customs at his house B­5, Gulmohar Park, New Delhi. Also the CBI had raided his factory with a search team situated at Meerut Road and searched the machines, raw products, finished products   and   even   got   dug   the   land   over   there   but   nothing incriminating   was   found   against   him   in   the   said   search.     It   was claimed in his statement u/s 313 CrPC that the CBI has not produced that report on the court record and has concealed the same from this Hon'ble Court.  

Accused Shreekant Jain examined D1W1 Sh. Y.K. Midha in his defence.

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 18 The accused Kashinath in his statement u/S 313 Cr.P.C stated that he was innocent and was falsely implicated in this case. 

I have heard the Ld. Sr. PP Sh. B.K. Singh & Sh. Tajvinder Singh,   Ld.   PP   for   CBI   as   well   as   ld.   Counsel   Sh.   P.R.   Aggarwal, Advocate for accused Shreekant Jain and ld. Counsel Sh. Mahender Singh, Advocate for accused Kashi Nath.     I have also perused the record carefully.  

ARGUMENTS OF Ld. PP FOR CBI AND DEFENCE It was argued by CBI that there is no question from the side of defence to any Air India Officer as to whether Shreekant Jain had gone in the same flight on some other seat or on some other ticket.  As per Ld.Sr.PP, this was necessary on the part of the defence, as the defence has claimed that the P­form Ex.PW2/B signed by the accused   Shreekant   Jain   bears   some   other   ticket   number.     It   was further argued that accused Shreekant Jain was tried to be traced even in the plane but he managed to flee from Airport.  

It was also highlighted that the PW­4 Vijay Sethi has also corroborated the version of the prosecution and the other PW Sita Ram could not be brought into the witness box, as he has already expired.     He   further   stated   that   there   were   only   three   witnesses namely PW­3 Satish Kumar, PW­4 Vijay Sethi and PW Late Sita Ram, who had witnessed the recovery of the incriminating material at the airport from five boxes at the airport and who all except Sita Ram (since expired) were examined by prosecution. 

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 19 As per Ld.Sr.PP for CBI, Section 24 of the Antiquity & Art Treasure   Act   1972   categorically   states   that   if   any   question   arises whether any article, object or thing or manuscript, record or other document is or is not an antiquity or is not an art treasure for the purposes   of   this   Act,   it   shall   be   referred   to   the   Director­General, Archaeological   Survey   of   India   and   the   decision   of   the   Director­ General or such officer on such question shall be final.  Attention of this Court has been drawn towards a letter Ex.PW17/A written by Mr.Shankar Nath to Addl.Custom Air Customs wherein it has been mentioned that 18 pieces of stones sculptures were examined by the Director­General, ASI on 30.06.1981 and all the 18 stone pieces were declared antiquities.   Hence, according to Sr.PP for CBI, there is no requirement of this fact being proved further, as the requirements for getting the sculptures declared antiquity have already been fulfilled and   the   Director­General   had   already   conveyed   the   same   to   the Customs Office through its own Superintending Archaeologist vide letter Ex.PW17/A.  The   Ld.   Defence   counsel   for   the   accused   Shreekant   Jain vehemently argued that the  present case is fit for acquittal of the accused, as the prosecution has not been able to prove it beyond the shadow of doubt.  It has been averred that prosecution has not been able to bring on record the original documents on the basis of which the   present   case   has  been  filed against  the  accused, except  a few original documents including the P­form.  The PW­3 Satish Kumar is stated   to   be   the   witness   from   Customs   Department,   who   had removed the 5 suitcases from the conveyor belt was examined, but Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 20 no other witness who was party to the Panchnama Ex.PW3/A could be examined by the prosecution. Though it has  been mentioned that the   loader   Sita   Ram   from   the   Customs   Department   had   already expired,   but   the   other   witnesses   namely   PW­4   Vijay   Sethi     has mentioned in his examination in chief itself that when he reached the departure Customs Hall all the suitcases were found open and some articles like terracotta/stone articles were lying there in the hall, all the documents were already prepared when he reached there and he was  asked  by   the   Customs Officer to sign  the  documents and the articles were told to be lying in the hall.  

The   Ld.   Counsel   highlighted   that   first   of   all   the   original Panchnama has not been produced and no plausible explanation has come forward for not producing the same.  Secondly, the PW­4 Vijay Sethi,   who   was   allegedly   signatory   to   the   Panchnama   was   given Panchnama   just   for   getting   the   same   signed   without   him   actually being   involved   in   the   preparation   of   the   same.     The   Ld.counsel pointed  out  that  CBI  has not  been  able  to explain  as to how this Panchnama   came   to   be   placed   on   record   by   CBI   given   the circumstance when the seizure memo of the same has not been filed by CBI.  The Ld. Counsel stated that in case the Investigating Agency recovers some documents after registration of the FIR or before the same, it is mandatory on its part to prepare a seizure memo which may reflect the name of the person from whom it was collected, date, time as well as place etc. from where it was recovered,   for which record   is   silent.     The   Ld.counsel   has   also   highlighted   another Panchnama of the same date, dated 07.06.81   which has not even been proved.  It was contended that without the seizure memo, this Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 21 document Ex.PW3/A cannot be read in evidence, firstly for want of its original and secondly, for doubts as to its recovery.  It was stated that this Panchnama Ex.PW3/A was of highest importance, as this was   the   first   document   prepared   by   the   Customs   Officials   for initiating   proceedings   against   the   accused   Shreekant   Jain.    It   was further   stated   that   the   seeds   of   the   doubts   appears   to   have   been sown by the prosecuting agency itself by not filing seizure memo of document Ex.PW3/A and further by not filing its original.  

On   these   points,   Ld.Sr.PP   though   conceded   that   the   seizure memo   has   not   been   filed   by   the   CBI   for   the   said   document,   but submitted that the permission to lead secondary evidence for these documents was taken by this Court on 24.01.96 and on 31.05.13.  It was submitted that the Customs Officials had lost the documents and the documents were not handed over to CBI as the custom officials could not produce any receipt for handing over the documents to the CBI.  

The Ld. Counsel for the accused Shreekant Jain took another point   regarding   the   P­form.   The   accused   admits   the   P­form Ex.PW2/B filed in original by the CBI.  It was explained that in the earlier   times,   to   regulate  the  foreign  exchange, the  issuance  of  P­ form   was   mandatory   under   the   Foreign   Exchange   Regulatory Act,1947   and   without   issuance   of   the   same,   nobody   could   have undertaken any journey to the foreign country.   He has referred to Section 18(B) of the aforementioned Act in support of his claim.  The Ld.counsel   has   also   referred   to   Rule   12   of   Section   II   of   the notification dated 15.04.65 issued by Reserve Bank of India to all steamer/airline/flights/travel   agents,   which   mandates   the   travel Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 22 agents   that   while   issuing   ticket   for   travel   abroad,   the   airline companies and travel agent should endorse on relative form P about the number and date of the ticket issued and the said record should be forwarded to RBI alongwith monthly statement by the agents.  

The Ld. counsel submitted that without the P form being issued by the travel agent (here Janta Travels Pvt. Ltd.), the person having the said form could not have performed the journey.  The P form though earlier was proved by PW­2 Rahul as Ex.PW2/B, which has been fairly admitted by the accused, but even the said P­form has not been proved properly as the person who had prepared the same was   not   produced.     It   has   been   highlighted   that   for   want   of   the author of the Ex.PW2/B, the defence lost opportunity to put certain questions regarding the ticket number written on P­form Ex.PW2/B. Despite the fact that the author was still working with Janta Travels, the   CBI   chose   to   examine   his   colleague   rather   than   the   author himself.   It was further argued that in the cross examination, it has been termed to be correct by PW­2 that anyone can purchase the ticket in the name of anyone.  

As per Ld. Counsel, in the P­form Ex.PW2/B, the ticket number   has   been   mentioned   as   0984400793549.     The   P­form suggest that the name of the passenger and his address etc. is same as  that  of the  present  accused. It  was highlighted that in  fact  the accused   had   traveled   abroad   on   the   aforesaid   ticket   number   last three   digits   ending   with   549   with   full   ticket   number   as 0984400793549 but not on the ticket bearing no.0984400793544.  It has   been   stressed   that   in   fact,   the   accused   Shreekant   Jain   never visited abroad on ticket number last three digits ending with 544.

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 23 The Ld.counsel stated that the present accused is suffering for the last 36 years in this case, and even the ticket number on which the accused had traveled abroad does not match with the particulars of the ticket number which was found to be connected with recovery, if any, made by the Customs Officials at the airport with respect to the antique   objects.   It   was  stated  that  in  fact,  accused  came  to  know about   the   recovery   only   when   he   joined   the   investigation   under compulsion from CBI and he has nothing to do with those objects.

Ld.   Counsel   again   drew   the   attention   of   this   Court towards the ticket no.   0984400793544 and stated that neither the original tickets, nor photocopy, nor any other register record or other document could be produced by the prosecution in order to establish that   in   fact,   the   accused   Shreekant   Jain   traveled   abroad   on   this ticket.  The Ld. Counsel was surprised as to why CBI was not put any clarificatory   questions   upon   the   relevant   witness   for   seeking   the correct ticket number on which the accused might have traveled. He stated that the ticket bearing no.  0984400793544 is neither original nor a photocopy of the original , but in fact they are the photographs which appears to have been developed into positive hard copy after developing   the   negative   under   the   old   methodology   of   taking photographs   as   there   was   no   technology   at   that   time.   He   further stated that the photographer who might have taken the photographs was not produced, and neither original photographs were produced, nor   negatives   of   these   photographs   have   been   produced,   which squarely leads to the conclusion that the photographs Ex.PW2/A and Ex.PW1/DA are manipulated one. 

After hearing the parties on the points discussed herein Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 24 above, first of all, I shall deal with the aspect regarding recovery of the incriminating material from the possession of the accused on the basis of which the Customs Authorities swung into action.  It is clear from   the   evidence   produced   that   no   direct   recovery   was   effected from the accused Shreekant Jain and in fact, the case is based on constructive possession of incriminating material   with the accused Shreekant Jain. 

The   material   witness   regarding   recovery   of   the incriminating   material   was   PW­3   Satish   Kumar   who   was   the   Air Customs Officer at Indira Gandhi Airport and was working under the supervision of T.Haridas. The said T.Haridas has not been produced by   the   prosecution.     The   PW­3   Satish   Kumar   deposed   before   this Court   that   during   the   intervening   night   of   06­07/06/1981,   while checking the luggage in the departing flights on the conveyor belt, he noticed that when out of 5 suitcases which were received together, one suitcase was tried to be lifted, it was found to be unusually very heavy.   He got all the 5 suitcases removed from the conveyor belt and on the basis of the tags tied on the 5 baggages, it was revealed that   the   said   baggages   were   to   be   taken   by   AIR   flight   no.115. Inquiries were made by PW­3 to find out the passenger who was to travel   in   the   said   flight   with   those   5   baggages,   however   despite efforts the Customs Officer could not trace the passenger.

Therefore, it is clear from this part of testimony of PW­3 Satish Kumar that the direct recovery of the incriminating material was   not   effected   from   the   accused   and   prosecution   intended   to prosecute the accused Shreekant Jain on the basis of identification of the accused through the ticket numbers as well as the particulars of Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 25 the passenger traveling vide AIR flight no.115.  The prosecution has tried   to   connect   the   recovery   of   incriminating   articles   from   the accused in this fashion.

The   PW­3   Satish   Kumar   has   further   mentioned   in   his testimony that since he could not trace the passenger, the counter of Air India was approached wherein it was informed by the official at the counter that the tags had been issued to the passenger named Shreekant   Jain   as   the   tags   were   issued   for   heavy   luggage.     The information was flashed to immigration counter wherein the PW­3 Satish Kumar came to know through immigration counter that the passenger/accused   Shreekant   Jain   as   per   Embarkation   Card   had checked  in  for travel.  The passenger Shreekant  Jain  was searched everywhere right up to the plane but he could not be found. 

From   this   later   part   of   the   testimony   of   PW­3   Satish Kumar, it is clear that the accused /passenger Shreekant Jain could not be   located  at  the airport  or in the  plane despite search being made by the PW­3.   It is also clear from the testimony that it was only the PW­3 Satish Kumar who had taken out the incriminating material from the conveyor belt and thereafter had searched for the accused / passenger and it is only after the time when the accused could not be traced he could inform his Superintendent T.Haridas. After   getting   instructions   from   Superintendent   T.Haridas,   two witnesses namely Vijay Sethi (PW­4) and one loader Sita Ram were called.   The   baggages   were   tried   to   be   opened,   and   were   finally opened with one key. The Panchnama Ex.PW3/A was simultaneously prepared.  

Though,   it   has   been   mentioned   in   the   testimony   that Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 26 Panchnama was prepared with the aid of carbon paper. The carbon copy   of   the   same   has   been   placed   on   record,   but   the   original   of Panchnama has not been filed in this case and same has been proved through   secondary   evidence.   The   seizure   memo   of   the   said Panchnama has also not been filed by CBI and it is not clear as to whether   the   seizure   memo   was   prepared   or   not.   It   has   been mentioned in the testimony of PW­3 Satish Kumar that Panchnama Ex.PW3/A was signed by T.Haridas, Superintendent Air Customs, but the said T.Haridas has not been produced by the prosecution.  It was further deposed by PW­3 Satish Kumar that after the preparation of Panchnama, the articles were put in the same suitcase from which they   were   recovered   and   were   again   resealed   with   Customs   seal. These proceedings  were carried on by PW­3 Satish Kumar and other Customs Officials on 07.06.81.   The lone witness who had proved this Panchnama is PW­3 Satish Kumar, but the prosecution has tried to corroborate the same through the testimony of PW­4 Vijay Sethi who was also working as Traffic Assistant  at Palam Airport. Though it has not been mentioned in the testimony of PW­3 Satish Kumar that at the time of taking out the incriminating material from the conveyor belt on suspicion, the PW­4 Vijay Sethi was present, but the PW­4 Vijay Sethi has specifically mentioned that in the intervening night of 06/07.06.81 he was instructed by Superintendent and PW­3 Satish Kumar to take out 5/7 suitcases from the conveyor belt for random checking and accordingly he asked Sita Ram, loader of the Air   India   to   take   out   those   suitcases,   who   followed   the   order accordingly.   This   testimony   of   PW­4   Vijay   Sethi   is   somewhat   in contradiction   to   the   testimony   of   PW­3   Satish   Kumar,   who   in   his Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 27 testimony brought PW­4 Vijay Sethi into picture only after deposing factum of removing the baggages from the conveyor belt and at a time when even the accused could not be traced at the airport and plane despite efforts made by PW­3 Satish Kumar.   The PW­4 Vijay Sethi  specifically  mentioned in  his statement  on  oath that  he  had informed the PW­3 Satish Kumar that the S.No was given on the tag put   on   the   baggage   and   S.No   can   be   tallied   with   the   list   of passengers.     He   also   stated   on   oath   before   this   Court   that   the passenger could not be traced and it was revealed that one passenger had   not   reported   for   check­in   and   it   is   only   thereafter   that   the clearance was given for the flight to take off. 

In the carbon copy of Panchnama Ex.PW3/A, though the PW­4 Vijay Sethi identified his own signatures on all the three sheets of Panchnama, but he failed to identify the signatures appearing at point C on this Panchnama. It was claimed by the prosecution that the said signatures at point C was of Sita Ram (loader who has since expired).  The presence of Sita Ram loader at the time of preparation of Panchnama could not be established. 

Upto   this   juncture   of   proceedings   initiated   by   custom officials,   though   the   recovery   of   articles   were   effected,   but   the articles   could   not   be   connected   with   any   person   including   the accused Shreekant Jain.  This court shall come to the aspect of stolen property as well as the identity of the property at a later stage, but upto   this   stage   the   zeal   of   this   court   is   the   connection   of   the incriminating   articles   with   the   accused   Shreekant   Jain.     The prosecution   has   tried   to   connect   the   accused   Shreekant   Jain   with recovery of incriminating articles through the departure tickets and Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 28 baggage   tickets   etc.,   but   could   not   establish   the   presence   of   the accused   Shreekant   Jain   either   at   the   airport   or   in   the   plane immediately   after   the   recovery   of   incriminating   articles   from   the conveyor   belt.     Therefore,   in   these   circumstances,   this   Court   is required to magnify the aspect right from the issuance of the ticket by the travel agent upto the filing of the same at the ticket counter in order to appreciate the arguments of the prosecution that infact the articles  were   connected   with  the   tickets   of  the   accused  Shreekant Jain.  

Before going into the details of the ticket as well as the evidence pertaining to the travel ticket, it would be appropriate to first   go   through   the   relevant   provisions   of   Foreign   Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 which provided the mode and manner in which the tickets for foreign travel was to be regulated for its issuance.  It has   been   prescribed   in   the   said   Act   that   a   proposed   traveller   is required to  take  P­form which was to be  signed by the passenger who wanted to travel abroad. It was also obligatory and compulsory as   per   RBI   guidelines   under   FERRA   that   it   is   only   thereafter   the issuance of P­form that a travel ticket may be issued by the travel agent or the airlines.  This P­form is prepared in duplicate and as the record of this P­form is required to be send to RBI. 

In the present matter, the prosecution has filed the P­form Ex.PW2/B   which   carries   the   name   of   Shreekant  Jain.   The   reverse side of the said P­form Ex.PW2/B mentions the ticket number to be as   984400793549   (with   certain   cuttings   on   the   thousandths   digit from ones place as it appears that either 3 is overlapping on 7 or vice versa).  The said P­form was filed in original by the prosecution, but Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 29 again   no   seizure   memo   of   the   same   has   been   filed.     As   per prosecution,  it  carries the signatures of accused Shreekant  Jain  at point   Q­1.       In   order   to   prove   the   same,   the   prosecution   has examined PW­2 Sh.Rahul Sangar who after going through the said P­ form stated that it was in his own handwriting and the contents of the P­form was filled up by PW­2 only. He also proved his signatures on the reverse side of Ex.PW2/B at points A and B.     Though, he mentioned that the traveller/ person paying the fare is required to sign at point Q­1 but he failed to depose with certainty and stated that he cannot say, if the same was signed by the traveller or his agent or his representative. In his cross examination, he also termed it to be correct that anyone can purchase the ticket in the name of anyone else.  

Neither   the   CBI   nor   the   defense   counsel   in   any   way assisted   this   Court   by   putting   any   question   regarding   the   cutting /overlapping marks on the ticket number on the reverse side of P­ form Ex.PW2/B.  The PW­2 Rahul Sangar also termed it to be correct that the copy of P­form so prepared is kept in the office of PW­2 and that   the   filled   up   portion   at   points   A   and   B   bears   his   signatures. Upto this part of the story it is clear that the P­form was duly proved as Ex.PW2/B, but the fatal part for the prosecution is that the P­form contains the ticket no.984400793549, whereas the prosecution has based its case on the basis of ticket no.984400793544.  

The   original   tickets   were   neither   been   seized,  nor   been filed.  No explanation has been furnished by the prosecution through any of the witnesses as to why the original tickets could not be filed. The filing of the original tickets was of vital importance as there may Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 30 occur   various   goof­ups   in   preparation   of   the   copy   of   the   original document.  This is the case where the carbon copy or the photocopy of the tickets have not been filed, but it is the enlarged version of the photographs of  the  tickets which had been filed.   It has not been explained as to why the positives of the photographs of the tickets the baggage tickets were filed.  It has also not been explained by CBI as to why the photocopies were not filed in case the originals could not be made available.   No reasons have been assigned as to why specifically   the   photographs   of   the   passenger   tickets   and   baggage tickets were filed by the CBI.  The most unfortunate part is that even the negatives of the photographs have not been placed on the record nor any explanation has been furnished as to why negatives were not filed.  No clarifications has come forward from any of the witnesses of   the   prosecution   as   to   who   were   the   photographers   who   had clicked the photographs of the tickets.  This is a grave lacunae in the prosecution story which the prosecution should have clarified during trial, but it has failed to do so. Though, the flight coupons as well as the excess baggage tickets and one coupon for foreign travel ticket were   seized   by   the   Customs   Officer   Mr.R.Kathuria   and   Mr.Ashok K.Sarkar vide seizure memo Ex.PW6/A, but the position of the said seizure memo Ex.PW6/A is also similar to that of the tickets as it is also a photograph of the seizure memo.  It is not even a carbon copy or   a   photocopy.     There   were   various   other   documents   like   the passenger manifest Ex.PW5/A, the flight coupons, the extra baggage ticket,   besides   several   other   documents   which   are   basically   the photographs of the document.  Given these circumstances, it was the utmost   duty   of   the   prosecution   firstly,   to   have   furnished   an Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 31 explanation specifically as to why the photographs were filed by it and in case, it was not inclined to do so, it could have atleast filed the   negatives   or   could   have   produced   the   photographer   who   had clicked the same. The handing over memo of this seizure memo by the Customs Authorities to either Archaeological Survey of India or to CBI has not been filed and therefore it is not clear as to how CBI got the possession of these documents.

With   respect   to   the   admissibility   of   the   photographs,   I have come across a judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in AIR 1976 Bombay 264 wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay was pleased to hold as under:­ " The first piece of documentary evidence to which I will refer is the negative (Ex.62) of the group photograph alleged to have been taken at the time of adoption ceremony, and the   enlarged   print   (Ex.63)   which,   witness   has   stated   was made   from   another   photo   print   in   respect   of   which   the negative is lost.   As far as the negative Ex.62 is concerned, the same has been produced by the witness Madhukar, Babu Rao  who   has   deposed   that  his   father  Babu   Rao  Tukaram was     a   photographer   and   died   in   1960,   that   he   had   his studio   at   Islampur,   that   defendant   no.1   had   approached him with a photograph and had asked him to find out its negative and that he had found out the negative Ex.62.  In the course of cross examination, however, he has admitted that   he   cannot   say   whether   or   not   that   negative   was prepared by his father.   In my opinion, the negative Ex.62 has   not   been   duly   proved   and   should   not   have   been admitted in evidence. It is only when a person who takes a photograph  and develops it  into a  negative  himself comes Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 32 into the witness box and deposes to both these facts that a negative   becomes   admissible   in   evidence.   As   far   as   the enlarge print Ex.63 is concerned, the position is still worse, for   no   print   or   enlaregment   can   be   admitted   in   evidence without   its   negative   being   produced   and   proved   in   the manner   only   indicated   above.  Moreover   the   evidence   of witness   Dattatraya   Chavan   does   not   show   which   was   the photo   print   from   which   the   photograph   which   had   been tendered as Ex.63 was taken.  In this state of evidence, in my opinion,  the   said   enlarged   photoprint   Ex.63   has   not  been duly   proved   and   should   not   have   been   admitted   in evidence."  

From   the   aforesaid   judgment   of   Hon'ble   Bombay   High Court   it   is   clear   that   without   the   negatives   being   produced,   the document which is a photograph is not admissible in evidence. In the cited judgment, the position was far better than the case in hand, as in that case the negative though was produced but could not be duly proved.     In   the   case   in   hand,   even   the   negative   has   not   been produced.     In   the   cited   case,   the   person   who   had   clicked   the photograph was identified as the father of the witness who deposed in that case, but here in this case, it is not known as to who, where, how   and   at   whose   behest,   the   photographs   were   clicked. Accordingly,   the   documents   which   are   the   photographs   of   the original cannot be admissible in evidence in the given circumstances.

Even   if   we   ignore   the   inadmissibility   of   the   documents which are the photographs, still this Court has lot more to discuss regarding the other contradictions.  Once the P­form was proved, the next course of action is with respect to the ticket number mentioned Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 33 on the P­form. It has been repeatedly claimed by the defence that though accused Shreekant had visited abroad on the same day and in the  same  flight  but his visit was on ticket number 984400793549 whereas   the   case   of   the   prosecution   is   based   on   ticket   number 984400793544. The prosecution produced the PW­5 Ms.Suhas Vats, who   deposed   before   this   Court   that   she   was   posted   as   Traffic Assistant  with Air India at International Airport  in  the year 1981­ 1982   and   her   job   was   flight   handling   etc.     She   was   shown   the passenger   manifest   which   is   also   a   photograph   of   the   original   or photocopy   of   the   document.   On   seeing   the   same,   she   stated   that passenger   manifest   Ex.PW5/A   of   Air   India   flight   no.115   dated 07.06.81 from Delhi to London and New York carries her initials. She proved   the   same,   but   the   mode   and   manner   of   the   proof   was objected to by defence. The said objection has already been discussed in the foregoing paras.  She stated that she could notice the name of passenger   'Jain­JKF'   at   point   B   on   the   passenger   manifest   and elaborated that JKF means John F Kennedy Airport, New York, USA. The PW­5 Suhas Vats was also shown the photographs of Air ticket number   984400793544   which   she   stated   was   in   the   name   of passenger, Jain/Shreekant/Mr. After seeing the photographs of the excess baggage ticket Ex.PW1/A and 1/B she stated that the name of the passenger is Mr.S.K.Jain. She deposed that the complete ticket number was not legible on Ex.PW1/A and Ex.PW1/B. Regarding the identification of passenger, she stated that the passenger must have reported at her counter, after seeing the passenger tags she stated that   the   photographs   mark   B   she   stated   that   the   passenger   was having 5 bags. After seeing the flight manifest number AI­115 dated Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 34 07.06.81 Ex.PW5/A, she further stated that usually baggage was put on   scales   by   the   passenger   itself   and   she   could   not   recall   as   to whether the passenger had infact accompanied the bags.  

She was subjected to detail cross examination by ld.Sr.PP for CBI in which the statement given by her to CBI was readover from portion A to A, B to B, C to C, D to D, E to E, F to F and G to G wherein she had admitted the same to be as correct.  She could not recollect as to whether the suitcases Ex.P6 to Ex.P­10 shown to her in the Court were same which were found to be containing the articles at the airport on that day.   The portion of statement readover by Sr.PP for CBI to PW­5 Suhas Vats was exhibited as Ex.PW5/B which was   objected   to   by   the   defence   at   the   time   of   recording   of   her testimony.  The manner of cross­examination of a hostile witness has been discussed in later paras which is in violation of the law laid down by Superior Courts. 

Therefore   upto   this   stage   the   accused   Shreekant   Jain could   not   be   identified   physically   and   recovery   of   incriminating material is tried to be connected through tickets etc. and not directly.

Now I shall come to the aspect of sanction required u/S 26 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972 herein after called Act, 1972).   Section 26 of the said Act categorically states that no prosecution   for   an   offence   sub   section   1   of   Section   25   shall   be instituted   except   by   or   with   the   sanction   of   such   officer   of   the government as may be prescribed in this behalf. The sub clause 2 of the   same   section   states   that  no   court   shall   take   cognizance   of   an offence punishable under sub  section 2 or sub section 3 of Section 25 except upon a complaint in writing made by an officer generally Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 35 or specially authorized in this behalf by the Central Government.  

Though the objections regarding Sanction for prosecution could   have   been   taken   by   the   Ld.defence   counsels   at   the   time   of taking cognizance by the concerned court immediately after filing of the   chargesheet,   yet   in  view of  the  judgment  of  Hon'ble  Supreme Court of India in  P.K. Pradhan vs State of Sikkim (2001) 6 SCC 704 to assert that the question of sanction can be raised at any time even after conviction, this court has considered the aspect of sanction even   after   the   completion   of   evidence.     Accordingly,   in   order   to appreciate   as   to   whether   the   sanction   to   prosecute   under   Section 25(1) of the Act, 1972 was a valid sanction or not or as to whether the complaint under section 25(2) of the Act, 1972 was filed by an authorized person, this court is required to consider the evidence led by the prosecution.  

The   issue   regarding   sanction   of   prosecution   is   of   vital importance  as the cognizance of the offence under the Antiquities and Treasures Act, 1972 can only be taken only if the sanction of the government   is   filed.   Section   26   of   the   said   Act   states   that   no prosecution for an offence under Sub Section 1 of Section 25 shall be instituted   except   by   or   with   the   sanction   of   such   officer   of Government as may be prescribed in this behalf. Sub section 2 goes on   to   say   that   no   court   shall   take   cognizance   of   an   offence punishable under sub section 2 or sub section 3 of Section 25 except upon   a   complaint   in   writing   framed   by   an   officer   generally   or specially authorized in this behalf by the Central Government.  

Rule 2(A) of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Rules, 1973 (hereinafter called 1973 Rules) also commands that where having Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 36 regard   to   the   nature   and   other   matters   pertaining   to   any   human work of art which the Central Government proposed to declare to be an   Art   treasure   under Clause  (b)  of Section  2 of Act,  the  Central Government considered it necessary to do so, it may, by notification in the official gazette constitute a committee consisting of not less than 3 persons having expert knowledge as to like works of art to consider and submit a report on the artistic and aesthetic value of the work of art so proposed to be declared.  

The   Ld.counsel  for  the   defence  had  made  this  court   go through the Panchnama dated 30.06.81 Ex.PW3/C (which is again a photograph  of  the  original or copy of the Panchnama) and stated that the sanction has been given by the Director General in defiance of     established   principles   of   law   and   the   the   then   sanctioning authority   had   not   even   taken   a   glance     towards   the   articles   in question. He stated that the Panchnama dated 30.06.81 states that all the 18 stones sculptures after inspection by a bench of officers of the   Archaeological   Survey   of   India   were   repacked   in   respective suitcases after photography by photo department of the said office. 

The   sanction   for   prosecution   is   to   be   given   by   the concerned   authorities   on   the   basis   as   to   whether   the   articles recovered were infact antiques or not.   The antiqueness of the art object is a important issue in this case for the reasons that this case is not only restricted to the offence u/s 411 IPC but also extends to dealing   with,   and/or   attempting   to   export   antique   art   objects. Therefore, it was imperative on the part of the prosecution to prove that   the   articles   recovered   from   accused   Shreekant   were   indeed antiques.  

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 37 Ld.   Sr.   PP   for   CBI   vehemently   opposed   the   idea   of consideration of the sanction at this stage of final arguments.   He submitted that  the  cognizance  of the offence  was taken way back three decades ago and in case the accused party had any grievance against the cognizance taken, they could have resorted to approach the higher platforms, hence as per Sr. PP now the accused persons are estopped from raising this issue at such a later stage.  He submits that cognizance has been taken on the basis of the complaint made by Archaeological survey of India and is a valid cognizance.

Ld. Counsel for the defence on the other hand per contra refuted by stating that the entire cognizance has been vitiated as the sanction has not been given in terms of law.  He has referred to the provisions of Section 2A of the Antiquities and Art Treasure Rules and submitted that no committee consisting of not less than three persons having expert knowledge as to like works of art was formed and hence the prosecution has not proved that in fact the articles allegedly seized or used comes within the definition of Antiquities as contained   in   Section   2   of   Antiquities   and   Art   Treasure   Act.     Ld. Counsel   for   defence   has   made   this   court   go   through   various panchnamas   of   different   dates   and   states   that   even   the   witnesses who has mentioned the factum regarding the opening of the sealed baggages or re­packaging of the same could not be produced by the prosecution.   It was highlighted that the complainant, the Director, Archaeological Survey of India has not even sealed the articles.  Ld. Counsel has highlighted the testimonies of PW­10 Dhanpat Rai and also PW­17 A.K. Goswami, both officials of Archaeological Survey of India in order to establish his defence that the cognizance is illegal as Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 38 sanction for prosecution is not in terms of the law.  It was submitted that   the   sanction   is   sine   qua   non   and   hence   it   has   a   attached importance to the entire episode.  

The Ld. Sr. PP while refuting the arguments referred to Section   15   of   Antiquities   and   Art   Treasure   Rule   wherein   it   is prescribed that the Director General shall be the officer competent in terms of sub section 1 of Section 26 of the Act to institute, or to sanction institution of prosecution for offence under Sub section 1 of Section 25 of the Act.

Before considering this aspect regarding sanction as raised by Ld. Counsel for defence, it would be appropriate to refer to some case laws of the Hon'ble Apex Court and Hon'ble High Courts.  In a judgment passed by Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) in   Vaman   Narain   Ghiya   vs   State   of   Rajasthan   2014   (1)   RCC (Rajasthan 31) DOD 15.01.2014, it was held as under:

"133.  Interestingly, while Section 26(1) uses   the word 'sanction', sub­section (2) uses the  word 'authorized'. While both the words, in  general parlance mean 'to grant permission',  but the word 'sanction' has certain legal  connotations. All sanctions are authorizations, but it is not necessary that an authorization  would be a sanction.  Sanction is a genus,  authorization is a specie.  Sanction is a legal  word which means to grant permission to  prosecute a person.  Sanction order is a  requirement of law, where the aim of law is to Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 39 protect a person from frivolous litigation.

134. Though it may appear curious that the  AAT Act would like to protect an alleged  offender from vexatious litigation, but one has to remember that the law tries to control the  acts of those who are engaged in business of  export, or in the business of selling antiquities  and art treasure.  This class of people would  also include those who sell handicrafts and  other artistic artifacts.  Since economy is the  bloodline of a nation, the law tries to protect  them from needless legal harassments. 

Moreover, art objects can be declared as  antiquities only by experts.  Therefore, it is  essential that the opinion of the experts in the  field is taken.  Further, since the ASI is reposed with the responsibility of protecting the art  treasures and antiquities, it was but natural  to have their opinion and sanction before a  person could be prosecuted under the AAT Act. Hence, for the graver punishment, it was  essential that the criminal proceeding be  initiated only with the sanction of the  Director­General. Therefore, for prosecuting  an offender for offender under Section 3 read  with Section 25(1) of the AAT Act, the  sanction order is a sine quo non condition.  As  far as offences under Section 25(2) and (3) of  Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 40 the AAT Act are concerned, no sanction order  is required; an authorization letter is legally  sufficient."

Further,   in   another   judgment   the   Hon'ble   Supreme Court of India in  Jaswant Singh Vs State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 124 laid down that the object of the provisions of sanction is that the authority giving the sanction could be able to consider for itself the evidence before it comes to a conclusion that the prosecution in the circumstances be sanctioned or forbidden.   It should be clear from the form of sanction that the sanctioning authority considered the sanction before it and after consideration of all the circumstances of the case, sanctioned the prosecution and unless the matter can be proved by other evidence, in the sanction itself the facts should be referred   to   indicate   that   the   sanctioning   authority   had   applied   its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case.   Later on, certain broad principles were laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India regarding sanction in CBI vs Mahesh G. Jain 2013 Crl. LJ 3092 SC. Though, the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with the sanction order under   the   PC   Act,   it   has   summarized   the   principles   governing sanction order.   It would certainly be fruitful to quote the relevant summarization which is as under:

"From the aforesaid authorities, the  following principles can be culled out:

(a)   It   is   incumbent   on   the   prosecution   to   prove that the valid sanction has been  granted by the sanctioning authority after   being satisfied that a case for sanction has   Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 41 been made out.

(b) The sanction order may expressly show   that the sanctioning authority has perused   the   material   placed   before   him   and,   after   consideration   of   the   circumstances,   has   granted sanction for prosecution. 

(c) The prosecution may prove by adducing   the  evidence  that   the  material  was   placed   before   the   sanctioning   authority   and   his   satisfaction was arrived at upon perusal of   the material placed before him.

(d) Grant of sanction is only an  administrative function and the sanctioning  authority is required to prima facie reach   the   satisfaction   that   relevant   facts   would   constitute the offence.

(e) The adequacy of matter placed before the sanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the court as it does not sit in appeal over the sanction order.

(f) If the sanctioning authority has perused  all   the   materials   placed   before   him   and   some   of   them   have   not   been   proved   that   would not vitiate the order of sanction.

(g) The order of sanction is a pre­requisite as it   is   intended   to   provide   a   safeguard   to   public servant against frivolous and  vexatious   litigants,   but   simultaneously   an   Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 42 order of sanction should not be construed in  a pedantic manner and there should not be  hyper­technical approach to test its  validity."

With   the   assistance   of   the   aforesaid   dictum   of   law   laid down   by  Hon'ble   Superior  Courts  and  before  continuing  with any further   discussion,   it   would  be  appropriate  to  stir  the  evidence  of different officials of the custom as well as Archaeological Survey of India in order to reach to the conclusion as to whether the sanction for prosecution in this case under the Antiquities and Treasure Act was   a   valid   sanction   or   not   or   as   to   whether   the   sanction   for prosecution was given within the periphery of law.  

The PW­3 Satish Kumar after seizure of the articles in question   under   section   10   of   Customs   Act   had   prepared   a panchnama   Ex.PW3/A   which   was   also   signed   by   T.Haridas, Superintendent   (Air   Customs).     It   has   already   been   brought   on record that Superintendent Air Customs Mr. T.Haridas has not been produced   by   the   prosecution   to   depose.     As   per   the   PW­3   Satish Kumar,   on   17.06.1981,   Mr.   Dhanpat   Rai   who   was   an   official   of Archaeological Survey of India came to the office of PW­3 at Indira Gandhi   Airport   after   he   was   intimated   as   to   the   recoveries.   The articles were shown to him.  Before the suit case were opened, two witnesses namely  Mr. Subhash from BCCI and Mr. Dayanand also from BCCI were called to witness the proceedings.  It is deposed that all the suitcases were opened in the presence of both these witnesses Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 43 and in the presence of PW­3 Satish Kumar and other members of the staff of the office of PW­3.  It has specifically been mentioned by PW­ 3 Satish Kumar that he did not remember as to whether the suitcases were opened in the presence of Mr. Dhanpat Rai (from ASI).  It was also deposed that after the articles were seen by the PW­10 Dhanpat Rai, the articles were put back in the same suitcases and again re­ sealed with the custom seal.  Thereafter, the PW­3 Satish Kumar has referred to the photograph of panchnama Ex.PW3/B dt. 17.06.1981 wherein he proved his signatures at point A and that of PW­Subhash Munjal and Dayanand at points B & C.  Both these witnesses to the panchnama   Ex.PW3/B   namely   Subhash   Munjal   and   Dayanand Sharma could not be produced by the prosecution and unfortunately were not even found listed in the list of prosecution witnesses.  

The PW­10 Dhanpat Rai from Archaeological Survey of India also stated that in the year 1981 he was posted at Air Customs as   DSA   from   Archaeological   Survey   of   India.     As   and   when   Air Customs Authorities asked him to sort out the objects expected to be antiquities they were referred to him.   He used to check them and refer the same objects to the Director General­Archaeological Survey of India for their opinion.  The PW­10 Dhanpat Rai further deposed that he had told the Custom Authorities that the objects sorted by them were referred to Archaeological Survey of India. With respect to panchanama dt. 17.06.1981, he stated that there is reference of his name because the articles in question were shown to him were suspected to be antiquities, and that he referred to Director General­ Archaeological Survey of India for final opinion to declare whether they were antiquities or not.  

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 44 From the testimonies of PW­3 Satish Kumar and PW­10 Dhanpat Rai, it is crystal clear that till the preparation of panchnama dt.   17.06.1981,   though   various   witnesses   were   involved   in preparation of various panchanamas, but only the PW­Satish Kumar could be produced as a prosecution witness. Unfortunate part is that on 17.06.1981 when PW­10 Dhanpat Rai was called and asked for getting the articles checked and the case property was opened, the prosecution   has   not   proved   this   factum   through   any   witness   that suitcases were infact opened in the presence of PW­10 Dhanpat Rai or any other witness except the PW­3 Satish Kumar who himself had seized the articles from the conveyor belt of the airport.  The PW­10 Dhanpat   Rai  has  nowhere stated that panchanama dt. 17.06.1981 was prepared in his presence.  He has simply stated in his testimony on oath that since the articles were retained by the customs which were shown to him were antiquities, he had simply referred those objects  to  DGASI  for  their final opinion  as to whether same were antiquities or not.   Hence for proving panchanama dt. 17.06.1981 which   is   a   photograph   Ex.PW3/B,   the   prosecution   could   produce only  PW­3  Satish  Kumar and none  else.   The PW­3 Satish Kumar thereafter   stated   that   the   articles   were   put   again   in   the   same suitcases and were again re­sealed.  

Now, this court shall discuss about the panchnama dt. 30.06.1981.  The PW­3 Satish Kumar deposed before this court that on 30.06.1981 he had taken the articles which were five suitcases to the   office   of   Archaeological   Survey   of   India   near   India   Gate.   He called   two   witnesses   who   were   officials  of   Director­Archaeological Survey of India and in the presence of these witnesses suitcases were Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 45 opened.  Goods were shown to the officers of Archaeological Survey of India and then the articles were re­sealed and brought back to his own   office.   He   proved   the   photograph   of   panchanama   dt. 30.06.1981   Ex.PW3/C.     He   proved   the   signatures   of   the   PW­ P.Dhawan at point B and that of A.Khan at point C. Again for this panchanama dt. 30.06.1981 Ex.PW3/C also,   no   witness   could   be   produced   by   the   prosecution   as   it   was informed that either of the witnesses were not traceable or had died, though  they  were   listed in  the  list  of witnesses.   Accordingly, the position upto the construction of this document Ex.PW3/C i.e. the panchanama dt. 30.06.1981 remains the same which was upto the preparation   of   panchanama   dt.   17.06.1981.     The   witness   PW­3 Satish Kumar who was the author of this document could prove the same by himself and no other witness was produced despite the fact that   their   signatures   are   appearing   on   this   document.     The panchanama dt. 30.06.1981 Ex.PW3/C was also the photograph of the   panchanama   and   was   not   original   one.     The   panchnama   dt. 30.06.1981 Ex.PW3/C was required to be corroborated as it is only for the first time that the articles were stated to have been re­opened in the office of Archaeological Survey of India for getting the same inspected.     The   PW­10 Dhanpat  Rai has already mentioned in his testimony   which   is   also   been   referred   herein   above   that   he   had referred the articles in question to Director General­Archaeological Survey of India for final decision on 17.06.1981.   It could not be gathered from panchanama dt. 30.06.1981 Ex.PW3/C as to before whom the articles were opened as it has been mentioned that "the said   suitcases   were   opened   in  our   presence  for   the   inspection   of Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 46 stone   sculptures   contained   therein   as   per   details   already   given   in panchnama dt. 17.06.1981."  The testimony of the persons who have mentioned   the   aforesaid   words   that   the   suitcases   were   opened   in "our presence"  was of strategic importance as it was opened in the office   of   ASI.     The   description   of   the   suitcases   and   the   contents therein i.e. stone sculptures which finds mention in panchnama dt. 30.06.1981 are also the same as detailed down in panchnama dt. 07.06.1981.  Accordingly, for want of production of those witnesses who had mentioned so in this document was very important in order to   clarify   the   position   before   this   court   that   in   fact   the   articles opened in the office of Archaeological Survey of India on 30.06.1981 were   same   which   were   mentioned   in   the   earlier   panchnama   dt. 07.06.1981.  Accordingly, the preparation of this panchnama or the production of the property before Director Archaeological Survey of India by PW­Satish Kumar also comes within the periphery of doubt.

It finds mention in the panchanama dt. 30.06.1981 by PW­3 Satish Kumar as narrated by both the witnesses namely S.P. Dhawan   and   A.Khan   to   him   at   the   time   of   preparation   of panchanama  that  all the 18 stone sculptures after inspection by a bench   of   officers   of   the   Archaeological   Survey   of   India   were   re­ packed   in   the   respective  suitcases  after photography  by the  photo department of the said office.  It has simply been mentioned that it was   inspected   by   a   bench   of   officers.     In   the   entire   catena   of evidence, no where it could find mention as to who were the persons who had inspected the same, as even the PW­10 Dhanpat Rai was not shown to be present at the time of preparation of panchnama dt. 30.06.1981.  

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 47 The PW­10 Dhanpat Rai has categorically mentioned in his   testimony   on   oath   before   this   court   that   Director   General­ Archaeological   Survey   of   India   had   called   an   expert   advisory committee meeting and these objects were verified and found to be antiquities.   It appears that there is no substance in his deposition regarding the verification of objects by expert advisory committee as minutes of the meetings of the expert advisory committee or the list of the constituent members or the date and place of the meeting etc. has not been filed.  The objects were opened only on 30.06.1981 and were closed on the same day after inspection by bench of officers, as highlighted in panchnama dt. 30.06.1981.  

In   his   cross­examination,   the   PW­10   Dhanpat   Rai   has termed it to be correct that whatever statement was given by him on the date of deposition in the examination in chief was never given by him   to   CBI.   He   termed   it   to   be   correct   that   Director   General­ Archaeological   Survey   of   India   constituted   a   committee   for examination of suspected objects and their opinion was final.   He also termed it to be correct that he was not shown any opinion of the committee declaring any object to be antiquities and stated that he was not having any knowledge as to who were the members of the committee constituted by Director General­Archaeological Survey of India. 

From   the   testimony   of   PW­10 Dhanpat Rai, it is clear that the Director General used to form committees for the purposes of calling report on the antiquities in terms of Section 2A of Antiquities and Art Treasure Rules, but the prosecution   has   not   been   able   to   prove   the   factum   regarding Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 48 formation   of   any   committee   of   such   type   within   the   meaning   of Section   2A   of   the   rules   which   was   to   be   formed   by   the   Director General­Archaeological Survey of India  for declaring the articles to be antiquities.  

Though, Ld. Sr.PP for CBI had firmly argued that it is the prerogative  of  Director General to sanction prosecution within the meaning of Section 18 of Antiquities and Art Treasure Rules, 1973 which has been done in this case, but the prosecution has not been able   to  show  that   the  decision  of  the  Director  General  was based upon   the   material   placed   before   him/her   or   before   the   standing committee.  The prosecution could not prove the fact as to whether the Director General had seen the incriminating objects.  As already discussed, the prosecution also could not make this court abreast of as to who had inspected the articles in question on 30.06.1981, as mentioned   in   Panchnama   dt.   30.06.1981.     Unfortunately,   the   DG who had given the sanction vide his letter dt. 13.08.1981 Ex.PW10/A could not be produced as he had already expired.   The said letter Ex.PW10/A written by the Director General­Archaeological Survey of India  to the Director, CBI was proved by PW­10 Dhanpat Rai.   He identified   the   signatures   of   D.Mitra,   the   then  Director   General­ Archaeological Survey of India  at point A and affirmed that he had seen her writing and signing in the official course of duties.  If we go through the contents of the letter/sanction order written by Director General­Archaeological Survey of India  to Director CBI Ex.PW10/A, again it is not clear as to whether the Director General had inspected the articles herself or the job was delegated to someone else.  It has simply been mentioned in this letter Ex.PW10/A that 18 pieces of Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 49 stone sculptures were brought to her office by Additional Collector Customs   on   30.06.1981   to   ascertain   whether   those   objects   were antiquities.  It has also been mentioned that all the pieces of stones (terracotta)   were   found   antiquities.     The   Director   General­ Archaelogical Survey of India could nowhere explain as to who had declared the articles to be as antiquities or as to whether she had personally inspected the same or as to whether she had perused the file, if any brought before her by Air Custom Authorities.  

It   is   settled   law   of   land   that   at   the   time   of   grant   of sanction   by   a   sanctioning   authority,   the   sanctioning   authority   is required to apply its mind and before making any decision in this regard, it is required to peruse the documents attached therein.  The sanction   cannot   be   a   stereotypical   sanction   and   it   requires   the application   of   the   wisdom   of   the   sanctioning   authority   after consideration of all the relevant facts.   The sanctioning authority is also required to give reasons of its decision and the sanction cannot be given arbitrarily or whimsically.  The sanctioning authority is also not required to act upon the decision of its subordinate.   It has to take decision only after application of mind.  

Here in this case, it has been mentioned that the objects appeared to have been moved from ancient monuments, sites and remains   of   historical   importance   by   someone   who   was   trying   to smuggle these antiquities out of the country, again, apparently this opinion of Director General does not carry the source of information and it is not clear as to whether this type of opinion was given by Director General on the basis of file, if any prepared by Air Customs authorities.  It is also not clear as to whether the file was produced Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 50 by   Air   Customs   Authorities   or   not   before   the   Director   General­ Archaeological Survey of India.  

Now   I   shall   come   to   the   another   letter   Ex.PW17/A written   by   Shankar   Nath­Sr.   Archaeologist   in   the   office   of Archaeological   Survey   of   India   to   the   Additional   Collector   (Air Customs)   which   is   dt.   16.07.1981.     The   author   of   this   letter   dt. 16.07.1981 Ex.PW7/A was called to appear in the witness box but the   daughter   namely   Toya   Sinha   of   PW­Shankar   Nath   who accompanied   him   stated,   as   contained   in   the   testimony   of   PW­7 Shankar Nath dt. 24.04.2014, that her father Shankar Nath had lost memory   and   he   was   not   in   a   position   to   recollect   anything. Accordingly,   this   witness   was   discharged.   In   order   to   prove   the aforementioned letter Ex.PW17/A and another letter dt. 19.08.1981 Ex.PW17/B,   the   prosecution   produced   PW­17   A.K.   Goswami   from Archaelogical Survey of India. The PW­17 A.K.Goswami proved the handwriting of Shankar Nath on both these letters Ex.PW17/A and Ex.PW17/B which were infact the photocopies and were not original documents.   The contents of letter Ex.PW17/A reflects that it was addressed   to   Additional   Collector   Air   Customs   on   the   subject regarding examination of objects by Director General­Archaeological Survey   of   India   wherein   it   was   informed   that   18   pieces   of   stone sculptures were examined by Director General­Archaeological Survey of India on 30.06.1981 and were declared antiquities vide the other letter Ex.PW17/B, the value of the antiquities were informed to the Custom   Authorities.     From   these   two   letters   also,   the   basis   of assessment regarding antiquity could not be established. Though, it has been mentioned that Director General­Archaeological Survey of Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 51 India had examined the articles on 30.06.1981 but it could not find mention anywhere   either by the Director General herself or in the panchnama prepared by PW­3 Satish Kumar regarding the timings as to   when   he   produced   these   articles   before   the   office   of Archaeological Survey of India.  

Since   no   committee   was   constituted,   there   remains   no question of examination of any member of expert committee on the basis   of   whom   the   sanction   was   given.     There   is   confusion   with regard to the basis on which the art objects have been declared as antiques.     As   per   Ld.   Counsel,   the   articles   can   be   classified   as antiques   only   on   the   basis   of   certain   scientific   examinations   and analysis.  They cannot be identified as antiques only on the basis of their  appearance,   as  has been  done in this case.   This court  is in concurrence   with   the   views   of   the   Ld.   Counsel   for   the   defence because the appearances can be dubious.   If the objects were to be classified as antiques only on the basis of their appearance, then it would be very difficult to distinguish between an original art work and its fake copy.   The very endevour of a fake artist is always to ensure that fake piece appears as real as original.   The PW­17 A.K. Goswami   had   not   seen   Dr.   D.Mitra/Sanctioning   Authority   signing and writing at any point of time before  him but he identified the signatures   of   the   sanctioning   authority   on   the   basis   of   circulars received   by   him   signed   by   Dr.   D.Mitra.     He   also   expressed   his inability   to   tell   as   to   whether   complete   file   used   to   be   sent   for obtaining sanction or whether in this case the sanctioning authority has seen the complete file or as to whether the same was sent to her. The PW­10 Dhanpat Rai who was the only witness brought by the Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 52 prosecution with respect to the sanction though proved the report dt. 13.08.1981 given by Dr. D. Mitra and also deposed that he had seen her signing and writing, but in the cross­examination he failed to tell as to whether Ex.PW3/B was prepared in his presence or not.   He also deposed that the report of the Director General was based on the opinion of the committee, but the prosecution could not produce any member of the committee.  On a specific question being put to PW­17 A.K. Goswami by Ld. Counsel for defence to the effect that whether   fake   copies   of   the   sculptures   of   the   stone   as   well   as terracotta or brass are readily available in the market, he answered the same in affirmative and stated that they are easily available in Delhi in Janpath Market and also in Muradabad.  

In   a   very   remarkable   judgment,   the   Hon'ble   Rajasthan High Court in Vaman Narayan Ghiya Vs State of Rajasthan while dealing with the opinion of expert has held as under:

"198. The prosecution case against the appellant  and other co­accused persons was that they are in possession of, selling, or exporting or attempting  to export antique sculptures out of India.  Except  for the Goddess and the Jain idol, for the rest of  the artifacts and antiques, the appellant has been  convicted for the offences under Sections 3/25(1)  and 14/25(2) of the AAT Act.  Hence, the crux of  the   prosecution   case   is   that   the   appellant   was   dealing with "antique" sculptures and artifacts.    Therefore, the prosecution was required to firmly  establish, through cogent and convincing  Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 53 evidence,   that   the   artifacts/sculptures   allegedly   recovered from the appellant or on the basis of   his statement under Section 27 of the Evidence   Act were actually 'antiques.'

199. The trial court is neither an expert in art   history, nor in antiquities.   The fields of art history   and  antiquities  are  as  specialized  as  ballistics  and   medical jurisprudence.   Faced with various styles of   sculptures   in   India,   from   Chola   to   Pala,   from   Khajaraho style to Vijaynagar style, overwhelmed by  the   endless   number   of   Gods   and   Goddesses   of   the   Hindu, Buddhist and Jain pantheon, a court is likely  to be lost  in the labyrinth of art  and antiquities,    Moreover, both knowledge about the art style, and   about   the   technology   and   methodology   used   to   classify a piece of art as an antique are essential.    Thus, expert opinion is sine quo non.  Section 45 of  the Evidence Act not only defines who is an expert,   but   also   makes   his/her   testimony   relevant   and   admissible.   According to the said provision "When   the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of   foreign law or of science or art,.... the opinions upon  that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign  law, science or art... are relevant facts.  Such persons  are called experts."   Therefore,   before   a   court   can convict a person of an offence under the AAT Act,  the requirement of expert opinion is fundamental to  prove that the art objects are genuine 'antiques'.  For  Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 54 instances are not lacking when even the experts  have been   fooled   into   treating   a   good   fake   copy   as   a   genuine piece of art.  It is common knowledge that in  Europe,   a   few   fake   paintings   have   been   sold   as   genuine works of the famous Dutch Painter Vermeer. Moreover, in 1956, an idol of Natraj (Lord Shiva as a cosmic dancer) was stolen from a temple in South   India.   Its fake copy was installed in the temple   and worshiped. Subsequently, in 1973, the original   idol   surfaced   at   the   Norton   Simon   Foundation   in   USA. Thus, from 1956 to 1973 even the priests and   the   worshipers   did   not   realize   that   they   were   worshiping   a   fake   copy   of   the   original   idol.   Thus,   even those who were intimately connected with the   idol did not realize that the original  was replaced   with a fake  copy.   Most  importantly, according to   Hari Manjhi (PW69) who was the Director of ASI,   fake copies of antiques are available in the market.    Hence, it was imperative that the 'antiqueness' of the  artifacts/paintings/sculptures   be   proved   beyond   a   reasonable doubt."

Coming to case in hand, the prosecution has not produced any expert. The sanctioning authority D. Mitra has already expired. The court is left with the testimonies of PW­10 Dhanpat Rai as well as   that   of   PW­17   A.K.   Goswami   who   had   not   given   any   opinion. The   IO   has   also   not   been   examined   in   this   case   and   hence   with regard to nature of the allegedly recovered art objects, there is no Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 55 evidence at all.   For want of any expert opinion, this court is left floundering.  

  In the case of  State of Himachal Pradesh vs Jai Lal & Ors.,  Hon'ble Apex Court elaborated on the function and need for having an expert opinion.   Referring to Section 45 of the Evidence Act, it is observed as under:

"18. An expert is not a witness of fact.  His  evidence is really of an advisory character.  The duty of an expert witness is to furnish the Judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing  the accuracy of the conclusions so as to enable  the Judge to form his independent judgment by  the application of this criteria (sic) to the facts  proved by the evidence of the case.  The  scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible,  convincing and tested becomes a factor and  often an important factor for consideration  along with the other evidence of the case.  The  credibility of such a witness depends on the  reasons stated in support of his conclusions and the data and material furnished which form  the basis of his conclusions."

As per the above referred judgment in State of Himachal Pradesh   Vs   Jai   Lal   &   Ors.   (supra),   the   Hon'ble   Apex   Court   has already delivered a dictum that the scientific opinion if intelligible, convincing and tested becomes a factor and offer an important factor for   consideration   along   with   other   evidence   of   the   case   and   the Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 56 credibility of such a witness depends on the reasons stated in the support of his conclusions.  In the case in hand, on a bare look at the document Ex.PW10/A, one does not find any reasons being assigned by   the   Director­   Archaeological   Survey   of   India   for   declaring   the objects/case property as antiques.   It is not based on any report of the committee.   It has simply been mentioned that all the 18 pieces of   stone   and   terracotta   were   declared   as   antiques.     As   already discussed,   the   mode   and   manner   of   examination   has   not   been explained.     Adverse   opinion   can   therefore   be   taken   against   the prosecution   in   this   regard   as   not   even   a   single   reason   has   been assigned for classifying the objects as antiques.  Therefore, the court is at loss as to scientific basis on which the objects were declared antiques as the details are conspicuously missing.  The report of the Director General simply reflects that the stone and terracotta were declared   antiques,   but   they   do   not   reveal   the   type   of   stone   i.e. whether sandstone,  marble  or granite; they have not  revealed the style in which the sculpture is done i.e. whether belongs to Gupta Style or Konark Style; they have neither revealed the dynasty under which the sculpture was likely to be done i.e. Kushan Dynasty, Gupta Dynasty, Pala Dynasty or Pratihara Dynasty.   No opinion has been given as to the historical period to which the sculpture belonged.  It appears that the opinion has been given ostensibly only on the basis that the sculptures were old.  There is no indication about the subject matter,   age,   period,   the   style   and   the   dynasty   etc.     No   scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of the conclusion has been described. This court has considered all these things on the basis of judgment given in Viman Narain Ghiya case (supra).  

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 57 In   other   case   titled  Mahmad   Hanif   Shaikh   Ibrahim,  a learned   Division   Bench   of   Hon'ble   Gujarat   High   Court   was   seized with  a case   under  the  Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act.  It was dealing with the report of the public analyst with regard to the contraband drug.   However, the report did not contain any reason   for   the   conclusion   drawn   by   the   public   analyst   that   the substance was 'Charas'.   Their Lordships of the Hon'ble High Court observed that  "Now on perusal of the above report by no  stretch of imagination, the same can be said to  be full and complete, disclosing the scientific  tests or experiments performed by the public  analyst. Except for the bare opinion and  assertion that the muddamal article was  'Charas' there is indeed nothing on the basis of  which this Court can independently test and  assess the truthfulness and genuineness of the  said Public Analyst's Report, Exh.12".  Rejecting  the said report of the Public Analyst, Their  Lordships acquitted the appellant for offence  under the NDPS Act."

In   the   case   in   hand   also,   the   prosecution   was   under

bounden duty to eliminate the possibility that the recovered items were not mere fake copies of the original pieces.  Therefore, in view of the aforementioned discussion, this court is of view that sanction under the Antiquities & Art Treasures Act is not a valid sanction.

The   next   set   of   arguments   of   Ld.   Sr.   PP   was   with respect to Section 293 CrPC as it was pleaded that if the list/reports Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 58 are   of   government   scientific   experts,   the   same   can   be   taken   into evidence without any proof and can be relied upon for convicting the accused.  The said plea of Ld. Sr. PP appears to be untenable in view of the reasons hereinafter explained.  To consider the plea of Sr. PP CBI, it would be  appropriate to reproduce  the contents of Section 293 CrPC which runs as under:

"293. Reports of certain Government scientific  experts.

(1)  Any document purporting to be a report under the hand of a Government  scientific expert to whom this section  applies, upon any matter or thing duly   submitted to him for examination or  analysis and report in the course of any  proceeding under this Code, may be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code.

(2)  The Court may, if it thinks fit, summon  and examine any such expert as to the   subject­matter of his report.

(3) Where any such expert is summoned by  a Court and he is unable to attend  personally, he may, unless the Court has expressly directed him to appear  personally, depute any responsible  officer working with him to attend the   Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 59 Court, if such officer is conversant with  the facts of the case and can  satisfactorily depose in Court on his  behalf.

(4) This section applies to the following  Government Scientific experts namely:

(a) any Chemical Examiner or Assistant  Chemical Examiner to Government;

(b)  the Chief Inspector of Explosives;

(c) the Director of the Finger Print Bureau;

(d) The Director, Haffkeine Institute, Bombay;

(e)  The Director, Deputy Director or Assistant   Director of a Central Forensic Science  Laboratory or a State Forensic Science  Laboratory;

(f) The Serologist to the Government.

A bare  perusal   of   the  provision  shows  that  that the  said provision   does   not   cover   the   Expert   Committee   formed   by   the Archaeological   Survey   of   India.   Therefore,   the   report   of   the   Expert Committee would necessarily is required to be proved.   Hence, the CBI cannot   take   the   benefit   of   Section   293   CrPC   and   claim   that   the prosecution   was  not   required   to  prove   the   contents  of  the  lists/reports given the circumstances when no notification has been filed in terms of Section 293(4)g of CrPC. Accordingly, in terms of the discussion herein above made the plea of Ld. Sr. PP that the report of Dr. D.Mitra, Director General­ Archaeological Survey of India cannot be termed to Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 60 be a report u/s 293 CrPC and the prosecution was therefore required to prove the contents effectively.  

Now   I   shall   deal   with   the   other   charge   against   the accused Shreekant Jain w.r.t. Section 411 IPC.

Section   411   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   mandates   that whoever   dishonestly   receives   or   retains   any   stolen   property, knowing or having reason to belief the same to be stolen property shall   be   punished   with   imprisonment   prescribed   in   the   said Section.  Here in this case, the charges u/s 411/414 IPC are qua the accused   Shreekant   Jain   only.     One   of   the   main   requirement   of Section 411 IPC is that the property alleged to have been recovered from the accused must be a stolen property.  It is the prime duty of the   prosecution   to   have   proved   that   the   property   alleged   to   have been   recovered   from   the   accused   Shreekant   Jain   was   infact   a property of which theft was committed. In order to bring home the guilt   of   the   accused,   the   prosecution   has   tried   to   prove   the   FIR regarding theft of the articles alleged to have been recovered which was registered at PS Atarsuiya, District Allahabad.  The prosecution produced one witness PW­9 Ram Chander who happens to be the complainant of the said FIR.  The photocopy of the FIR was marked as Mark PW9/F.  It has been mentioned by PW­9 Ram Chander in his testimony on oath before this court that in the year 1981 there were 5 idols of Lord Shiva, one idol of Lord Hanuman, one idol of Goddess Durga and in small form there were idols of Lord Rama, Lakshman and Sita.   He stated that the idols of goddess Durga was stolen in 1981   for   which   they   approached   the   PS   Atarsuiya   and   gave information regarding theft of the idol of goddess Durga.  He failed Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 61 to   say   anything   about   the   FIR   as   the   matter   was   very   old   and accordingly,   the   FIR   was   marked   as   Mark   PW9/F.       In   his   cross­ examination by Ld. Sr. PP, it was stated by PW­9 Ram Chander that copy   of   the   FIR   was   given   to   him.     He   termed   it   to   be   incorrect during  cross­examination  by Ld. Defence  Counsel  that  he  had not given any statement Mark PW9/PX.    Though, another witness PW­ 11 SI Krishnamurthy was produced by CBI who was an official from PS Atarsuiya, but he stated that he could not trace the FIR inspite of his best efforts as the same has been weeded out after expiry of the period of which they would have to be retained.  Nothing more could be deposed by this witness except the details regarding the death of the then SHO etc.   The   CBI   has   not   been   able   to   file   the   final   report regarding the FIR No. 7/81 PS Atarsuiya regarding the theft of the articles allegedly recovered from the accused Shreekant Jain.   The status of the FIR is not clear with respect to the fact as to whether charge­sheet has been filed in that FIR or not or as to whether any other accused has been arrested or tried before the courts having the jurisdiction   over   the   area   of   PS   Atarsuiya.     No   attempt   has   been made by CBI for getting the said case at PS Atarsuiya clubbed with the   present   case   in   order   to   have   a   common   trial.     For   want   of information regarding the status of the final report, possibility cannot be   ruled   out   that   there   could   be   a   parallel   trial   for   some   other accused in the court having jurisdiction over PS Atarsuiya.  Though this court is not inclined for further proof regarding the registration of FIR as the complainant has been produced by the CBI, but yet the CBI was under the bounden duty to atleast have taken care of filing Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 62 the   copy   of   the   final   report   in   the   aforementioned   FIR   at   PS Atarsuiya­Allahabad.  It has been mentioned by PW­9 Ram Chander that theft was not committed in his presence, though he identified the articles brought in the court.  The Duty Officer who recorded the FIR   or   any   other   person   conversant   with   his   handwriting   and signature or the register of FIR has not been produced.   Despite all these   omissions   on   part   of   CBI   still   this   court   is   presuming   the existence of this fact regarding the registration of FIR u/s 114 of the Indian Evidence Act which states that  the court may presume the existence   of   any   fact   which   it   thinks   likely   to   have   happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in relation to the facts of particular case and its illustration (e) that all the judicial and official acts are regularly performed. Accordingly, this court treats the registration of FIR at PS Atarsuiya as proved.  

Now the question is whether the articles of which the theft was committed at PS Atarsuiya, Allahabad were the same as that of which are allegedly recovered from the accused Shreekant Jain or for which the accused Shreekant Jain and the accused Kashi Nath are alleged   to   have   entered   into   conspiracy   besides   other   accused   for committing theft of the same.   In order to prove the charge for the offence u/s 411 IPC, the prosecution was further required to prove the identity of the articles recovered, to establish that it was stolen from a temple at Allahabad and to demonstrate that it was recovered from accused.  There are too many missing links in the prosecution's chain.   The test identification parade of the case property after its alleged recovery has not been conducted in this case.   Only a bald Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 63 statement   was   made   by   PW­9   Ram   Chander/complainant   during cross­examination by CBI that he had identified the same before the CBI.   The complainant has identified the case property for the first time in court and no other evidence could be brought to the record by the CBI w.r.t. any TIP etc. was carried on for the case property.  If a witness identifies the case property for the first time in the court, the   evidentiary   value   regarding   identification   gets   lost   as   the possibility   cannot   be   ruled   out   that   the   prosecution   might   have tutored the witness to identify the case property whatever was shown to   him   in   the   court   given   the   circumstances   when   no   test identification   was   done.     In   this   context,   I   gain   support   from   the judgment   of   Hon'ble   Apex   Court   in  Ram   Kishan   Mithan   Lal Sharma Vs State of Bombay AIR 1955, SC 104 wherein it was held as under:

"Test identification parades are held by the  police in the course of their investigation for the  purpose of enabling witnesses to identify the  properties   which   are   the   subject­matter   of  the   offence or to identify the persons who are  concerned in the offence.  They are not held  merely for the purpose of identifying property or  persons irrespective of their connection with the  offence.   Whether the police officers interrogate   the identifying witnesses or the Panch witnesses  who are procured by the police to do so, the  identifying witnesses are explained the purpose   of holding these parades and are asked to  Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 64 identify the properties which are the subject­ matter of the offence of the persons who are  concerned in the offence..... the process of  identification by the identifying witnesses  involves the statement by the identifying  witnesses that the particular properties  identified were the subject­matter of the offence  or the persons identified were concerned in the   offence."

The   PW­9   Ram   Chander   who   was   the   sewadar   of   the temple and who is the only witness produced from Allahabad where theft was allegedly committed was the star witness for the purposes of the identification of  the case property.  The examination in chief of   this   witness   recorded   on   26.11.2015   shows   that   the   malkhana Incharge had produced one box containing parts of the idol of the case   property   in   an   unsealed   condition.   Though,   the   idol   was identified   by   the   witness   but   the   question   is   whether   such   an identification   has   got   the   approval   of   the   law   as   this   was   the identification   for   the   first   time   in   the   court   for   the   purposes   to establish that the articles allegedly recovered were stolen property. Moreover, whenever the case property was produced before different witnesses,   it   was   produced   in   an   unsealed   condition.     The   court observation has also been endorsed in this regard.  Even at the time of   examination   of   PW­3   Satish   Kumar/Officer   of   the   Custom   who had allegedly recovered the articles from the conveyor belt, it has been   endorsed   by   the   Ld.   Predecessor   of   this   Court   that   the   five Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 65 suitcases   produced   before   the   court   were   in   bad   shape,   torn condition, without any seal and in broken and open condition. The sealing of the case property is of utmost importance as it rules out the tampering of the same.  

The prosecution is required to establish each link of the chain of circumstances.  One of the links is the safe custody of objects or   artifacts   recovered   during   the   course   of   investigation/enquiry. Accordingly, the sealing of recovered objects is essential as it ensures that   the   object   was   safely   kept   during   the   period   of investigation/enquiry/trial.     It   also   ensures   that   object   produced before the court is the same object which was recovered.  As per the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan in Vaman Narain Ghiya case (supra), in case the prosecution fails to prove the safe custody of objects   during   investigation   and   prior   to   the   production   of   object before the court, a lurking doubt is created in the mind of the court whether the object actually recovered is the same as produced before the   court   or   not.     It   was   further   observed   that   instances   are   not lacking when planted or replaced objects have been produced before the court in order to convict an accused.  Dictum was laid therefore that   prosecution   must   prove   the   safe   custody   of   an   allegedly recovered object by marshalling out cogent evidence on this point and if it fails to do so the prosecution case stands diluted as the link evidence is conspicuously missing.  

The case is based on circumstantial evidence.  To judge as to whether the given circumstances leads to hypothesis of guilt of the accused or not, I am being guided by judgment of Hon'ble Superior courts.  

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 66 In  Harishchandra   Ladaku   Thange   Vs.   State   of Maharashtra, reported at AIR 2007 Supreme Court 2957 in which Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

  "8.   It   has   been   consistently   laid   down   by   this   Court that  where   a   case   rests   squarely   on   circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can  be justified only when all the incriminating facts   and circumstances are found to be incompatible   with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of   any other person.  The circumstances from which  an   inference   as   to   the   guilt   of   the   accused   is   drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with  the principal fact sought to be inferred from those  circumstances."

In Bhagat Ram v. State of  Punjab (AIR 1954 SC 621)  it   was   laid   down   that   where   the   case   depends   upon   the   conclusion   drawn   from   circumstances   the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused   and   bring   home   the   offences   beyond   any   reasonable doubt."

In  C.Chenga Reddy & Ors.V. State of A.P. (1996 (10) SCC 193), wherein it has been observed thus:

"21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the  settled law is that the circumstances from which the  Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 67 conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved   and   such   circumstances   must   be   conclusive   in   nature.   Moreover, all the circumstances should be   complete   and   there   should   be   no   gap   left   in   the   chain of evidence. Further the proved circumstances  must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the   guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his  innocence."

In Padala Veera Reddy V. State of A.P (AIR 1990 SC 79) it   was   laid   down   that   when   a   case   rests   upon   circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests:

(1) the circumstances from which an inference of  guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and  firmly established;

(2)   those   circumstances   should   be   of   a   definite   tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the  accused;

(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should   form a chain so complete that there is no escape  from   the   conclusion   that   within   all   human   probability   the   crime   was   committed   by   the   accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain  conviction  must   be   complete   and   incapable   of   explanation of any other hypothesis than that of  Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 68 guilt of the accused and such evidence should not  only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence."

In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (1992 Crl.LJ 1104) it was pointed out that  "great   care   must   be   taken   in   evaluating   circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied   on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted.  It was  also   pointed   out   that   the   circumstances   relied   upon must be found to have been fully established  and   the   cumulative   effect   of   all   the   facts   so   established   must   be   consistent   only   with   the   hypothesis of guilt."

Sir   Alfred   Wills  in   his   admirable   book   'Wills Circumstantial Evidence (Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specifically to be observed in the case of circumstantial evidence :

(1)   the   facts   alleged   as   the   basis   of   any   legal   inference   must   be   clearly   proved   and   beyond   reasonable   doubt   connected   with   the   factum   probandum;

(2) the burden of proof is always on the party who  asserts the  existence   of   any   fact,   which   infers   legal accountability;

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 69 (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial  evidence the best evidence must be adduced which  the nature of the case admits;

(4)   in   order   to   justify   the   inference   of   guilt,   the   inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the   innocence   of   the   accused   and   incapable   of   explanation,   upon   any   other   reasonable   hypothesis than that of his guilt; and (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of  the   accused,   he   is   entitled   as   of   right   to   be   acquitted."

There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touchstone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by this Court as far back as in 1952.

In  Hanuman   Govind   Nargundhkar   and   another   V. State of M.P. (AIR  1952 SC 343) it was observed thus:­ "It is well to remember that in cases where the   evidence   is   of   a   circumstantial   nature,   the   circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt   is to be drawn should be in the first  instance   be   fully established, and all the fact so established   should be consistent only with the hypothesis of   the guilt of the accused.  Again, the circumstances  Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 70 should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis  but   the   one   proposed   to   be   proved.     In   other   words, there must be a chain of evidence  so   far   complete as not to leave any reasonable ground   for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of   the accused and it must be such as to show that   within all human probability the act must have   been done by the accused."

A   reference   may   be   made   to   a   later   decision   in  Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1984 SC 1622). Therein while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that :

"the onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in   the prosecution cannot be cured by a false defence  or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of  this  Court, before  conviction could be  based on   circumstantial evidence, must be fully established.  They are:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of  guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.   

The circumstances concerned must or should and  not may be established;

(2)   the facts so established should be consistent   only   with   the   hypothesis   of   the   guilt   of   the   Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 71 accused,   that   is   to   say,   they   should   not   be   explainable on any other hypothesis except that   the accused is guilty;

(3)   the   circumstances   should   be   of   a   conclusive   nature and tendency;

(4)   they should exclude every possible hypothesis   except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete  as   not   to   leave   any   reasonable   ground   for   the   conclusion   consistent   with   the   innocence   of   the   accused and must show that in all  human   probability the act must have been done by the   accused."

No site plan of either the place of recovery, or place of theft has been prepared by the IO.  This is also a great lapse on the part of prosecution.   The Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in Vaman Narain Ghiya case (supra) has also laid down as under:

"259. Similarly, it is imperative that a site plan of  the place of recovery should be drawn up at the   time of the recovery.  For, one of the principles of  criminal   jurisprudence   is   that   "Men   may   lie,   documents do not."  Therefore, while witness may  not   reveal   the   truth,   the   contemporaneous   documents may.   Moreover, the courts generally   Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 72 look for corroboration of oral evidence.   The site   plan tends to corroborate, or at times contradict,  the witness's testimony.  Hence, the site plan is an  essential document.  For, it not only thrown light  on   the   alleged   recovery,   but   also   acts   as   a   touchstone for testing the veracity of a testimony.   In the absence of a site plan, the recovery becomes  highly doubtful."

From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that for want of site   plan,   there   remains dent   in   the   prosecution  version  as to  the recovery of incriminating articles.

The prosecution has though cited the witnesses namely Girdhari Lal and Pritipal Yadav who were alleged to have transported the articles/statues from Allahabad to Delhi after its theft by the co­ accused, but the prosecution could not produce the said witnesses in the witness box.  As per the prosecution story, after the idols stolen, one Mr. Natwar Lal is stated to have broken the statues into four pieces at  the  instance  of accused, but  unfortunately, the  aforesaid witnesses have also not been produced by the prosecution.  

As discussed in last paras, the recovery/possession or even the   constructive   possession   of   the   articles   from   the   accused Shreekant Jain could not be established. The prosecution has also miserably failed to prove that the case property produced in court was in fact stolen property which was stolen from Allahabad.  

Now,   I   shall   come   to   the   charge   regarding   the conspiracy   being  hatched between  the  accused under  trial  namely Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 73 Shreekant Jain and Kashinath with other accused.  Both the accused are facing trial for the charges u/s 120­B IPC also r/w Sec.380 IPC and   Sec.3   of   Art   &   Antiquities   Treasures   Act,   1972.     It   has   been mentioned in the charge that both these accused alongwith other co­ accused   namely   Ramesh   @   Chedi   Lal   (since   P.O),   Asgar   (since expired), Dulal Chakravarti (since P.O) and Jhanna Lal (approver) entered   into   criminal   conspiracy   to   commit   theft   of   antique   idols from ancient temples including temple of Takasha Keshwar Mahadev in Daryabad at Allahabad and smuggled them out of India illegally and   thereby   committed  an   offence  u/s  120­B   r/w  aforementioned sections.  

  To attract the punishment u/s 120­B IPC, the prosecution was under obligation to prove that the aforesaid persons had agreed to do or cause to be done an illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means.  The agreement here refers to the meeting of mind and   is   different   from   common   intention.     Meeting   of   minds   may occur   without   even   physically   meeting   the   stake   holders   in   the commission of offence.  This Court is also cognizant of the fact that the conspiracies are designed in the closed corridors and it is very difficult for the prosecution to establish the same as the evidence for the same is easily not available as all the evidence remains with the accused who do not open the same because it remains against their interest.   It has generally been seen that in the offences u/s 120­B IPC, the prosecution chose to attract one or two of the accused with greed   of   pardon   in   case   they   are   inclined   to   make   the   true   and correct disclosure of the facts which had led to the commission of offence.  

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 74 Law   with   regard   to   criminal   conspiracy   has   been discussed by Hon'ble Supreme Court In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs Sheetla Sahai and Ors. Criminal Appeal No.1417 of 2009 (Arising out of SLP (Cri.) No.4130 of 2006 decided on 04.08.2009 wherein it was held as under:

"49.   Criminal conspiracy has been defined in Section 120A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 to mean:

When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done, - (1) an illegal act, or (2)   an   act   which   is   not   illegal   by   illegal   means,   such   an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:

Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.

Explanation.­ It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object. 

Section   120B   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   provides   for punishment for criminal conspiracy.

50.     Criminal   conspiracy   is   an   independent   offence.   It   is punishable   separately.     Prosecution,   therefore,   for   the purpose of bringing the charge of criminal conspiracy read Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 75 with   the   aforementioned   provisions   of   the   Prevention   of Corruption   Act   was   required   to   establish   the   offence   by applying   the   same   legal   principles   which   are   otherwise applicable for the purpose of bringing a criminal misconduct on the part of an accused.

51.  A criminal conspiracy must be put to action inasmuch as so long a crime is generated in the mind of an accused, it does   not   become   punishable.     What   is   necessary   is   not thoughts,   which   may   even   be   criminal   in   character,   often involuntary,   but   offence   would   be   said   to   have   been committed thereunder only when that take concrete shape of an agreement to do or cause to be done an illegal act or an act which although not illegal by illegal means and then if nothing further is done the agreement would give rise to a criminal conspiracy.

Its ingredients are

(i) an agreement between two or more persons;

(ii) an agreement must relate to doing or causing to be done either (a) an illegal act; (b) an act which is not illegal  in itself but is done by illegal means.

What is, therefore, necessary is to show meeting of minds of two   or   more   persons   for   doing   or   causing   to   be   done   an illegal act or an act by illegal means.

52.   While   saying   so,   we   are   not   oblivious   of   the   fact   that Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 76 often   conspiracy   is   hatched   in   secrecy   and   for   proving   the said offence substantial direct evidence may not be possible to be obtained.  An offence of criminal conspiracy can also be proved by circumstantial evidence."

In Kehar Singh and Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration) MANU/SC/0241/1988 : 1988 (3) SCC 609 at 731,  this Court has quoted the following passage from Russell on Crimes (12th Edn. Vol 1): 

"The gist of the offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the act, or effecting the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to do them, nor in inciting others to do them, but in the forming of the scheme or agreement between   the   parties.     Agreement   is   essential.     Mere knowledge,   or   even   discussion,   of   the   plan   is   not,   per   se enough." 

In State (NCT) of Delhi v. Naviot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru MANU/SC/0465/2005 : (2005) 11 SCC 600,  this Court stated the law, thus:

  "101. One more principle which deserves notice is that the cumulative   effect   of   the   proved   circumstances   should   be taken into account in determining the guilt of the accused rather   than   adopting   an   isolated   approach   to   each   of   the circumstances.     Of   course,   each   one   of   the   circumstances should   be   proved     beyond   reasonable   doubt.     Lastly,   in Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 77 regard   to   the   appreciation   of   evidence   relating   to   the conspiracy, the Court must take care to see that the acts or conduct of the parties must be conscious and clear enough to infer   their   concurrence   as   to   the   common   design   and   its execution."

We may also notice that in  Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI MANU/SC/0017/2003 : (2003) 3 SCC 641, it was held:

"...  Law   making   conspiracy   a   crime   is   designed   to   curb immoderate   power   to   do   mischief   which   is   gained   by   a combination of the means.  The encouragement and support which   co­conspirators   give   to   one   another   rendering enterprises possible which, if left to individual effort, would have   been   impossible,   furnish   the   ground   for   visiting conspirators and abettors with condign punishment....."

In  Yogesh   @   Sachin   Jagdish   Joshi   v.   State   of Maharashtra  MANU/SC/7528/2008   :   (2008)   6   SCALE 469, this Court opined:

"23. Thus, it is manifest that the meeting of minds of two or more   persons   for   doing   an   illegal   act   or   an   act   by   illegal means is sine qua non of the criminal conspiracy but it may not   be   possible   to   prove   the   agreement   between   them   by direct proof.  Nevertheless, existence of the conspiracy and its objective can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and   the   conduct   of   the   accused.   But   the   incriminating circumstances   must   form   a   chain   of   events   from   which   a Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 78 conclusion about the guilt of the accused could be drawn.  It is well settled that an offence of conspiracy is a substantive offence   and   renders   the   mere   agreement   to   commit   an offence   punishable   even   if   an   offence   does   not   take   place pursuant to the illegal agreement.

From the chargesheet it is not clear as to how the IO got a lead to all the accused persons except the accused Shreekant Jain who   could   be   traced   through   the   records   of   airport.     Regarding allegation   of   criminal   conspiracy   qua   accused,   the   investigation revealed   that   the   aforesaid   six   accused   namely   Shreekant   Jain, Ramesh   @   Chedi   Lal,   Kashinath,   Jhanna   Lal,   Asgar   and   Dulal Chakravarti   @   Dinesh   entered   into   or   were   parties   to   a   criminal conspiracy to commit theft of antique articles etc. from the ancient temples   and   to   bring   the   stolen   antique   objects   to   Delhi   for   the purposes of  sale  and smuggle them out  of India in  an  illegal and authorised manner.

The IO of this case has not been examined and hence, this Court has lost the opportunity to get the clarifications from the IO regarding the aforementioned lead or could have extracted the same from the examination of the IO.  

Be that as it may.   Now the question is as to how the prosecution   could   get   a   lead   to   all   the   accused   which   is   very important to prove the charges of conspiracy. The prosecution had tried to make two accused as approvers namely Asgar and Jhanna Lal for the purposes of their making true and correct disclosure of the entire episode.   The first accused Asgar though initially was willing Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 79 to   become   approver   for   the   purposes   of   furnishing   the   true disclosures, but later on he was not of any help for the prosecution as he declined to become an approver.  Though, the record reflects that the prosecution had moved an application before this Court that the remaining   accused persons were threatening him for becoming the approver, but when the said accused Asgar was brought before this Court, he instead stated that it was the prosecution which was trying to overawe him and was pressurizing him to become an approver. He stated that the accused persons were not harassing him.  In view of  the   statements  made  by the  accused Asgar before the Court  of Ld.MM, the Ld.MM vide order dated 08.10.1986 had dismissed the application of the CBI for making the accused Asgar as an approver.  

The prosecution brought another accused namely Jhanna Lal as an approver in this case.   On an application being moved by accused Jhanna Lal u/s 306 Cr.P.C, the then Ld.Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Sh.R.L.Chugh granted conditional pardon to the accused Jhanna Lal u/s 306 Cr.P.C. The accused Jhanna Lal also accepted the tender   of   pardon.   He   answered   in   affirmative   when   he   was confronted with a question as to whether he wanted to accept tender of pardon  on  the  conditions explained to him.   The  Ld.CMM also endorsed in the order dated 10.02.83 that the tender of pardon was accepted by Sh.Jhanna Lal. The said order of accepting the tender of pardon was proved by the prosecution through PW­16 Sh.R.L.Chugh, who   deposed   before   this   Court   that   after   making   general   discrete inquiries   from   accused   Jhanna   Lal   to   find   out   whether   tender   of pardon should be granted to him or not, he passed requisite order tendering pardon to the accused and proved his order as Ex.PW16/B. Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 80 After   the   accused   Jhanna   Lal   accepted   the   tender   of pardon,   his   statement   u/s   306   Cr.P.C   was   recorded   as   PW­1   on 17.12.86.   

Prior   to   that   the  statement   of   accused   Jhanna  Lal   was also   recorded   on   21.10.82   u/s   164   Cr.P.C   by   the   Ld.   Judicial Magistrate at Varanasi.  The Ld.Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi has not been produced by the prosecution to prove the statement of Jhanna Lal u/s 164 Cr.P.C.  In his statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C, the said Jhanna Lal had mentioned all the facts which led to the arrest of the both the accused   under   trial.     The   IO   has   not   mentioned   anything   in   the chargesheet w.r.t. fact as to how the accused Jhanna Lal came into picture.  Accordingly, there is a missing link in the chain.  It is also not clear from the chargesheet as to whether accused Jhanna Lal was arrested   prior   to   his   acceptance   of   pardon   by   the   then   CMM Sh.R.L.Chugh.   There is a reference of statement of Jhanna Lal u/s 164   Cr.P.C   in   the   testimony   of   PW­16   Sh.R.L.Chugh,   the   then Ld.CMM, wherein it has been mentioned by him that the statement of accused Jhanna Lal u/s 164 Cr.P.C which was recorded by JM­I Varanasi   was   received   in   the   office   of   CMM   in   due   course.     The chargesheet   is   also   not   clear   as   to   what   made   the   IO   to   get   the statement of accused Jhanna Lal recorded u/s 164 Cr.P.C at Varanasi instead of Delhi as the case of the CBI was registered at Delhi.  The said   statement   u/s   164   Cr.P.C   is   not   purported   to   have   been recorded in the theft case registered at P.S Attarsuiya,  Allahabad.  

The   statement  of  Jhanna  Lal  u/s  164  Cr.P.C, therefore have no evidentiary value as he has not been examined at all in the trial   Court,   but   it   appears   that   it   would   have   been   useful   for Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 81 prosecution   as   source   information.   It   is   only   on   the   basis   of   this statement of accused Jhanna Lal that the case appears to have been solved.

As per mandate of section 164(2) Cr.P.C, the Magistrate shall   before   recording   such   confessional   statement   explain   to   the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and that if   he   does   so,   it   may   be   used   as   evidence   against   him;   and   the Magistrate   shall   not   record   any   such   confession   unless,   upon questioning the person making it, he has reason to believe that it is being   made   voluntarily.     The   next   sub­section   i.e.   164(3) categorically mandates that if at any time before the confession is recorded the person appearing before the Magistrate states that he is not willing to make a confession, the Magistrate shall not authorise the detention of such person in police custody.  

Since the confession u/s 164 Cr.P.C was required to be recorded, the Judicial Magistrate­I, Varanasi was under obligation to follow the strict mandate of the legislative command u/s 164 (2) and (3) Cr.P.C.  There is nothing on record which may suggest that time was granted to the accused Jhanna Lal for making statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C or as to whether his consent was obtained for recording the same.     The   Ld.   Judicial   Magistrate­Varanasi   has   simply   given   a certificate u/s 164 (4) Cr.P.C which itself is not sufficient to make this court believe that the statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C was recorded in terms of the dictum of law laid down in Cr.P.C.  

Now, coming to the statement of the approver Jhanna Lal u/s   306   Cr.P.C   recorded   by   Ld.MM.   After   grant   of   pardon   he categorically deposed before Ld.MM that he came to Allahabad with Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 82 co­accused Chedi Lal in the year 1992 where they stayed in the Lok Nath Mohalla and in the house of one Bhahian Pandit, thereafter he saw one murti (idol) at Mahadev Mandir.  At that time, co­accused Dinesh,   Chedi   and   Asgar   were   present   with   approver   Jhanna   Lal. Photographs of the said murti (idol) were taken by them.  The photo was   brought   to   Delhi   and   presented   before   accused   Kashi.     After seeing the photograph, the accused Kashi Nath asked the approver Jhanna Lal and his party to bring the aforementioned murti (idol) to Delhi. The approver Jhanna Lal and his associates thereafter picked up the murti (idol) from the Mandir with the help of four persons and  same was booked in Allahabad on zero road.   Thereafter the murti   (idol)   was   landed   in   Delhi.     The   approver   and   his   party thereafter   reached   at   Delhi.   The   accused   Chedi   went   to   accused Kashi at Lajpat Nagar. In the evening they all went to Kashi and met at a paan shop near bus stop. Thereafter, the approver and his party went to Paharganj to get the murti (idol) released.   After that they came to the house of Kashi with the murti (idol) which was tied in a petti.   The approver further said that when he was coming back he saw a car in which accused Chedi, Kashi and two more persons were putting up the murti (idol).  The approver was told that one of them was   the   brother   in   law   of   accused   Kashi   Nath,   whose   name   was disclosed to him as Shreekant (accused).   Thereafter, they came to Dharamshala. Accused Chedi told the approver that the murti (idol) has   been   sold   for   a   sum   of   Rs.5,000/­.   The   approver   was   paid Rs.100/­ and he came back to his house at Allahabad.  The approver was further paid a sum of Rs.300/­.  The murti was also identified by the approver besides the accused persons who were present in the Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 83 Court on that day.

The cross examination of this approver Jhanna Lal was deferred and thereafter this approver Jhanna Lal was never brought to   Court   room   by   the   prosecution.   Finally   he   was   stated   to   have expired.  

Ld.counsel   for   the   accused   persons   vehemently   argued that since no opportunity for cross examination has been given to the defence by the then MM while he was recording the testimony of Jhanna   Lal   as   an   approver   on   17.12.86,   the   statement   of   the approver recorded therein has no value in the eyes of law.  The Ld. Counsel has made this court to go through the contents of section 306   Cr.P.C,   wherein   it   has   been   prescribed   that   every   person accepting   a   tender   of   pardon   made   under   sub   section   1   shall   be examined as a witness in the court of Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial, if any.  It was highlighted that the word examination u/s 306 (4) Cr.P.C means examination within the meaning of section 137  of Evidence Act, 1872 which as per Ld.counsel means examination in chief, cross examination and re­examination.     Ld.counsel   submitted   that   as   per   section   138   of Evidence   Act,   1872,   the   order   of   the   examination   shall   be   , examination­in­chief, cross examination and then re­examination.  It was elaborated that when approver could not be cross examined due to his death and the approver was not even brought to the witness box during trial which is pre requisite for completion of tender of pardon proceedings, the statement of approver Jhanna Lal recorded on 17.12.86 by the Ld.MM has no evidentiary value.

Ld. Counsel for defence relied upon the division bench Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 84 judgment of Hon'ble Kerala High Court in State of Kerala Vs Monu Surendran   1990   (1)   KLT   53  wherein   it   was   held   that   light   of decisions in  Sanjay Gandhi vs Union Of India (1978) 2 SCC 39 and State (Delhi Administration) vs Jaggit Singh 1989 Supp (2) SC   598  that   the   accused   have   a   right   to   examine   the   approver examined u/s 306(4)(a) CrPC.  

Ld.Sr.PP for CBI on the other hand strenuously took up the stand and argued that it is not necessary for the court recording the statement of the approver after accepting the tender of pardon that   any   opportunity   is   required   to   be   provided   to   the   accused persons for cross examination of the approver.   He stated that the proceedings   u/s   306   Cr.P.C   for   the   purpose   of   recording   of   the examination of the approver is akin to the proceedings u/s 200 / 202 Cr.P.C which are recorded during inquiry and in those proceedings there   is   no   requirement   of   the   witness   being   subjected   to   cross examination.   He   further   argued   that   the   statement   of   approver   is valid in law and it can be read not only as statement of approver but also a statement u/s 33 of Indian Evidence Act besides section 32(3) of Evidence Act, 1972. He stated that even if we take the arguments of the Ld. Counsel for the defence recording sequence of examination u/s 137 and 138 of Evidence Act is mandatory provision as a gospel truth, still the records reflects that the defence had not desired for the   cross   examination   and   the   cross   examination   was   simply deferred. It was highlighted that nowhere it has been mentioned in the ordersheet that defence had desired to cross examine the witness in terms of Section 138 Evidence Act.  

Ld. Sr. PP for CBI further argued that the Division Bench  Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 85 of decision of Hon'ble Kerala High Court in State of Kerala Vs Monu Surendran's case (supra) has already been over ruled by a later three judge bench decision of Hon'ble Kerala High Court in Asokan L.S. vs State of Kerala Crl.A. No. 534 of 1992 (C) decided on 03.08.2005. As per Ld. Public Prosecutor what is important to observe is that even Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh Vs Surinder Mohan,   (2000)   2   SCC   396  has   not   disapproved   the   decision   of single Judge Bench of Hon'ble Kerala High Court which was held to be rendered per incurium by Division Bench of  Hon'ble Kerala High Court in Monu Surendran's case (supra) which is relied upon by the ld. Counsel for the defence.   He further stated that the decision in Monu Surendran's case (supra) has no application at all in view of the subsequent decisions in Asokan L.S. case (supra) and it was held in Asokan L.S. case (Three Judges Bench) that the Monu Surendran's case was not correctly decided.  

I have taken note of the rival submissions of the parties on   the   issue   regard   the   evidentiary   value   of   the   statement   of approver   Jhanna   Lal   recorded   by   Ld.MM   here.   It   would   be appropriate to first reproduce the provisions of section 306 Cr.P.C.

306. Tender of pardon to accomplice.­ (1) With a view to  obtaining   the   evidence   of   any   person supposed to have  been   directly   or   indirectly concerned in or privy to an  offence to which this section applies, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 86 Metropolitan   Magistrate   at   any   stage   of   the investigation   or   inquiry   into,   or   the   trial   of,   the offence,   and   the   Magistrate   of   the   first   class inquiring into or trying the offence, at any stage of the inquiry or trial, may tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure   of   the   whole   of   the   circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every   other   person   concerned,   whether   as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof.

(2) This section applies to ­

(a) any offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session or by the Court of a Special Judge appointed   under   the   Criminal   Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952).

(b) any offence punishable with imprisonment which   may   extend   to   seven   years   or   with   a more severe sentence.

(3)  Every Magistrate who tenders a pardon  under sub­section (1) shall record ­

(a) his reasons for so doing.

(b)   whether   the   tender   was   or   was   not   accepted   by   the   person   to   whom   it   was   made,  and shall, on application made by the  Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 87 accused, furnish him with a copy of such  record free of cost.

(4)   Every   person   accepting   a   tender   of   pardon made under  sub­section (1)­

(a)   shall   be   examined   as   a   witness   in   the Court of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial, if any.

(b)   shall,   unless   he   is   already   on   bail,   be detained   in   custody   until   the   termination   of the trial.

(5)   Where   a   person   has   accepted   a   tender   of   pardon   made   under   sub­section   (1)   and   has   been examined  under   sub­section   (4),   the   Magistrate   taking   cognizance   of   the   offence   shall,   without   making   any   further   inquiry   in   the case,­

(a) commit it for trial­

(i) to the Court of Session if the offence is triable  exclusively  by  that  Court  or if  the Magistrate taking cognizance is the Chief Judicial Magistrate;

(ii) to a Court of Special Judge appointed under   the  Criminal   Law  Amendment   Act, 1952   (46   of   1952),   if   the   offence   is   triable exclusively by that Court;

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 88

(b) in any other case, make over the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate who shall  try the case himself. 

The   object   of   the   provision   for   tendering   pardon   to   an accomplice   is   to   get   evidence   in   cases   involving   grave   offences alleged   to   have   been   committed   by   several   persons   under circumstances making it difficult to get any evidence otherwise.  No clue   or   trace   of   the   offence   might   have   been   left   behind   by   the perpetrators of the crime.   The dominant purpose of pardon is that the   culprits   behind   such   heinous   and   grave   crimes   do   not   go unpunished if a co­participant of the crime comes forward offering to make a clean Brest of his own complicity as also the complicity of the other   offenders.     Evidence   is   accordingly   collected   by   tendering pardon   to   a   person   supposed   to   have   been   directly   or   indirectly concerned in or privy to the offence what is tendered is a conditional pardon.  The condition is that he will make a full and true disclosure of   the   entire   circumstances   within   his   knowledge   concerning   the offence   and   concerning   every   other   person   involved   in   the commission of the offence.   The conditional pardon so tendered is thus   a   contract   between   the   accomplice   and   the   State   and   the consideration   for   the   same   qua   the   accomplice   is   the   exoneration from liability and the consideration qua the State is the agreement to make   a   full   and   true   disclosure.     Once   pardon   is   granted   to   an accused he ceases to be an accused person and become a witness for the prosecution.  When the approver resiles from the agreement and breaks the conditional pardon, the contract is broken and the State Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 89 becomes entitled to prosecute him by recourse to Section 308 CrPC. It   is   to   ensure   that   the   approver   who   has   accepted   conditional pardon, makes a full and true disclosure of the entire facts within his knowledge, that he is examined as a witness before the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence under Section 306(4)(a) of CrPC. The   said   provision   further   mandates   that   the   approver   shall   be examined in the subsequent trial also.

In the light of aforementioned guidelines extracted from various judgments on the issue, what now falls to be considered is as to whether  there  is any difference in  the nature of enquiry under Section 202 CrPC and Section 306(4) CrPC and whether the accused persons   have   a   right   to   cross­examine   the   approver   during   his examination   as   a   witness   before   the   Magistrate   taking   cognizance under   Section   306(4)(a)   CrPC.     If   the   said   examination   of   the approver is akin to the examination of witnesses under Section 200 and 202 CrPC, then, as has already been seen, the accused have no right to cross­examine the approver at the stage.  That was the view taken by a learned Single Judge of the Hon'ble Kerala High Court in 1988 Crl.L.J.     The said decision was relied on and followed by a Division   Bench   of     Hon'ble   Kerala   High   Court   in   Kurian   v.   State 19889 KLT S.No. Case no. 60. However, the Division Bench in State of Kerala v. Monu Surendran 1990 (1) KLT 53, the very same Hon'ble Judge  (U.L.   Bhat,  J.)  who rendered the  decision  for the  Bench in Kurian   v.   State,   speaking   for   the   Bench   in  Monu   Surendran's  case observed that in the light of the decisions in Sanjay Gandhi v. Union of   India,   (1978)   2   SCC   39   :   AIR     1978   SC   514   and   State   (Delhi Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 90 Administration) v. Jaggit Singh, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 770: AIR 1989 SC 598,   the   accused   have   a   right   to   cross­examine   the   approver examined under Section 306(4)(a) and that the above decisions of the   Hon'ble   Apex   Court   were   not   brought   to   the   notice   of   the Division Bench in Kurian v. State.  The later Division Bench also held that the decisions of the Single Judge in In re. Chief Judl. Magistrate, Trivandrum and that of the Division Bench in Kurian v. State were per   incuriam   and   directed   the   Ld.   Chief   Judicial   Magistrate, Trivandrum (who had committed some of the cases to the Sessions Court   without   examining   the   approver)   to   examine   the   approver giving an opportunity to the accused to cross­examine the approver and then to deal with the matter in accordance with law.   It was pursuant to the above direction that the approver was examined by the   Ld.   Chief   Judicial   Magistrate   Trivandrum   and   some   of   the appellants had cross­examined the approver also.  

Further,   this   issue   has   been   dealt   with   by   our   own Hon'ble  High Court  of Delhi as well as Hon'ble Supreme Court  in various pronouncements which are discussed as under: 

In  State (Delhi Administration) v. Jagjit Singh, 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 770 AIR 1989 SC 598 what has been held is that­  "examination   of   the   approver   both   in   the   committal   court   as   well   as   the   trial   court   is   mandatory.   Both sides do not dispute the above   proposition. The only dispute is as to whether the  expression   "examination"   would   include   cross­ examination."

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 91 In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar (1995 Supp (1) SCC 80) a reading of paragraph 30 thereof will show that  "the   defect   of   non­examination   of   the   approver   before the Chief Judl. Magistrate was rectified by a  remand   from   the   Sessions   Court   to   the   Chief   Judicial Magistrate who thereafter complied with   the requirement under Sec. 306(4) CrPC.   It was,   therefore, held that the subsequent trial was not   vitiated   for   the   alleged   non­compliance   of   Sec.  

306(4)(a) CrPC the compliance of which was held  to be mandatory."

In  Narayan   Chetanram   Cahdhary   v.   State   of Maharashtra,  (2000)   8  SCC  457  the   application   for   pardon  was filed   under   Sec.   307   CrPC   after   the   committal   and   before   trial. Hence there was no obligation on the trial court or a right in favour of the accused in insist on compliance with the requirement under Section 306(4).

In Ranadhir Basu v. State of West Bengal (2000) 3 SCC 161  the question pointed arose as to whether the accused have a right   of  cross­examination of the  approver during his examination under Sec. 306(4)(a) of Cr.PC.  This is what the Apex Court held in paragraph 7: 

"It   was   contended   by   Mr.   Muralidhar,   learned   counsel   appearing for the appellant that Sudipa was not "examined  as a witness" as contemplated by Section 306(4) CrPC.  He  submitted that Sudipa was examined by the Magistrate in    Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 92 his chamber and not in the open court and at that time the  accused were not kept present.  Her evidence was subjected to cross­examination.   In support of his submission he relied   upon the decision of tis court in Suresh Chandra Bahri v.   State of Bihar.  In that case this Court after pointing out the  object and purpose of enacting  Section 306(4)  CrPC  had   ruled that since the provision had been made for the benefit  of the accused it must be regarded as mandatory."  

It had observed therein that : (SCC p. 101, para 30).

"The   object   and   purpose   in   enacting   this   mandatory   provision   is   obviously   intended   to   provide a safeguard to the accused in as much as  the approver has to make a statement disclosing   his   evidence   at  the   preliminary  stage   before  the   committal order is made and the accused not only  becomes aware of the evidence against him but he  is also afforded an opportunity to meet with the   evidence   of   an   approver   before   the   committing   court itself at the very threshold....

From this observation, it does not follow that the  person who is granted pardon must be examined   in the presence of the accused and that the accused has right to appear and cross­examine him at that stage also. As pointed out by this Court in that   case the object is to provide an opportunity to the  Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 93 accused to show to the court that the approver's   evidence at the trial is untrustworthy in view of   the contradictions or improvements made by him  during his evidence at the trial. Considering the   object   and   purpose   of   examining   the   person   accepting tender of pardon as a witness is thus   limited. The proceedings which takes place before  the Magistrate at that stage is neither an inquiry  nor   a   trial.     Therefore,   the   submission   of   the   learned   counsel   that   Sudipa   should   have   been   examined as a witness in open court and not in the chamber   and   that   while   she   was   examined   the   Magistrate should have kept the accused present   and   afforded   to   them   an   opportunity   to   cross­ examined Sudipa cannot be accepted. The phrase  "examination   of   a   witness"   does   not   necessarily   mean examination and cross­examination of that   witness.  What type of examination of a witness is  contemplated would depend upon the object and   purpose of that provision. Section 202 CrPC also   contemplates   examination   of   witness   yet   it   has   been held, considering the object and purpose of   that provision, that the accuse has no locus standi  at that stage."

In   State   of   Himachal   Pradesh   v.   Surinder   Mohan Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 94 (2000) 2 SCC 396 the approver was examined under Sec. 306(4)(a) CrPC   before   the   Ld.   Chief   Judicial   Magistrate   and   he   was subsequently examined and cross­examined during trial before the the Court of Session.  At the stage of arguments before the Sessions Court,   it   was   contended   for   the   first   time   that   failure   to   give   an opportunity   for   the   accused   to   cross­examine   the   approver   before committal   court   would   vitiate   the   trial.     The   said   contention   was repelled   by   the   Hon'ble   Supreme   Court   holding   that   the   said contention was raised belatedly and that even if the accused had the right   to   cross­examine   the   approver   when   examined   under   Sec. 306(4)(a) CrPC, the defect would stand cured under Sec. 465 CrPC. Dealing   with   the   contention   of   the   accused   regarding   the   alleged right of cross­examination, this is what the Hon'ble Apex Court held in para 11:

"From the aforesaid ingredients, it is abundantly clear   that at the stage of investigation, inquiry or trial of the  offence, the person to whom pardon is to be granted, is to be examined for collecting the evidence of a person who is directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence.   At the time of investigation or inquiry into an offence, the accused   cannot   claim   any   right   under   law   to   cross­ examine   the   witness.     The   right   to   cross­examination   would arise only at the time of trial. During the course of investigation   by   the   police,   the   question   of   cross­ examination by the accused does not arise.   Similarly,   under Sec. 200 CrPC when the Magistrate before taking  cognizance of the offence, that is, before issuing process   holds the inquiry, the accused has no right to be heard,  and,   therefore,   the   question   of   cross­examination   does   Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 95 not   arise.     Further,   the   person   to   whom   pardon   is   granted,   is   examined   but   is   not   offered   for   cross­ examination and thereafter during trial if he is examined and   cross­examined   then   there   is   no   question   of   any   prejudice  caused to the accused.   In such cases, at the   most the accused may loss the chance to cross­examine   the approver twice, that is to say, once before committal  and the other at the time of trial."

                 In   Ranadhir     Basu     case     (supra)     and     Surindra
Mohan     case     (supra)     particularly     Ranadhir     Basu     case,     the

Hon'ble  Apex  Court  had  pointedly  considered  the  question  as  to whether   the   expression   "examination"   in   Sec.   306   (4)   (a)   CrPC would   include   cross­examination   and   held   that   at   that   stage   the accused has no right to appear and cross­examine the approver and the   legal   position   was   treated   akin   to   an   inquiry   under   Sec.   202 CrPC.       These   pronouncements   give   credence     to     the     view expressed by Ld.  PP  for CBI who had set up his arguments on the basis of judgment of Hon'ble Kerala High Court in Asokan L.S. case. But   the   approver   has  not   been   examined  as a  witness before   this court. This court shall now discuss the evidentiary value of statement of approver made before Ld. MM in case he is not examined before trial court for one reason or other.

In         this         regard,         I       shall       take       up       the arguments  of Ld. Sr. PP  for  CBI  that  in  case  the  approver  could not   be   produced   by    the    prosecution    in    the    witness    box during   trial      by      the     CBI    for     the    reasons   of    his  Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 96 death, his statement recorded before the Ld.MM is admissible u/s 33 and u/s 32(3) of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.  The Ld. Counsel for the defence vehemently argued that the same is not admissible under the aforementioned sections of the Evidence Act, 1872 as the approver was  examined  only  conditionally  by  tendering pardon  to  him and within  the  meaning  of section  306 Cr.P.C. It was highlighted that section 33 of Evidence Act is applicable only when in a subsequent judicial proceedings the witness cannot be found or dead and further subject to condition that the adverse party in the proceedings had the right and opportunity to cross examine the witness.   He stated that when   the   defence   has   got   no   opportunity   to   cross   examine   the witness, section 33 of Evidence Act has no applicability at all.  

To   deal   with   this   issue,   it   would   be   necessary   to reproduce the provisions of section 33 of Indian Evidence Act which are as under:­

33.   Relevancy   of   certain   evidence   for   proving,   in subsequent   proceeding,   the   truth   of   facts   therein stated.­  Evidence   given   by   a   witness   in   a   judicial proceeding, or before any person authorized by law to take it, is relevant for the purpose of proving, in a subsequent judicial proceeding, or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, the truth of the facts which it states, when the witness is dead or cannot be   found,   or   is   incapable   of   giving   evidence,   or   is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or if his presence cannot be obtained without an amount of Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 97 delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, the Court considers unreasonable:

Provided­ that the proceeding was between the same parties or their   representatives   in   interest;   that   the   adverse party   in   the   first   proceeding   had   the   right   and opportunity to cross­examine;  that   the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as in the second proceeding.

Therefore, with a view to make the evidence of witness relevant   for   the   purpose   of   proving   in   a   later   stage   of     judicial proceedings what is important is that the adverse party in the first proceedings must have got right and opportunity to cross examine the witness.  The Hon'ble Kerala High Court in a case titled Asokan L.S   Vs State of Kerala 2005 Crl.L.J. 3848 (full bench)  had also come across a similar issue in which the Hon'ble Kerala High Court referred to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ranadhir Basu case (supra) and Surinder Mohan case (supra) and held as under :­ "In the case of a witness examined during an inquiry under Sec. 202 CrPC the question pointedly arose before the Supreme Court as   to   whether   his   statement   recorded   by   the   Magistrate   and favourable to the prosecution would be admissible  under Sec. 33 of the Evidence Act if such witness had turned hostile to the prosecution during the subsequent trial.   After holding that the accused   had   no   right   and   opportunity   to   cross­examine   a prosecution witness examined during the course of inquiry under Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 98 Sec. 202 CrPC, the apex court (In Ranadhir Basu case) held as follows in paragraph 10.

"10. Thus, we have no difficulty in holding that as during the course of inquiry under Sec. 202 of the Code an accused has no right much less opportunity to cross-examine a prosecution witness, statement of such a witness recorded during the course of the inquiry is not admissible in evidence under Sec. 33 of the Act and, consequently, the same cannot form the basis of conviction of an accused.

Accordingly, the Hon'ble Kerala High Court in Asokan L.S case   has  on   the   basis  of judgment  of  Hon'ble  Apex Court  held as under:­

25. "Since the appellants/ accused had not right to cross­examine the approver while he was examined before   the   Chief   Judicial   Magistrate   under   Section 306(4)(a)   CrPC   the   statement   is   not   relevant   or admissible under Sec. 33 of the Evidence Act during the subsequent trial in which the approver was not available for examination by reason of his death in the meanwhile."

In   the   case   in   hand,   the   approver   though   has   been examined   u/s   306   Cr.P.C   before   the   Court   who   had   granted   and accepted pardon from him, accordingly in terms of aforementioned dictum,   the   said   statement   of   the   approver   cannot   be   read   and relevant u/s 33 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Now,   I  shall  deal  with the  another  set  of  arguments of Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 99 Ld.Sr.PP   for   CBI   that   the   statement   of   accused   recorded   u/s   306 Cr.P.C shall be relevant u/s 32(3) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as the prosecution could not produce him for the reasons of his death.  He stated that the statements written or verbal made by a person who is dead or who cannot be found etc. are relevant facts u/s 32 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and is thus admissible.  The Ld. Counsel for the defence rebuted by saying that the pre requisite for admission of the statement of approver u/s 32 of Indian Evidence Act is that it should be either relating to his death, or is made in the course of business, or against the maker     besides other reasons mentioned in the said section.   He stated that though the statement of the approver was against the maker of this case, but it would not have exposed him to criminal prosecution etc. but rather the statement of the approver was a saviour for the approver from criminal prosecution within the meaning of Section 306 CrPC.

Before   appreciating   the   rival   arguments   of   the   defence counsels and Ld.Sr.PP for CBI, it would be appropriate to go through the relevant provisions of section 32 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which runs as under:­  

32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is   dead   or   cannot   be   found,   etc.,   is   relevant.­  Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead,   or   who   cannot   be   found,   or   who   has   become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance  cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the cases, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 100 cases:­ (1) ........

(2).........

(3) or against interest of maker.­ When the statement is against   the   pecuniary   or   proprietary   interest   of   the person making it, or when, if true, it would expose him or would have exposed him to a criminal prosecution or to a suit for damages.

For   the   purpose   of   appreciation   of   the   aforementioned provisions in the light of the facts of this case, apparently it is clear from   sub   section   3   of   Section   32   Evidence   Act   that   when   the statement is against the interest of maker, or when if true it would expose him or would have exposed him to criminal prosecution, only in those cases the statement of dead person made by him before his death shall be relevant.   I find force in the arguments advanced by Ld.counsel for defence that the statement which was made by the approver could not have exposed the approver to criminal trial, but in fact, it had saved him from criminal prosecution.  The provision of section 306 Cr.P.C under which the statement of PW­1 Jhanna Lal was recorded states that the statement can be recorded only after the approver has been granted pardon which should also be accepted by the approver. Accordingly, there is no substance in this arguments of Ld.Sr.PP for CBI that the statement of the approver PW­1 Jhanna Lal is relevant u/s 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.  

Now I shall be dealing with the issue regarding Section Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 101 120­B   IPC   in   particular   reference   to   Section   10     of   the   Indian Evidence Act, 1872.  

Ld.   Sr.   PP   for   the   CBI   has   vehemently   argued   that   the prosecution has already established the meeting of minds between all the accused live or dead in this case.  It was elaborated that all the accused had conspired together to steal the idols from Allahabad for the purposes of committing an offence and whatever had been said or done by all of them in reference of their common intention at the time  when such intention  was entertained by them has been  well explained by the accused Jhanna Lal not only in his statement u/s 164 CrPC made before the Ld. Judicial Magistrate­I at Varanasi but also before the court of Ld. MM while his statement u/s 306(4) IPC was   recorded.     Ld.   Sr.   PP   for   CBI   further   asserted   that   PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar had also corroborated the version of the approver Asgar while the PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar appeared in the witness box.

Ld. Sr. PP had made this court go through the testimony of PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar wherein he stated that in the year 1980­81 he was living at Allahabad and since he was rickshaw puller and one other boy namely Asgar was also rickshaw puller, he knew the said Asgar as he and Asgar used to sit together.  On one occasion, the said Asgar asked him to tell him if the PW­8 came to know about any idol in Allahabad.  The said Asgar also told PW­8 that in case there is an idol   then   he   would   get   good   money   if   sold   outside   Allahabad. Thereafter, PW­8 identified accused Kashinath in court as being the person introduced to him by the said Asgar. 

The said Asgar had shown some pieces of broken idols to the   PW­8   Dharamraj  Sonar but the PW­8 told him that the  Asgar Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 102 should sell those broken idols himself.  Thereafter, PW­8 left for his native village and when he returned to Allahabad again, upon being asked by Asgar to sell the broken pieces of idols, the PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar told him that he himself should sell those broken idols.  PW­8 further testified that Asgar later on told him that he had sold those broken idols to resident of Delhi.  The PW­8 failed to tell the name of the person who was informed to him by Asgar as being resident of Delhi, but he identified the accused Shreekant in court.  

The abovementioned part of the testimony of PW­8 was of utmost importance as the Ld. Sr. PP for CBI had sought permission for   cross­examination   of   this   witness   as   he   was   resiling   from   his earlier statement given u/s 161 CrPC.   In his cross­examination by CBI, the entire statement of the witness u/s 161 CrPC was put to this witness   PW­8   Dharamraj   Sonar   who   termed   it   to   be   correct   or incorrect para by para except some part in which questions regarding threats etc. extended to him by accused Kashinath was given.  Ld. Sr. PP for CBI stated that the statement of this witness PW­8 Dharamraj is   relevant   u/s   10   of   Indian   Evidence   Act,   1872.     He   further explained that the statement of the accused/approver Jhanna Lal u/s 164 CrPC as well as u/s 306 CrPC corroborates the version of PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar.  

Per contra, ld. Counsel for the defence vehemently argued on   this   point   that   the   prosecution   has   not   been   again   able   to establish how the PW­8 Dharamraj landed on the platform   during investigation.  It was further submitted that since the accused Asgar has already expired and could not face trial, it is not clear from the testimony of PW­8 Dharamraj as to whether he was talking about the Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 103 same Asgar who was made an approver by the prosecution or some other Asgar.   It was again highlighted that the statement of the co­ accused Asgar (who has already expired) recorded by Ld. CMM u/s 306   (4)   IPC   cannot   be   read   in   evidence   either   u/s   33   of   Indian Evidence   Act   or   under  section   32  of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act  and therefore there is no question of any corroboration of his statement or the statement of the PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar recorded before this court.  Regarding Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, ld. Defence Counsel again elaborated that it is not applicable as even the PW­8 Dharamraj   had   cast   no   aspersions   on   the   accused   Kashinath   or Shreekant Jain in his examination in chief.

Ld. Counsel for the defence further submitted that in his testimony   on   oath   before   this   court,   the   PW­8   Dharamraj   Sonar identified the accused Kashinath as the person who was introduced by Asgar (since expired) to him and he had mentioned that he did not   have   any   discussions   with   the   accused   Kashinath   relating   to idols.  Regarding  other accused Shreekant Jain, it was elaborated by the   PW­8   Dharamraj   that   Asgar   told   him   that   he   had   sold   those broken idols to resident of Delhi and pointed out towards Shreekant Jain.  Ld. Counsel explained that it is not clear from the examination in   chief   as   to   how   the   PW­8   Dharamraj   identified   the   accused Shreekant Jain who was a resident of Delhi given the circumstances when   there   is  no  evidence  on  record  that  accused Shreekant  Jain ever visited Allahabad.  

Ld.  Counsel relied upon the judgment of  Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Satish Kumar Vs State Crl. Appeal no. 38/92 DOD 09.08.1995  in   context   of   the   way   cross­examination   of   PW­8 Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 104 Dharamraj by Ld. Sr. PP upon his resiling from earlier statement.

I have heard the Ld. Sr. PP for CBI as well as counsel for defence on the issue regarding Section 120­B IPC r/w Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.  

If   we   go   through   the   examination   in   chief   of   PW­8 Dharamraj   Sonar,   it   categorically   goes   to   suggest   that   accused Kashinath   was   simply   introduced   by   the   co­accused   Asgar   (since expired) to PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar.   He had not cast any aspersion on   accused   Kashinath   except   this   fact   w.r.t.   introduction   in   his examination in chief.   He had also stated that he did not have any discussion   with   Kashinath   relating   to   the   idols.   It   appears   to   this court that simply because the co­accused had introduced one witness to the other accused does not itself leads to assumption that the said other accused Kashinath can be held guilty u/s 120­B IPC for the acts and conducts of the first accused.  Regarding the accused Shreekant Jain, I find force in the arguments advanced by ld. Counsel for the defence that prosecution has not been able to lead any evidence in order   to   support   its   claim   that   accused   Shreekant   ever   visited Allahabad.     For   want   of   this   evidence,   this   court   is   unable   to understand   as   to   how   and   under   what   circumstances,   PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar could identify the accused Shreekant as there is no evidence that PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar ever visited Delhi.  As already discussed, no test identification parade of any of the accused was got conducted   and   it   has   not   been   explained   as   to   how   the   PW­8 Dharamraj   Sonar   could   get   in   touch   with   the   accused   Shreekant before   getting   his   testimony   recorded   in   this   court.   The   cross­ examination of PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar carried on by Sh. S.P. Singh Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 105 Chaudhary recorded on 05.01.2016, it would be appropriate to refer to relevant extract of cross­examination of PW­8 relied upon by Sr. PP for CBI which is as under:

"Kashi   Nath   used   to   live   in   Banaras   around   45   years back and after that he had shifted to Delhi.   I  had never seen  the  residential  house  of Kashi   Nath of Delhi. I never met Kashi Nath in Delhi.  I  met   Kashi   Nath   for   the   first   time   in   Delhi   regarding this case in this Hon'ble Court.   Kashi   Nath and other accused of this case had talked in  my   presence   4­5   times   at   hotel   at   Allahabad.     Name of the other accused persons were Chedi Lal, Jhanna and others, but I do not remember the   names   of   other   accused.     I   cannot   tell   the   approximate date, month or the year of the said   talk in Allahabad hotel.  There was no talk in the  hotel Kashi Nath of any other person, Vol. below  the hotel Kashi Nath stated if there was any old   idol available I should contact him.  It is correct  that in my statement Ex­PW8/A I have not stated  volunteer   statement   to   the   CBI   officers.     It   is   wrong to suggest that there was no talk of Kashi  Nath in Allahabad.   Asgar had never shown me   any pieces of idol of goddess Durga."

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 106 The   bare   reading   of   statement   of   the   PW­8   Dharamraj Sonar u/s 161 CrPC recorded earlier by CBI was put to the PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar para by para by Ld. Predecessor and he continued to term it correct or incorrect para by para.   The statement of the witness   u/s   161   CrPC   can   only   be   used   for   the   purposes   of contradiction u/s 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 or can be used   for   the   purposes   of   Section   162   CrPC.     If   such   like   entire statement of the witness u/s 161 CrPC which is put to witness in the cross­examination by the Prosecutor and which is termed as correct or incorrect by the witness is allowed to be considered as a correct version of the incident, then the day is not far away when not even a single accused facing criminal prosecution shall go unpunished and the   very   theory   of   the   criminal   jurisprudence   that   the   accused   is presumed   to   be   innocent   from   the   very   beginning   shall   get frustrated.     The   deposition   in   the   examination   in   chief   has   to   be appreciated on terms which are absolutely different from deposition in cross­examination of witness in case he resiles by the same party who called him.  In this regard,  I take guidance from the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Satish Kumar vs State case (supra) relied upon by ld. Counsel for defence.   It would be appropriate to reproduce   the   first   part   of   para   20   of   the   cited   judgment   which reflects the kind of cross­examination done by the prosecutor in that case.

In her cross­examination by the prosecution,  she   had   affirmed   the   fact,   as   suggested   to   her, that she had told the police that, her son Suresh had returned at 12 midnight and had Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 107 gone behind the hut for urination and she   had   also   stated   to   the   police   that   the   appellant,   Satish   Kumar,   had   followed   Suresh.     She   had   also   stated   to   the   police   that she heard the noise of her son saying   "HAI   MA   MUJHE   BACHAAO,   SATISH   NE   MUJHE   CHAKU   MAR   DIYA   HAI."     These   statements   made   by   the   witness   in   cross­ examination   appear   to   be   wholly   inadmissible in evidence because it need not  be   emphasised   that   any   statement   to   the   police made by any witness is not admissible  in evidence and such a statement could be   used  only  for  the  purpose   of  contradicting   the witness in view of provisions of Section   162 of Criminal Procedure Code read with   Section 145 of Indian Evidence Act."

After   referring   to   this   para,   the   Hon'ble   High Court held as under:

"We   are   surprised   that   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge, who recorded the evidence, had lost sight   of   such   elementary   legal   principles   of   taking   evidence in a case.  

The prosecutor who put the questions in this form  to elicit the answers was also perhaps completely  ignorant   of   the   legal   procedure   for   cross­ examining   the   witness   produced   by   the   Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 108 prosecution itself.   The questions which ought to   have   been   put   to   the   witness   while   cross­ examination   by   the   prosecutor,   should   have   elicited   facts   and   not   statements   made   to   the   police.     So,   this   part   of   the   testimony   of   the   witness   has   to   be   completely   ignored   from   consideration  as   to  what  she  had  stated   to  the   police."

In   order   to   further   discuss   the   testimony   of   PW­8 Dharamraj   Sonar   and   for   the   purposes   of   appreciation   of   cross­ examination carried on by Sr. PP for CBI, it would be appropriate to first  discuss the  provisions of Section 154 of Indian Evidence  Act, 1872   in   the   light   of   various   pronouncements   of   Hon'ble   Supreme Court and Hon'ble High Court of Delhi.   Section 154 of the Indian Evidence   Act,   1872   relates   to   the   permission   being   granted   by   a court   to  the   party   who calls  a witness to  put  questions to such  a witness which might be put up in cross­examination by the adverse party.   Here in the present case, PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar was called by the CBI and in fact CBI has sought permission to cross­examine this witness as he resiled from his earlier statement.  In Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration 1976 Cri LJ 295, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the words "hostile" and "adverse" in fact restrict the discretion   of   the   court   "and   that   it   is   to   be   liberally   exercised whenever   the   court   from   the   witnesses'   demeanour,   temper, attitude,   bearing   or   the   tenor   and   tendency   of   his   answers   or from   a   perusal   of   his   previous   inconsistent   statement,   or Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 109 otherwise, thinks that the grant of such permission is expedient to extract the truth and to do justice." The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul case  drew a distinction between the English law and the Indian Law and observed that "faultiness of the memory in the case of such   a   witness   would   be   another   object   of   cross­examining   and contradicting   him   by   a   party   calling   the   witness."    However,   the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not dispense with the requirement of the party having to seek permission of the Court to put leading questions in the cross­examination of such witness.

I have also come across a recent judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in  State vs Surender @ Sonu Punjabi & Ors. Crl. Appeal   No.   1219   of   2013,   DOD   17.09.2014  wherein   issue   was relating to the questions being asked by the prosecution which were closed   after   being   granted   permission   by   the   court.     It   would   be appropriate  to  first  reproduce  the cross­examination  carried on by Ld. Addl. PP in the cited judgment which is as under:

76. Immediately thereafter a series of close­ended questions were put   to   PW­27   by   the   APP   and   she   replied   to   each   of   them beginning with the words " It is correct that......" Her replies read thus:

"  It   is   correct   that  in   my   statement   Ex.PW27/A   to   the police,   I  had  stated   that   on   20.07.09,  my  cousin   Naresh had   come   from   Haridwar   with   kanwar   and   offered   the holy water of Ganga at Shiv Mandir of our area and the persons who had brought the said kanwars were dancing opposite shiv Mandir in the gali.   It is correct that  I was watching   my   said   cousin   dancing   and   there   were   many Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 110 ladies, boys and gents were present and after some time, I came back at my home.  It is correct that it was 11.30 p.m. when I was standing outside my house with my mother.  It is correct that accused Sudhir and Sunil are residing in our basti.   It is correct that after watching the dance, accused Sudhir and Sunil were going from my gali when they had commented upon me and made indecent gestures towards me.  It is correct that I had stated to the police that I know all the accused persons as they are resident of the same locality.     Vol.   Accused   Danny  is  residing   just   behind  my house.   It  is correct  that  accused Sunil  and  Sanjay were having   base   ball   bat   in   their   hands   and   accused   Sudhir was  having  knife  in  his hand  and  accused  Sonu  Punjabi was having iron rod in his hand and accused Phullu and Danny   were   having   glass   bottles   in   their   hands.   (court observation:­ The weapons i.e. iron rods and glass bottles in   the   respective   hands   of   the   said   three   accused   were uttered by the witness voluntarily even prior to putting the question in complete sense by the Ld.APP).

It is correct that  when the accused persons were chasing my brother when he was running towards mandir, accused Sunil was uttering that " is saley ne hamari badmashi ko chunoti   di   hai,   is   saley   ko   khatam   karna   hai"   (the   said deceased had challenged their ruffianism so he should be killed).   It is correct that  accused Sudhir had caught hold of my  brother  Subhash  opposite  Shiv  Mandir  in the gali and   accused   Sunil   and   Sanjay   hit   on   the   head   of   my brother   with   baseball,   accused   Sonu   Punjabi   hit   on   his Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 111 head   with   iron   rod  and   accused   Danny  and  Phullu  gave blows on the head of my brother with empty liquor glass bottles.   It is correct that  when I, my mother, my cousin Naresh   and   neighbor   Sameer   raised   alarm   of   'bachao bachao'   then   accused   Sudhir   inflicted   knife   blows   on Naresh and Sameer.   It is correct that  in the quarrel, the empty liquor glass bottles in the hands of accused Danny and Phullu were broken and pieces of glass had scattered in the gali and in the scuffle, accused Sunil fell on the said glasses   and   sustained   injuries   on   his   body.  It   is   correct that  due to fear of apprehension, all the accused persons ran   away   from   the   spot.    It   is   correct   that  Naresh   and Sameer   were   referred   to   Safdarjung   hospital   from   SGM Hospital. It is correct that due to lapse of time, I could not recollect   the   facts   which   are   put   to   me   in   my   cross­ examination." 

The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi after going through the aforementioned   judgments   of   Hon'ble   Supreme   Court   summarized the   position   that   according to Section 142 of the  Indian  Evidence Act, a court can permit leading questions  to the matters which are introductory   or   undisputed   or   which   are   already   been   sufficiently proved.  However, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held that Section 142 does not give power to the prosecutor to put leading questions on the material parts of the evidence. The Prosecutor shall not be allowed to frame questions in such a manner  which   the   witness answer by stating merely yes or no but he is directed to give evidence which he witnessed.

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 112 Coming to the present case, as already said, it is repeated here that the Ld. PP for CBI during the cross­examination of PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar after getting permission from the court, had almost put the entire statement of PW­8 to the witness who termed it to be either correct or incorrect as was done in the cited case in Surender @ Sonu Punjabi & Ors. Case (supra).   It was held by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi as under:

"84. In the present case, what the learned APP did in the  garb  of  cross­examination  (presumably   under   Section 154 EA) is what he could not have done even if he had been permitted to put leading questions in examination­in­chief under   Section   142   EA   which   permission   had   been specifically denied by the trial Court.  The APP put to PW­ 27 a series of close ended questions of 'yes­no' type, which as explained   in   Varkey   Joseph   (supra)   was   not   permissible. Even in terms of Section 154 EA, the cross­examination is restricted to questions that might be put to the witness by the adverse party. The trial Court did not notice the above legal   position.     It   could   not   have   permitted   cross­ examination of PW­27 by the APP in a manner contrary to the law  as explained by  the Supreme Court  in the  above decisions."

Accordingly,   in   view   of   the   aforementioned   guidelines, whatever the prosecution has tried to establish by cross­examination by putting forth the statement of the said witness PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar u/s 161 CrPC to him is not acceptable in law as the correct version of the incident.  

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 113 Ld.   Sr.   PP   for   CBI   stated   that   cross­examination   of   PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar by the ld. Counsel for the defence, as incorporated in the above paras, the PW­8 Dharamraj Sonar has simply mentioned that   Kashinath   and   other   accused   of   this   case   had   a   talk   in   his presence at a hotel at Allahabad.  He described the name of the other accused as Chedi Lal, Jhanna Lal and others, but he could not recall the names of other accused. In this regard, this court is of the view that since the PW­8 Dharamraj could not elaborate the contents of the   talk   between   all   the   accused   with   Kashinath,   this   evidence becomes   a   very   weak   evidence   given   the   circumstance   when   the date, time, month or the year could not be furnished by PW­8.  It has simply been mentioned by PW­8 that too voluntarily that below the hotel accused Kashinath stated that if there is any idol, he should contact him.  From this para, as mentioned above, no incriminating evidence of any kind for the purpose of Section 120­B could be found by   this   court   given   the   circumstances   when   the   approver   has   not been   examined   by   the   prosecution   as   a   witness   during   trial. Further, in his cross­examination by Sh. Gurdayal Singh, Ld. Counsel for accused Shreekant, the PW­8 specifically mentioned that he knew accused  Chedi  Lal,   Asgar,  Bengali and Kashinath and nobody  else which  also   creates  a  doubt  regarding his  identification  of  accused Shreekant   Jain     in     the     court.       Ld.   Sr.   PP   also   referred   to  the conditions under which the witnesses were produced by the CBI in this court.   The   PW­8   Dharamraj   Sonar   was   examined   after   a period  of  30 years and  the  same  was  the  case  with  PW­5  Suhas Vats.   He has also drawn  the  attention  of  this  court  towards  the statement   of PW­2     u/s   161     CrPC     Ex.PW2/DA­1     in     which Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 114 there   is   a   reference   of   issuance   of   tickets   under   the   number 0984400793544 being issued to the accused Shreekant Jain.  Ld. Sr. PP further submits that in view of the provisions of Section 103 & 106   Indian   Evidence   Act   it   was   the   obligation   on   the   part   of   the defence to have brought the records of the ticket under which he had gone to USA or the P­form etc. as the burden of proving this fact was especially within the knowledge of the accused.  

Per contra, Ld. Counsel for the defence argued on this point that   there   is   long   standing   established   rule   of   law   in   the   Indian Criminal Jurisprudence that the accused is presumed to be innocent from the very beginning.  It was highlighted that the accused was not expecting his prosecution in this case as he was innocent and hence he could not maintain the tickets etc.  Regarding the burden of proof u/s 103 & 106 Indian Evidence Act, 1872 raised by the Ld. Sr. PP for CBI, it was elaborated by the ld.counsel for the defence that it was not the accused who was to establish his innocence but it was the prosecution who was required to bring home the guilt of the accused by leading evidence which should be beyond the scope of doubt.  It was   also   urged   that   though   this   fact   regarding   the   visit   of   the accused Shreekant at USA was within his knowledge, but as already said, being innocent he was not having any idea of prosecution, he could not thus for cogent reasons bring the record etc.   even when the prosecution could not prove its case beyond doubt.  

After hearing all the parties on the issues herein above argued by the rival parties, this court find force in the arguments advanced by the ld. Defence counsel for the accused.  This is because under   our   criminal   justice   administration   system,   the   accused   is Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 115 presumed   to   be   innocent   from   the   very   beginning   and   the prosecution is under bounden duty to prove its case beyond doubt. The plea of the accused Shreekant Jain that he could not maintain the   record   with   respect   to   his   tickets   etc.   cannot   be   ruled   out straightway and cannot be ignored on the basis of his submissions that he was not having an idea w.r.t. his prosecution.

Ld.   Counsel   for   the   accused   Shreekant   argued   that   the accused had travelled by flight no. AI115 but on some other ticket and that complete set of passenger manifest has not been produced. The attention of this court has been drawn on the embarkation cards filed by the prosecution back side of which is Ex.PW15/B.  As per ld. Counsel, the back side is important as it bears the signatures of the accused   which   were   also   sent   by   the   prosecution   to   CFSL   for comparing the signatures of the accused Shreekant Jain on the back side of the card with that the sample handwritings and signatures.  It was   asserted   that   even   the   accused   Shreekant   Jain   himself   have admitted the said signatures and is not going to challenge the report of the CFSL.  Ld. Counsel further stressed that the security people are under obligation to keep a tag of the passenger who once enters the embarkation counter and is not allowed to disappear or go out of the embarkation   premises   and   if   someone   does,   criminal   proceedings initiated against him.  There is no record/complaint with the airport authorities   as   to   whether   some   persons   had   disappeared   after entering the embarkation premises.  

It was further explained by ld. Counsel that none of the prosecution witnesses including PW­3 Satish Kumar or PW­4 Vijay Sethi had ever seen or met the accused, but the PW­5 Ms. Suhash Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 116 Vats was the only witness who could possibly remember the accused Shreekant Jain, but no TIP was got done.

Ld.   Sr.   PP   opposed   the   arguments   by   saying   that   non lodging   of   complaint/report   before   the   authorities   in   case   some passenger skips the embarkation premises does not ipso facto leads to conclusion that the accused Shreekant Jain had boarded Flight No. AI115 on some other ticket.   It was explained by Sr. PP that when the PW­3 Satish etc. had gone to trace the passenger, he could not be found in the plane.  

This   court   is   of   view   that   the   claim   of   the   accused Shreekant Jain is that he had travelled by flight no. AI115 cannot be ruled out as the complete manifest of the passenger has not been brought by the prosecution.  The signatures of the accused Shreekant Jain   are   already   proved   to   be   tallied   with   his   signatures   on   the embarkation   card.     This   itself   goes   to   suggest   that   the   accused Shreekant Jain was present at the embarkation premises for boarding flight no AI115.   It is not clear from the testimony of PW­3 Satish Kumar   as   to   whether   he   had   simply   searched   for   the   accused Shreekant   Jain   by   his   face   or   photograph  or   by   entering   into   the plane and then calling or searching him by name.  It has simply been mentioned in the testimony of PW­3 Satish Kumar that Shreekant Jain was searched everywhere right upto the plane but PW­3 Satish Kumar could not search the accused Shreekant Jain.  There is a hole in the prosecution story and the mystery still surrounds the same on the   issue   as  to  when   the  accused Shreekant  Jain  had entered  the embarkation premises, whether he had left in the flight no. AI115 or had left the embarkation premises without boarding the plane.   No Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 117 complaint etc. has been filed by the prosecution with the appropriate authorities regarding missing of one passenger.  The prosecution has not even brought the record of the plane or record of the list of the passengers arrived at the destination which could be of much help for prosecution. Therefore, the prosecution could not prove the facts that   infact   the   accused   Shreekant   Jain   had   left   the   embarkation premises without boarding the plane and accordingly the possibility cannot be ruled out that accused Shreekant Jain might have travelled flight no. AI115 but on some other ticket. 

The   recovery   of   the   stolen   property   from   accused Shreekant   Jain   could   not   be   established.     Even   the   constructive possession of the incriminating articles could not be proved.   This fact   could   not   be   proved   that   the   incriminating   articles   were antiquities within the meaning of  Section 24 of the Antiquity & Art Treasure Act 1972. The case is based on circumstantial evidence but link chains are missing.  The very statement of approver on the basis of   which   the   case   could   be   proved   by   prosecution   could   not   get sustainability of law and conspiracy could not be established.

This was the evidence which has been discussed in the pre­paras  which  was  led by the prosecution  and the defence  with respect   to   the   charges   framed   against   the   accused   persons.     This court in order to find out the truth gains guidance from the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Ved Prakash Kharbanda vs Vimal Bindal, RFA No. 83/2007 Date of Decision 08.03.2013 wherein it was held that the truth should be guiding star in the entire judicial process with emphasis on Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act.  The Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 118 following guidelines were laid down by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi.

"(1) The   law's   approach   to   truth   is   to   be   distinguished form the approach of religion,  spirituality and subjective ideas of truth.

(2) For   the   judicial   system,   truth   is   nothing   more   than   fact   established   in   accordance   with procedures prescribed by law.

(3) The purpose of judicial inquiry is to establish the existence of facts through reasoning and  rationality and in accordance with law, not  to establish the truth in the absolute, divine  or subjective sense.

(4) Facts are proved through lawfully prescribed methods and standards.

(5) The belief of Courts that facts exist must be  based   on   reason,   rationality   and   justification, strictly on the basis of relevant  and admissible evidence, judicial notice or   legally permitted presumptions.  It must be  based on a prescribed methodology of proof.

It must be objective and verifiable."

It was further laid down in the cited judgment that in ancient times evidence could be extracted in virtually any manner based  on  religion,   torture, ritual, ordeal or confession.   Whatever was believed to be true by the Judge or Panchs was the truth.  The truth was traditionally subjected truth which varied from Judge to Judge   and   was   fraught   with   uncertainty   and   unpredictability. However,  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  Indian  Penal  Code and Evidence Act   were   enacted   in   order   to   secure   uniformity and diversity   where   you   can     have     it.     Under     this     new Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 119 concept, truth was to be discovered by individual Judges not from holy books or inner voice, but from things observable and observed by   senses   whose   existence   would   be   proved   in   an   objective   and verifiable manner.   Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in aforementioned case   further   held   that   under   this   approach,   "fact"­proved   or established   in   accordance   with   law   becomes   truth.     Through   this new approach, "truth" acquired an objective and empirical character that it did not have before.  The new approach is set out in Evidence Act wherein it states that the fact is said to be proved when after considering the matter before it the court either believes it to exist, or   considers   its   existence   so   probable   that   a   prudent   man   ought under   the   circumstances   of   the   particular   case,   to   act   upon   the supposition that it exists.  Therefore, there was a paradigm shifts to the concept of "belief" as the basis of truth applied by Indian Courts from faith based belief as in the earlier traditional judicial system to evidence based belief (scientific system) which is prevalent in the current era.   To satisfy the standard of belief required by Evidence Act, as guided by Hon'ble High Court a court should come to the evidence based belief through reasoning and rationality.  The Indian Evidence Act does not define the truth.   It defines what facts are relevant and admissible and how to prove them.   Indian Evidence Act lays down important principles to aid the court in its quest for duly proved relevant facts.  

Therefore,   it   is   clear   from   the   aforesaid   judgment   of Hon'ble High Court that courts can base its opinion only on the basis of   evidence   produced   before   it   and   the   matters   before   it.     The Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 120 evidence produced must be a evidence recorded and produced within the periphery of law. The evidence produced by the CBI has already been discussed.   As has already been opined that there are missing links and the evidence of the IO was the only hope which could have given some relief to CBI to fulfill the gaps in prosecution story to justify its claim.  Therefore now this court shall discuss the impact of non examination of IO.

Regarding the non examination of IO, though it is settled law that non examination of the IO is not fatal to the case of the prosecution   in   case   the   prosecution   has   produced   all   relevant evidence on all material particulars for establishing the guilt of the accused.  But here in this case, the non examination of IO has proved to   be   fatal   for   prosecution   as   the   case   is   based   on   circumstantial evidence. It was informed that the IO of this case had expired but no attempt has been made by CBI to produce some officer well versed with   the   investigation   or   who   could   have   taken   part   in   the investigation to substitute the role of the IO. The recovery has not been   affected   directly   from   the   accused   Shreekant   Jain.The examination of some other officer or senior officer in place of IO was necessary in order to clarify about the missing links and also about non production of seizure memos and also for an explanation for non production of the original documents. The defence has lost a chance to   cross   examine   the   IO   to   bring   the   lacunas   of   prosecution   in limelight. The prosecution case cannot be treated as gospel truth and it is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.  After all this Court in order to find out the truth is required to go by evidence and cannot base its opinion on conjectures and surmises, as highlighted Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 121 in aforementioned judgment in Ved Prakash Kharbanda case (supra).

The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in its judgment titled as  Lahu   Kamlakar   Patil   and   Anr.   Vs   State   of   Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 114 of 2008 held that:­ "19.   Keeping  n   view   the   aforesaid   position   of   law,   the testimony   of   PW1   has   to   be   appreciated.     He   has admitted   his   signature   in   the   FIR   but   has   given   the excuse that it was taken on a  blank paper.   The  same could have been clarified by the Investigating Officer, but for some reason, the Investigating Officer has not been examined by the prosecution.  It is an accepted principle that non­examination of the Investigating Officer is not fatal to the prosecution case.  In Behari Prasad v. State of Bihar [14], this Court has stated that non­examination of the Investigating Officer is not fatal to the prosecution case, especially, when no prejudice is likely to be suffered by the accused. In Bahadur Naik v. State of Bihar [15], it has   been   opined   that   when   no   material   contradictions have   been   brought   out,   then   non­examination   of   the Investigating Officer as a witness for the prosecution is of no   consequence   and   under   such   circumstances,   no prejudice is caused to the accused.   It is worthy to note that neither the trial judge nor the High Court has delved into   the   issue   of   non­examination   of   the   Investigating Officer.   On a perusal of the entire material brought on record,   we   find   that   no   explanation   has   been   offered. The present case is one where we are inclined to think so especially   when   the   informant   has   stated   that   the signature was taken while he was in a drunken state, the panch   witness   had   turned   hostile   and   some   of   the Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 122 evidence adduced in the court did not find place in the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code.  Thus, this   Court   in   Arvind   Singh   v.   State   of   Bihar   [16], Rattanlal   v.   State   of   Jammu   and   Kashmir   [17]   and Ravishwar   Manjhi   and   others   v.   State   of   Jharkhand [18],   has   explained   certain   circumstances   where   the examination of Investigating Officer becomes vital.   We are disposed to think that the present case is one where the Investigating Officer should have been examined and his non­examination creates a lacuna in the case of the prosecution." 

Accordingly,   for   non­examination   of   IO   or   some substitute officer in his place the rights of accused have been affected adversely.

In view of the aforesaid circumstances, it is clear that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case beyond the shadow of   doubt   despite   all   hard   efforts   being   made   by   the   Ld.   Public Prosecutor. 

This case is the best example where shabby investigation has been done.  There appears to be no supervisory role of any senior officer.  Though, IO remains in the center of the sphere in the entire investigation,   but   it   appears   that   senior   officers   have   failed   to supervise the investigation.  Even despite the fact the CBI was aware that the IO has expired, no attempts were made to put some officer in his place in the list of witnesses during trial.  Though CBI claims itself to be the prime investigating agency in India dealing in high profile cases and it has been observed that whenever some hue and cry is raised regarding investigation by some local police, the people Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc. 123 of  India  always  raise   a demand that investigation be  shifted from hands   of   local   police   to   CBI.     Like   a   fair   and   impartial   trial   the accused has a right of fair and impartial investigation. But to say the least,   if  investigations  are  conducted  in  such  a  manner  by   CBI  as highlighted in this judgment, time is not far away when people will lose faith in the system and government will be forced to constitute another agency. All senior officers of CBI kept sitting with their eyes closed during investigation in  this case  which is very unfortunate. Need  is felt  that CBI should sensitize its officers for making them more   responsive   and   effective   towards   investigation   and   they   are required to awake from long slumber.

Accordingly, I hereby acquit accused Shreekant Jain and accused   Kashi   Nath   for   the   charges  u/s  120­B/380  IPC   read  with Section 3 of Art & Antiquities Treasures Act, 1972.   Further, I also acquit accused Shreekant Jain for the charges u/s 411/414 IPC; u/s 3 read with Section 25(1)& (2) of Art & Antiquities Treasures Act, 1972   and  u/s  14(3)  read with  Section  25(2)  of  Art   &  Antiquities Treasures   Act,   1972.     Their   regular   bail   bonds   stands   cancelled, sureties discharged.

Both the accused have already furnished the bonds u/s 437A CrPC.

File be consigned to record room.

Announced in the open court on this 16th day of November, 2017.

(SANJAY KUMAR AGGARWAL)            Special Judge­03, CBI (PC Act),  Tis Hazari Courts: Delhi.

Judgment CBI Vs Shreekant Jain etc.