Calcutta High Court
Ashok Kumar Saboo (Huf) And Anr. vs Hindusthan Paper Corporation Limited ... on 10 April, 2007
Equivalent citations: 2007(3)CHN533, 2007(2)CTLJ72(CAL), AIR 2007 (NOC) 2548 (CAL.)
Author: Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta
Bench: Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta
JUDGMENT Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta, J.
1. This was an appeal against judgment and order dated 8th September, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge who dismissed the writ petition holding that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction. The writ petition was dismissed on receipt of affidavit on the question of jurisdiction. Naturally learned Trial Judge did not proceed to decide the writ petition on merit. The fact of the case made out in the writ petition is that there have been two agreements for sale and supply of raw materials viz. bamboo, hard wood, bamboo chips for manufacturing papers. One was entered into by and between one M/s. Durga Trading represented by its sole proprietor, Sri Kishore Saboo, the eighth respondent and the respondent No. 1 and another was concluded later between first respondent by the second petitioner and the first respondent. The petitioner No. 2 and the respondent No. 8 are closely related to each other. In terms of both the contracts raw materials were to be delivered at the factory of the first respondent situate at Kagajnagar in the State of Assam. However, disputes and grievances are primarily concerned with the contract between the petitioners and the respondent No. 1, because of, amongst others, linking with earlier contract. The first respondent invited tender to conclude contract with petitioner No. 1 and in response to this invitation first writ petitioner placed offers for supply of the required quantity of bamboo sticks and to be effected at the said factory site. On receipt of this offer of the first writ petitioner the first respondent placed work order in writing stipulating various terms and conditions and also adopting few of the terms and conditions contained in the tender document. The said work order was accepted by the first writ petitioner and thereafter a formal bilateral agreement was entered into by the first writ petitioner and first respondent. Pursuant to the condition of the tender document and the work order the first writ petitioner deposited security at the rate of Rs. 20/- per metric ton. According to the writ petitioners the first writ petitioner had been supplying raw materials in terms of the contract. However, the first respondent most wrongfully and illegally terminated the said contract, also failed and neglected to pay the balance amount of price of the goods sold delivered. Following cancellation of the contract the first respondent invoked risk purchase clause and asked both the writ petitioners for making payment for the loss on account of purchase at a higher price.
2. Normally the point of jurisdiction has to be dealt with going by the statement and averment made in the writ petition but in this case the affidavit was filed on the question of jurisdiction only, as such, the learned Trial Judge had taken note of not only the statement and averment in the writ petition but also the same made in the affidavit-in-opposition. In order to invoke jurisdiction of this Court it appears in the clause title that the petitioners have stated that the respondent No. 1 has its head office at 75C, Park Street, Rubi Building, Kolkata- 700 016 and also its officials viz. respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 at 75C, Park Street, Kolkata- 700 016. However, it is stated that the respondent Nos. 5,6 and 7 were also officials of the first respondent and their office is at Nagaon Paper Mill, Kagajnagar, Assam outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In order to invoke the territorial jurisdiction of this Court it is alleged in paragraph 45 of the petition that the office of the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 is located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. The contract in question involving both the petitioners was executed on behalf of the petitioner at 40, Strand Road, Kolkata- 700 001 within the aforesaid jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. Moreover, all the communications from the respondents including the impugned notice dated 21st June, 2005 were addressed to and received by the respondents by post, at their said office at 40, Strand Road, Kolkata-700 001. Therefore, part of cause of action has arisen within the aforesaid jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. It is also stated in paragraph 46 that the records of the case were located partly in the office of the respondent No. 1 at Kolkata within the aforesaid jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court and partly at the office of the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 at Nagaon Paper Mills Unit of the respondent No. 12 at Assam outside the aforesaid jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. In paragraph 24 of the writ petition it is specifically stated that the said agreement as per Clause 17 of the work order was executed on behalf of the petitioner No. 1 at 40, Strand Road, Kolkata- 700 001 with the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. In paragraph 8 it is claimed that the work order was accepted by Kishore Saboo, proforma respondent No. 8, on behalf of the petitioner at the office situate at 40, Strand Road, Kolkata within the territorial jurisdiction.
3. In the affidavit-in-opposition the contesting respondents have specifically averred that no part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial limit of this Hon'ble Court. It is alleged that the contract was executed at the factory site of the first respondent in the State of Assam. In terms of the contract the payments were to be made and indeed were made at a branch of a nationalized bank at Nagaon Paper Mill, Kagajnagar. The work order was handed over and accepted by the writ petitioners at Kagajnagar in the State of Assam. The contract was terminated at Kagajnagar. It is further specifically averred that the head office at Park Street of the respondent No. 1 has nothing to do with this transaction except the tender documents which were made available therefrom. All transactions and negotiations took place in this matter at Kagajnagar. The raw materials were agreed to be supplied and, in fact, were supplied at Kagajnagar. Thus, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction.
4. Besides, there is an agreement of forum selection for resolving all the disputes by the competent Court situate in the State of Assam.
5. The learned Trial Judge was convinced by the contentions of the respondents and accepted the plea that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction, and held that though the petitioners have their place of business within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court the contract was actually executed outside the jurisdiction. He held that in view of the forum selection clause in the agreement and further execution of the contract having taken place at Nagoan, Assam part of cause of action cannot be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. Learned Trial Judge rejected the plea in this case and decided principle of debtor seeks creditor could not constitute any part of cause of action, as the payment in terms of agreement was to be made and in fact made through the bank situated in the State of Assam. Learned Trial Judge further held that communication of the letter dated 21st June, 2005 terminating contract was made from the State of Assam. Learned Trial Judge further found that all the records and connected documents relating to this case are located in the State of Assam. Learned Trial Judge further held that while weighing balance of convenience and inconvenience this Court has no jurisdiction as the same overwhelmingly tilts in favour of the Court situated in Assam. Learned Trial Judge has accepted the contention that forum selection clause is a governing factor relating to jurisdiction because cause of action is emanating from a contract.
6. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, submits that the learned Trial Judge is absolutely wrong in holding that this Court has no jurisdiction. The learned Judge has ignored the admitted position that the respondent No. 1, being a Government company has its head office at 75, Park Street, Kolkata situate within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. Therefore, according to him, the place of business of the first respondent is good enough to invoke the writ jurisdiction if one reads Article 226 clauses (1) and (2) carefully. He submits that originally before amendment of the Constitution in 1963 the writ petition could only be filed in a Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the seat of the respondents located but thereafter the Constitution was amended incorporating Clause (la) whereby and whereunder appropriate High Courts within whose territorial jurisdiction whole or part of cause of action arises were conferred with jurisdiction. Thereafter, this Clause (la) was deleted by the subsequent amendment and by consolidating the Clause (2) of the said Article.
7. According to him, the writ petition at present can be filed in two Courts viz. either in one within whose territorial jurisdiction the seat of the State situates or the person resides and also in the Court within whose jurisdiction whole or part of cause of action arises. He contends in support of his document that this would be clear from the Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in case of Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 1989(1) CLJ 324.
8. He further contends that the substantial part of cause of action has arisen in this case within the territorial limit of this Hon'ble Court when the counteroffer in the shape of work order was accepted by the writ petitioners at its place of business at 40, Strand Road (4th floor, room No. 4), Kolkata -700 001 within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. Besides, the payment is to be made at the place of business of the plaintiff following the principle of debtor must seek creditor. In support of this part of his contention he has relied on the following decisions , .
9. Mr. Ajoy Krishna Chatterjee, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents submits that the dismissal of the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction by the learned Trial Judge is absolutely justified. It is mixed question of fact and law and on appreciation of fact the learned Trial Judge held that no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial limit of this Hon'ble Court. This Court should not interfere with these findings. He contends through various statements and other documents that the jurisdictional fact pleaded in the writ petition is absolutely incorrect as no part of cause of action could be said to have been arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. The formal contract in question was executed in accordance with the terms and conditions as provided in the tender documents at Kagajnagar, Assam and not at 40, Strand Road, Kolkata -700 001. The notice, which was challenged, was never sent by post to the petitioner No. 1. It was received by and on behalf of Durga Trading Company by its authorized representative at Kagajnagar, Assam. This fact of acknowledgement of receipt of such notice is appearing in the copy of the notice itself. He further contends that the payment was to be made and, in fact, it was made to the writ petitioners under the condition of the tender document in a bank situates at Kagajnagar. Under those circumstances it cannot be said that the principle of debtor must seek creditor does and can arise. His next contention is that the head office in Calcutta has nothing to do with the transaction as all correspondences, have been exchanged and agreement negotiation had taken place between the respondent company and the writ petitioners at its branch at Kagajnagar in the State of Assam. From the head office tender document was supplied merely and nothing else and it is settled law that if the office and/or place of business of the respondent has no nexus and relation with the transaction within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the purpose of jurisdiction. When no part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court and further the effective place of business of respondent in connection with transaction does not situate within the territorial limit of this Hon'ble Court the writ petition cannot be entertained. Besides, he contends, in the agreement there is forum selection clause whereby and whereunder parties agreed that all the proceedings must be brought before the Appropriate Court situates in the State of Assam. In support of his contention he has relied on the following decisions , and .
10. It appears upon considering the submissions of the respective learned Counsel and also the facts of the case that the issue of jurisdiction in this case is related to the following questions:
(1) Whether filing of the writ petition can be governed by the forum selection agreement between the parties or not?
(2) Whether the situs of the head office of the respondent No. 1 in the facts and circumstances of this case is a relevant factor for invoking writ jurisdiction of this Court or not?
(3) Whether any part of cause of action going by the pleadings and evidence can be said to have arisen within the territorial limit of this Hon'ble Court or not?
11. It appears that the learned Single Judge has taken note of the forum selection clause and was persuaded to hold that this forum selection is one of the bars to file the writ petition in this regard. We, therefore, think it fit if the forum selection agreement is a governing factor in this case then how far it operates as bar under the law has to be examined, and if we find that bar indeed then certainly other contentions of the learned Counsel are not to be considered at all. We set out the text of the forum selection agreement contained in the tender document which has been adopted as the terms and conditions of the agreement here:
for any legal dispute, if arises, the jurisdiction for settlement will be the Civil Court, Murigaon, Assam.
12. It is plain from the above clause that the resolution of legal dispute if arises will have to be brought by any of the parties on the strength of the aforesaid agreement before the Appropriate Civil Court at the place in the State of Assam. In the writ petition upon scrutiny we find enforcement of civil right and/or complaint in connection with breach of contractual obligation is not the subject-matter. Grievance in the writ petition is for enforcement of right as guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Civil Court has no power to entertain any dispute as required to be resolved by the Writ Court. Therefore, we are of the view that the aforesaid agreement selecting forum is only applicable in case of litigation brought in the private law field. Besides, the agreement appears to be vague and such an agreement cannot operate as bar. Moreover, it is impossible to think that the provision under Article 226 can be contracted out by selecting one of the two competent forums. There cannot be estoppel as against provision of Constitutional law. The legality and validity of the forum selection agreement is indirectly recognized under the provision of Section 28 of the Contract Act. This provision does not envisage, in our view, recognition and acceptance of contracting out of the provision of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Thus, we are unable to subscribe the contention raised by Mr. Chatterjee that forum selection clause operates as a bar to entertain writ petition by this Court. Therefore, findings of the learned Trial Judge to that extent is not accepted by this Court and the same is patently erroneous on fact and in law. This view of the learned Trial Judge is accordingly negatived by this Court.
13. Now coming to the question of accrual of cause of action whether whole or part has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court, we find in paragraph 45 of the writ petition, it has been specifically stated how the cause of action has accrued within the jurisdiction of this Court on fact. This fact has been denied in the affidavit-in-opposition emphatically and it is stated, on the other hand, that this whole cause of action has accrued in the State of Assam. Therefore, we have no option but to look into the document. The petitioner has stated that agreement has been entered into at 40, Strand Road, Kolkata. Apart from this statement on oath there is no document to establish this fact since it is denied. The work order though addresses at the office of the petitioner was sent from the factory office of the respondent No. 1 locates at Kagajnagar in Assam. But where it has been received and accepted by the petitioner is not proved. On the other hand, it has been stated in the affidavit-in-opposition and it also appears from the document that this was received at Kagajnagar. The work order in the form of a letter does not appear to have been sent by the regular postal communication. How it was received is not stated nor established by any document. If it was received otherewise by post then necessary documents should have been produced. Rather it is specifically proved that consequent upon acceptance of the work order the formal agreement was signed at the office of Assam. From the document it is clear that it was executed at Kagajnagar in the State of Assam. Therefore, the learned Judge has correctly found that this part of cause of action had arisen in the State of Assam.
14. Mr. Mukherjee then contends that payment in terms of the contract was to be made by the respondent No. 1 following the principle of debtor must seek creditor. In our view this case has not been pleaded in the petition though Mr. Mukherjee urges this principle does not require to be pleaded, according to him, pleading is required where there exists an agreement contrary to the aforesaid principle regarding payment. We do not think that without impleadment of this principle, though legal, jurisdiction fact can be complete. It is true that the principle of law is not required to be pleaded, but then sometimes principle of law becomes statement of fact that needs to be stated for invocation of jurisdiction. It appears to us on the contrary under the terms and conditions embodied in the tender document which has been adopted and made part of the contract relating to the payment it is provided as follows:
All payments payable to the contractors/suppliers after deduction of recovery of any dues to the company shall be made through account payee cheque on SBI, Sonacuchi Branch on any schedule bank.
15. It is, thus clear that the payment is to be made by the banker situates outside the territorial limit of this Hon'ble Court. The mode of payment is provided by account payee cheque and obviously upon encashment and/or clearance of the cheque the payment is effected, not by mere issuance the same. Collection of proceeds upon cheque being deposited by the banker of the drawee qua agent, from the banker of the drawer is also payment. If payment in a case of this nature is taken to be part of cause of action, then the place of collection of the value of the cheque is relevant for deciding the situs of the Court. It is further contended that the notice which is under challenge was received by the writ petitioners at its office situates within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. Such statement is denied and disputed on oath. Rather it is stated specifically that it was received by authorized representative of the writ petitioner at Kagajnagar in the State of Assam. The petitioner has failed to prove adducing any cogent evidence that this impugned notice was received at Kolkata. Under such circumstances, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court on the plea as averred. We, therefore, approve the findings of the learned Single Judge that no part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court.
16. I now consider the contention as whether the head office of the respondent No. 1 is a factor for invocation of jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court or not.
17. Therefore, it is necessary to set out the relevant portion of the Article 226 of the Constitution of India:
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred the Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
18. Upon plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses it seems to us that the jurisdiction under Article 226 can be invoked in two situations viz. in case of accrual of cause of action whole and part, and in case where the seat of such Government or authority or residence of such person, to put it differently either the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction whole or part of cause of action has arisen can be approached, or the Court within whose jurisdiction the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person situates can be approached. The word 'notwithstanding' used in Clause (2) has made it clear without any doubt that the situs of the respondents still remains one of the factors for invoking jurisdiction. Actually prior to the Constitution, 15th Amendment Act, 1963 this provision was not originally in the Article 226. Clause (1) of Article 226 was the only factor for deciding the question of jurisdiction. The language of Clause (1) is very clear that every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs etc., for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. So there is no room for doubt that exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 was depending upon the seat for the respondents within its territory. Going by the aforesaid provision which stood before amendment the Supreme Court has explained in the case of Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao reported in 1953 SCR 1144 and in the subsequent cases of Khajor Singh v. Union of India and Collector of Customs v. E. I. Commercial Co. that place of office and/or residence of the respondents was the only factor for invocation of the jurisdiction of Article 226. Taking note of the aforesaid judicial pronouncement the Constitution was amended as correctly contended by Mr. Mukherjee by the 15th Amendment Act, 1963 incorporating Clause (1A) and thereafter this Clause (1A) and Clause (2) stood consolidated and renumbered as Clause (2) by 42nd Amendment. It appears to us that the text of previous Clause (1A) of Article 226 and the language imparted in the present clause of Article 226 are absolutely same and there in no change at all.
19. Accordingly, we hold that the word 'seat' of such Government or authority used in Clause (2) of the Article 226 means and connotes registered office or principal office or head office whatever may be terminology or even branch office, irrespective of the fact that these places of office have any relation and/ or nexus with the accrual of causes of action. If the nexus and/or connection of the place of business with accrual of causes of action, is conceived as contended by Mr. Chatterjee then the situs of the residence becomes meaningless and in that case Constitution makers could have deleted the theory of situs theory altogether. Rather it could have been provided straightaway that accrual of causes of action either whole or part is the only factor for invocation of jurisdiction, not the place of residence or seat of the respondent. This proposition of law as enunciated by Mr. Chatterjee drawing a reference and/or analogy in the case of a civil matter is wholly misplaced in the public law field.
20. I find a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court rendered in Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat case reported in 1989(1) CLJ 324 is in support of our aforesaid proposition. In paragraph 4 Their Lordships observed as follows:
The question with respect to cause of action, wholly or in part, arising within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court was not directly relevant, since Clause (1) of Article 226 of the Constitution is attracted in the present case in view of the fact that the Head office/Registered office of the second respondent company, which is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, is situate in Calcutta....
21. The learned Single Judge missed to take note of the aforesaid observation of the Division Bench which is binding upon him as it was directly on this issue. Rather he has relied on a decision of the learned Single Judge. The decision cited by Mr. Chatterjee rendered by the learned Single Judge in the case of Calpro Food (Pvt.) Ltd. reported in 100 CWN 322 had nothing to do with the question of the office of the respondent, rather the said case was founded on cause of action while attracting territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Moreover, the learned Single Judge's observation in paragraph 5 that the provision of Article 226 can be contracted out under the provision of Section 28 of the Contract Act is not sustainable in law as we have observed that provision of Article 226 is a Constitutional provision and it cannot be contracted out by the act of the parties. The said judgment is not a good law as far as contracting out the provision of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned. It is now firmly settled that this provision is one part of basic structure of the Constitution and it is inviolable even by the Parliament, not to speak of private individual.
22. All other decisions cited by Mr. Chatterjee rendered in case of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr. has dealt with the question of accrual of causes of action for attracting jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. Rather in paragraphs 10, 25 and 30 of this judgment it is made clear that the theory of forum convenience can be made applicable in case of accrual of part of cause of action in the writ jurisdiction also. It is held in that case that if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of one particular High Court the same by itself may not be considered to be determinative factor compelling the High Court concerned to decide the matter on merit. This judgment of the Supreme Court nowhere said that the accrual of causes of action was relatable to the seat of the State and/or authority and the residence of the respondent. The decision of the Supreme Court referred to by us prior to amendment 1963 is not reversed by any subsequent decision of the Supreme Court or by making any provision in the Constitution. The intention of the Parliament while amending the Constitution was to confer jurisdiction upon two Courts under the Constitution as observed by us earlier.
23. Next decision relied on by Mr. Chatterjee reported in Madan Mohan, Chairman-cum Managing Direction, Coal India Limited and Ors. does not help in this case as this case proceeded on the fact that part of cause of action accrued in Calcutta at the head office of respondent No. 1. The learned Single Judge, of course, did not expressly state as a proposition of law that the place of business or office of the respondent must have nexus to be accrual of causes of action. So, this judgment is not at all relevant in this case. The learned Single Judge, therefore, decided the question of jurisdiction by making seat of the respondent relatable to cause of action. Thus, we are unable to support the judgment of the learned Trial Judge.
24. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and now, the writ petition be heard on merit before the learned Single Judge for which we remand the matter.
Arun Kumar Bhattacharya, J.
25. While I fully concur with the aforesaid views of my learned Brother, Hike to add a few more words.
26. To obviate the difficulties with the holding that the cause of action was not at all relevant for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on High Courts under Article 226 as it originally stood, as expressed in the case of Venkata Rao ; Rashid Ahmed and re-affirmed in Collector of Customs v. East India Commercial Company Ltd. and as observed by the Apex Court that the only remedy was amendment of the Constitution, new Clause (1A) after Clause (1) was introduced by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 which was subsequently renumbered as Clause (2) by 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 the underlying object being to avoid considerable hardshop to litigants from distant places due to the holding that the only High Court which was jurisdiction with respect to the Central Government is the Punjab High Court. The effect of the said amendment is that it made the accrual of cause of action an additional ground to confer jurisdiction to a High Court under Article 226. Thus, after insertion of Clause (2) the legal position is that a writ can be issued by a High Court against a person. Government or authority residing within the jurisdiction of that High Court or with whose jurisdiction the cause of action in whole or in part arises.
27. Even though the registered office of the company was at Ludhiana, a petition was filed in this High Court on the ground that the company had its branch office there, and ex parte ad interim relief was obtained by the petitioner.
Vacating the ad interim relief it was held in Union of India v. Oswal Industries that having regard to the fact that the registered office of the Company is at Ludhiana and the principal respondents against whom the primary relief is sought are at New Delhi, one would have expected the writ petition to be filed either in the High Court of Punjab & Haryana or in the Delhi High Court. The petitioners, however, have chosen the Calcutta High Court as the forum perhaps because one of the interlocutory reliefs which is sought is in respect of a consignment of beef tallow which arrived at the Calcutta Port. An inevitable result of the filing of the writ petitioners elsewhere than at the place where the concerned offices and the relevant records are located is to delay prompt return and contest.
28. In the case of Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das the registered office of the company was located at Bombay, but by filing a petition in the District Consumer Redressal Forum, Calcutta, the petitioner got the company restrained from allotting shares. Vacating the interim order it was observed by the Apex Court that as far as India is concerned, the residence of the company is where the registered office is located. Normally, cases should be filed only where the registered office of the company is situated.
29. Therefore, when the present case comes under the purview of Clause (1), attracting the provision of Clause (2) of Article 226 obviously does not arise, and accordingly this Court, needless to mention, has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the present writ petition.