Madhya Pradesh High Court
Charanjeet vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 16 April, 2026
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193
1 Cr.A. No. 649/2016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA YADAV
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 649 of 2016
CHARANJEET
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Deependra Singh Raghuwanshi, Advocate for the appellant
Dr. Anjali Gyanani, Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State.
Reserved on : 09/04/2026
Pronounced on : 16/04/2026
JUDGMENT
Per: Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia This Criminal Appeal, under Section 374 of Cr.P.C, has been filed against the judgment and sentence dated 26.05.2016 passed by First Additional Sessions Judge, Dabra, District Gwalior in Sessions Trial No. 248/2014, by which the appellant has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with a fine of ₹500 with default imprisonment of 3 months‟ R.I..
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 2 Cr.A. No. 649/2016
2. The facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal, in short, are that on 04.12.2013, an information was received from Civil Hospital Dabra, to the effect that Smt. Priya Dhanuk has been brought by her Jeth Virendra Dhanuk in a burnt condition. She was immediately referred from Civil Hospital, Dabra to Gwalior. On 04.12.2013 itself, at about 11.20 p.m., the Dying Declaration of injured Priya Dhanuk, was recorded, who stated that on 04.12.2013 at about 08.00 P.M., her husband/appellant has set her on fire after pouring kerosene oil on her. On 4-12-2013 itself, spot map was prepared. On 05.12.2013 from 11.01 A.M. to 11.15 A.M., another Dying Declaration of deceased Smt. Priya Dhanuk was recorded by Tahsildar, Morar District, Gwalior, to the effect "that on 04.12.2013 at about 08.00 P.M., her husband has set her on fire after pouring kerosene oil on her. At the time of incident, she and her husband were in the house. It was also stated by the deceased that her parents-in-law also reside with them, however, on the date of incident, they had gone to attend some marriage. Her husband is an alcoholic and without any issue, he always picks up quarrel with her." The medical certificate from the doctor was also obtained by the Tahsildar. On 09.12.2013, another information was received from Ayushman Hospital Trauma Centre, Gwalior, to the effect that Smt Priya Dhanuk, who was brought in a burnt condition on 04.12.2013, has expired. Accordingly, Merg No. 113/2013 under Section 174 of CrPC was registered. The post mortem of dead body of deceased was got done. Crime detail form was prepared on 13.12.2013 at 12.30 P.M. The statements of the witnesses were recorded. The appellant was arrested. The seized articles were sent to F.S.L. The police after recording statements and collecting evidence filed a charge sheet against the Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 3 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 appellant under Section 302 of IPC. The FSL report was also received during the pendency of the trial.
3. The Trial Court, by Order dated 2-5-2014, framed charge under Section 302 of IPC. Charge was abjured by appellant. (It is not out of place to mention here that a factual mistake was committed by the trial Court and it was mentioned in the charge that the appellant has killed his wife on 09.12.2013 by pouring kerosene oil on her. In fact the deceased was set on fire on 04.12.2013 and she died on 09.12.2013. However it is made clear that no objection with regard to the vagueness in the charge or any sort of prejudice was ever raised by the appellant).
4. The prosecution in order to prove its case, examined Meena (PW1), Hukum Singh (PW2), Shugar Singh (PW3), Dr. J.N. Soni (PW4), Chandan Singh (PW5), K. K. Dixit (PW6), Sunny Jatav (PW7), Sharda Pathak (PW8), Uttam Singh (PW9), Fateh Singh (PW10), Suresh chand (PW11), Pratigya Dhengula (PW12), Vijay Singh Kushwaha (PW13), Dinesh Singh Chauhan (PW14), Dr. Vikrant Singh (PW15), Jitendra Singh (PW16) and Hukum Singh (PW17).
5. The appellant examined Lakshmi (DW1), Virendra Dhanuk (DW2) and Gauri Shankar (DW3) in his defence.
6. The Trial Court, after hearing both the parties, convicted the appellant under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced him to undergo the jail sentence of life imprisonment and a fine of ₹500 with default imprisonment of 3 months‟ rigorous imprisonment.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 4 Cr.A. No. 649/2016
7. Challenging the judgment and sentence passed by the Trial Court, it is submitted by counsel for appellant that the parents of the deceased namely Meena (PW1), and Hukum Singh (PW2) as well as Shugar Singh (P.W.3) and Sunny Jatav (P.W.7) have turned hostile and they did not support the prosecution case. It is submitted that the case is primarily based on two Dying Declarations of the deceased. Once the parents of the deceased have specifically stated that the deceased was never maltreated by her in-laws, then it is clear that her Dying Declarations have become doubtful. Furthermore, from the spot, a kerosene stove in a burst condition was recovered, which clearly shows that the deceased died on account of accident and not on account of burn injuries due to pouring of kerosene oil by the appellant. It is further submitted that since, the deceased had suffered 80-90% burn injuries, therefore, She was not in a position to speak.
8. Per contra, the appeal is vehemently opposed by counsel for the State. It is submitted that in fact the Dying Declarations of the deceased are trustworthy and reliable. The stove was found broken and not burst. It is well established principle of law that if the Dying Declaration is found reliable and trustworthy, then conviction can be recorded on the basis of the same. The trial court did not commit any mistake by convicting the appellant.
9. Heard, learned counsel for the parties.
10. The case in hand is based on the following circumstantial evidences:
First : Homicidal Death
Second : Dying Declaration.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND
SHRIVASTAVA
Signing time: 16-04-2026
18:12:06
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193
5 Cr.A. No. 649/2016
Third : Presence of the deceased on the spot.
Fourth : Conduct of the deceased post incident.
Fifth : FSL report.
Whether the death of the deceased Smt. Priya Dhanuk was homicidal or accidental
11. Dr. J.N. Soni (PW4) is the autopsy surgeon. He had conducted the post mortem of the deceased along with Dr. Ajay Gupta. As per post mortem report, dead body of an average-built female aged about 20 years was lying on post mortem table in supine condition. The autopsy surgeons found first to third degree ante mortem 4 to 6 days old, infected, foul- smelling burns and wounds.
(i) Anteriorly burn present over face, neck, right arm, chest, abdomen and both lower limbs;
(ii) Posterior burn present over both upper limbs, back and trunk in patches, Neck and back of both lower limbs;
(iii) Burn wound involves 90% of the body's surface area and sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature.
The cause of death was due to cardiorespiratory failure as a result of burn and its complications. The duration of death was within 24 hours since post mortem examination and nature of death was opined to be decided on the basis of circumstantial evidences collected. The post mortem report is Ex. P7.
12. Dr. J.N. Soni (P.W.4) was cross examined in short and he stated that a person who has suffered 90% burn injuries can always speak and he stated that thumbs of both the hands were containing the Ink and he also admitted that he cannot give an opinion as to whether the death of the Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 6 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 deceased was suicidal or homicidal and therefore they had given an advice that the said aspect should be decided after considering the surrounding circumstances.
13. Thus it is clear that the deceased had died on account of first to third degree burns. However, whether the death of the deceased was suicidal or homicidal, can be decided only after considering the other circumstances. This aspect shall be dealt with at a later part of this Judgment.
Dying Declaration
14. Before considering the facts of the case, this Court would like to consider the law related to the Dying Declaration.
15. The Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh v. State of Haryana, reported in (2017) 1 SCC 529 has held as under :
31. Law on the admissibility of the dying declarations is well settled. In Jai Karan v. State (NCT of Delhi), this Court explained that a dying declaration is admissible in evidence on the principle of necessity and can form the basis of conviction if it is found to be reliable. In order that a dying declaration may form the sole basis for conviction without the need for independent corroboration it must be shown that the person making it had the opportunity of identifying the person implicated and is thoroughly reliable and free from blemish. If, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is found that the maker of the statement was in a fit state of mind and had voluntarily made the statement on the basis of personal knowledge without being influenced by others and the court on strict scrutiny finds it to be reliable, there is no rule of law or even of prudence that such a reliable piece of evidence cannot be acted upon unless it is corroborated. A dying declaration is an independent piece of evidence like any other piece of evidence, Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 7 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 neither extra strong or weak, and can be acted upon without corroboration if it is found to be otherwise true and reliable.
There is no hard-and-fast rule of universal application as to whether percentage of burns suffered is determinative factor to affect credibility of dying declaration and improbability of its recording. Much depends upon the nature of the burn, part of the body affected by the burn, impact of the burn on the faculties to think and convey the idea or facts coming to mind and other relevant factors. Percentage of burns alone would not determine the probability or otherwise of making dying declaration. Physical state or injuries on the declarant do not by themselves become determinative of mental fitness of the declarant to make the statement (see Rambai v. State of Chhattisgarh).
32. It is immaterial to whom the declaration is made. The declaration may be made to a Magistrate, to a police officer, a public servant or a private person. It may be made before the doctor; indeed, he would be the best person to opine about the fitness of the dying man to make the statement, and to record the statement, where he found that life was fast ebbing out of the dying man and there was no time to call the police or the Magistrate. In such a situation the doctor would be justified, rather duty-bound, to record the dying declaration of the dying man. At the same time, it also needs to be emphasised that in the instant case, dying declaration is recorded by a competent Magistrate who was having no animus with the accused persons. As held in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, this kind of dying declaration would stand on a much higher footing. After all, a competent Magistrate has no axe to grind against the person named in the dying declaration of the victim and in the absence of circumstances showing anything to the contrary, he should not be disbelieved by the court (see Vikas v. State of Maharashtra).
33. No doubt, the victim has been brought with 100% burn injuries. Notwithstanding, the doctor found that she was in a conscious state of mind and was competent to give her statement. Thus, the Magistrate had taken due precautions and, in fact, the medical officer remained present when the dying declaration was being recorded. Therefore, this dying declaration cannot be discarded merely going by the extent of Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 8 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 burns with which she was suffering, particularly, when the defence has not been able to elicit anything from the cross- examination of the doctor that her mental faculties had totally impaired rendering her incapable of giving a statement.
16. The Supreme Court in the case of Purshottam Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2020) 11 SCC 489 has held as under :
Admission and acceptability of dying declaration: The principles
18. The principles relating to admission and acceptability of the statement made by a victim representing the cause of death, usually referred to as a dying declaration, are well settled and a few doubts as regards pre-requisites for acceptability of a dying declaration were also put at rest by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra.
18.1. In the said case of Laxman, conviction of the appellant was based on dying declaration of the deceased which was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. The Session Judge and the High Court found such dying declaration to be truthful, voluntary and trustworthy; and recorded conviction on that basis. In appeal to this Court, it was urged with reference to the decision in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P. that the dying declaration could not have been accepted by the Court to form the sole basis of conviction since certification of the doctor was not to the effect that the patient was in a fit state of mind to make the statement. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the State, with reference to the decision in Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat, that the material on record indicated that the deceased was fully conscious and was capable of making a statement; and his dying declaration cannot be ignored merely because the doctor had not made the endorsement about his fit state of mind to make the statement. In view of these somewhat discordant notes, the matter came to be referred to the larger Bench.
18.2. The Constitution Bench in Laxman summed up the principles applicable as regards the acceptability of dying Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 9 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 declaration in the following: (Laxman case, SCC pp. 713-14, para 3) "3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with.
Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however, has always to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a Magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a Magistrate absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a Magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 10 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a Magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a Magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise."
18.3. The Constitution Bench affirmed the view in Koli Chunilal Savji while holding that Paparambaka Rosamma, was not correctly decided. The Court said: (Laxman case, SCC p. 715, para 5) "5. ... It is indeed a hypertechnical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind especially when the Magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the questions he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind whereafter he recorded the dying declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this Court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P. must be held to be not correctly decided and we affirm the law laid down by this Court in Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat."
19. In Dal Singh case, this Court has pointed out that the law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration nor is there a prescribed format or procedure for the same. All that is required is the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making such a statement. This Court also pointed out that as to whether in a given burn case, the skin of thumb had been completely burnt or if some part of it will remain intact, would Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 11 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 also be a question of fact. This Court said: (SCC p. 167, paras 20-22) "20. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that law does not provide who can record a dying declaration, nor is there any prescribed form, format, or procedure for the same. The person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making such a statement. Moreover, the requirement of a certificate provided by a doctor in respect of such state of the deceased, is not essential in every case.
21. Undoubtedly, the subject of the evidentiary value and acceptability of a dying declaration, must be approached with caution for the reason that the maker of such a statement cannot be subjected to cross-examination. However, the court may not look for corroboration of a dying declaration, unless the declaration suffers from any infirmity.
22. So far as the question of thumb impression is concerned, the same depends upon facts, as regards whether the skin of the thumb that was placed upon the dying declaration was also burnt. Even in case of such burns in the body, the skin of a small part of the body i.e. of the thumb, may remain intact. Therefore, it is a question of fact regarding whether the skin of the thumb had in fact been completely burnt, and if not, whether the ridges and curves had remained intact."
19.1. In Bhagwan, this Court accepted the dying declaration made by a person having suffered 92% burn injury and whose continued consciousness was certified by the doctor. This Court referred to the decision in Vijay Pal v. State (NCT of Delhi), where the statement made by the victim having suffered 100% burn injury was also accepted. This Court said: (Bhagwan case, SCC pp. 106-107, paras 24-25) "(B) Can a person who has suffered 92% burn injuries be in a condition to give a dying declaration?
24. This question is also no longer res integra. In Vijay Pal v. State (NCT of Delhi), we notice the following discussion: (SCC p. 759, paras 23-24) „23. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that when the deceased sustained 100% burn injuries, she could not have made any statement to her brother. In this regard, we may Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 12 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 profitably refer to the decision in Mafabhai Nagarbhai Raval v. State of Gujarat wherein it has been held that a person suffering 99% burn injuries could be deemed capable enough for the purpose of making a dying declaration. The Court in the said case opined that unless there existed some inherent and apparent defect, the trial court should not have substituted its opinion for that of the doctor. In the light of the facts of the case, the dying declaration was found to be worthy of reliance.
24. In State of M.P. v. Dal Singh, a two-Judge Bench placed reliance on the dying declaration of the deceased who had suffered 100% burn injuries on the ground that the dying declaration was found to be credible.‟
25. Therefore, the mere fact that the patient suffered 92% burn injuries as in this case would not stand in the way of patient giving a dying declaration which otherwise inspires the confidence of the Court and is free from tutoring, and can be found reliable."
20. In Gian Kaur, the dying declaration was disbelieved on the ground that though as per medical evidence the deceased had 100% burn injuries but the thumb mark appearing on the dying declaration had clear ridges and curves. The benefit of doubt extended by the High Court was found to be not unreasonable and hence, this Court declined to interfere while observing as under: (Gian Kaur case, SCC p. 943, para 5) "5. The High Court disbelieved the dying declaration on the ground that even though according to the medical evidence Rita had 100% burns, the thumb mark of Rita appearing on the dying declaration had clear ridges and curves. The High Court found the evidence of Dr Ajay Sahni-PW 1 not reliable as he failed to satisfactorily explain how such a thumb mark could appear on the dying declaration when Rita had 100% burns over her body. The High Court relied upon the deposition of Doctor Aneja, who had performed the post-mortem and who has categorically stated that there were 100% burns over her body and both the thumbs of Rita were burnt. In view of such inconsistent evidence, the High Court was right in giving benefit of doubt to the respondents. It cannot be said in this case that the High Court has taken an unreasonable view."
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 13 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 20.1. In Gopalsingh, the Court found that the dying declaration did not contain complete names and addresses of the persons charged with the offence and it was found that conviction could not be based on such dying declaration alone without corroboration. Essentially, for the infirmity carried by such dying declaration, this Court found lesser justification for the High Court‟s interference with the order of acquittal while observing as under: (SCC p. 272, para 8) "8. But even if we assume that the High Court was right in concluding that the dying declaration established the identity of the appellants, it was certainly not of that character as would warrant its acceptance without corroboration. It is settled law that a court is entitled to convict on the sole basis of a dying declaration if it is such that in the circumstances of the case it can be regarded as truthful. On the other hand if on account of an infirmity, it cannot be held to be entirely reliable, corroboration would be required."
20.2. In Dalip Singh, the alleged dying declaration turned out to be doubtful for it contained such facts which could not have been in the knowledge of the deceased and hence, this Court found it unsafe to rely on the same while observing as under:
(SCC p. 335, para 9) "9. ... The dying declaration seems to be otherwise truthful but for the fact that it could not be within the knowledge or vision of Teja Singh that Jetha Singh was murdered by the appellants. His saying so in the dying declaration makes his statement a bit doubtful. It is, therefore, safe to leave out of consideration this dying declaration."
20.3. In Thurukanni Pompiah, this Court held that while a truthful and reliable dying declaration may form the sole basis of conviction, even without corroboration but the Court must be satisfied about its truthfulness and reliability; and if the Court finds that the declaration is not wholly reliable and a material portion of the deceased‟s version of the occurrence is untrue, the Court may, in the circumstances of a given case, may consider it unsafe to convict the accused on the basis of the declaration alone without further corroboration. This Court observed, inter alia, as under: (AIR p. 941, para 9) Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 14 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 "9. Under clause (1) of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872, a statement made by a person who is dead, as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death is a relevant fact in cases in which the cause of that person‟s death comes into question, and such a statement is relevant whether the person who made it was or was not, at the time when it was made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question. The dying declaration of Eranna is, therefore, relevant and material evidence in the case.
A truthful and reliable dying declaration may form the sole basis of conviction, even though it is not corroborated. But the Court must be satisfied that the declaration is truthful. The reliability of the declaration should be subjected to a close scrutiny, considering that it was made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity to test its veracity by cross-examination. If the Court finds that the declaration is not wholly reliable and a material and integral portion of the deceased‟s version of the entire occurrence is untrue, the Court may, in all the circumstances of the case, consider it unsafe to convict the accused on the basis of the declaration alone without further corroboration."
20.4. In Uka Ram, this Court again emphasised on the requirement that the Court should be satisfied about trustworthiness of the dying declaration, its voluntary nature and fitness of the mind of the deceased and it was held that: (SCC p. 257, para 6) "6. ... Once the court is satisfied that the dying declaration was true, voluntary and not influenced by any extraneous consideration, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration as a rule requiring corroboration is not a rule of law but only a rule of prudence."
20.4.1. In the said case of Uka Ram, however, the Court found that the deceased was a mental patient and there existed a doubt about mental condition of the deceased at the time of making the dying declaration. In the given circumstances, this Court found that to be a fit case to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused.
21. For what has been noticed hereinabove, some of the principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 15 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 admissibility and reliability could be usefully summed up as under:
21.1. A dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction even without corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the court. 21.2. The court should be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement; and that it was a voluntary statement, which was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination.
21.3. Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
21.4. When the eyewitnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot prevail.
21.5. The law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration nor there is any prescribed format or procedure for the same but the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making the statement.
21.6. Although presence of a Magistrate is not absolutely necessary for recording of a dying declaration but to ensure authenticity and credibility, it is expected that a Magistrate be requested to record such dying declaration and/or attestation be obtained from other persons present at the time of recording the dying declaration.
21.7. As regards a burns case, the percentage and degree of burns would not, by itself, be decisive of the credibility of dying declaration; and the decisive factor would be the quality of evidence about the fit and conscious state of the declarant to make the statement.
21.8. If after careful scrutiny, the court finds the statement placed as dying declaration to be voluntary and also finds it coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in recording conviction on its basis even without corroboration.
* * * * 25.2. Another emphasis laid on behalf of the appellants is on the fact that the victim Sher Singh had suffered 100% burns and he was already in critical condition and further to that, his Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 16 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 condition was regularly deteriorating. It is, therefore, contended that in such a critical and deteriorating condition, he could not have made proper, coherent and intelligible statement. The submissions do not make out a case for interference. As laid down in Vijay Pal case and reiterated in Bhagwan case, the extent of burn injuries -- going beyond 92% and even to 100%
-- would not, by itself, lead to a conclusion that victim of such burn injuries may not be in a position to make the statement.
Irrespective of the extent and gravity of burn injuries, when the doctor had certified him to be in fit state of mind to make the statement; and the person recording the statement was also satisfied about his fitness for making such statement; and when there does not appear any inherent or apparent defect, in our view, the dying declaration cannot be discarded.
* * * * 25.4. The suggestions have also been made that the victim was in 100% burnt condition and therefore, the alleged statements Exts. PW-8/A and PW-16/B are manipulated and manufactured. We find nothing of substance in such suggestions for there had not been shown any reason for which PW 8 Dr Sushma and PW 16 SI Rajesh Kumar would manufacture any such document. Interestingly, certain suggestions were made to PW 19 Inspector Om Prakash in his cross-examination about his previous exchange of hot words or altercation with the accused persons. However, there was no such suggestion to PW 16 or to PW 8. For the same reason, the doubts sought to be suggested about availability of thumb impression of the victim on the statement Ext. PW-16/B deserve to be rejected. In Dal Singh, this Court has pointed out that in the case of burns, the skin of a small part of the body like thumb may remain intact; and it is essentially a question of fact as to whether skin of thumb had also been burnt completely. In this regard, it is also noticeable that even when the victim was carrying 100% deep burns, as per the post- mortem report, peeling off of skin was noticed on dorsum of hands and therefore, taking of thumb impression on Ext. PW- 16/B is not ruled out. The concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court in accepting the thumb impression on Ext. PW-16/B do not appear calling for any interference. It gets, perforce, reiterated that there appears no reason for PW 16 to go Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 17 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 to the extent of manufacturing the document with a false thumb impression.
17. As per Modi's Medical Jurisprudence, 1st degree burn mark is also known as epidermal burn. First Degree burns consists of erythema or simple redness of the skin caused by the momentary application of flame or hot solids, or liquids much below boiling point. It can also be produced by mild irritants. The erythema marked with superficial inflammation usually disappear in few hours, but may last for several days, when the upper layer of the skin peels off but leaves no scars. They disappear after death due to the gravitation of blood to the dependent parts. Second degree burns comprise acute inflammation and blisters produced by prolonged application of a flame, liquids at boiling point or solids much above the boiling point of water. The third and fourth degree burns are also known as Dermo-Epidermal burns. The third degree burn refers to the destruction of the cuticle and part of the true skin which appears horny and dark, owing to it having been charred and shrivelled. Exposure of nerve endings gives rise to much pain. Whereas in Fourth degree burn, the whole skin is destroyed. The fifth and sixth degree burns are also known as Deep burns. Fifth degree burn includes penetration of the deep fascia and implications of the muscles, and results in great scarring and deformity whereas sixth degree burn involves charring of the whole limb including the bones and ends in inflammation of the subjacent tissues and organs, if death is not the immediate result. Thus, it is clear that it is not the extent of superficial burn which effects the state of mind of the patient, but it is the degree of burn which effects the state of mind of the patient. Thus, merely because the patient had suffered 100% burns would Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 18 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 not mean that he/she was reduced to ashes. Therefore, it cannot be held that merely because a person has sustained 100% burn injuries, therefore, he cannot make a Dying Declaration.
18. The Supreme Court in the case of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2002) 6 SCC 710 has held as under :
5. The Court also in the aforesaid case relied upon the decision of this Court in Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab wherein the Magistrate in his evidence had stated that he had ascertained from the doctor whether she was in a fit condition to make a statement and obtained an endorsement to that effect and merely because an endorsement was made not on the declaration but on the application would not render the Dying Declaration suspicious in any manner. For the reasons already indicated earlier, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the observations of this Court in Paparambaka Rosamma v.
State of A.P. (at SCC p. 701, para 8) to the effect that "in the absence of a medical certification that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the declaration, it would be very much risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making a declaration"
has been too broadly stated and is not the correct enunciation of law. It is indeed a hypertechnical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind especially when the Magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the questions he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind whereafter he recorded the Dying Declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this Court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P. must be held to be not correctly decided and we affirm the law laid down by this Court in Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat.Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 19 Cr.A. No. 649/2016
19. The Supreme Court in the case of Govindappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 533 has held as under :
24.......What is essentially required is that the person who recorded the Dying Declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. The certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and, therefore, the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise
20. The Supreme Court in the case of Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2019) 8 SCC 779 has held as under :
39. We can proceed on the basis that even absence of the certificate by a doctor is not fatal to act upon a Dying Declaration. However, the requirement remains that the person who records the Dying Declaration must ensure that the patient was in a fit condition, both mentally and physically, to give the declaration.
21. Thus, it is clear that obtaining fitness certificate is merely by way of caution, but if the person recording Dying Declaration is satisfied that the maker of the Dying Declaration is in fit state of mind, then such satisfaction is sufficient for recording the Dying Declaration.
22. Further, the Dying Declaration, can be a sole basis for conviction, provided the same is found to be reliable. The Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Kumar v. State of T.N., reported in (2006) 9 SCC 240 has held as under :
5. Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is an exception to the general rule against hearsay. Sub-section (1) of Section 32 makes the statement of the deceased admissible which is generally described as "Dying Declaration". The Dying Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 20 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 Declaration essentially means statements made by the person as to the cause of his death or as to the circumstances of the transaction resulting in his death. The admissibility of the Dying Declaration is based upon the principle that the sense of impending death produces in man‟s mind the same feeling as that of a conscientious and virtuous man under oath. The Dying Declaration is admissible upon consideration that the declarant has made it in extremity, when the maker is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to the falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. Notwithstanding the same, care and caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to these species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth.
The court has always to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not the result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court has also to see and ensure that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy itself that the deceased was in fit mental condition to make the Dying Declaration, has to look for the medical opinion. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, it undoubtedly, can base its conviction on the Dying Declaration without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the Dying Declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely the rule of prudence. These well-settled principles have been recognised and reiterated by this Court in Paniben v. State of Gujarat; Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan; Laxman v. State of Maharashtra; P.V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka; State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay; Muthu Kutty v. State
23. The Supreme Court in the case of Laltu Ghosh Vs. State of W.B. reported in (2019) 15 SCC 344 has held as under :
18. The courts cannot expect a victim like the deceased herein to state in exact words as to what happened during the course of Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 21 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 the crime, inasmuch as it would be very difficult for such a victim, who has suffered multiple grievous injuries, to state all the details of the incident meticulously and that too in a parrot-
like manner. The trial court assumed that the investigating officer in collusion with the doctor wilfully fabricated the Dying Declaration. It is needless to state that the investigating officer and the doctor are independent public servants and are not related either to the accused or the deceased. It is not open for the trial court to cast aspersions on the said public officers in relation to the Dying Declaration, more particularly when there is no supporting evidence to show such fabrication. 19. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a Dying Declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated by other evidence. A Dying Declaration, if found reliable, and if it is not an attempt by the deceased to cover the truth or to falsely implicate the accused, can be safely relied upon by the courts and can form the basis of conviction. More so, where the version given by the deceased as the Dying Declaration is supported and corroborated by other prosecution evidence, there is no reason for the courts to doubt the truthfulness of such Dying Declaration.
24. The Supreme Court in the case of Kalawati Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2009) 4 SCC 37 has held as under :
14. "12. Though a Dying Declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-
examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the Dying Declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the Dying Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 22 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 Declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing Dying Declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat : (SCC pp. 480-81, paras 18-19)
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that Dying Declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P.)
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the Dying Declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar.)
(iii) The court has to scrutinise the Dying Declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor.)
(iv) Where a Dying Declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P.)
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any Dying Declaration, the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of M.P.)
(vi) A Dying Declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P.)
(vii) Merely because a Dying Declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu.) Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 23 Cr.A. No. 649/2016
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar.)
(ix) Normally, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the Dying Declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the Dying Declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P)
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the Dying Declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan.)
(xi) Where there are more than one statements in the nature of Dying Declaration, the one first in point of time must be preferred of course, if the plurality of the Dying Declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra.)"
See also Mohan Lal v. State of Haryana, at SCC pp. 153- 55, para 10.
25. The Supreme Court in the case of Ramilaben Hasmukhbhai Khristi v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2002) 7 SCC 56 has held as under :
28. Under the law, Dying Declaration can form the sole basis of conviction, if it is free from any kind of doubt and it has been recorded in the manner as provided under the law. It may not be necessary to look for corroboration of the Dying Declaration. As envisaged, a Dying Declaration is generally to be recorded by an Executive Magistrate with the certificate of a medical doctor about the mental fitness of the declarant to make the statement.
It may be in the form of question and answer and the answers be Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 24 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 written in the words of the person making the declaration. But the court cannot be too technical and in substance if it feels convinced about the trustworthiness of the statement which may inspire confidence such a Dying Declaration can be acted upon without any corroboration.
26. Now, the Dying Declarations relied upon by prosecution shall be considered. The prosecution has relied upon two Dying Declarations of the deceased, Priya Dhanuk; (i) Dying Declaration Ex. P.18C, recorded by Dr. Vikrant Singh (PW15), (ii) Dying Declaration Ex. P.11, recorded by Tahsildar Sharda Pathak (PW8).
Dying Declaration Ex. P.18C recorded by Dr.Vikrant Singh (P.W.15)
27. The deceased Priya Dhanuk was brought to Civil Hospital, Dabra on 04.12.2013. An information was received by police from Civil Hospital Dabra that Priya has been brought in a burnt condition who has suffered burn injuries to the extent of 80 to 90%, and she has been referred to the District Hospital Gwalior. The information is Ex.P.21. In this information, it is mentioned that Smt. Priya has been brought by her family members who have informed that she has suffered burn injuries on account of bursting of Kerosene Oil stove. Accordingly, Rojanamcha Sanha No. 312 was recorded on 4-12-2013 at 21.10.
28. Dr. Vikrant Singh, (PW15) was working in Ayushman Hospital & Neuro Trauma Center, Gwalior. He has stated that on 04.12.2013 at 10.30 p.m. she was brought to the hospital from Dabra in an injured condition. Accordingly an information Ex. P.17 was given by Dr. Vikrant Singh, (PW15) to the police station. The in-charge of Burns Ward and the MLC doctors were informed. This witness enquired from the Injured about the history of the case. The patient informed "that the name of her husband is Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 25 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 Charanjeet Dhanuk and on 04.12.2013 at about 08.00 p.m. he poured the kerosene oil on her and set her on fire, as a result she has sustained extensive burn injuries." The Dying Declaration recorded by Dr. Vikrant Singh is Ex. P.18 and its photo copy is Ex. P.18C. The thumb impression of her left hand was also affixed on the Dying Declaration Ex. P.18C. At the time of recording of Dying Declaration, the father of the deceased namely Hukum Singh and the Jeth of the injured, namely Prabhu Dayal, were present, who also put their signatures at C to C and D to D. On 05.12.2013, Sharda Pathak, Tahsildar Murar came to record the Dying Declaration of the deceased. Prior to recording of Dying Declaration, Priya Dhanuk was medically examined by this witness and accordingly, Dr. Vikrant Singh (PW15) put his remark "that the patient is medically fit to give her statement". After the Dying Declaration was recorded, again a medical certificate was given by this witness to the effect "that during the recording of the Dying Declaration by the Tehsildar, the patient was in the full senses and since her both hands and legs were burnt therefore her thumb impression was put at B to B and E to E." Thus, it is clear that Dr. Vikrant Singh, (PW15) not only recorded the Dying Declaration of the deceased Ex. P.18C, but also on 5-12-2013, he medically examined the injured/deceased prior to and after recording of the Dying Declaration.
29. This witness was cross examined in detail. He admitted that he is holding BHMS degree. He further admitted that he did not treat the patient. However, it was stated that Dr. T.C. Agarwal was the in charge of the burn unit. He claimed that he had recorded the statement of the injured Ex. P.18C, under the instructions of Dr. V. K. Divan, M.L.O. He further claimed that he had prepared the Bed Head Ticket/Treatment sheet of the Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 26 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 patient. Patient Priya Dhanuk was treated by Dr. T.C. Agarwal in his presence. After recording the statement of the injured, he had informed the police. He denied that he had not recorded the statement of the patient, namely Priya Dhanuk (Ex. P.18C). So far as the Dying Declaration recorded by Sharda Pathak, Tahsildar, Morar District Gwalior (Ex. P.11) is concerned, he denied that the said Dying Declaration was not recorded in his presence. He further reiterated that he had given the medical fitness certificate prior to and after recording of the Dying Declaration of the deceased Ex. P.11. He denied the suggestion that he had not recorded the statement of the patient Priya Dhanuk. Thus, it is clear that except asking certain questions about the educational qualification of this witness, a general suggestion was given that he did not record the statement of the injured Priya Dhanuk Ex. P.18C and the Dying Declaration, Ex. P.11 was not recorded by Sharda Pathak, Tahsildar Murar District Gwalior in his presence. Although, the statement, Ex. P.18C which has to be treated as Dying Declaration was recorded in the presence of father and Jeth of the deceased, but the said Dying Declaration was not challenged by the appellant on the ground of tutoring. Since, Dying Declaration, Ex. P.18C was recorded in the presence of father and Jeth of the deceased and in absence of any suggestion of tutoring, this Court is of the considered opinion, that presence of father and Jeth of the deceased was inconsequential. The appellant could not point out any significant lapses or circumstances in the evidence of this witness to indicate that this witness was not competent or this witness had not recorded the Dying Declaration of injured Priya Dhanuk Ex. P.18C or he did not give the Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 27 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 medical fitness certificate to the patient before and after recording of another Dying Declaration Ex. P.11.
Dying Declaration, Ex. P.11 recorded by Sharda Pathak (P.W.8), Tahsildar.
30. On 5-12-2013, Sharda Pathak (PW.8), Tahsildar, Murar, Distt. Gwalior recorded second Dying Declaration, Ex.P.11. Sharda Pathak (P.W.8) has stated that she got a requisition from Police Station Jhansi Road, Gwalior to record the Dying Declaration of Priya Dhanuk in Ayushman Hospital and Neuro Trauma Centre, Gwalior. This witness has specifically reiterated the Dying Declaration given by the injured/deceased and stated that a statement was given by Priya Dhanuk that "her husband used to quarrel with her very often and on 4-12-2013 at about 8:00 P.M. he set her on fire after pouring Kerosene Oil on her. At the time of incident, only she and her husband were in the house and her parents-in-law had gone to attend some marriage. Her husband is an alcoholic and therefore, used to quarrel with her without any reason." This witness has also stated that since, both legs and hands of the injured were burnt, therefore, thumb impression of her left hand was taken on the Dying Declaration. She further stated that before and after recording the Dying Declaration, she had taken the medical fitness certificate from the Doctor.
31. In cross-examination, she specifically stated that at the time of recording of Dying Declaration, no member of her family was present. Even the police was also not present. However, admitted that the room number in which the injured was admitted is not mentioned. She denied Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 28 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 that the injured was unconscious. No other question was put to this witness.
32. Thus, it is clear that Sharda Pathak (P.W.8), who was posted as Tahsildar and had recorded the Dying Declaration, Ex. P.11 was not cross examined effectively, so as to point out that the Dying Declaration, Ex. P.11 was suspicious or not reliable. Even otherwise, Dr Vikrant Singh (P.W.15) and Sharda Pathak (P.W.8) are independent witness and they have no grudge to grind against the appellant. Even no such suggestion was given to any of the above mentioned witness.
33. Under these circumstances, it is clear that Dr. Vikrant Singh (P.W.15) had recorded the Dying Declaration, Ex. P.18C and Sharda Pathak (P.W.8) had recorded Dying Declaration, Ex. P.11 and both the Dying Declarations are identical.
34. It is clear from Spot Inspection Map, Ex. P.5 which was prepared on 5-12-2013 that one empty Kerosene Oil Stove was found outside the kitchen with broken base whereas the burnt pieces of Saree and Blouse were found near the bed kept in the adjoining room. From the seizure memo, Ex. P.6, it is clear that one Stove which was not in working condition with broken base and its pump and washer were seized. It is the argument by the counsel for the appellant, that since, the Kerosene Stove had burst, therefore, the deceased Priya Dhanuk got burnt. However, it is clear from the Spot Map, Ex. P.5, that no kerosene oil was found either on the floor or on the wall. If the stove had burst, then, there should have been remains of kerosene oil, either on the floor or on the surrounding walls, but no such evidence was found. How it is possible that on account of bursting of stove, the entire kerosene oil would fall on the deceased and Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 29 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 not on any surrounding articles kept on the spot? Furthermore, the kerosene Oil Stove was found outside the kitchen and pump and washer were found inside the kitchen. If the stove had burst, then it should also have been found inside the kitchen. The burnt pieces of Saree and blouse were found inside the bed room i.e., by the side of the bed. If the stove had burst, then its body should have got shattered but merely the base was found broken. Even if it is presumed that the deceased after getting ablazed on account of accident, had rushed towards her bedroom, then there should have been some evidence on the floor from kitchen to bedroom. But nothing of that sort was found by the police on 5-12-2013.
35. Thus, the theory of bursting of stove as projected by the appellant, is not supported by any circumstance found on the spot.
36. Furthermore, the appellant did not take said defence in his statement recorded under Section 311 of Cr.P.C.
37. Apart from that, if the intention of the injured/deceased was to falsely implicate her other in-laws, then she would have alleged against her parents-in-law also but she did not utter a single word against them, which clearly shows that she was narrating the truth only and was not trying to over implicate any of her other in-laws. Even otherwise, the person on the death bed is not likely to make false statement, unless and until he is tutored. There is no evidence of tutoring and even that argument was also not raised by Counsel for appellant. Thus, the Dying Declarations Ex. P.11 and Ex. P.18C are reliable and trustworthy.
Presence of the deceased on the spot Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 30 Cr.A. No. 649/2016
38. In both the Dying Declarations, Ex. P.11 and Ex. P.18C, the deceased had specifically alleged that she was burnt by her husband after pouring kerosene oil on her. It is submitted by Counsel for appellant, that the appellant was not in the house and he had gone to attend one function along with his parents.
39. Considered the aforementioned submission made by the Counsel for the appellant.
40. The appellant has examined Laxmi (D.W.1), Virendra Dhanuk (D.W.2) and Gaurishanker (D.W.3). Gaurishanker (D.W.3) has proved two documents i.e., an information given to S.H.O., Police Station Behat, Distt. Gwalior, Ex. D.1 and Condolence Message, Ex. D.2.
41. Information given by Gaurishanker (D.W.3) to S.H.O., Police Station Behat, Ex.D.1 was to the effect that he himself, Gangaram, Chetan Das, Prabudayal, Janaki bai and Leela bai were present in 13 th day ceremony of mother of Kamlesh. This information was given to S.H.O., Police Station Behat on 4-12-2013 at 20:00 i.e., 08:00 P.M. What was the need for Gaurishanker (D.W.3) and others to give a written information to S.H.O., Police Station Behat at 8:00 P.M. about their presence in Behat? Further more, the name of Chetandas has been mentioned in the information, whereas the appellant‟s name is Charanjit. Furthermore, the condolence message, Ex. D.2 was not addressed to any of the family member of the appellant but it was addressed to some Pappu and Bhojelal. Gaurishanker (D.W.3) has not stated in his evidence, that the appellant is also known as Chetan Das. Even the counsel for the appellant, clearly admitted that the name of appellant is not mentioned in the information which was given to S.H.O., Police Station Behat, Ex. D.1. Furthermore, Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 31 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 the factum of giving an information about their presence in police station, Behat itself is a suspicious circumstance. Appellant did not examine any police personal from Police Station Behat to prove that the information Ex. D.1 was in fact given by Gaurishanker (D.W.3) on 4-12-2013 at 20:00 i.e., 08:00 P.M. Thus, the defence taken by the appellant that he had gone to village Behat to attend 13th day ceremony and was not in his house at the time of incident is false and accordingly it is rejected.
42. Section 106 of Evidence Act reads as under :
106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.--
When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.
43. The Supreme Court in the case of Rajinder Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 15 SCC 245 has held as under :
18. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not relieve the burden of the prosecution to prove guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but where the prosecution has succeeded to prove the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts and the accused by virtue of special knowledge regarding such facts fail to offer any explanation then the court can draw a different inference.
44. As the appellant has failed to give any explanation as to how the deceased suffered burn injuries which resulted in her death, this Court is of considered opinion, that failure on the part of appellant to give information with regard to circumstance which was within his special knowledge would be an additional circumstance to prove his guilt.
Conduct of the appellant post incident Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 32 Cr.A. No. 649/2016
45. This Court has already come to a conclusion, that the appellant was in his house at the time of incident. Had it been a case of accident, then the appellant would have certainly rushed to the hospital along with the injured, but it is clear from the information sent from Civil Hospital Dabra, Ex. P.21, that the injured was brought by her Jeth Virendra Dhanuk (D.W.2) and not by husband. Furthermore, in the case of accident, the appellant was expected to make an attempt to save his wife and in that situation, he should have suffered burn injuries. But as per the arrest memo, no injuries were found on the body of the appellant. Similarly, it is clear from information sent by Ayushman Hospital Neuro Trauma Centre, Gwalior, Ex. P.17, the injured was accompanied by her Jeth Virendra Dhanuk and not by husband/appellant. Thus, it is clear that the appellant immediately ran away from the spot and the injured was taken to Civil Hospital Dabra and from there to Ayushman Hospital Neuro Trauma Centre, Gwalior by her Jeth Virendra Dhanuk. Thus, the absence of the appellant, immediately after the incident clearly indicates his guilty mind. Although the fact that the accused had absconded immediately after the incident, may not be a conclusive circumstance, because under the apprehension of false implication, even an innocent person may also abscond, however, when there are other surrounding circumstances indicating towards the guilt of the accused, then his abscondence after the incident also become an important chain. The Supreme Court in the case of Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P., reported in (1993) 2 SCC 684 has held as under :
22. Prosecution has also relied upon the circumstances of the absconding of the appellants to prove its case.Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 33 Cr.A. No. 649/2016
23. A closer link with the conduct of the appellants both at the time of the occurrence and immediately thereafter is also the circumstance relating to their absconding. Md. Baduruddin PW 15, the investigating officer, deposed that he had taken up the investigation of the case and having examined PWs 1-4 had caused search to be made for the accused but they were not found in the village and despite search, they could not be traced. Appellant 1 surrendered before the court on November 10, 1981 while appellant 2 surrendered in the court on December 7, 1981. No explanation, worth the name, much less a satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the appellants about their absence from the village till they surrendered in the court in the face of such a gruesome „tragedy‟. Indeed, absconding by itself may not be a positive circumstance consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused because it is not unknown that even innocent persons may run away for fear of being falsely involved in a criminal case and arrested by the police, but coupled with the other circumstances which we have discussed above, the absconding of the appellants assumes importance and significance. The prosecution has successfully established this circumstance also to connect the appellants with the crime.
46. Therefore, the conduct of the accused immediately after the incident, specifically when his own wife had suffered extensive burn injuries also become important and significant. At the cost of repetition, it is once again clarified that abscondence by itself may not be a conclusion proof of guilt, but if the other surrounding circumstances are the proof of guilt of the accused, then abscondence would also become one of the important chain of circumstance to prove the guilt of the accused.
47. Accordingly, it is held that the fact that the appellant did not take his wife to hospital and absconded after the incident Under these circumstances, the post incident conduct of the appellant also become an important chain of circumstance. However, there is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. No question was put to the appellant Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 34 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. regarding his abscondence. The Supreme Court in the case of Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 595 has held as under :
9. "12. The purpose of Section 313 of the Code is set out in its opening words--„for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.‟ In Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat it has been laid down by Bose, J. that the statements of the accused persons recorded under Section 313 of the Code „are among the most important matters to be considered at the trial‟. It was pointed out that : (AIR p. 470, para 8) „8. ... The statements of the accused recorded by the Committing Magistrate and the Sessions Judge are intended in India to take the place of what in England and in America he would be free to state in his own way in the witness box [and that] they have to be received in evidence and treated as evidence and be duly considered at the trial.‟ This position remains unaltered even after the insertion of Section 315 in the Code and any statement under Section 313 has to be considered in the same way as if Section 315 is not there.
13. The object of examination under this section is to give the accused an opportunity to explain the case made against him.
This statement can be taken into consideration in judging his innocence or guilt. Where there is an onus on the accused to discharge, it depends on the facts and circumstances of the case if such statement discharges the onus.
14. The word „generally‟ in sub-section (1)(b) does not limit the nature of the questioning to one or more questions of a general nature relating to the case, but it means that the question should relate to the whole case generally and should also be limited to any particular part or parts of it. The question must be framed in such a way as to enable the accused to know what he is to explain, what are the circumstances which are against him and for which an explanation is needed. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 35 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 explaining circumstances which appear against him and that the questions must be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. A conviction based on the accused‟s failure to explain what he was never asked to explain is bad in law. The whole object of enacting Section 313 of the Code was that the attention of the accused should be drawn to the specific points in the charge and in the evidence on which the prosecution claims that the case is made out against the accused so that he may be able to give such explanation as he desires to give.
15. The importance of observing faithfully and fairly the provisions of Section 313 of the Code cannot be too strongly stressed:
„30. ... it is not sufficient compliance to string together a long series of facts and ask the accused what he has to say about them. He must be questioned separately about each material substance which is intended to be used against him. ... The questioning must therefore be fair and couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. Even when an accused person is not illiterate, his mind is apt to be perturbed when he is facing a charge of murder. ... Fairness therefore requires that each material circumstance should be put simply and separately in a way that an illiterate mind, or one which is perturbed or confused, can readily appreciate and understand.‟*"**
48. The Supreme Court in the case of Alister Anthony Pareira v.
State of Maharashtra, reported in (2012) 2 SCC 648 has held as under :
58. The words of P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) in Jai Dev v. State of Punjab speaking for the three-Judge Bench with reference to Section 342 of the 1898 Code (corresponding to Section 313 of the 1973 Code) may be usefully quoted: (AIR p. 620, para 21) "21. ... The ultimate test in determining whether or not the accused has been fairly examined under Section 342 would be to enquire whether, having regard to all the questions put to him, he did get an opportunity to say what he wanted to say in respect Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 36 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 of prosecution case against him. If it appears that the examination of the accused person was defective and thereby a prejudice has been caused to him, that would no doubt be a serious infirmity."
59. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra a three- Judge Bench of this Court stated: (SCC p. 806, para 16)
"16. ... It is trite law, nevertheless fundamental, that the prisoner‟s attention should be drawn to every inculpatory material so as to enable him to explain it. This is the basic fairness of a criminal trial and failures in this area may gravely imperil the validity of the trial itself, if consequential miscarriage of justice has flowed. However, where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned by such defect must be established by the accused. In the event of evidentiary material not being put to the accused, the court must ordinarily eschew such material from consideration. It is also open to the appellate court to call upon the counsel for the accused to show what explanation the accused has as regards the circumstances established against him but not put to him and if the accused is unable to offer the appellate court any plausible or reasonable explanation of such circumstances, the court may assume that no acceptable answer exists and that even if the accused had been questioned at the proper time in the trial court he would not have been able to furnish any good ground to get out of the circumstances on which the trial court had relied for its conviction."
60. The above decisions have been referred in Asraf Ali v. State of Assam. The Court stated: (SCC pp. 334 & 336, paras 21-22 &
24) "21. Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on the court to put in an enquiry or trial questions to the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any of the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It follows as a necessary corollary therefrom that each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused is required to be put to him specifically, distinctly and separately and failure to do so amounts to a serious irregularity vitiating trial, if it is shown that the accused was prejudiced.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 37 Cr.A. No. 649/2016
22. The object of Section 313 of the Code is to establish a direct dialogue between the court and the accused. If a point in the evidence is important against the accused, and the conviction is intended to be based upon it, it is right and proper that the accused should be questioned about the matter and be given an opportunity of explaining it. Where no specific question has been put by the trial court on an inculpatory material in the prosecution evidence, it would vitiate the trial. Of course, all these are subject to the rider whether they have caused miscarriage of justice or prejudice. ...
* * *
24. In certain cases when there is perfunctory examination under Section 313 of the Code, the matter is remanded to the trial court, with a direction to retry from the stage at which the prosecution was closed."
61. From the above, the legal position appears to be this: the accused must be apprised of incriminating evidence and materials brought in by the prosecution against him to enable him to explain and respond to such evidence and material. Failure in not drawing the attention of the accused to the incriminating evidence and inculpatory materials brought in by the prosecution specifically, distinctly and separately may not by itself render the trial against the accused void and bad in law; firstly, if having regard to all the questions put to him, he was afforded an opportunity to explain what he wanted to say in respect of the prosecution case against him and secondly, such omission has not caused prejudice to him resulting in failure of justice. The burden is on the accused to establish that by not apprising him of the incriminating evidence and the inculpatory materials that had come in the prosecution evidence against him, a prejudice has been caused resulting in miscarriage of justice.
49. Therefore, it is clear that recording of statement of accused under Section 313 of CrPC is not a mere formality and the Court must put all the incriminating circumstances to the accused under Section 313 of CrPC to enable him to give explanation to the circumstances, which can be used against him. But this aspect is also subject to exception. If the Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 38 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 circumstances which have been put to the accused, grants him reasonable opportunity to explain what he wanted to say in respect of prosecution case against him and any omission has not caused any prejudice to the accused, then the circumstance which was not put to the accused can be used against him. Under these circumstances, non-putting a question to the appellant in his statement under Section 313 of CrPC regarding his abscondence from the place of incident, as he did not take his wife to the hospital, would not come in the way of the prosecution for using the circumstance of abscondence against the appellant, specifically when the appellant himself had tried to take the plea of alibi.
FSL report
50. The FSL report was not exhibited but it is admissible under Section 293 of CrPC. As per the FSL report, kerosene oil was found in stove, as well as in semi burnt cloths, but no kerosene oil was found in the pump and its washer. According to the appellant, the stove had burst, and stove was recovered from the spot with broken base and the pump with washer was recovered from the kitchen. Pump with washer is an important part of kerosene oil stove and washer always remain dipped in the kerosene oil. However no smell of kerosene oil was found on the pump and washer, which clearly means that the Kerosene Oil Stove was not containing pump and washer and in such circumstance, the stove cannot burst. This Court has already held that the appellant has failed to prove that the stove had burst. Non presence of kerosene oil on the pump and washer of the kerosene oil stove, indicates, that an attempt was made to create false evidence by damaging the base of the stove, and with an Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 39 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 intention to show that stove had burst, the pump and washer were kept at different place, so that it can be projected that pump and washer had fallen at different place, but the person creating false evidence, forgot to dip the pump and washer in kerosene oil.
51. It is not out of place to mention here that FSL report is part of record but when it was received by the Court is not clear from the order sheets of the Trial Court. Whether a copy of the same was supplied to the appellant or not is also not clear. No question with regard to FSL report was put to the appellant in his statement under Section 313 of CrPC. Since, there is nothing on record to suggest that even copy of the FSL report was supplied to the appellant, therefore, this Court is of considered view that non-mentioning of FSL report in the statement under Section 313 of CrPC would certainly cause prejudice to the appellant. Accordingly, the FSL report can not be considered as a circumstance against the appellant.
Whether the death of Priya Dhanuk was homicidal
52. In view of the dying declarations, Ex. P.11 and Ex. P.18C, the abscondence of the appellant immediately after the incident, non- explanation of circumstance (as to how his wife got burnt with kerosene oil on her body) which was within special knowledge of appellant, this Court is of the considered opinion, that the death of Priya Dhanuk was homicidal and not accidental.
53. It is clear from the evidence of Meena (P.W.1) and Hukum Singh (P.W.2), that the deceased Priya Dhanuk had died a homicidal death, within 2 years of her marriage. It is true that Meena (P.W.1) and Hukum Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 40 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 Singh (P.W.2) who are the parents of the deceased Priya Dhanuk had turned hostile, but it is a case of murder and not of dowry death. Whether the relations of the deceased with her in-laws were good or not is not material.
54. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, it is held that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
55. It is next contended by the counsel for appellant, that even if the entire allegations are found proved, still the act of the appellant would come within the purview of Culpable Homicide not amounting to murder.
56. Considered the submissions made by Counsel for the appellant.
57. The appellant had knowingly/intentionally and with knowledge that his act would cause death of his wife Priya Dhanuk, poured kerosene oil and set her on fire. Thereafter, he did not felt guilty of what he had done, and instead of taking her to hospital or making an attempt to extinguish her fire, he went missing and accordingly, the injured Priya Dhanuk was taken to hospital by her Jeth Virendra Dhanuk. From arrest memo, Ex. P.20, it is clear that no injury was found on the body of the appellant, which clearly means that he did not try to save his wife. Even otherwise, it is not the case of the appellant, that he had suffered any burn injuries either on his hands or on any other part of his body. Thus, not only the conduct of the appellant was with full knowledge and with intention but even after setting his wife on fire, he did not show repentance for what he had done, and did not try to save his wife. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the act of the appellant in pouring kerosene oil and setting her on fire was an outcome of momentary outburst. Under these Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 41 Cr.A. No. 649/2016 circumstances, it is held that the Trial Court has rightly held the appellant as guilty for committing murder of his wife and thus rightly held the appellant guilty for committing offence under Section 302 of IPC. The Supreme Court in the case of Purshottam Chopra (Supra) has held as under :
27.5. Another contention urged on behalf of the appellants about converting the present case to that under Section 304 Part II for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder has only been noted to be rejected. The act of pouring kerosene over a person and then putting him on fire by lighting a match has all the ingredients of doing an act with the intention of causing death of a person in a gruesome manner. The conviction of the appellants for the offence of murder appears justified and we find no reason to convert the same into any offence of lesser degree. Therefore, the submissions made on behalf of the appellants with reference to the decisions in Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda and Kalabai also deserve to be, and are, rejected.
58. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 302 of IPC is hereby affirmed.
59. So far as the question of sentence is concerned, Life Imprisonment is the minimum sentence, accordingly no interference is required on the question of sentence.
60. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence dated 26.05.2016 passed by First Additional Sessions Judge, Dabra District Gwalior in Sessions Trial No. 248/2014 is hereby affirmed.
61. A copy of this Judgment along with the record, be sent to the Trial Court for necessary information and compliance.
62. The appellant is already in jail and he shall undergo the remaining jail sentence.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND SHRIVASTAVA Signing time: 16-04-2026 18:12:06NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:12193 42 Cr.A. No. 649/2016
63. The appeal fails and is hereby Dismissed.
(G.S.Ahluwalia) (Pushpendra Yadav)
Judge Judge
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND
SHRIVASTAVA
Signing time: 16-04-2026
18:12:06