Calcutta High Court
Sunil Sardar vs State Of West Bengal on 13 December, 2000
Equivalent citations: AIR2001CAL72, AIR 2001 CALCUTTA 72
Author: D.K. Seth
Bench: D.K. Seth
ORDER D.K. Seth, J.
1. The first writ petition was moved by one Sunil Sardar, a member of the Panchayat challenging the meeting requisitioned by the private respondents for removal of the Pradhan on the ground that 3 of the requisitionists were disqualified Under Section 11(e) of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 and a resolution having been taken to that effect the same was forwarded to the prescribed authority for appropriate action. Therefore, the said 3 persons were disqualified from requisitioning the meeting. As such the notice for holding the meeting should be quashed.
2. In the said writ petition an interim order was granted that the meeting may be held the result may be published and the same may be given effect to. Subsequently, the second writ petition (A.S.T. 4087 of 2000) was moved by one Jahide Seikh who is also a member of the said Panchayat. It is almost the same relief that was asked for in the second writ petition as was asked for in the first writ petition and almost on indentical ground. Therefore, both these writ petitions are taken up in terms of order dated 21st November, 2000.
3. Mr. Bihani, the learned counsel for the petitioner, in his submission has pointed out that in case the prescribed authority for some reason or other deals the process in removing the disqualified persons in that event such members in order to seek prevention of such removal may remove the Pradhan as has been done in the present case and thereby frustrate the whole democratic process. In as much as once a Pradhan is removed even if the newly elected Pradhan loses his majority still then a minority group will be at the helm of affairs frustrating the number of majority roll in a democratic set up. Therefore, according to him, it was incumbent on the prescribed authority to take immediate steps for removal of the said members as soon as they had incurred disqualification and should not have allowed the respondents to hold the meeting for removal of Prodhan. Alternatively, he contends that the decision Under Section 11 should have been taken by the prescribed authority before such meeting is concluded, otherwise this will erode the whole democratic system and create dead-stock in the administration and bring unwarranted consequences in the whole process in terms of Section 11 and pass appropriate order before the meeting is held and in case it is not so done in that event, the meeting may be postponed till such decision is taken.
4. Mr. Dasgupta, the learned counsel for the State, on she other hand, contends that the Prodhan himself has not vindicate his right. On the other hand, two individual members had come separately to support the Prodhan. He contends that until a member is removed he has every right to continue as a member and exercise his democratic right and participate in the meeting. Mere initiation of a proceeding Under Section 11 does not preclued a member from exercising his right as a member until an order is passed and such order is not stayed and does not become final. The order would operate only when it becomes final or if is not stayed by the appellate authority the order becomes operative subject to the result of the appeal. He also contends that in the present case, the prescribed authority may be directed to dispose of the process at the earliest but non-disposal thereof does not stand in the way of holding a meeting for removing a Prodhan.
4-A. The learned counsel for the private respondents, on the other hand, contends that the meeting has already been held. He, however, adopts the submissions of Mr. Dasgupta and submits that the democratic process can not be interfered with even if the submission of Mr. Bihani may be very attractive. Law has to follow its own course and unless there is infraction in law on even if the consequences are disastrous the Court can not intervene.
5. I have heard all the learned counsel at length.
6. Section 11 prescribed removal of a member on any of the grounds contained in Clauses (a) to (e) of Sub-section 1. Here in this case, a resolution was taken by the Panchayat that 3 of its members were defaulter and as such were liable to be removed under Clause (e) of Sub-section 1 of Section 11. Pursuant to such resolution the jurisdiction of the prescribed authority has since been invoked by the Panchayat in relation to Section 11 some times in September, 2000. As soon such a step was taken the respondents had managed to issue the notice of removal joining hands with other members so as to frustrate the process. Even if such a step is taken until it appears that such step is in infringement of the process of law this Court is helpless. This Court is not supposed to look at the consequences while interpreting a law. It has to interpret according to the principle of interpretation namely lieteral meaning of the general expression unless there is any ambiguity or it has any inconsistency with the scheme of the Act and the provisions does not show that there is any inconsistency or it is contrary to the scheme. Therefore, the Court is not concerned with the consequences of such provision.
7. If the words of an Act are clear the Court must follow them even though they lead to manifst absurdity. The Court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has committed absurdity; Reg v. Judge of the City of Landon Court, (1892) IQB 273. The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is by giving the words used by the legislature, their ordinary, natural and gramatical meaning; if however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the Court may adopt the same; but if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation; Veerappa v. State of Mysore AIR 1965 Mysore 227 (FB). If matters not, in such a case, what the consequence may be. When by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced, even though it is absurd or mischievous; Ghulam Mahammad v. Panna Ram AIR 1924 Lahore 374. The canons of construction of statute do not permit the Court to take the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the consequences of a particular interpretation as it is in substance a question of expedience for the legislature; Ajit Kumar Roy v. Surender Nath Ghosh It is not the duty of the Court to make the law reasonable, but it is its duty to expound it as it stands according to the real sense of the words and leave the remedy to others; Venugopalan v. Commissioner Vijayawada Municipality AIR 1957 Andh. Pra. 833. When the language of a section of an Act is not ambiguous in interpreting the plain words of such a positive enactment any suggestion of hardship is out of place; Amarnath Basheahar Dass, Firm v. Tekchand . The 'argumentum ab inconvenienti' is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the statute is obscure. When the language is explicit, its consequences are for the legislature and not of the Courts, to consider. In such a case suffereing citizen must appeal for relief to the law giver, and not the lawayer; Satyanarayanamurthi v. Malluri Papayya ILR (1941) Mad 824 : (AIR 1941 Madaras 713). If the language employed is plain and unambigous, the same must be given effect to irrespective of the consequences that may arise Daryobai v. Surjamal .
8. As observed earlier, in the present case the meaning is not obscure. Neither it is capable of two meaning. The language is clear and explicit. In case the other meaning is sought to be given then one has to read something more in the section. The Court cannot add anything to the statute. Therefore, it is not possible to acceed to the submission made by Mr. Behani in this regard.
9. At the same time the Court is not supposed to supervise the administration or functioning of a Panchayat at every stage even if it might be of a view that the democratic process is being misused or abused. Such a view may be personal to a person but the same can not be reflected in a judicial process or proceeding so long there is no infraction of law and the law is not infringed.
10. Section 11 does not prescribed any time limit within which the same has to be exercised but at the same time in the absence of any time limit it is expected that the same is to be performed within a reasonable proximity from the date of making such application or invocation of jurisdiction under Section 11. The provision for showing cause has also to be kept in mind and therefore it should be done as soon as possible and the same can not be extended beyond a reason-
able period. At the same time, no one can be permitted to take advantage of absence of time limit prescribed in Section 11 by dragging on the matter for any indefinite period to his own advantage. Therefore, all endeavour should be made to dispose of such matter as early as possible, preferably, within six weeks with an outer limit of 3 months. Such step is to be taken on principle having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.
11. Since no provision has been provided in the Act and the rules therefore the Court has been tempted to prescribe the outer limit having regard to the provisions contained in Section 213-A Sub-section 9 which however prescribes six weeks as limit.
12. So far as the abuse of the democratic process as contended by Mr. Bihani is concerned, the Court is not supposed to look into any such question unless there is any infringement of law. In view of the provisions contained in Section 11 particularly Sub-section 3 read with Sub-section 2 it can not be said that the removal would operate from the date the jurisdiction of the prescribed authority is invoked. On the other hand, by reason of the expression used in Sub-section 2 and 3, the removal becomes effective only on the passing of the order by the prescribed authority and it remains operative unless it is stayed by the appellate authority. However, by reason of Sub-section 3 such an order becomes final after the order on appeal is passed. Therefore, so long the order does not become final or becomes operative a member against whom a process Under Section 11 is initiated can not be precluded from participating in the meeting or even to requisition a meeting for removal of the Prodhan. It is a democratic process and a democratic process is not confined to the democratic right of the petitioner alone. It also extends to the democratic right of the respondents as well. It is a question of striking a balance. One might be of one view and the other might be of other. But those views can not be inducted when it is a question of interpretation of law or doing justice according to law. It is only law that has to be looked into. Whether it works hardship or it brings absurd result that is none of the business for the Court to look into. Such consequences are to be taken care of by the legislature. The Court even while interprating can not encroach upon the domain of the legislature. The Court also can not indirectly legislate through interpretation which is otherwise impermissible and outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
13. In the absence of any provision under which such members can be precluded from participating in a meeting it is not possible for this Court to prevent their participation in the meeting and exercising their right available under the system.
14. In the present case the proceeding has since been initiated in September, 2000 and as such it is expected the the prescribed authority should decide the question as early as possible in accordance with Section 11 even if the case so requires without giving any adjournment after a date is fixed for showing causes by the members. Thus the prescribed authority is hereby directed to conclude the process by 22nd January, 2001. Mr. Dasgupta pointed out that the said resolution was forwarded to the District Panchayat Village Development Officer. According to him, there is no such officer whereas Mr. Bihani had pointed out that it was sent to the Sub-divisional Officer who is the prescribed authority. Therefore, this question need not be gone into. The Sub-divisional Officer or the prescribed authority is hereby directed to comply with the order as directed above within the time stipulated.
15. This writ petition is thus disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
16. Let xerox plain copies of this order duly counter signed by Asstt. Registrar (Court) be given to the learned counsel for the parties.