Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Kambhamettu Jaya Bharathi vs Khaja Abdul Moin Baig (Died) And Ors. on 6 April, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2004(4)ALT622
JUDGMENT B.S.A. Swamy, J.
1. The defendant in O.S.No.1040 of 1980 is the appellant before this Court. Having been aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Sub-ordinate Judge at Vijayawada in A.S. No.150 of 1982, dated 21-08-1995, confirming the judgment and decree passed by the District Munsif, Vijayawada, in O.S.No.1040 of 1980, dated 06-10-1982, she filed the present Second Appeal.
2. The facts are not disputed. On 10-02-1976 the plaintiff in O.S.No.1040 of 1980 i.e., Khaja Abdul Moin Baig executed an agreement of sale in favour of the defendant to sell a house admeasuring 527..7 square yards with a small stoned wall thatched shed, for a sale consideration of Rs.11,000/- and having received advance amount of Rs.1,500/-, possession of the land was handed over to the defendant. As per the terms of the agreement of sale, the defendant has to pay Rs.300/- on 20-01-1979 and Rs.5,200/- on 25-07-1979, Rs.3,000/- on 01-01-1980 and the balance sale consideration at the time of registration of the sale deed. Admittedly, the defendant paid only Rs.300/- on 20-01-1979 and thereafter she committed default in payment of all other instalments. In those circumstances, the plaintiff having repudiated the contract sought for re-conveyance of the property. When the defendant did not oblige, he filed the suit for recovery of the possession of the suit schedule property. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff died and his wife and two sons were brought on record as his legal heirs. The trial Court decreed the suit 06-10-1982 and the same was confirmed by the Sub-ordinate Judge, Vijayawada, in A.S.No.150 of 1982, dated 21-08-1995. Hence, the present Second Appeal.
3. The only contention raised by Ms. Shakira Bhanu, representing Sri T. Dasaradha Ramaiah, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant in this Second Appeal is that the second respondent in the appeal i.e., Mehudunnisa Begum died during the pendency of the appeal and the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent failed to furnish the list of her legal representatives as required under Order 22 Rule 10-A of C.P.C. and as such her counterpart in the lower appellate Court could not bring the legal representatives on record and ultimately the appeal was disposed of. Since one of the respondents died and her legal representatives were not brought on record, the contention of Ms. Shakira Bhanu is that as the appeal was abated against Mehudunnisa Begum. Hence, the entire appeal has to be declared as abated against other respondents also.
4. Countering the arguments of Smt. V. Dyumani, representing Sri T.S. Anand learned counsel for the respondents contended that even if legal representatives of Mehudunnisa Begum are not brought on record, the appeal cannot be abated since Mehudunnisa Begum along with legal representatives was representing the estate of the deceased plaintiff. She being the mother of the two other respondents, they are already on record to represent her. At any rate, the estate of the late Khaja Abdul Moin Baig is represented by the other legal representatives and as such the question of abatement of the appeal does not arise. In support of her contention she cited the following two decisions.
5. In Newanness V. Shaikh Mohamad 1 the Supreme Court held that:
"It is next contended that since D-1 died in March, 1990, steps were not taken to bring the legal representatives on record until 27th January, 1995 despite notice given to the appellant by a letter dated November 14, 1990 and no proper explanation has been given for the inordinate delay. Therefore, the appeal as a whole should be dismissed as having been abated. We find no force in the contention. Since the third defendant is already on record representing all the heirs of the first defendant widow, the question of abatement does not rise. Even otherwise, we find that substitution should be allowed, since no injustice would be done in bringing the legal representatives on record. Thus the objection is over ruled. The application for substitution is allowed."
6. In Beharilal and Bhuri Devi 2 the Supreme Court held that:
"In view of the respective contentions, the first question that arises for consideration is whether the appeal has abated on account of failure to substitute the legal representatives of the first respondent. It is seen that the original allottee, Ram Gopal is represented by his widow Bhuri Devi, and Kamla, the daughter. Kamala and Bhuri Devi are on record representing his estate. Therefore, on the demise of Bhuri Devi, Kamla being already on record, is representing the estate of her mother as well as her father Ram Gopal. Under these circumstances, the appeal has not been abated nor is there any need to bring separately the legal representatives of Bhuri Devi on record."
7. From these two judgments it is seen that, since the estate of the plaintiff is duly represented by his sons even after the death of his wife, the appeal does not abate even if some other legal representatives are there and they were not brought on record.
8. As far as the merits of the case are concerned, the Appellate Court also confirmed the judgment of the trial Court. In other words, the view taken by the trial Court was upheld. Since some other legal representatives represented the estate of the plaintiff, the question of abatement does not come into play. If the Appellate Court takes a different view from that of the trial Court i.e., when there are two conflicting judgments and when the judgment of the trial court became final due to abatement, a contrary view taken in the appeal in the presence of other legal representatives is not permissible because there cannot be two conflicting views on the very same issue, but such a situation is not arising in this case.
9. Viewed from any angle, I do not find any substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. It is also brought to my notice that after the first Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, the respondents have taken possession of the land on 30-09-1995. Hence, I do not find any merit in this Appeal.
10. The Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.