Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
B.C.Rajesh, vs Andhra Pradesh Southern Power ... on 18 September, 2025
APHC010501982025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3328]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY,THE EIGHTEENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA
PRASAD
WRIT PETITION NO: 25708 OF 2025
Between:
1.B.C.RAJESH,, S/O. LATE B. CHINNAPPA, AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
R/O. D.N0.6-33-C, BALAJI NAGAR, CTM ROAD, MADANAPALLE,
ANNAMAYYA DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
AND
1.ANDHRA PRADESH SOUTHERN POWER DISTRIBUTION
CORPORATION LTD, REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR,
CORPORATE OFFICE, KESAVAYANAGUTTA, TIRUPATI.
2.THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, OPERATIONS, APSPDCL,
KESAVAYANAGUTTA, TIRUPATI.
3.THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, OPERATIONS, APSPDCL,
GREENSPET, CHITTOOR.
4.THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, OPERATIONS, APSPDCL,
NEAR Y JUNCTION, PILERU ROAD, RAYACHOTI, ANNAMAYYA
DISTRICT.
5.THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER, OPERATIONS, APSPDCL,
KADAPA.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be
2
pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction
declaring the action of the respondents in issuing tender notifications in 1)
SE/O/TPT/APSPDCL Tech / TS-26/2025-26, 2) SE/O/CTR/APSPDCL,
Tech/TS-28/2025-26, and 4) SE/OPN/APSPDCL/ANM/3) TS.No.36/2025-26
SE/OPN/APSPDCL/KDP/TS.No.30/2025-26 for awarding the work of carrying
out operation and maintenance of 33/11 KV Sub-Stations without there being
clarity about the selection of successful bidders is illegal, arbitrary, violation of
principles of the natural justice and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India and consequently set-aside the tender notifications issued by the
respondent authorities and pass
IA NO: 1 OF 2025
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
pleased to stay of all further proceedings pursuant to tender notifications in 1)
SE/O/TPT/APSPDCL Tech / TS-26/2025-26, 2)SE/O/CTR/APSPDCL,
Tech/TS-28/2025-26, 3) SE/OPN/APSPDCL/ANM/TS.No.36/2025-26 and 4)
SE/OPN/APSPDCL/KDP/TS.No.30/2025-26 issued by the respondent
authorities, pending disposal of the Writ Petition and pass
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1.O M R LAW FIRM
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1.VENKATA RAMA RAO KOTA SC FOR APSPDCL
2.
3
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA
PRASAD
WRIT PETITION NO: 25708 of 2025
ORDER:-
Heard Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, briefed by M/s O.M.R. Law Firm, learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioner.
2. The prayer sought in the present Writ Petition as under:
"For the aforementioned reasons, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction declaring the action of the respondents in issuing tender notifications in 1) SE/O/TPT/APSPDCL Tech / TS-26/2025-26, 2) SE/O/CTR/APSPDCL, Tech/TS- 28/2025-26, 3) /OPN/APSPDCL/ANM/TS.No.36/2025- 26 and 4) SE/OPN/APSPDCL/KDP/TS.No.30/2025-26 for awarding the work of carrying out operation and maintenance of 33/11 KV Sub-Stations without there being clarity about the selection of successful bidders is illegal, arbitrary, violation of principles of the natural justice and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and consequently set-aside the tender notifications issued by the respondent authorities and pass such order or orders as the Hon'ble court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."
3. The facts in this case as projected by Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, are that the Writ Petitioner has a valid A-Grade Electrical Licence issued by the Chief Electrical Inspector, Government of Andhra Pradesh, for carrying out Operation and Maintenance of 33 kv and above including Watch and Ward, Housekeeping, Gardening, etc.; that the Writ Petitioner is the existing Contractor for maintaining sub-stations in Andhra Pradesh Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited (AP TRANSCO); and that he belongs to the OBC community, for which reservation is provided.
44. He further submits that the Superintending Engineer, Operation, APSPDCL, issued a Tender Notification dated 04.09.2025 for carrying out Operation and Maintenance of 5 Nos. 33/11 KV Sub stations at 5 places round the clock on works-contract basis as per the scope of work in Rural Chandragiri Section, in the Rural Division, Tirupati (O) Circle, Tirupati, for a period of 2 years; that the estimated Contract Value is fixed at Rs.1,66,95,889/-; that various Tender conditions are set out in the Tender document; and that Clauses 22.6 and 22.7 (Page No.14 of the Bid document), reads as follows:
22.6 The bidder has to quote +3% to +4% of administration charges, the bid quoted less that +3% and more than +4% will not be accepted and it will be liable to be rejected 22.7 Incase more than one bidder is quoted the same price i.e., L1, the undersigned reserves the right to decide the successful Bidder.
5. It is contended by the Writ Petitioner that Clauses 22.6 and 22.7 are unclear, inasmuch as there is no indication of the procedure that the Respondents would adopt if two or more bidders quote the same price. It is contended that the tenderers are required to quote their administrative charges only between +3% and +4%, which means that the bidders are given leverage to quote only within a narrow range of 1%, inasmuch as the difference between +3% and +4% is only 1%.
6. It is contended by Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel that while the variations among the bids can only be in the range of 1%, a situation can arise where two or more bidders quote the same price and the decision is left to the discretion of the Authorities; and that such discretion without prescribing parameters, is arbitrary and bad in law.
5Analysis:
7. Admittedly, the bidder is an existing Contractor. The bid was issued on 04.09.2025 and the last date for receipt of bids is up to 16:00 hours on 20.09.2025. The date and time for opening the Tender is from 17:00 hours on 20.09.2025 itself.
8. While the Tender was issued way back on 04.09.2025 and the last date for submission of bids is 20.09.2025, the present Writ Petition was filed only on 18.09.2025, challenging the Tender conditions in Clauses 22.6 and 22.7, which is just two days before the closure of bids.
9. In the present Writ Petition, the Writ Petitioner is also seeking an Order of Stay of the Tender process as an interim relief.
10. While the approach of the Writ Petitioner in approaching the Court only on 18.09.2025, whereas the Tender document was issued way back on 04.09.2025, is one aspect of the issue involved in seeking interim relief to stay the Tender process. This conduct of the Writ Petitioner must also be taken into account by the Writ Court to determine whether the Writ Petitioner was diligent in approaching the Court or whether it had approached this Court with an intent to delay the tender process with any oblique motive to continue as existing contractor?
11. The contention of the Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel is that the variation provided between +3% and +4% is a difference of 1%, which is very narrow. In the event that the Respondents have reserved their right to select one among the equally placed bidders at their discretion without laying down any criteria or parameters, the decision 'may be' arbitrary and therefore would be bad in law.
12. Taking the contention of Writ Petitioner into account, this Court is of the considered opinion that the criteria or conditions laid down in Clauses 22.6 and 22.7 are neither arbitrary nor vague in nature. This raises the question 6 whether the Respondent Authorities are expected to lay down the conditions in such a precise manner with absolute exactitude that there cannot be any leverage or discretion in selecting one among several equal bidders at their own discretion. The other issue that arises is whether a party can approach the Court with a presumption that the Respondents are going to be arbitrary and whether such imagination or presumption can be preempted by approaching the Court of law.
13. The above discussion would raise the following issues for consideration before this Court.
Issues: -
1. Whether the Respondent Authorities are legally obligated to lay down the Eligibility conditions/ Criteria with absolute exactitude in such precise manner that such Eligibility Conditions/ Criteria would cover each and every issue that may arise in the course of evaluation of Bids?
2. Whether there is any Cause of Action in the present Writ Petition?
3. Whether the present Writ Petition is an Abuse of Process?
14. Issue No.1: -
Whether the Respondent Authorities are legally obligated to lay down the Eligibility conditions/ Criteria with absolute exactitude in such precise manner that such Eligibility Conditions/ Criteria would cover each and every issue that may arise in the course of evaluation of Bids?7
The facts in this case would indicate in no uncertain terms that the Writ Petitioner has not been aggrieved of any action or inaction or any arbitrariness in the decision making process. The facts in this case would also indicate that the Writ Petitioner has imagined without any foundation that there is a likelihood of having a 'tie' between the writ petitioner and any other bidder or bidders and in such an event, the 'discretion' which is reserved by the Authorities in Clause No.22.7 in choosing one among such bidders without laying down any further criteria would be in violation of the principles of Natural Justice and also in violation of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
15. It is settled law that the employer is endowed with expansive flexibility and discretion in as much as 'play in the joints' is very much available to an employer (Sterling Computers Limited Vs. M/s M & N Publications Limited and Others : (1993) 1 SCC 445 - Para No.12); and Directorate of Education and Others Vs. Educomp Datamatics Ltd., and Others : (2004) 4 SCC 19 - Para No.12).
16. This apart, the scope of interference of a Writ Court has also been well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of decisions. In Manish S. Pardasani (M/S Wine Kornder) And Others vs Inspector State Excise, P-1 Division, Mumbai (Suburbs) And Others : (2019) 2 SCC 660, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Para Nos.66 and 67, held as under :
"66.It is the sole discretion of the appellate authority under the Act to decide the appeal based on the facts involved in the appeal, and legal provisions which eventually result in passing a judicial order. No higher court can pass such directions merely on anticipation of an order being passed by an appellate authority. It is only after the order is passed, that the aggrieved person has a legal right to take recourse to a legal remedy available in law against such order by approaching to a higher forum and pray for grant of appropriate relief against such order.
67. This stage' in this case is yet to arrive. The High Court should not have, therefore, pre-empted the passing of any order of the appellate authority, while deciding the writ 8 petition. It is a settled law that the Court can stay or quash only those orders, which are impugned in the lis before it. A fortiori, the Court cannot stay or/and quash the orders in anticipation, before they are passed. We cannot, therefore, uphold such writ/directions issued by the High Court."
17. In State of Madhya Pradesh and Another Vs. Uttar Pradesh State Bridge Corporation Limited and Another : (2022) 16 SCC 633, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Para Nos.21 to 26, held as under:
"21. We have heard all the learned counsel for the parties. The parameters of judicial review in matters such as the present have been well stated in many decisions of this Court, beginning with the celebrated Tata Cellular v. Union of India [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651] , in which a three-Judge Bench of this Court laid down the following principles : (SCC pp. 687-88, para 94) "94. The principles deducible from the above are:
(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action.
(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made.
(3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts.
(5) The Government must have freedom of contract.
In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.
9(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure."
(emphasis supplied)
22. Likewise, in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa [Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517], this Court held :
(SCC pp. 531-32, para 22) "22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether 14 choice or decision is made "lawfully" and not to check whether choice or decision is "sound". When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction.
Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions:
(i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone;
OR Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say:'the decision is such that no responsible 10 authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached';
(ii) Whether public interest is affected.
If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action."
(emphasis supplied)
23. In Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium) [Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium), (2016) 8 SCC 622 : (2016) 4 SCC (Civ) 106] , this Court held as follows : (SCC p. 638, paras 47-48) "47. The result of this discussion is that the issue of the acceptance or rejection of a bid or a bidder should be looked at not only from the point of view of the unsuccessful party but also from the point of view of the employer. As held in Ramana Dayaram Shetty [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] the terms of NIT cannot be ignored as being redundant or superfluous. They must be given a meaning and necessary significance. As pointed out in Tata Cellular [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651] there must be judicial restraint in interfering with administrative action. Ordinarily, the soundness of the decision taken by the employer ought not to be questioned but the decision-making process can certainly be subject to judicial review. The soundness of the decision may be questioned if it is irrational or mala fide or intended to favour someone or a decision 'that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached' as held in Jagdish Mandal [Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517] followed in Michigan Rubbe [Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 216].
(emphasis supplied)
48. Therefore, whether a term of NIT is essential or not is a decision taken by the employer which should be respected. Even if the term is essential, the employer has the inherent authority to deviate from it provided the deviation is made applicable to all bidders and potential 11 bidders as held in Ramana Dayaram Shetty [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] . However, if the term is held by the employer to be ancillary or subsidiary, even that decision should be respected. The lawfulness of that decision can be questioned on very limited grounds, as mentioned in the various decisions discussed above, but the soundness of the decision cannot be questioned, otherwise this Court would be taking over the function of the tender issuing authority, which it cannot."
24.Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd. [Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818] puts the proposition extremely well when it states : (SCC p. 825, paras 14-15) "14. We must reiterate the words of caution that this Court has stated right from the time when Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489] was decided almost 40 years ago, namely, that the words used in the tender documents cannot be ignored or treated as redundant or superfluous -- they must be given meaning and their necessary significance. In this context, the use of the word "metro" in Clause 4.2(a) of Section III of the bid documents and its connotation in ordinary parlance cannot be overlooked.
15. We may add that the owner or the employer of a project, having authored the tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret its documents. The constitutional courts must defer to this understanding and appreciation of the tender documents, unless there is mala fide or perversity in the understanding or appreciation or in the application of the terms of the tender conditions. It is possible that the owner or employer of a project may give an interpretation to the tender documents that is not acceptable to the constitutional courts but that by itself is not a reason for interfering with the interpretation given."
(emphasis supplied)
25. This view of the law has been subsequently reiterated and followed in Montecarlo Ltd. v. NTPC [Montecarlo Ltd. v. NTPC, (2016) 15 SCC 272] (see para 25 at p. 287) and Caretel Infotech [Caretel Infotech Ltd. v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., (2019) 14 SCC 81] (see paras 38-39 at pp. 92-93).
1226. Judged by these parameters, it is clear that this Court must defer to the understanding of clauses in tender documents by the author thereof unless, pithily put, there is perversity in the author's construction of the documents or mala fides......"
18. The above extract has also dealt with the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court. In Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa : (2007) 14 SCC 517 - Para NO.22) the Hon'ble Supreme Court had categorically held that Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/ procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. The alarm sounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court squarely applies to the facts of the present case in as much as the Writ Petitioner has invoked the Writ Jurisdiction of this Court without there being any injustice caused to him and with an imagination that the petitioner may suffer injustice, that too in a remote situation of having a tie between two bidders or more. It cannot be said in any manner that Clause No.22.7 of the tender conditions, which reserves discretion to the authority to select one bidder in situations of 'tie' between the bidders cannot be said to be either unreasonable or arbitrary. This apart, the very fact that the Writ Petitioner is an existing contractor and that while the tender notification was issued on 04.09.2025, the bidder having approached this Court only on 18.09.2025 i.e., two days before the closure of the Bid i.e., 20.09.2025 seeking stay of the tender process would also create any amount of suspicion in the mind of this Court as regards the bonafides of the present petitioner seeking to stall the tender process. In these facts, it is easy for this Court to say that the Writ Petitioner has approached this Court with oblique intentions because the beneficiary is the petitioner if the tender process is either stalled or stayed by this Court.
19. Issue No.2: -
13Whether there is any Cause of Action in the present Writ Petition?
In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others : MANU/SC/0939/2012, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Para Nos.7 and 8, held as under :
"7. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the Authority/Court, that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons.
Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a complaint by the appellant that there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the Authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that, the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. Infact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same. (Vide : State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12; Saghir Ahmad & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 728; Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1044; Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2736; and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 784).14
8. A "legal right", means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The expression, "person aggrieved" does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised. (Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Chanji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974 SC 1719; and State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 1361)."
20. In Vinoy Kumar Vs. State of U.P And Others : (2001) 4 SCC 734, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Para No.2, held as under :
"2. Generally speaking, a person shall have no locus standi to file a writ petition if he is not personally affected by the impugned order or his fundamental rights have neither been directly or substantially invaded nor is there any imminent danger of such rights being invaded or his acquired interests have been violated ignoring the applicable rules. The relief under Article 226 of the constitution is based on the existence of a right in favour of the person invoking the jurisdiction. The exception to the general rule is only in cases where the writ applied for is a writ of habeas- corpus or quo warranto or filed in public interest. It is a matter of prudence, that the court confines the exercise of writ jurisdiction to cases where legal wrong or legal injuries caused to a particular person or his fundamental rights are violated, and not to entertain cases of individual wrong or injury at the instance of third party where there is an effective legal aid organisation which can take care of such cases. Even in cases filed in public interest, the court can exercise the writ jurisdiction at the instance of a third party only when it is shown that the legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or determined class of persons is, by reason or poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the court for relief."
21. In Oriental Bank of Commerce Vs. Sunder Lal Jain And Another, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Para Nos.11 and 12, held as under :
11.The principles on which a writ of mandamus can be issued have been stated as under in The Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies by F.G. Ferris and F.G. Ferris, Jr. :15
"Note 187- Mandamus, at common law, is a highly prerogative writ, usually issuing out of the highest court of general jurisdiction, in the name of the sovereignty, directed to any natural person, corporation or inferior court within the jurisdiction, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, and which appertains to their office or duty. Generally speaking, it may be said that mandamus is a summary writ, issuing from the proper court, commanding the official or board to which it is addressed to perform some specific legal duly to which the party applying for the writ is entitled of legal right to have performed.
Note 192 - Mandamus is, subject to the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the appropriate remedy to enforce a plain, positive, specific and ministerial duty presently existing and imposed by law upon officers and others who refuse or neglect to perform such duty, when there is no other adequate and specific legal remedy and without which there would be a failure of justice. The chief function of the writ is to compel the performance of public duties prescribed by statute, and to keep subordinate and inferior bodies and Tribunals exercising public functions within their jurisdictions. It is not necessary, however, that the duty be imposed by statute; mandamus lies as well for the enforcement of a common law duty.
Note 196 - Mandamus is not a writ of right. Its issuance unquestionably lies in the sound judicial discretion of the Court, subject always to the well-settled principles which have been established by the Courts. An action in mandamus is not governed by the principles of ordinary litigation where the matters alleged on one side and not denied on the other are taken as true, and Judgment pronounced thereon as of course. While mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. Before granting the writ the Court may, and should, look to the larger public interest which may be concerned - an interest which private litigants are apt to over-look when striving for private ends. The Court should act in view of all the existing facts, and with due regard to the consequences which will result. It is in every case a discretion dependent upon all the surrounding facts and circumstances. Note 206.-. The correct rule is that mandamus will not lie where the duty is clearly discretionary and the party upon whom the duty rests has exercised his discretion reasonably and within his jurisdiction, that is, upon facts sufficient to support his action.
12. These very principles have been adopted in our country. In Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh and others, AIR 1977 SC 2149, after referring to the earlier decisions in Lekhraj Satramdas 16 Lalvani v. Deputy Custodian-cum-Managing Officer, AIR 1966 SC 334; Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. The Governing Body of the Nalanda College, AIR 1962 SC 1210 and Dr. Umakant Saran v. State of Bihar, AIR 1973 SC 964, this Court observed as follows in paragraph 15 of the reports :
There is abundant authority in favour of the proposition that a writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of the officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate Tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limit of their jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. ......... In the instant case, it has not been shown by respondent No. 1 that there is any statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on respondents 2 to 4 which they failed to perform. All that is sought to be enforced is an obligation flowing from a contract which, as already indicated, is also not binding and enforceable. Accordingly, we are clearly of the opinion that respondent No. 1 was not entitled to apply for grant of a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court was not competent to issue the same."
Therefore, in order that a writ of mandamus may be issued, there must be a legal right with the party asking for the writ to compel the performance of some statutory duty cast upon the authorities. The respondents have not been able to show that there is any statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on the appellant bank to declare their account as NPA from 31st March, 2000 and apply R.B.I. guidelines to their case."
22. In the light of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered view that no cause of action has arisen to entitle the Writ Petitioner herein to invoke the Writ Jurisdiction of this Court.
23. Issue No.3: -
17Whether the present Writ Petition is an Abuse of Process?
This Court has noted above that the Writ Petitioner has approached this Court on 18.09.2025 while the tender notification was issued on 04.09.2025. The Schedule closing time and date regarding the sale of tender documents is upto 11.00 Hours on 20.09.2025. The Bid Submission closing time and date is upto 16.00 Hours on 20.09.2025 and the Pre-Qualification and Technical Bid Opening Time and Date is at 17.00 Hours on 20.09.2025. The present Writ Petition is filed on 18.09.2025 challenging the Clause Nos.22.6 and 22.7 dealing with examination of Bids and determination of Responses. Filing of the Writ Petition at a stage which is just two days before the closure of the bid with an interim prayer seeking Stay of the tender process on an imaginary events which may arise in the future is an abuse of process.
24. At this stage, this Court is reminded of a Caveat sounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Caretel Infotech Limited Vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., and others; (2019) 14 SCC 81, wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court in para Nos. 37 to 39 held as under:
37. We consider it appropriate to make certain observations in the context of the nature of dispute which is before us. Normally parties would be governed by their contracts and the tender terms, and really no writ would be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In view of Government and public sector enterprises venturing into economic activities, this Court found it appropriate to build in certain checks and balances of fairness in procedure. It is this approach which has given rise to scrutiny of tenders in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It, however, appears that the window has been opened too wide as almost every small or big tender is now sought to be challenged in writ proceedings almost as a matter of routine. This in turn, affects the efficacy of commercial activities of the public sectors, which may be in competition with the private sector. This could hardly have been the objective in mind. An unnecessary, close scrutiny of minute details, contrary to the view of the tendering authority, makes awarding of contracts by 18 government and public sectors a cumbersome exercise, with long drawn out litigation at the threshold. The private sector is competing often in the same field.
Promptness and efficiency levels in private contracts, thus, often tend to make the tenders of the public sector a non-competitive exercise. This works to a great disadvantage to the Government and the public sector.
38. In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd. [Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818] , this Court has expounded further on this aspect, while observing that the decision-making process in accepting or rejecting the bid should not be interfered with. Interference is permissible only if the decision-making process is arbitrary or irrational to an extent that no responsible authority, acting reasonably and in accordance with law, could have reached such a decision. It has been cautioned that constitutional courts are expected to exercise restraint in interfering with the administrative decision and ought not to substitute their view for that of the administrative authority. Mere disagreement with the decision-making process would not suffice.
39. Another aspect emphasised is that the author of the document is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements. In the facts of the present case, the view, on interpreting the tender documents, of Respondent 1 must prevail. Respondent 1 itself, appreciative of the wording of Clause 20 and the format, has taken a considered view. Respondent 3 cannot compel its own interpretation of the contract to be thrust on Respondent 1, or ask the Court to compel Respondent 1 to accept that interpretation. In fact, the Court went on to observe in the aforesaid judgment that it is possible that the author of the tender may give an interpretation that is not acceptable to the constitutional court, but that itself would not be a reason for interfering with the interpretation given. We reproduce the observations in this behalf as under: (Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. case [Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818] , SCC p. 825, para 15) "15. We may add that the owner or the employer of a project, having authored the tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret its documents. The constitutional courts must defer to this understanding and appreciation of the tender documents, unless there is mala fide 19 or perversity in the understanding or appreciation or in the application of the terms of the tender conditions. It is possible that the owner or employer of a project may give an interpretation to the tender documents that is not acceptable to the constitutional courts but that by itself is not a reason for interfering with the interpretation given."
25. In the above premise, the present Writ Petition is devoid of any merits. Although, in the opinion of this Court, the filing of the present Writ Petition at this stage and under the circumstances mentioned hereinabove is an abuse of process, this court has desisted in imposing any costs.
26. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
27. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, pending, if any, shall stand closed.
_________________________________ GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD, J Dt: 18.09.2025 DSV/Dvs 20 503 HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD WRIT PETITION NO. 25708 OF 2025 Dt: 18.09.2025 Note: LR copy to be marked.
B/o : DSV/DVS