Allahabad High Court
Ram Lalit vs State Of Up And 2 Others on 5 September, 2024
Author: Dinesh Pathak
Bench: Dinesh Pathak
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:144615 Court No. - 49 Case :- WRIT - B No. - 3476 of 2024 Petitioner :- Ram Lalit Respondent :- State Of Up And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Dharmendra Kumar Mishra,Vishal Singh Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Dinesh Pathak,J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel.
2. Instant writ petition has been filed on 31.08.2024 assailing the order dated 20.04.1996 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (in brevity 'D.D.C.') in Revision No.438 under Section 48 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (in brevity 'U.P.C.H. Act'). As per endorsement of reporting section there is delay of 10270 days in filing the instant writ petition. The petitioner, in paragraph 13 of instant writ petition, has tried to explain the delay on very vague ground. For ready reference, paragraph no.13 is quoted herein below :-
"13. That the petitioner is poor person and received the order dated 20.4.1996 on 8.3.2012 and thereafter concern the some local counsel for filed the Civil Misc. Writ Petition before this Hon'ble Court and paper, and expenses has been paid to the local counsel namely Sri R.S Dubey, Advocate District Court Basti total mistake of the R.S Dubey did not filed the writ petition before this Hon'ble Court, the petitioner illiterate person and did not knowledge of the limitation and total liability of the local counsel misuse the means and did not filed the Civil Misc. Writ Petition before this Hon'ble Court, when the petitioner is inspection before this Hon'ble Court and found that no writ petition pending before this Hon'ble Court, hence the pray before the local counsel to return the paper, the local counsel Mr. R.S Dubey return the paper in the month of July 2024, thereafter arrange the money and make to his Counsel Mr. Vishal Singh, Advocate High Court, Allahabad so immediate file a writ petition before this Hon'ble Court without any delay, if any delay in filing the present Civil Misc. Writ Petition be condone."
3. Record on Board evince that the petitioner has filed objection under Section 9-A(2) of the U.P.C.H. Act which has been rejected by the Consolidation Officer vide order dated 08.08.1972. At a very belated stage in the year 1996, the petitioner has preferred revision before the D.D.C. After due consideration on merits as well as delay, the D.D.C. has dismissed the revision vide order dated 20.04.1996. While dismissing the revision, the D.D.C. has returned categorical finding that no sufficient cause has been assigned by the revisionist at the time of filing the revision at belated stage and no affidavit has been filed for condoning the delay.
4. Prima facie, it appears that the petitioner was throughout reluctant in pursuing the lis. There is a gross negligence and deliberate inaction at his part. Despite full knowledge, as mentioned in paragraph no.13 of the writ petition, the petitioner has deliberately approached this Court at a highly belated stage. There is no sufficient ground to exercise the discretionary power in favour of the petitioner to condone the delay. In the case of Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao vs. Reddy Srivedi & Others reported in AIR 2022 SC 332, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expounded that deliberate delay at the part of the applicant is not liable to be condoned. Relevant paragraphs no.7 to 7.5 are quoted herein below :-
"7. At this stage, a few decisions of this Court on delay in filing the appeal are referred to and considered as under:-
7.1 In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal (supra), it is observed and held as under:-
In construing s. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light- heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, "s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant."
7.2 In the case of P.K. Ramachandran (supra), while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously.
7.3 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed as under :-
The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as "statutes of peace". An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy."
7.4 In the case of Basawaraj (supra), it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression "sufficient cause" cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence. inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature.
7.5 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed by this Court that the court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Courts help those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights."
5. In recent judgment of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), SLP (Civil) No. 31248 of 2018, decided on 08.04.2024, reported in [2024] 4 S.C.R. 241, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expounded that discretionary jurisdiction to condone the delay should not be exercised in cavalier manner and laid down certain guidelines for condoning the delay. Relevant paragraphs no.16 to 26 are quoted herein below :-
"16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase 'sufficient cause used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. v. Katiji and Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107 - AIR 1987 SC 1353, this Court in advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for sufficient cause' held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day's delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of sufficient cause' for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases liberal approach', justice-oriented approach and cause for the advancement of substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing sufficient cause' in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd A.I.R. 1962 SC 361 has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a sufficient cause' for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party.
19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors. A.I.R. 1935 PC 8S, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.
20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. 2014 (4) SCALE 50 wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as 'liberal approach', 'justice-oriented approach' and 'substantial justice cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.
22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors. AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression 'sufficient cause' as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.
24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it stands. Paragraph 12 reads as under:
"12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide paragraph 15 went on to observe as under:
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature." (emphasis supplied)
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally.
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."
6. In this conspectus, having applied the ratio decided by Hon'ble Apex Court as discussed above, in the given circumstance of the present case, I am of the considered view that no case is made out to exercise discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner to condone the inordinate delay begot in filing the revision. Despite full knowledge and made contest before the consolidation courts, present petitioner has deliberately acted negligent and inactive. Present petitioner has not come with clean hands before this Court. No justifiable ground is made out to entertain the instant writ petition and interfere in the order passed by the authority concerned which is under challenge in the instant writ petition. There is no illegality, perversity or infirmity in the order under challenge so as to warrant the indulgence of this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There is nothing on record to demonstrate as to how the petitioner is prejudiced, or if there is any likelihood of causing miscarriage of justice to him, owning to orders impugned.
6. Resultantly, instant writ petition, being misconceived and devoid on merits, is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Order Date :- 5.9.2024 VR