Punjab-Haryana High Court
Shanti Devi Etc. vs State Of Haryana And Ors. on 18 February, 1999
Equivalent citations: (1999)122PLR640
Author: Swatanter Kumar
Bench: Swatanter Kumar
JUDGMENT Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. The State of Haryana on 4th June, 1986 issued a notification No. LAC (G)-86/1783 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) with an intention to acquire 75.34 acres of land in the revenue estate Bhiwani Lehar, District Bhiwani and 8.89 acres of land in revenue estate village Palwas, District Bhiwani. In furtherance to this notification, the government actually acquired the said land and issued notification No. LAC (G)-87/13 dated 15.4.1987 under Section 6 of the Act
2. After due notice to the land owners, the Land Acquisition Collector, Urban Estate Department, Haryana, Gurgaon, published two awards, vide Award No. 7 of 1987-88 and Award No. 17 of 1987-88. In Award No. 7 of 1987-88 dated 10.11.1987 the Land Acquisition Collector, awarded a sum of Rs. 57,500/- per acre for Nehri land while for the other kind of land like Tal, Gairmumkin and Ban-jar, he awarded Rs. 55,200/- per acre. In other award, being Award No. 17 of 1987-88 dated 31.3.1988 the Collector awarded the same amount of compensation.
3. The claimants being dissatisfied with the amount of compensation, awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector, Urban Estates Department, Haryana, Gurgaon, for their respective land, filed objections, which were referred under Section 17 of the Act by the Land Acquisition Collector to the learned District Judge, Bhiwani. In all, 151 references were made by the Land Acquisition Collector arising out of Awards Nos. 7 and 17 of 1987-88 respectively. All these 151 references were disposed of by the learned District Judge by awarding uniform rate of compensation to the extent of Rs. 125 per square yards amount to Rs. 6,05,000/- in face of the amount of Rs. 11.81 paise per square yard awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector. All these 151 references were disposed of by the learned District Judge, while awarding the aforestated compensation by three different judgments, details of which are as under:-
1. LAC No. 14/91 Shanti Devi v. Haryana State, decided on 14.10.1993.
2. LAC No. 20/93 Raghbir @ Pohkar v. Haryana State, decided on 31.7.1995.
3. LAC No. 10/94 Savitri Devi v. Haryana State, decided on 31.10.1995.
4. These three judgments have given rise to 251 Regular First Appeals being preferred by the claimants as well as by the State of Haryana. The claimants have prayed for enhancement of the compensation awarded to Rs. 500/- per square yard, while the State being dissatisfied with the enhanced compensation awarded by the learned District Judge prayed that the compensation awarded should be reduced to Rs. 11.81 paise per square yards awarded by the Collector.
5. Shanti Devi v. State of Haryana was the first judgment pronounced by the learned District Judge and was followed in the subsequent two judgments. As all these Regular First Appeals arises from the common judgments and common controversies arises for determination in these appeal, therefore, I propose to dispose of all these 251 RFAs by this common judgment.
6. Learned Advocate General, appearing for the State of Haryana, at the very outset very fairly conceded that exhibits R.2 to R.62 cannot be looked into and read in evidence for the purpose of determining the fair market value of the acquired land at the time of issuance of notifications, in view of the well settled principle of law now that without examining the vendor or vendee or duly concerned person from the Registrar's office, the sale instances cannot be taken into consideration. Thus, I have no hesitation in holding that exhibits R.2 to R.62 cannot be looked into by this Court.
7. At this stage, reference can be made to the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Union of India v. Dr. Balbir Singh, R.F.A. No. 2382 of 1997 decided on 10.12.1998, (reported as (1999-2)122 P.L.R. 613) where, after discussing the law in detail, it was held as under:-
"On the contrary, the respondents produced 14 sale instances in Court being Ex.R/3 to Ex.R/16, but neither the vendor nor the vendee of these sale instances/sale deeds was examined in Court. The respondent did not even summoned a witness from the Registrar's office to prove the sale deeds in accordance with law. In other words, all the sale instances brought on record by the respondents are inadmissible in evidence and cannot form the basis for awarding the amount of compensation to the claimants. This question is no more res integra and stands fully covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of A.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Hyderabad v. P. Venkaiah and Ors., A.I.R. 1997 Supreme Court 2600; Special Duty Collector and Anr. etc. v. Kurra Sambasiva Rao and Ors., A.I.R. 1997 Supreme Court 2625; Baldev Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1996 Supreme Court 498 and Mehar Ban and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1997 Supreme Court 2664.
In the case of P. Venkaiah and others (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
"Admittedly, none of the persons connected with the documents, namely, neither the vendee nor the vendor has been examined. This Court in Kumari Veeraiah v. State of A.P., (1995)4 S.C.C. 136, held that in the absence of addiction of any evidence through the vendor or the vendee, the document per se cannot be relied upon. This was reiterated in State of Bihar v. Madheshwar Prasad, (1996)6 S.C.C. 197. Acceptance of certified copy of the sale deed under Section 51-A relates only to the production of the original sale deeds but it does not dispense with proof of the contents of the documents, relative features vis-a-vis, the land under acquisition. All is needed to be proved by examining the persons connected with the same and parties to the document. Following the above ratio, we hold that the view taken by the High Court and that of the reference Court is entirely illegal.
The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment and award of the reference Court as modified stand set aside. The matter is remitted to the reference Court for disposal of the matter afresh after an opportunity is given to adduce evidence afresh and the same is considered. No. costs."
8. However, the sale instances exhibits R.2 to R.62 produced by the respondents were considered by the learned District Judge. The reason for ignoring of these sale instances was that Haryana Urban Development Authority itself had sold the plots in the same vicinity at the rate of Rs. 342/- per square yard and during the pendency of the reference cases, the plots were even being sold at the rate of Rs. 600/- to 650/- per square yard. According to the learned Judge this conduct of the authority by itself renders the sale instances, exhibits R.2 to R.62 irrelevant. I do not find any merit in this reasoning. If the sale instances are proved in accordance with law, then they have to be taken into consideration by the Court and cannot be brushed aside only on the ground that they reflect lower market value of the land than the one reflected by the petitioner. I do not need to venture any further discussion on this issue because exhibits R.2 to R.62 are, in any case, not admissible in evidence. The learned Advocate General, Haryana has further argued that the letters of allotment issued by the Haryana Urban Development Authority and the fact that the plots were being sold in the year 1980-85 at the rate of Rs. 342/- per square yard and subsequently at a higher price cannot be taken into consideration. This is for the reason that the well planned and developed plots cannot be made basis for determining the fair market value of the acquired land in question.
9. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the various claimants in all these appeals commonly argued that they are entitled to receive compensation at the rate of Rs. 342/- per square yard as fixed by the Haryana Urban Development Authority, at best with a reasonable deduction on that amount. They also contended that keeping in view the location and potentiality of the entire land in mind, no amount of cut ought to be applied to the awarded amount. Learned counsel also agreed that only other material piece of evidence is exhibit P.7. Exhibit P.7 comes to Rs. 99.17 paise per square yard. This amount ought to be increased. In view of the rates fixed by the Haryana Urban Development Authority and as such the claimants, in any case, would be entitled to receive compensation more than one awarded by the learned District Judge i.e. at the rate of Rs. 125/- per square yard.
10. Keeping in view the contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing for their respective clients, this court has to determine whether-exhibit P.7 is admissible in evidence and is an indication of a fair market value of the land at the time of issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act in relation to the acquired land. Further, the Court has to determine what is the effect of prescribed rate of Haryana Urban Development Authority for the allotment of plots in the same sector, which are stated to be Rs. 342/- per square yard and later being sold at the rate of Rs. 661/- per square yard.
11. As already noticed, exhibit P.7 has been relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, during the course of their arguments. Exhibit P.7 was proved by PW.8 who is a vendee of the land, which has been shown in exhibit P.7. Thus, exhibit P.7 has been proved in accordance with law and is admissible in evidence. PW8, Om Parkash has proved the genuineness of this sale instance and has admitted that he has paid a sum of Rs. 1,80,000/- for purchasing three kanals of land. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the counsel for the parties also agree that exhibit P.7 is equicomparable sale instance for determining the market value of the land in question at the relevant time. There is no other document and this is the only sale instance available which admittedly is adjacent to the acquired land. As such, this sale instance is admissible and referable but to what extent it would help in determining the amount, I would be discussing shortly.
12. There is also no dispute to the fact that the Haryana Urban Development Authority has sold the plots or had proposed to sell the plots in the year 1986 for a sum of Rs. 342/- per square yard. Exhibit P.4 is the brochure issued by the Haryana Urban Development Authority for allotment of plots at the above rates. PW.5 Nand Lal, Assistant Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority, Bhiwani has stated that the price fixed by the Haryana Urban Development Authority for the plots was Rs. 372.48 paise per square yard, as per pamphlet exhibit P.4. He further stated that in the year 1991 the plots were being sold at the rate of Rs. 641/- per square yard. Exhibit P.4 is a self speaking document, which gives lay out plan, scope of carried developments, residential and commercial area around the plots proposed to be sold and price thereof. Exhibit P.4 indicates the development of Sector 13 as well as 23. The land in question has been acquired for the development of these sectors. The pamphlet was issued in the year 1991.
13. I am unable to hold for various reasons that exhibit P.4 has no bearing on the market value of the land in question at the time of issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. The plots sold by the Haryana Urban Development Authority are the developed plots and after the State has incurred huge expenditure in developing the said land. The brochure itself was published in the year 1991, nearly 5 years after the date of the notification. To my mind, exhibit P.4 can only be a relevant piece of evidence for determining the location and potentiality of the. land but as far as determination of price is concerned exhibit P.4 cannot be taken into consideration.
14. Exhibits P.24 to 27 are the other sale instances, which were proved by the claimants. All these sale deeds have been rightly rejected by the learned District Judge for the reasons that all these sale instances are post notifications. All these four sale deeds are from January to April, 1990 again nearly 5 years after the date of notification issued under Section 4 of the Act in relation to the land in question. I would affirm the view taken by the learned District Judge in this regard.
15. However, the learned District Judge has given no reason whatsoever for not considering exhibits P.18 and P.19, the sale instances proved in accordance with law by the claimants. In fact, the learned District Judge has not even made mention thereof in the entire judgment. Exhibits P. 18 and P.19 were proved by Mr. Chandgi PW.15 he was vendor in one sale deed and vendee in another. While appearing in the witness box, this witness has clearly stated that, vide exhibit P.18, he had sold the land measuring 19 marlas i.e. nearly 570 square yards for a sum of Rs. 49,000/- on 26.11.19895. He further stated that vide exhibit P.19 he had purchased 1 kanal 4 marlas of land for a sum of Rs. 35,000/- vide sale deed dated 18.1.1982. The statement of this witness is that the land, subject matter of these two sale deeds, is at a distance of 6 killas from the acquired land. He also stated that the land was having greater potentiality for residential and commercial purposes and even subsequent to these sale deeds, he was offered Rs. 300/- per square yard. Both these sale instances cannot be considered irrelevant or inadmissible in law. The court has to consider every relevant/piece of evidence available on record, while determining the fair market value of the land in question. The contents of the sale deeds having been proved on record, it has to be presumed that they are genuine sale instances. They are not such small pieces of land, which could be held to be not worthy of consideration. Exhibit P.18 is sale of 500 square yards, while P19 relates to nearly 720 square yards. Another sale deed which fall within the reasonable time from the date of the notification should be treated to be relevant specially when the other sale instances of the period subsequent to the period of notifications are available on record. The advantages of considering the relevant period is that the trend in the increase of the value of the land would also be brought to the notice of the Court and it would help in applying the principle of averages for determination of the price of land. In fact, in recent time, the Hon'ble Supreme court has approved the principle of average for determining the fair market value of the land than any other principle concerning the fixation of fair market value of the land. In this regard references can be made to the case titled Baldev Singh v. State of Haryana and Anr., R.F.A. No. 965 of 1992 decided on 14.1.1999, wherein the Court held as under:-
"In a very recent judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Kanwar Singh and Ors. v. Union of India, J.T. 1998(7) S.C. 397 observed that Courts while applying the market value of the land in the adjacent villagers or revenue estates must cautiously follow the same as it is not necessary that compensation granted in adjacent villages would itself be a deciding factor for other lands. The Supreme Court also applied the principle of averages/mean to get the correct market value of the acquired land with some element of conjectures or guess in the case of Krishna Yachendra Bahadurvaru v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore and Ors., A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 869."
16. Applying the above well enunciated principle of law, the average of the following three sale instances i.e. exhibits P.7, P.18 and P.19 could be relied upon for determining the fair market value of the land.
Sr. Exhibits Date of Sale Area Sale Price per
No. Consideration sq. yard
1. P.7 30.09.1985 3 Kanals 1,80,000/- 100.00
2. P.18 26.01.1985 19 Marlas 49,000/- 48.62
3. P.19 18.01.1982 1 Kanal 35,000/- 85.97
4 Marlas
The Total price of 234.59 - = 78.19
17. The other well accepted principle for determining the fair markets value of the land in question is the market value of the land proved on record by sale instances immediately before acquisition of the land in question. As already noticed, the learned counsel for the parties have heavily relied upon exhibit P.7 to Justify their claim. I have already held that exhibit P.4 cannot be considered by this Court for determining the market value of the land in question, as such, exhibit P.7 certainly is a very relevant piece of evidence for the purpose of determining the market value of the land. The land involved in exhibit P.7 is measuring about 3 kanals abutting the main road and nearly has been sold at the rate of Rs. 99.70 paise per square yard. The learned District Judge has totally relied upon this document to grant the amount of compensation payable to the claimants. It has come in evidence that this land is situated nearly 20 killas away from acquired land but according to the claimants, this is adjacent to the acquired land and is abutting the main road. On behalf of the State, it was contended that this land has greater potentiality, commercial as well as residential rather than the land in question. In the facts and circumstances of the case, exhibit P.7 has to be taken into consideration as material piece of evidence and in fact, most material piece of evidence because it is clear from the site plan filed on record that the location of this land is adjacent to the acquired land. The sale is dated 30th September, 1985 while the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act is dated 4th August, 1986. Thus, exhibit P.7 is the most reliable and relevant piece of evidence in point of time, distance and potential. Thus, I have no hesitation in accepting the contention raised on behalf of the counsel for the parties that this is most equi-comparable sale instance on record. Thus, the amount awarded by exhibit P.7 even if taken to be indicating the fair market value of the land in question at the relevant time, on all fair principle, even then, I am unable to understand how could the learned District Judge grant the increase on that payment. Exhibit P.7, which is the sale instance being 30th September, 1985 and the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, being dated 4th August, 1986, there is no scope for granting increase either on flat rate or on percentage basis.
18. In this regard and at the very outset, I would refer to the conclusion arrived at by the learned District Judge in the impugned judgment.
" . . . . Besides this, in view of the admitted fact that the Haryana Urban Development Authority itself is selling this land, that too after development, at a rate of Rs. 342/- per square yard and later on in 1991, at a rate of Rs. 650/- or so per square yard, then the criteria looking to the facts contained in sale deed Ex.P.7 and in view of the statement of PW.5 Shri Nand Lal, Assistant of the Estate Office, Bhiwani, that these lands were being sold at the rate of Rs. 372.48 paise per square yard and Rs. 641/- per square yard, the price of this land at the time of acquisition could not be by any stretch of imagination less than Rs. 100/- per square yard. Since the acquisition took place in 1986 and excluding the year of 1986/1987 and 1993, an increase of Rs. 5/- per year for five years would also be in the interest of equity, justice and good conscience, which makes the price to be Rs. 125/- per square yard, may be a reasonable amount to be awarded to the claimants for delaying the award....."
19. The above conclusion is erroneous in law and incorrect on facts. With respect to the learned judge. I really cannot appreciate as to where was the need of granting increase value at the rate of Rs. 5/- per square yard for five years subsequent to the date of notification. Once the land is acquired and possession is taken in terms of the relevant provisions of the Act, the right and obligation of the parties are controlled by the statute itself and the Court cannot grant any additional benefit which is not permissible within the scope and ambit of the provisions of the Act and more particularly under Section 23(1-A), 23(2), and 28 of the Act.
20. The principle of granting flat increase price for the year even prior to the date of notification was not approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as it was considered to be not an appropriate method of computing the amount of compensation payable to the land owner. In this regard, reference can be made to the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of the State of Haryana and another v. Jagir Kaur and Ors., (1999-2)122 P.L.R. 259.
"The ancillary question that arises there from is whether this Court should consider the judgments and awards produced by the parties within the past reasonable time with or without the element of increase. Addition of the element of increase at the rate of 12% per annum which has even been suggested by the learned Advocate General cannot be considered a sound criteria for determining the market value of the land in question. Without entering into any further discussion on this aspect of the matter, it will be appropriate to refer to a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Mehtab Singh and Ors. etc. etc. v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1995 Supreme Court 667. The Hon'ble Apex Court while disapproving such progress in its universal application observed as under: -
"No occasion arose to take judicial notice of the inflation and high rise of prices. It must be borne in mind that from the date of award, interest becomes due to the claimant land owner, for thenceforth the land ceases to be his and while so the question of price rise does not arise when he is compensated for the deprival by payment of interest. That apart we have our strongest reservations to the rule evolved by the High Court in Maya Devi's case as also in Inder Singh's case afore-quoted. The Amendment Act of 1984 is explicit in terms. The limited retrospectively provided in the amending provisions do not permit adoption of 12% increase in price in each and every acquisition. If it was so intended the legislature would have expressly provided so. We would decry that rule and express our disapproval for its universal application or for all acquisition." From the above detailed discussion three exhibits produced and proved by the claimants which are comparable instances are Ex. PX, Ex.PA and Ex.P.18. These instances are not only comparable in terms of location, and potentiality but are also relevant in relation to proximity of time of acquisition of land."
LOCATION AND POTENTIAL In regard to the location and potential of the land there is really not much dispute between the parties. PW1, PW2, PW14 and RW1 are the witnesses which have deposed in the court in regard to the location and potential of the land. Exhibit P24/1 and exhibit R1 are the site plans placed on record by the respective parties. These documents clearly show that the land in question is adjacent to the land already acquired for developing of Sectors 13 and 23. Exhibit P4 is also a relevant document to indicate that the land in question was acquired for specially developing Sectors 13 and 23. On the one side of the acquired land there is a city railway station while on the other there is 100 feet wide road.
Both PW5 as well as PW15 in their statements have stated that the land in question has great potential and is located adjacent to developed area. RW1, in his cross-examination, has stated as under :-
"The Colony carved out in Ex.P4 from the acquired land, which is in Sector 13 and 23.1 am not concerned with sale of plots by the HUDA. Mini Secretariat is about 11 killas from the acquired land. In between Mini-Secretariat and the acquired land is the officer's colony. I have included area of officer's colony in Mini-Secretariat, I have not seen colony of Public Health, so I have not shown in the plan. I have seen this land in December, 1992. I had not gone to the residences of Additional Sessions Judge or of C.J.M. I have not seen the revenue colony. I cannot say if the same is in existence for the last 20 years. The land of Mini-Secretariat was acquired in 1974. While I have not seen the colony so I cannot say if facilities of road, water, sewerage are available or not in PWD and officer's colony. There is a railway colony consisting of 15/20 quarters near City Railway Station. I do not know since how long City Railway Station is in existence........."
21. There is overwhelming oral and documentary evidence to show that the land in question is situated and surrounded by developed areas and the land has a commercial and residential potentiality. Though this fact would need no more evidence in face of exhibit P.4, which is a document issued by the instrumentality of the State i.e. Haryana Urban Development. Thus, I have no hesitation in holding the land has a reasonably good potential and its location can not, in any way, be treated detriment to the interest of the claimants.
FIXATION OF MARKET VALUE
22. From the above discussion, the general principle of average applied by this Court in computing the market value of the land at the relevant time, the only possible way is to take exhibit P.7 as the very foundation for giving the claimant amount of compensation on account of acquisition of their land. It is more so because the rates declared by Haryana Development Authority have already been held to be irrelevant for such determination. Exhibit P.7 gives the land value of Rs. 99.17 paise per square yard, which relates to between two individuals. The sale relates to a plot of three kanals, which is nearly measuring 1800 square yards. This land is located on the main road itself and has 100 feet wide face touching the main road. The area has greater commercial potential in comparison to other area. It would be difficult to place it at par with the lands which are at considerably distance from the main road. The present acquisition is a large acquisition nearly 84 acres of land and for the development of residential and commercial area of Sectors 13 and 23, to be developed by the Haryana Urban Development Authority. For these reasons some extent of deduction/cut has to be applied to this value, though may not be much higher percentage of cut.
23. The learned counsel for the State, while relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.S. Shivadevama and Ors. v. Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer and Anr., 1996(2) Supreme Court Cases 62, prayed that a cut of 53% should be applied. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the claimants, while relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bagwathula Samanna v. Special Tehsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, 1991 Land Acquisition Law 318 (S.C.), submitted that no element of cut should be applied.
24. Considering these two extreme submissions raised on behalf of the respective parties, I am of the considered view that some element of cut need to be applied to the aforestated value of land. In this regard reference can be made to the judgment of this court in the case of Union of India v. Dr. Balbir Singh, (1999-2)122 P.L.R. 613, wherein the Court held as under:-
"What is the purpose of applying the cuts had been clearly elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Smt. L. Kamalamma (dead) trough LRs and Jhandoo through LRs referred supra. It was stated that l/3rd of market value has to be deducted towards development charges. The factors like lumpsum payment, its investment value, the time factor involved in formation of-layouts and the period for which the money in addition thereto shall be blocked, would be relevant for applying the cut. Consequently, in these cases the Hon'ble Supreme Court applied 33% cut while in the other raised the cut 50% from 25% (awarded by the High Court).
In the case of Bhagwathula Samanna v. Special Tehsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, 1992(1) Recent Revenue Reports 256 relied upon by learned counsel for the claimants, the observations of the Court were that where complete development has taken place, the land is located on the National Highway and the land was to be valued only as building site, applying the principle of cut would not be called for. The other judgments of this court state that where the area acquired was part of the Municipal developed area, it may not be appropriate to apply the principle of cut.
As is clear from the above discussion, it is difficult to lay down a straight jacket formula, which would universally apply to all cases of land acquisition, but these are the guiding factors which the Court would have to take into consideration to determine whether the principle of cut should or should not be applied to an given case.
It must indicate development of area in accordance with law and keeping in view the civic sense seen in the light of the Municipal lands or other local Acts or Bye-laws applicable to that area. Haphazard development and a planned development as understood in law or even in common parlance cannot be treated as synonymous to each other. They describe uncomparable areas and as such mere indication of some structural existence or roads would not per se be termed as a developed area which would totally exempt the area acquired from the operation of principle of cut."
25. Applying the above well settled principles and the view expressed by this Court in R.F.A. No. 2382 of 1997 titled Union of India v. Dr. Balbir Singh, (1999-2)122 P.L.R. 613, where the Court, after discussing at great length the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-
"I have already dealt in great detail the reasons as to why the land in question cannot be termed as a developed area for applying the principle of cut. It also needs to be noticed that the learned Additional District Judge, Sirsa, has not given any specific finding in the entire judgment that the area in question is a developed area as commonly accepted.. Haphazard development would be of some consequence, but could no way be equated to a fully developed area. The purpose for which the land is acquired, the relevant records declaring the entire land as agricultural land and the fact that the sale deeds relate to comparatively small pieces of land would fully justify the application of the element of cut to the afore-said amount. It has been held above that 20 per cent cut on uniform basis would be a fair determination of the market value "of the land in question."
26. Thus, the ends of justice would be met if the cut of 20% is applied to this determination of the value.
27. Another ground to justify the cut is that the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the value of the land of the claimants have been enhanced considerably because of the activities carried out by the State or its instrumentalities, but for the development of the project by the Haryana Urban Development Authority, it is a matter of common sense that the prices of the acquired land would not have shot up that high as shown in exhibit P.7. The land for the development of the project was acquired by the State of Haryana on an earlier occasion in the year 1974 and thereafter in 1985. The State has to carry out and incur heavy expenditure for developing the land which has now been acquired and, as such, some element of cut, though may be minimum would have to be applied to the facts of the present case.
28. Consequently, I am of the considered view that the cut of 20% could be applied to the present case. The value being 99.17 paise x 20 over 100 = 10.19. Value net payable value would be 99.17 - 19.19 = 79.98.
29. Applying both the above principles of computation of the market value of the land on the principle of average and/or sale instances more or less identical value is payable to the claimants. On the basis of average the value is Rs. 78.19 paise and on basis of sale instances the value comes to Rs. 79.98.
30. Thus, I would prefer to grant higher value assessed to the claimants as they are being deprived of their land. Another factor, which-has been lost sight of by the learned District Judge is exhibit P.60. In the case of Shanti Devi v. State of Haryana, this exhibit was neither placed on record nor proved before the learned District Judge. P.60 is the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Bhiwani in relation to the same acquisition, which was pronounced on 19th August, 1992. While award in the case of Shanti Devi was pronounced on 14th October, 1993, the judgment in the case of Shanti Devi was followed in the case of Savitri Devi v. State of Haryana as exhibit P.9 and was again followed in the case of Raghbir Singh v. State of Haryana, exhibit P.13. Exhibit P.60, which was produced and proved in the case of Savitri Devi got ignored in all these subsequent judgments and went unnoticed even in Savitri Devi's case.
31. However, I would prefer to discuss exhibit P.60, the judgment of the learned District Judge dated 19th August, 1992. Thus judgment, though is prior to the judgment, subject matter of the present appeal, but the bare reading of exhibit P.60 shows that the evidence produced in the present case and the sale instances, were not produced before the learned District Judge in those cases. In fact, in exhibit P.60, even the highest claim is for Rs. 66.70 paise per square yard by the claimants, as such. I do not consider it appropriate to comment any further on the merits of exhibit P.60. Exhibit P.60 would not effect the merit of the present case in any way whatsoever.
32. In relation to the claim of the claimants for trees and superstructure of tubewell or boundaries etc. the learned counsel for the parties have not pressed either the enhancement or reduction of the amount awarded by the learned District Judge, Bhiwani. The learned Judge observed as under:-
"Coming to the structures, trees and crops, a brief reference may be made to the claimant's evidence.
19. Rajesh Kumar, PW10 claimed that he had about 1560 eucalyptus trees and a kotha and 20 kikar trees. He spent Rs. 25,000/- over construction of kotha. There is no rebuttal to this evidence. It is already held in the authority of Hon'ble Supreme Court, namely, Tek Chand v. Union of India (supra) that the amount have to be tentatively awarded and hence I award a sum of Rs. 5,000/- for construction of Kotha and in all Rs. 5,000/- for trees. The ambient already paid in this behalf shall be deducted from this amount, if any.
20. In case of Rosin Singh PW11, he himself admitted that the well was 150 years old and another well was 15 years old and I am of the view that there is no definite evidence of the constructions. Chabutra, which could ever give the price of rupees five lacs in all. These constructions were of no utility and the wells have outlived their utility and, therefore, I do not award anything whatsoever for construction.
21. In the case of Bani Singh PW12, the construction consisted of only two pucca rooms and a verandah. A tentative amount of Rs. 5,000/- is granted as compensation. If any, amount has been granted in this behalf, this would be deducted from the said amount.
22. In case of Mahabir Singh PW 13, he had constructed five rooms and he claimed rupees one lac. There is no account kept for the expenses of these constructions. I, however; award a sum of Rs. 15,000/- tentatively awarding Rs. 5,000/- each to Inder Pal, Chhatar Pal and Mahavir Singh."
33. The above conclusion arrived at by the learned District Judge are based upon fair exercise of judicial discretion and do not call for any interference. It must be noticed that no evidence has been brought to the notice of this Court, which could justify variation of the amount already awarded on account of superstructures, trees and crops. Consequently, claim of all the claimants in this regard is hereby rejected.
34. For the aforestated reasons, I hold that the fair market value of the acquired land at the time of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act should be Rs. 79.98 paise per square yard in place of Rs. 125/- per square yard granted by the learned District Judge. The claimant in addition thereto would be entitled to statutory benefits of Section 23(1-A), 23(2) and Section 28 of the Act.
35. Resultantly, the appeals filed by the State are partly accepted by fixing the aforestated amount of compensation and all the appeals preferred by the claimants shall stand dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall be left to bear their own costs.