Karnataka High Court
Advocates' Association vs Chief Minister, Government Of ... on 17 June, 1996
Equivalent citations: ILR1997KAR221
Author: P. Vishwanatha Shetty
Bench: P. Vishwanatha Shetty
ORDER P. Vishwanatha Shetty, J.
1. This petition is presented by the Advocates Association, Bangalore, which is a premier association of Advocates in Karnataka State, ( which is hereinafter referred to as the 'Association'). The petitioner Association has sought for a direction to the respondents to demolish the exising old building of the Association and to construct in its place a new building at the premises of the City Civil Court Complex, Bangalore.M
2. Few facts which are relevant for the disposal of this petition as set out by the parties may be briefly stated as hereunder:
The case of the Association is that it is a unique association in the State of Karnataka and out of about 22,000 Advocates in the State, about 8,000 Advocates who are practicing in various Courts including the High Court of Karnataka, at Bangalore, are its members and the present premises in occupation of the Association which is located at City Civil Courts Complex is a very old building constructed more than 100 years ago; that it is in a dilapidated condition and the accommodation available in the said building can hardly be sufficient to accommodate little over 100 Advocates; and since the membership of the Association for the last one decade has been increasing rapidly, the present accommodation available is totally insufficient and also totally unsuitable and minimum facilities required by its members for discharge of their professional duties which they owe to the litigant public and also to the Courts are not available.
3. It is the further case of the Association that taking all these factors into consideration, the then Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka impressed upon the 4th respondent i.e. State of Karnataka to demolish the existing building and put up a new building in its place which would satisfy the minimum requirements of the Association. The respondents having been fully satisfied about the genuine need for accommodation for the Association, made a firm commitment in the meeting held in the Chambers of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka, and pursuant to that commitment necessary drawing prepared by the Chief Architect of the State was sent along with the line estimate for Rs. 475 Lakhs to the Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka in support of this Statement, the petitioner-Association had relied upon the letter dated 6th May, 1993, the copy of which has been produced as Annexure-A to this petition, addressed by the Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka to the Secretary to Government, Department of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Bangalore. It is useful to quote the said letter which reads as follows:
High Court of Karnataka, High Court Buildings, Bangalore-560001.
Dated: 6.5.93 LCA.IV.248/80 (HCA-II) From:
The Registrar, High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore, To The Secretary to Government Dept. of Law & Party. Affairs, Vidhanasoudha, Bangalore.
Sub: Construction of Bar Association Building in the City Civil Court Complex premises, Bangalore-line Estimate-Administrative Approval - reg.
With reference to the above subject, I am directed to forward herewith the plan and line estimate amounting to Rs. 475-00 Lakhs based on the Drawing Nos. 9401/1 to 9 prepared by the Chief Architect to Government, Bangalore, for construction of Bar Association Building in the City Civil Court Complex, at Bangalore, which comprises of basement floor, ground floor, First floor, second floor, third floor, fourth floor, each having an area of 1561.15 sq.mts. received from the Chief Engineer C & B (South), Bangalore, and to state that the High Court has considered the request of the Bar Association and is of the opinion that providing accommodation to the Bar Association as per the above Drawing is of immediate necessity.
The said word is not included in the printed Budged Estimate for 1993-94.
I am, therefore, to request you Kindly to take immediate action to accord administrative approval to the above line estimate amounting to Rs. 475.00 Lakhs by providing sufficient funds to take up the said work during the current financial year by meeting the expenditure under the Head of Account "4059.C.O.P.W-Administration of Justice.
A copy of letter dated 28.4.1993 of the Chief Engineer C & B (South), Bangalore is also enclosed herewith for reference.
Yours faithfully, Sd/-
Assistant Registrar."
The President of the Association, Sri K.N. Subba Reddy also wrote a letter dated 11th September, 1993, to the then Hon'ble Chief Minister of Karnataka bringing to his notice about the decision taken to construct a new building for the purpose of the Association, and also impressing upon him the urgency of pulling down the existing building and putting up of a new building in its place, and the problem faced by the Advocates and litigant public on account of want of proper accommodation for the Association and the delay in constructing the new building for the Association. The copy of the said letter has been produced as Annexure-C. The 4th respondent, in response to the letter Annexure-A written by the Registrar of the High Court requesting the State Government to take immediate steps in the matter, wrote a reply dated 27th September, 1993, informing the Registrar that on account of financial paucity during the budgeting year 1993-94, the work relating to construction of the Association building during the year 1993-94 cannot be taken up. The relevant portion of the said letter which has been produced as Annexure-B reads as follows:
4. It is the case of the petitioner that since the respondents did not take immediate steps for construction of the Association building as per the commitment made by the Government to the President and members of the Association and also the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka, the Association was constrained to file this petition.
5. The respondents while admitting the averments of the petitioner Association that a decision was taken to demolish the existing building of the association and put up a new building in its place as claimed by the Association, have taken up the plea that on account of financial constraints, and as the respondents were required to give priorities to other projects which have higher priority than the building for the Association, have not been able to take up Construction of new building in its place. It is further stated by the respondents that the work relating to the construction of the Association building was not included in the budget estimate for years 1993-94; 1994-95 and 1995-96. The statement made by the petitioner that the respondents have not shown any interest in the construction of the Association building and the existing building is in a dilapidated condition and is leaking has been denied by the respondents. However, it is admitted that the plinth area of the Building is only 9096 sq.ft. and was constructed prior to the year 1940. It is stated by the respondents that action has been taken to strengthen the roof against the leakage by laying Yelahanka tiles over the terrace and maintenance works were carried out to prevent the leakage in the existing building. However, the respondents have admitted that the Registrar General of High Court of Karnataka also renewed the proposal of the construction of the building for the Association during the year 1994-95 and a detailed plan and estimate amounting to fts.240 lakhs for construction of the first stage/phase of the building was received from the Registrar General.
6. In view of the importance of the issues raised in this petition, Sir R.N. Narasimha Murthy, learned Senior Advocate and former Advocate General, were requested to appear in this case as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court. Accordingly, he has appeared as Amicus Curiae and made his submissions.
7. Sir Narasimha Murthy submitted that the petitioner-Association is entitled for the grant of reliefs prayed for in this petition. In support of that he made two submissions Firstly, he submitted that providing building to the Advocates Association is one of the obligatory functions of the State Government, and it is not permissible for the State to avoid that obligation or delay in making available the minimum facilities required by the Association on the ground of paucity of funds. Elaborating this submission, the learned Senior Advocate submitted that Judiciary is one of the major organs of the State entrusted with the duties of judicial review in respect of the actions of the executive, Legislature and also conferred with the power of resolving the disputes between its people. He also submitted that Judiciary in our Constitutional set up is a basic feature of the Constitution and in that, the relevancy or the existence of an effective and competent Bar for the success of administration of justice is an absolute necessity; the Bar to be effective, competent, independent and fearless must be provided with the minimum facilities required to discharge its function as Officers of the Court; in view of high cost in the matter securing accommodation for establishing officers and the cost of books and other facilities, the large sections of members of the Bar who have been attracted to the profession hailing either from middle class or lower middle class strata of the Society whose financial condition is not sound, are not in a position to possess the minimum facilities required after they enter into the profession to make them competent; and the legal profession cannot be equated or compared with any other professions like Medicine, Engineering, Chartered Accountants etc., the position and status of a Lawyer in the working of a judicial system of the country is quite distinct and different from other professions as the Advocate is an officer of the Court and the duties he discharges is in the nature 'public duty'; that the role of a lawyer in the Administration of Justice should not be looked from a narrow angle of an Advocate carrying on his profession for his livelihood; and it must be looked at from the point of view of the beneficiary or the consumer of the services rendered by the Advocate. He also submitted that Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees right to liberty and livelihood to every person of this country, and Article 39A provides for legal aid. Therefore, he submitted that in the interest of litigant public especially those who cannot afford to have the services of the best legal talent who charge heavy fees must have the opportunity of securing the services of equally competent and good lawyers. According to the learned Senior Counsel, this is possible if the lawyers are provided with the building for the Association and minimum facilities for Library, furniture etc. In this, he submitted that it is not permissible for the State to take a plea that on account of paucity of funds, it is not in a position to provide accommodation to the members of the Association as the State has to give preference to other priorities keeping in view the other projects. Therefore, he submitted that the stand taken by the respondents that though a decision was taken to demolish the existing building and put up a new building in its place in phased manner, the State is not in a position to keep up its commitment on the ground of financial paucity, is highly unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 21 and 39A of the Constitution of India. Learned Senior Counsel also took me through some of the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), and also the rules framed thereunder in support of his submissions.
8. Secondly, Sri Narasimha Murthy submitted that so far as construction of new building for the petitioner-Association is concerned, there is a firm commitment made by the State Government to demolish the existing building and put up a new building in its place as per the plan got prepared by the State by its Chief Architect, which has been approved by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka in the month of January, 1993, and therefore, it is not permissible, and, it would be highly unreasonable, unfair for the State at this stage to go back on the assurance given to the petitioner-Association and more particularly to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka.
9. Sri Amarnath, Learned Counsel appearing of the petitioner-Association, while adopting the submissions of Sir R.N. Narasimha Murthy, submitted that on account of the delay in the construction of the building, the members of the Association are put to irreparable injury and hardship as they are without the minimum accommodation and also the other minimum facilities which are required for the proper functioning by the members of the Association. It is submitted that the then Hon'ble Chief Justice while replying to the farewell address given by the Chairman, State Bar Council had expressed his gratitude for the decision taken by the State Government to construct a new building after demolishing the existing building for the purpose of the petitioner-Association at City Civil Courts Complex; and similarly the Chairman of the State Bar Council also had expressed his gratitude on behalf of the State Bar to the State Government in this regard.
10. Sri Udayashankar, learned Additional Government Advocate, while not seriously disputing the importance or the role played by the Advocates in the Administration of Justice, submitted that there is no obligation either statutory or constitutional on the part of the State to provide a building to the members of the petitioner-Association; the members of the petitioner-Association cannot be placed on higher pedestal than the members of any other professional Associations like Doctors, Chartered Accountants, Engineers etc.; merely because the State, has been providing accommodation to the Advocates' Association, it does not confer any statutory or constitutional right on the petitioner-Association to insist on the respondents to demolish the existing building and put up a new construction in its place; and if the State has to make a preference between the building for the Advocates' Association and for Courts and quarters of the judicial officers, the State will have to naturally prefer the latter; and that while the State has all the consideration and concern for the members of the Bar, it does not confer any right to the petitioner-Association to seek for a direction from this Court for construction of new building for the purpose of the petitioner-Association. He further submitted that the submission made on behalf of the petition that the State is trying to avoid construction of a new building for the Association without any justification, is not correct; and it is only on account of paucity of funds, the State has not been able to take up immediate steps for construction of the building. He further submitted that the executive should have the discretion to implement their projects as per the priorities set by the State Legislature, and the claim of the petitioner-Association pertains to an item of expenditure which is not a priority item; and there is no surplus amount received by the Government by way of collection of Court fee; and as it is, the Government is finding it difficult to fulfill its obligation for construction of Forty six Court buildings in the State; and therefore the claim of the petitioner-Association for construction of its building cannot have preferential claim over the aforesaid obligations of the State to construct Court buildings which are presently run in rental buildings. He also submitted that the direction given by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court requires the State to construct more than 300 quarters for the Judicial Officers in the State and in this background, the respondents should be allowed to place before the Legislature the items of expenditure to be approved in the Budget, by the State Legislature and it is not permissible for this Court to direct the executive to spend on items of expenditure without reference to priorities determined by the State Legislature. He further submitted that the State has made alternative arrangements to accommodate members of the Association and as such there is to immediate inconvenience caused to the members of the Association as alleged. He also submitted that the petitioner Association has no locus standi to maintain this petition in the absence of any resolution of the Association.
11. Before I proceed to consider the submissions made by the Learned Counsel appearing for the parties, it may be useful to refer to some of the provisions of the Act and the rules framed by the Bar Council of India in exercise of the power conferred on it under the Act.
12. Section 29 of the Act provides that subject to provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, only Advocates are entitled to practice the profession of law. Section 33 of the Act, also further provides that except as provided under the Act or any other law for the time being in force, no person is entitled to practice in any Court or before any authority or person unless he is enrolled as an Advocate under the Act, after the appointed day. However, Section 32 of the Act, confers power on a Court/authority to permit any person who is not enrolled as an Advocate under the Act to appear in person in any particular Court, Section 30 which has not yet been given effect to entitles an Advocate as of right to practice through-out the territories to which the Act extends in all the Courts including the Supreme Court; before any Tribunal or any other authority etc. Section 34 of the Act, confers power on the High Courts to make rules laying down the conditions subject to which an Advocate can be permitted to practice in the High Court and the other Courts subordinate thereto. Section 35 of the Act, provides for punishment for professional misconduct committed by an Advocate. Section 36 of the Act provides for disciplinary powers of the Bar Council of India against Advocates. Section 38 provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court by a person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India etc.
13. Chapter II of Part-VI of the Rules framed by the Bar Council of India (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules') in exercise of the power conferred under Section 49(1)(c) of the Act, read with the proviso thereto lays down the standard of professional conduct and etiquette to the Advocates. It is useful to extract the preamble to the sub-rule which reads as follows:
"An Advocate shall, at all times, comport himself in a manner befitting his status as an officer of the Court, a privileged member of the community, and a gentleman bearing in mind that what may be lawful and moral for a person who is not a member of the Bar, or for a member of the Bar in his non-professional capacity may still be improper for an Advocate. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing obligation, an Advocate shall fearlessly uphold the interests of his client, and in his conduct conform to the rules hereinafter mentioned both in letter and in spirit. The rules hereinafter mentioned contain canons of conduct and etiquette adopted as general guides; yet the specific mention thereof shall not be construed as a denial of the existence of others equally imperative though not specifically mentioned."
14. Chapter II of Part VI of the Rules provides for the duty of an Advocate to the Court; to the client; to the opponent Counsel; to his colleagues. Rule 1 of the said rules among other things provides that an Advocate shall, during the presentation of his case and while otherwise acting before a Court, conduct himself with dignity and self respect. Rule 2 thereof provides that an Advocate shall maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, bearing in mind that the dignity of the judicial office is essential for the survival of a free community. Rule 4 thereof, among other things provides that the Advocate shall use his best effort to restrain and prevent his client from resorting to sharp or unfair practices or from doing anything in relation to the Court, opposing counsel or parties which the Advocate himself ought not to do.
15. Rule 11 of the Rules which provides for the duty of an Advocate to the client among other things provides that an Advocate is bound to accept any in the Courts or Tribunals or before any other authority in or before which he proposes to practice at a fee consistent with his standing at the Bar and the nature of the case, though special circumstances may justify his refusal to accept a particular brief.
16. Rule 12 thereof provides that the Advocate shall not ordinarily withdraw from engagements once accepted, without sufficient cause and unless reasonable and sufficient notice is given to the client, and upon his withdrawal from a case, he shall refund such part of the fee as has not been earned. Rule 15 thereof provides that it shall be the duty of an Advocate fearlessly to uphold the interests of his client by all fair and honourable means without regard to any unpleasant consequences to himself or any other and he shall defend a person accused of a crime regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, bearing in mind that his loyalty is to the law which requires that no man should be convicted without adequate evidence.
17. Rule 16 of the Rules provides that an Advocate appearing for the prosecution in a criminal trial shall so conduct the prosecution that it does not lead to conviction of the innocent and suppression of material capable of establishing the innocence of the accused shall be scrupulously avoided.
18. Rules 34 and 35 provide for the duty of an Advocate to his opponent. Rule 36 provides for duty of an Advocate to his colleagues. Rule 46 provides that every Advocate shall in practice of the profession of law bear in mind that any one genuinely in need of a lawyer is entitled to legal assistance even though he cannot pay for it fully or adequately and that within the limits of an Advocate's economic condition, free legal assistance to the indigent and oppressed is one of the highest obligations an Advocate owes to Society.
19. Rules 47, 48 and 49 impose restriction on Advocate taking up other employment.
20. In the light of the submissions made by the Learned Counsel, the questions that would arise for consideration in this petition are:
i) Whether the petitioner-Association has no locus standi to maintain this petition in the absence of the resolution of the petitioner-Association?
ii) Whether it is obligatory on the part of the State to provide accommodation/building for Advocates' Association as contended by the petitioner?
iii) Whether the State Government is required to demolish the existing building and put up a new building in its place in the City Civil Courts Complex, as claimed by the petitioner-Association?
21. 1 do not find any merit in the objections raised that the petitioner has no locus standi to maintain this petition in the absence of a resolution passed by the Association authorising the President of the Association to file this petition. This petition was filed on 16th March, 1994. The Division Bench of this Court on 16th April, 1994, directed that the petition should be posted for final hearing on 16th September, 1995. Objection Statement was filed only on 1st February, 1996. Neither in the Statement of Objections nor at any point of time till the hearing of this petition, though this petition has been pending consideration before this Court for the last about two years, the objection with regard to maintainability of the petition in the absence of any resolution of the Association was raised. The Learned Counsel for the petitioner-Association submitted that resolution had been passed authorising the President to file this petition. I have no reason to disbelieve the said statement. The President of the Association Sri K.N. Subba Reddy has sworn to the Affidavit in support of the petition Even otherwise, it is permissible for Sri K.N. Subba Reddy as the President of the Association to maintain this petition in his individual capacity. Further, the question raised in this petition concerns the rights of the members of the Bar of Bangalore for the Association building and this petition has been filed as public interest litigation. Under these circumstances, at this stage there is absolutely no justification to reject this petition on the ground that there is no resolution of the Association authorising the President of the Association to file this petition on behalf of the Association Therefore, the objection raised with regard to the maintainability of the petition is hereby rejected.
22. Now, let me examine the second question that would arise for consideration in this petition. A reading of various provisions of the Act and rules framed thereunder, make it dear that Advocate is an officer of the Court and he discharges public duty and has an important role to play in the administration of justice. The preamble to Chapter II of the rules specifically states that advocate is an officer of the Court. From the scheme of the Act, and more particularly reading of Sections 29, 32 and 33 of the Act, it is dear that no person other than an advocate except in any particular case, with the permission of the Court can appear before the Court or carry on profession of law. Some of the provisions of the rules referred to above provide for the duty of an Advocate to his clients; to Court opposite Counsel; and his professional colleagues. The Advocates are under disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar Councils and Bar Council of India. Section 34 of the Act empowers the High Courts to lay down conditions subject to which an Advocate is permitted to practice in the High Court and Subordinate Courts. As rightly pointed out by Sri Narasimha Murthy, the status of an Advocate as a professional man is quite different and distinct from other professional people like Doctors, Chartered Accountants, Engineers etc. The nature of duties and functions that are required to be discharged by an Advocate is in the nature of public duty.
23. Sri R.N. Narasimha Murthy relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ALL INDIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. in support of his contention that administration of justice and the part to be played by the Advocates in the system must be looked into from the point of view of litigant public and the right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 and right to free legal aid as contemplated under Article 39A of the Constitution of India. In the said decision, while considering the directions required to be given to improve the service conditions of the Judicial Officers the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraphs 41, 42 and 43 observed as follows:
"41. We are alive to the fact that our directions involve a burden on the State exchequer. Perhaps some justification as to why these expenses should not be grudged must now be indicated. Professor Pannick in his book entitled Judges has observed:
"Judges do not have an easy job. They repeatedly do what the rest of us seek to avoid; made decisions."
He further added:
"Judges are mere mortals but they are asked to perform a function that is utterly divine."
Professor Herold Laski once wrote to Justice Oliver Holmes that "he wished that people could be persuaded to realise that judges are human beings; it would be a real help to jurisprudence".
42. The Trial Judge is the kingpin in the hierarchical system of administration of justice. He directly comes in contact with the litigant during the proceedings in Court. On him lies the responsibility of building up of the case appropriately and on his understanding of the matter the cause of justice is first answered. The personality, knowledge. Judicial restraint, capacity to maintain dignity are the additional aspects which go into making the Court's functioning successful.
43. Krishna Iyer, J, described the scene very graphically thus" "Law is a means to an end and justice is that end. But in actuality, Law and Justice are distant neighbours; sometimes even strange hostiles. If law shoots down justice, the people shoot down law and lawlessness paralyses development, disrupts order and retarts progress. This is the current scene."
It calls for serious introspection."
24. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court taking into account the need to have an efficient and competent Judicial Officers and also the need to Improve their service conditions for the purpose of improving the administration of justice gave several directions to improve the working conditions of the Judicial Officers. As rightly pointed out by Sri Narasimha Murthy, what has been said by the Supreme Court in the said decision would apply in principle in equal force to the members of the Bar.
25. The next decision referred to by Sri Narasimha Murthy is in the case of M.H. HOSKOTE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA where in the Hon'ble Supreme Court has emphasised the need of securing service of a competent and efficient lawyer for a prisoner who is standing a trial for the commission of an offence. It may be useful to extract paragraphs 14, 15 and 18 of the said Judgment. They read as follows:
"14. The other ingredient of fair procedure to a prisoner, who has to seek his liberation through the Court process is lawyer's services. Judicial justice, with procedural intricacies, legal submissions and critical examination of evidence, leans upon professional expertise: and a failure of equal justice under the law is on the cards where such supportive skill is absent for one side. Our judicature, moulded by Anglo-American models and our judicial process, engineered by kindred legal technology, compel the collaboration of lawyer-power for steering the wheels of equal justice under the law. Free legal services to the needy is part of the English criminal justice system. And the American jurist, Prof, Vance of Yale, sounded sense for India too when he said (Justice and Reform, Earl Johnson, Jr.P.11):
What does it profit a poor and ignorant man that he is equal to his strong antagonist before the law if there is no one to inform him what the law is? Or that the Courts are open to him on the same terms as to all other persons when he has not the wherewithal to pay the admission fee?
15. Gideon's trumpet has been heard across the Atlantic. Black, J. there observed:
Not only those precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognise that in our adversary system of criminal justice any person haled into Court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both State and Federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defences. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that layers in criminal Courts are necessities, not luxuries. The fight of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but is in ours. From the very beginning, our State and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble idea cannot be realised if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
18. The American Bar Association has upheld the fundamental premise that Counsel should be provided in the criminal proceedings for offences punishable by loss of liberty, except those types of offences for which such punishment is not likely to be imposed. Thus in America, Strengthened by the Powell, Gideon and Hamlin cases, counsel for the accused in the more serious class of cases which threaten a person with imprisonment is regarded as an essential component of the administration of criminal justice and as part of procedural fair play. This is so without regard to the sixth amendment because lawyer participation is ordinarily an assurance that deprivation of liberty will not be in violation of procedure established by law. In short, it is the warp and woof of fair procedure in a sophisticated, legalistic system plus lay illiterate indigents aplenty. The Indian socia-legal milieu makes free legal services, at trial and higher levels as imperative processual piece of criminal justice where deprivation of life or personal liberty hangs in the judicial balance."
26. The Honourable Supreme Court in the case of HUSSAINARA KHATOON v. HOME SECRETARY relied upon by Sri Narasimha Murthy, while reiterating the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of M.H. Hoskote (supra) succinctly lays down the importance of philosopy of free legal services to the poor and the needy as an inalienable element of a fair procedure, and it may be useful to extract to few passages from paragraphs 7, 9 and 10 of the said decision which reads as follows:
"7. We may also refer to Articles 39A the fundamental constitutional directive which reads as follows:
39-A. Equal justice and free legal aid. The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.
This article also emphasisis that free legal service is an unalienable element of 'reasonable, fair and just' procedure for without it a person suffering from economic or other disabilities would be deprived of the opportunity for securing justice. The right to free legal services is. therefore, clearly an essential ingredient of 'reasonable, fair and just' procedure for a person accused of an offence and it must be held implicit in the guarantee of Article 21. This is a constitutional right of every accused person who is unable to engage a lawyer and secure legal services on account of reasons such as poverty, indigence or incommunicado sitution and the State is under amandate to provide a lawyer to an accused person if the circumstances of the case and the needs of justice so requires, provided of course the accused person does not object to the provision of such lawyer.
9, We may also take this opportunity of impressing upon the Government of India as also the State Governments, the urgent necessity of introducing a dynamic and comprehensive legal service programme with a view to reacing justice to the common man. Today, unfortunately, in our country the poor are priced out of the judicial system with the result that they are losing faith in the capacity of our legal system to bring about changes in their life conditions and to deliver justice to them. The poor in their contact with the legal system have always been on the wrong side of the line. They have always come across "law for the poor" rather than "law of the poor". The law is regarded by them as something mysterious and forbidding-always taking something away from them and not as a positive and constructive social device for changing the social economic order and improving their life conditions by conferring rights and benefits on them. The result is that the legal system has lost its credibility for the weaker sections of the community. It is therefore, necessary that we should inject equal justice in to legality and that can be done only by dynamic and activist scheme of legal services. We may remind the Government of the famous words of Mr. Justice" Brennan:
"Nothing rankless more in the human heart then a brooding sense of injustice. Illness we can put up with. But injustice makes us want to pull things down. When only the rich can enjoy the law, as a doubtful luxury, and the poor, who need it most, cannot have it because its expense puts it beyond their reach, the threat to the continued existence of free democracy is not imaginary but very real, because democracy's very life depends upon making the machinery of justice so effective that every citizen shall believe in and benefit by its impartiality and fairness.
and also recall what was said by Leeman Abbot years ago in relation to affluent America:
If ever a time shall come when in this city only the rich can enjoy law as a doubtful luxury, when the poor who need it most cannot have it, when only a golden key will unlock the door to the courtroom, the seeds of revolution will be sown, the fire-brand of revolution will be lighted and put into the hands of men and they will almost be justified in the revolution which will follow."
We would strongly recommend to the Government of India and the State Governments that it is high time that a comprehensive legal service programme is introduced in the Country. That is not only a mandate of equal justice implicit in Article 14 and right to life and liberty conferred by Article 21, but also the compulsion of the constitutional directive embodied in Article 39-A.
10. We find from the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents that no reasons have been given by the State Government as to why there has been such enormous delay in bringing the undertrial prisoners to trial. Speedy trial is, as held by us in our earlier judgment dated February 26, 1979, an essential ingredient of 'reasonable, fair and just' procedure guaranteed by Article 21 and it is the constitutional obligation of the State to device such a procedure as would ensure speedy trial to the accused. The State cannot be permitted to deny the constitutional right of speedy trial to the accused on the ground that the State has no adequate financial resources to incur the necessary expenditure needed for improving the administrative and judicial apparatus with a view to ensuring speedy trial. The State may have its financial constraints and its priorities in expenditure, but, as pointed out by the Court in Rhem v. Malcolm (377 F Supp 995): " The law does not permit any government to deprive its citizens of constitutional rights on plea of poverty". It is also interesting to notice what Justice, then Judge, Blackman said in Jackon v. Bishop (404 F Supp 2d 571):
Humane considerations and constitutional requirements are not in this day, to be measured by dollar considerations.
So also in Hold v. Sarver (309 F Supp 362), affirmed in 442 F Supp 362, the Court, dealing with the obligation of the State to maintain a Penitentiary System which did not violate the Eighth Amendment aptly and eloquently said:
...The State cannot avoid its constitutional obligation to provide speedy trial to the accused by pleading financial or administrative inability. The State is under a constitutional mandate to ensure speedy trial and whatever is necessary for this purpose ' has to be done by the State, it is also the constitutional obligation of this Court, as the guardian of the fundamental rights of the people, as a sentinel on the qui vive, to enforce the fundamental right of the accused to speedy trial by issuing the necessary directions to the State which may include taking of positive action, such as augmenting and strengthening the investigative machinery, setting up new courts, building new Court houses, providing more staff and equipment to the courts, appointment of additional Judges and other measures calculated to ensure speedy trial. We find that in fact Courts in the United States have adopted this dynamic and constructive role so far as the prison reform is concerned by utilising the activist magnitude of the Eighth Amendment.....
The powers of this Court in protection of the constitutional rights are of the widest amplitude and we do not see why this Court should not adopt a similar activist approach and issue to the State directions which may involve taking of positive action with a view to securing enforcement of the fundamental right to speedy trial."
27. It appears to me from the observations of the Supreme Court made in the aforesaid decision, the concept of equal justice system to be meaningful and purposeful, the legal aid contemplated under Article 39A and imbibed in Article 21 of the Constitution of India also must be made more purposeful and meaningful and in that direction the Courts should adopt activist approach and issue to the State positive directions.
28. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hussain ara Khatoon referred to above, makes it dear that the free legal service to the poor and the needy is an essential ingredient of "reasonable, fair and just" procedure for a person accused of an offence and it must be held that right is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and I am of the opinion, that cannot be achieved unless a competent, efficient and professionally skillful Bar is developed. The realities of Court practice would show that in many cases, the legal services rendered by the Counsel appearing for the parties are not equally balanced as one of the parties to the litigation who can afford to pay higher fees can secure the best legal talent, whereas the party who is poor has to be satisfied with the services of an Advocate who is not as competent as the Advocate of the other side. All these inequalities could be minimised by providing necessary facilities and working conditions to the members of the Bar in the Bar Association. It is needless to mention that a little more facilities, encouragement and support that may be given by the State to young members of the Bar who spend most of their time in the Bar Association will go a long way in helping to develop a very proficient, talented and professionally skillful and purposeful Bar/Advocates. Such a Bar is necessary for the benefit of, and protect the rights, of those unfortunate litigant public who on account of their financial constraints are unable to secure the best legal talent.
29. In the case of STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. PRAGAJI VASHI AND ORS. relied upon by Sri Narasimha Murthy, the Honourable Supreme Court at paragraph 16 of the Judgment has observed as follows:
"The rights of free legal aid and speedy trial are guaranteed fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The preamble to the Constitution of India assures Justice, social, economic and political. Article 39A of the Constitution provides equal Justice and free legal aid. The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes Justice. It means Justice according to law. In a democratic polity, governed by rule of law, it should be the main concern of the State, to have a proper legal system. Article 39A mandates that the State shall provide free legal aid by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way to ensure that opportunities for securing Justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. The principles contained in Article 39A are fundamental and cast a duty on the State to secure that the operation of the legal system promotes Justice, on the basis of equal opportunities and further mandates to provide free legal aid in any way by legislation or otherwise, so that Justice is not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. The crucial words are (the obligation of the State) to provide free legal aid 'by suitable legislation or by schemes' or 'in any other way', so that opportunities for securing Justice are not denied to any citizen by reason by economic or other disabilities. The above words occurring in Article 39A are of very wide import. In order to enable the State to afford free legal aid and guarantee speedy trial, a vast number of persons trained in law are essential. Legal aid is required in many forms and at various stages, for obtaining guidance, for resolving disputes in Courts, tribunals or other authorities, it has manifold facts. The explosion in population, the vast changes brought about by scientific, technological and other developments, and the all round enlarged field of human activity reflected in modern society, and the consequent increase in litigation in Courts and other forums demand that the service of competent persons with exercise in law is required in many stages and at different forums or levels and should be made available. The need for a continuing and well organised legal education, is absolutely essential reckoning the new trends in the world order, to meet the ever growing challenges. The legal education should be able to meet the ever growing demands of the society and should be thoroughly equipped to cater to the complexities of the different situations. Specialisation in different branches of the law is necessary. The requirement is of such a great dimension, that sizeable or vast number of dedicated persons should be properly trained in different branches of law, every year by providing or rendering competent and proper legal education. This is possible only if adequate number of law colleges with proper infrastructure including expertise law teachers and staff are established to deal with the situation in an appropriate manner. It cannot admit of doubt that, of late there is a fall in the standard of legal education. The area of 'deficiency' should be located and correctives should be effected with the co-operation of competent persons before the matter gets beyond control. Needless to say that reputed and competent academics should be taken into confidence and their services availed of, to set right matters. As in this case, a sole Government law college cannot cater to the needs to legal education or requirement in the city like Bombay. Lack of sufficient colleges called for the establishment of private law colleges. If the State is unable to start colleges of its own, it is only appropriate that private law colleges, which are duly recognised by the concerned University and/or the Bar Council of India and/or other appropriate authorities, as the case may be, should be afforded reasonable facilities to function effectively and in a meaningful manner. That requires substantial funds. Under the label of self financing institutions the colleges should not be permitted to hike the fees to any extent in order to meet the expenses to provide the infrastructure and for appointing competent teachers and staff. The private law colleges, on their own, may not afford to incur the huge cost required in that behalf.The 'standard' of legal education and discipline is bound to suffer. It should not so happen for want of funds. The 'quality' should on no account suffer in providing free legal aid and if it is not so, the free legal aid will only be a farce or make believe or illusory or a meaningless ritual. That should not be. It is in that direction the grant-in-aid by the State will facilitate and ensure the recognised private law colleges to function effectively and in a meaningful manner and turn out sufficient number of well trained or properly equipped law graduates in ail branches year after year. That will in turn enable the State and other authorities to provide free legal aid and ensure that opportunities for securing Justice are not denied to any citizen on account of any disability. These aspects necessarily flowing from Articles 21 and 39A of the Constitution were totally lost sight of by the Government when it denied the grant-in-aid to the recognised private law colleges as was afforded to other faculties. We would add that the State has abdicated the duty enjoined omit by the relevant provisions of the Constitution aforesaid. In this perspective, we hold that Article 21 read with Article 39A of the Constitution mandates or castes a duty on the State to afford grant-in-aid to recognised private law Colleges. Similar to other faculties, which quality for the receipt of the grant. The aforesaid duty cast on the State cannot be whittled down in any manner, either by pleading paucity of funds or otherwise. We make this position clear."
30. It is also useful to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of HARISHANKAR RASTOGI v. GIRDHARI SHARMA AND ANR. . In the said decision while considering the right of a litigant to take the services of a private person to represent his case before the Court instead of an Advocate, the Hon'ble Supreme Court at page 495 of the decision observed thus:
"....If the man who seeks to represent has poor antecedents or irresponsible behaviour or dubious character, the Court may receive counter-productive service from him. Justice may fail if a knave were to represent a party. Judges may suffer if quarrel some, ill-informed or blackguardly or block headly private representatives fling arguments at the Court. Likewise, the party himself may suffer if his private representative deceives him or destroys his case by mendacious or meaningless submissions and with no responsibility or respect for the Court. Other situations, settings and disqualifications may be conceived of where grant of permission for a private person to represent another may be obstructive, even destructive of justice. Indeed, the Bar is an extension of the system of justice: an advocate is an officer of Court. He is master of an expertise but more than that accountable to the Court and governed by a high ethic. The success of the judicial process often depends on the services of the legal profession.
Having regard to this conspectus of considerations f hold that a private person, who is not an advocate, has no right to barge into Court and claim to argue for a party. He must get the prior permission of the court, for which the motion must come from the party himself. It is open to the Court to grant or withhold permission in its discretion. In fact, the Court may, even after grant of permission, withdraw it half-way through if the representative proves himself reprehensible."
31. All the decisions referred to above in unmistakable terms lay down that an Advocate is an officer of the Court. The said decisions also indicate that the nature of the duties discharged by an Advocate is in the nature of a public duty. The accommodation/building for an Association must be construed and treated as part and parcel of the building of the Court or Court complex, and it cannot be treated differently from the building required for housing of Courts. There cannot be effective working of Judicial system or functioning of Administration of Justice in a democratic polity, unless the lawyers and Judges work in the system as complementary for each other. They are the two limbs of the system or can be compared to the two wheels of a chariot of justice. The chariot of justice cannot move or achieve the desired object unless both the wheels work and function complementary to each other. Just as the need of highly competent, honest and devoted judiciary is a must for the protection of rule of law, competent, honest and devoted Bar is also a must. Therefore, in a country like ours where the majority of the Advocates are not in a position to acquire necessary tools or facilities required by them for effective discharge of their professional duties, a duty is cast on the State to provide minimum facilities like building for an Advocates' Association, minimum library and other facilities to the Advocates' Association. It cannot be disputed that there is the need of an independent, strong, efficient and honest judiciary for maintenance of rule of law and for the continued existence of the democratic form of Government which we have accepted. It also cannot be disputed that the source of recruitment, whether for higher judiciary or subordinate judiciary, is from the Bar. Just as a law college is a training ground for a law student to blossom himself as an Advocate or Judicial Officer at a later stage of his career, the training of an Advocate in the discharge of his professional duties would have a telling bearing or effect if he has to preside over the Courts, starting from the lower level to the highest Court of the Country at a later stage of his career. All these qualities and training, an Advocate can acquire over the years mostly on account of his interaction with his colleagues in the Bar Association or in the Court Halls. A lawyer spends or is expected to spend, most of his time whenever he is free either in the Association or in the library attached to the Association, once he goes to the Court. Therefore, I am of the view, as rightly pointed out by Sri Narasimha Murthy, that there is a constitutional obligation on the part of the State to provide buildings and other facilities to the Advocates' Association. This constitutional obligation of the State as pointed out by me earlier can be read into the constitutional right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and also the directive principles of State policy provided under Article 39A of the Constitution of India. The view I have taken is fully supported by the principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra (supra), while pointing out the right of free legal aid and speedy trial and guaranteed fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has also pointed out that in order to enable the State to afford free legal aid and guarantee speedy trial, vast number of persons trained in law are essential, and in that view of the matter, the Supreme Court gave a direction to give financial assistance to the private law colleges. The principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision and also in the case of Harishankar Rastogi, dearly supports the contentions of the petitioner that the State has a constitutional obligation to provide building for Advocates' Association. From the examination of the principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to the nature of duties, functions and role to be played by the Advocates in the dispensation of justice in the Justice delivery system in our country, the Bar must be treated as integral part and parcel of Administration of Justice. The Bar Association is also a place where the litigant public can conveniently meet their Advocates and return to their villages or the place of their residence without being compelled to wait to meet their Advocates after the Court hours or late in the evening or the next day morning. All these factors cannot be overlooked by the State which has a duty to administer Justice in the State. Mere provision made for availability of food and shelter will not make the life of an individual meaningful, if he is driven or compelled to face unnecessary litigation without there being a proper mechanism provided for resolution of the dispute. Therefore, I am of the view that paucity of funds cannot be a ground at all for the State to refuse to make available the minimum facilities required by an Association either in the form of a building to the Advocates' Association or a library or the minimum furniture to the Association.
32. Sri Udayashankar, Learned Additional Government Advocate, submitted that in respect of the expenditure incurred by the State for buildings for Courts and Quarters for Judicial Officers. 50% of it is being reimbursed by the Central Government and in the case of building for Association, the same is not being reimbursed by the Central Government. I am unable to accept this submission. Since the construction of Association building is required to be treated as part and parcel of Court building or Court Complex and for the purpose of Administration of Justice, the State Government is entitled to seek reimbursement of the expenditure incurred by it as it is being done in the case of Court buildings and the quarters for the judicial officers. It is for the State Government to take effective steps in this direction to get the necessary funds released by the Central Government.
33. So far as the question as to whether the petitioner Association is entitled to seek for a direction to the respondents to demolish the existing building and put up new construction in its place is concerned, I am of the view that the answer must be in the affirmative for two reasons. Firstly, I have taken the view that providing accommodation to an Association is an obligatory function of the State; and secondly, in the facts of the present case, it is dear that in the month of January, 1993, a firm commitment has been made to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka. Pursuant to the said decision taken by the State in the meeting held in the chambers of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka, necessary drawings were got prepared by the Chief Architect of the State and was sent along with the line estimate for a sum of Rs. 475 Lakhs, to the Registrar General of the High Court of Karnataka on 24th August, 1993. In this connections, it is useful to extract para--3 of the Statement of Objections, which reads as follows:
"It is submitted that regarding construction of new Bar Association Building, it was decided in January, 1993, in the meeting held in the chambers of Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka and thereafter, necessary drawings were prepared by the Chief Architect and were sent along with the line estimate for Rs. 475 lakhs to the Registrar General. High Court, of Karnataka on 24.8.1993. The Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, in his letter No. LCA.IV. 248/80 (HCA II) dated 6.5.1993 has forwarded the line estimate amounting to Rs. 475 Lakhs to the Secretary to the Government, Law Department, Vidhana Soudha, Bangalore, for according administrative approval. It is submitted that the said works were not included in the printed Budget Estimates for the year 1993-94. Subsequently, the estimates were revised to Rs. 575 Lakhs for which administrative approval was sought."
Further, in para-5 of the Statement of objections, it is also admitted by the respondents that the Registrar-General had renewed proposal of the construction of the building for the petitioner-Association during the year 1994-95 and a detailed plan and estimate amounting to Rs. 340 Lakhs for first phase construction of Bar Association Building in the City Civil Courts Complex was also received from the Registrar-General. The relevant portion of para-5 reads as follows:
"... The Registrar-General, High Court of Karnataka, has renewed the proposal of construction of buildings for Advocates Association at City Civil Court Complex. Bangalore, during the year 1994-95. The detailed plan and Estimates amounting to Rs. 340.00 Lakhs for construction of Bar Association Building (I stage) in the City Civil Court Complex at Bangalore has been received from the Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, Since no amount was earmarked for this work in the Budget during 1994-95, this work could not be undertaken during 1994-95".
34. In para-6 of the Statement of Objections, it has been stated by the respondents that during the current year also, no amount has been earmarked in the State Budget and due to financial difficulties the Government did not take up the work this year also. The said paragraph of the Statement of Objection reads as follows:
"But even during this current year also, no amount has been earmarked in the Budget. Financial difficulties are being felt by Government in taking up this work during this year also. Though the total estimate of this project is 340.00 lakhs, at least a sum of Rs. 20.00 lakhs (being 30% of this amount for the remaining two months in this year) would be required to take up this work during this year. Efforts are being made to mobilise this required resources to facilitate the starting of this work.
Meanwhile, necessary improvement works are being taken up regularly, so as to avoid any inconvenience to the members of the Association."
35. From the stand taken by the State, it is dear that though a decision was taken in January, 1993, for construction of a new building for the Association in the chambers of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka and pursuant to that necessary plans and estimates were got prepared by the State Government and duly approved by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka, and the Registrar General of the High Court of Karnataka had made request to get the funds approved during the years 1993-94 and 1994-95, on account of financial constraint the State could not implement its decision. The stand of the State appears to be that it has the right to determine the priorities, and the expenditure to be incurred for the construction of Association Building being non-priority expenditure it has to recede to the background in view of other purposes to which the state has decided to give preference. I do no find any justification in the aforesaid stand taken by the State. Undisputedly,the decision was taken to demolish the existing building and to put up a new building for the Association as back as January, 1993. It is not possible to take the view that the State which is entrusted with the responsibility of managing the affairs of its people and their problems, without reference to the availability of the necessary funds; the need to demolish the existing building and put up new construction in its place, got the plan prepared and obtained estimate etc. Admittedly, a decision was taken in the meeting held in the Chambers of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka. As stated earlier, this position is admitted in the statement of objections filed by the State. The reference made by the Chairman of the Bar Council in his farewell address to the then Hon'ble Chief Justice and also the reference made by the then Hon'ble Chief Justice in his reply to the farewell address, would make it dear that the decision was taken by the State to demolish the existing building and put up new construction in its place. The decision taken to put up new construction for the Association Building in the presence of the Hon'ble Chief Justice and the assurance given to his Lordship cannot be equated to any other political or policy decision taken by the executive with regard to implementation of a programme or a project Some sanctity must be attached to the assurance given to the Head of the Judiciary by the State Government. The said assurance has to be in the context to be treated as firm commitment or promise made by the State to the Head of the Judiciary of the State in the larger interest of Administration of Justice. The State cannot be permitted to resile from the said commitment on the ground of paucity of funds. Therefore, the action of the respondents in not implementing the project pursuant to the decision taken in the meeting held in the Chambers of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka in January, 19S3, and subsequent plan prepared pursuant to the said decision is highly arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair and violative of the rights guaranteed to the members of the Association who are part of the Administration of Justice under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
36. The demand of the petitioner-Association for construction of a building has been pending consideration for the last over three years. No doubt it is true, the State has to work out its priorities and with regard to the need of its people. Out of the huge expenditure incurred by the State for the years 1993-94 and 1994-95 it should not have been difficult for the State to set apart the amount required for the purpose of construction of the building for the petitioner Association as per the plan prepared and decision taken. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate that on account of paucity of funds the respondents have not taken steps to put up construction of the building for the petitioner Association pursuant to the decision earlier taken. Even otherwise, as found by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra (supra), the paucity of funds is not a ground to deny the relief to the petitioner.
37. However, the Learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that it is not permissible for this Court to give a direction to the State to implement the project in question in exercise of the power conferred on this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, as it amounts to directing the Legislature to approve the Budget. I am unable to accept this submission because Sub-clause 3(e)of Article 202 of the Constitution of India provides that any sums required to satisfy any Judgment, decree or award of any Court or Arbitral Tribunal would be treated as an expenditure charging under consolidated fund of each State. Further, I have also found that the action of the State in not implementing the project is highly arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable. Therefore, when the action of the State is either arbitrary, unreasonable or unfair, it is not only permissible for this Court to quash the action of the State but it is also permissible for this Court to give positive direction to the State to discharge its duties, which it is under an obligation to do.
38. In view of my aforesaid conclusions, the Petitioner is entitled to succeed in this petition and accordingly this petition is allowed and the Rule issued is made absolute. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, and taking into account that three years had already elapsed from the time the State has taken decision to demolish the existing building and put up the new building in its place, I think it is just and proper to give three months time to the State from the date of receipt of this order to commence the work relating to construction of the building for the Advocates Association, Bangalore, which includes demolition of the existing building, at City Civil Courts Complex, Bangalore, which comprises of basement floor, ground floor, first floor, second floor, third floor and fourth floor, each floor having an area of 16115 sq.mtrs. in phased manner as expeditiously as possible and at any event of the matter, not later than three years from the date of commencement of the work.
39. Before I part with this order, I must place it on record, and thank Sri R.N, Narasimha Murthy, the learned senior Advocate, for the able assistance given by him, and for appearing on my request as Amicus Curiae in this petition.
40. Under these circumstances, I make the following order:
1) Respondents - 4 and 5 are directed to demolish the existing building of the petitioner - Association situated at City Civil Courts Complex, Bangalore and put up new construction/ building/s in its place at City Civil Courts Complex, Bangalore, which comprises of basement floor, ground floor, first floor, second floor and third floor each floor having an area of Sixteen thousand one hundred fifteen Sq.mtrs. in phased manner as expeditiously as possible and at any event of the matter, not later than three years from the date of commencement of the construction work.
ii) Respondents are directed to commence the work relating to the construction of new building of the petitioner - Association including demolition of existing building, as referred to above, as expeditiously as possible and at any event of the matter, not later than three months from the date of receipt of this order.
iii) However, liberty is reserved to the respondents to make necessary alterations in the plan prepared without substantially altering the basic features of the plan already approved, only with the approval of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka and in consultation of the President of the petitioner-Association.
41. In terms stated above, this petition is disposed of. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
42. Sri S. Udayashankar, Learned Additional Government Advocate is permitted to file his memo of appearance for respondents in four weeks.
43. Communicate this order to the respondents within one week.
ORDER ON BEING SPOKEN TO PVSJ:
12.06.1996
1. Since there was a typographical error crept in the order with regard to the number of floors and the area of the building proposed to be constructed, the matter is posted before me for being spoken to on my direction.
2. A direction was given to Respondents-4 and 5 to put up the building on the basis of the decision taken and the plan prepared by the Chief Architect, in my order passed on 11th June, 1996. However, by typographical error, the direction to construct the fourth floor was omitted and limited only to the third floor and the area of each of the floor was mentioned as sixteen thousand one hundred fifteen sq. mtrs. instead of 1561.15 sq. mtrs.
3. Sri Devanand, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri Ashok N. Naik, Learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents, also agree that the said error requires to be corrected.
4. Accordingly, a direction is issued to correct the order by substituting the area of each of the floor to be constructed as 1561.15 sq.mtrs in paragragh 38 of the order and in paragraph 40(i) of the order, where it is typed/mentioned as 16115 sq.mtrs.
5. It is further ordered to delete the word 'and' before the words 'third floor' and include the words 'and fourth floor' immediately after the words 'third floor' at paragraph 40.