Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
P. Prakash Archbald vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Others on 24 December, 1999
Equivalent citations: 2000(2)ALD44
Author: Goda Raghuram
Bench: Goda Raghuram
ORDER
1. The petitioner, a member of Rampa Yerrampalem Primary Agricultural Co-operative Society, Gokavaram Mandal, East Godavari District, (for short 'the Society') assails the proceedings of the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies (Respondent No. 1) dated 9-1] - ]999.
2. Respondent No.2 by proceedings dated 5-11-1999 in purported exercise of power under Section 34(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 (for short 'the Act') superseded the Management of the Society and appointed a Special Officer to the Society for a period of six months from the date of assumption of charge of the Special Officer. The President and Members of the Managing Committee represented to the respondent No.2 on 8-11-1999 against the orders dated 5-11-1999. As is facially apparent from the order impugned, on a consideration of the said representation, the 2nd respondent passed the orders impugned keeping the orders of supercession dated 5-11-1999 in abeyance "for the time being". The reasons recorded for the said order are that in order to take fresh stock of the situation an opportunity is being provided to the Managing Committee and thus the order is kept in abeyance. These proceedings are assailed by the writ petitioner on the ground that power available under Section 34 of (he Act being a quasi-judicial power and in the context of the fact that the statutory provision does not grant any power of revision of the orders passed in exercise thereof, the impugned are dated 9-11-1999 is inherently and patently ultra vires Section 34 of the Act, without jurisdiction and non est.
3. This Court by order dated 18-11-1999 in WPMP No.30098 of 1999 suspended the impugned order dated 9-11-1999. The Managing Committee of the Society by an application WVMP No.3269 of 1999 sought vacation of the interim order of this Court.
4. The writ petition itself is taken up for hearing with the consent of the learned Counsel for the respective parties -Sri A. Satya Prasad, learned Counsel for wit petitioner, Government Pleader for Cooperation for official respondents and Sri C. V. Mohan Reddy, learned Counsel for the party-respondents.
5. Sri Satya Frasad contends on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order is without jurisdiction and void. The power conferred by Section 34 of the Act incorporate criteria that render the power therein, a quasi judicial power. The consequences of the exercise of the power visit a democratically elected Managing Committee with civil consequences apart from loss of reputation if founded on allegations of misconduct. The power has to be exercised on a rational satisfaction of the existence of the conditions necessary for its exercise. The statute obligates an opportunity of representation to the Committee, which is sought to be superseded. Thus in the totality of the circumstances the power is quasi-judicial in nature.
6. It is settled principle of law that the power of review particularly in the area of exercise of quasi-judicial power, has to be conferred expressly or by necessary implication arising from the language of the relevant unit of statutory enactment. A perusal of the provision of the Act in general and Section 34 in particular, makes it abundantly clear that no power inheres or is granted enabling review of the power exercised. The principle that the power of review has to be conferred specifically or by necessary implication is too well settled -Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arjun Singhji, ; Dr. Smt Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (UP), ; Smt. Rama Debi v. Union of India, .
7. In these circumstances, I am clearly of the view that the order of the 2nd respondent dated 9-11-1999 which, at any rate, is in the nature of a step towards exercise of the power of review/ reconsideration of the earlier order dated 5-11-1999, is incompetent, patently and manifestly without jurisdiction and ultra vires the provisions of the Act. The impugned order is accordingly set aside.
8. Sri Mohan Reddy, learned Counsel for the party-respondents, however, would contend that since the initial order of supercession dated 5-11-1999 in purported exercise of powers available under Section 34 of the Act is itself void for being in violation of the audi alteram partem principle, this Court would not in exercise of discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India invalidate the orders impugned herein, which would have the effect of activating another illegal order viz, order dated 5-11-1999. This principle is also too well settled - Gadda Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, ; reiterated in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and others, Re: Inder Mohan Bensiwal Re: Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, .
9. However, the party-respondents herein have instituted an independent WPNo.26157 of 1999 assailing the order of supercession dated 5-11-1999 of the 2nd respondent. Since the validity of the supercession order dated 5-11-1999 is directly and substantively in issue in the said writ petition, this Court is of the considered view that the validity of the said proceedings need not be collaterally considered in this writ petition.
10. In the above conspectus of facts and the operative law this writ petition is allowed quashing the impugned order of the 2nd respondent in Proceedings No.6076/ 98-E1, dated 9-11-1999. No order as to costs.