Manipur High Court
(Through Video Conference) vs The State Of Manipur Represented By The ... on 19 January, 2022
Author: M.V. Muralidaran
Bench: M.V. Muralidaran
Digitally
KABOR signed by Page 1 of 29
KABORAMBAM
AMBAM LARSON
LARSO Date:
2022.01.21 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
N 15:14:58
+05'30' Cril. Petition No. 8 of 2017
(Through Video Conference)
Jacob John, aged about 45 years, S/o K. K. John, a resident
of A/S11, Govind Marg, Malviya Nagar, P.O. & P.S. - Malviya
Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
.... Petitioner/s
- Versus -
1. The State of Manipur represented by the Principal Secretary
(Home), Government of Manipur, Old Secretariat, Imphal
West, Manipur.
2. The Director General of Police, Manipur, Police Head
Quarters, Imphal West, Manipur.
3. The Superintendent of Police, Ukhrul, Manipur.
4. The Officer-in-Charge, Ukhrul Police Station, Manipur.
.... Respondent/s
BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.V. MURALIDARAN For the Petitioner : Mr. A. Mohendro, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. H. Samarjit, GA Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 2 of 29 Date of Hearing : 22.12.2021 Judgment & Order : 19.01.2022 JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV) This petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking to quash FIR Case No.23(4)2013 on the file of the Ukhrul Police Station registered under Sections 370(5)/376/34 IPC and under Section 6/10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) against the petitioner on the ground that for the same incident as stated in FIR Case No.23(4)2013, an FIR No.145 of 2013 was registered by the Mansarovar PS, Jaipur City under Sections 244, 323, 354A, 376 IPC and under Sections 23, 28 of Juvenile Justice Act and Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and under Sections 3/14 of Child Labour Act and under Section 24 of the Orphanages and other Charitable Homes (Supervision and Control) Act, 1960 is pending.
[2] The case of the petitioner is that he is Christian by faith and is running a Children's Home in Jaipur in the name and style "The Father's Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 3 of 29 Children Homes" for both boys and girls separately by giving education, shelter, food etc. to the poor and needy and under privileged children free of costs for more than 13 years, especially from North East. The said Home is a registered Society.
[3] On 12.3.2013, the petitioner was arrested by the Mansarovar police in connection with FIR No.145 of 2013 registered under Section 344, 366, 370(5) IPC and under Sections 23 and 28 of Children Protection Act and the petitioner was subsequently released on bail as per the order of the Sessions Judge, Jaipur on 21.3.2013. While enlarging the petitioner, the Sessions Judge, Jaipur observed that the parents of the children gave affidavit stating that they had sent their children with their own will and they were happy that with the help given by the petitioner by giving free education, shelter and food and also parents were allowed to meet and take out for entertainment from time to time. Thereafter, the petitioner was arrested by the Nagaland Police for the same offence in connection with FIR No.6/2013 registered under Sections 344/346/363/376 IPC on the file of Julukei Paren PS. Thereafter, based on the complaint given by the Chairman and Members of Child Welfare Committee, a case was registered in FIR No.23(4)2013 on the file of Ukhrul PS under Sections Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 4 of 29 370(5)/34 IPC and in the said case the petitioner was arrested and later on released on bail on 12.8.2013. According to the petitioner, by the order dated 2.9.2016, FIR No.6/2013 was quashed by the Gauhati High Court, Kohima Bench on the ground that there can be no successive FIRs in Criminal Revision Petition No.5(K) of 2016.
[4] The specific case of the petitioner is that the respondents have collectively subjected the petitioner to multiple prosecutions in three different States emanating from the multiple FIRs registered against him. According to the petitioner, the multiple FIRs against the petitioner report the same alleged offences which are made out from the raid conducted on 12.3.2013 at the orphanages managed by the petitioner in Jaipur. The petitioner filed the instant petition to be secured from the prejudice caused to him in defending multiple trails to prove his innocence. Hence, this petition.
[5] Respondents 2 to 4 filed affidavit-in-opposition stating that on 7.4.2013 at 3.40 pm, the Chairman and two other Members of the Child Welfare Committee, Ukhrul jointly lodged a complaint to the Officer-in- Charge of Ukhtul Police Station stating that (1) Nganingmi Vashi, (2) Leishipem Chamroy, (3) Anderson Yangya, (4) Leiyashim Lungleng and (5) Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 5 of 29 Grace Vasha are responsible for illegally taking the rescued children to the Father's Grace Home, Jaipur, Rajasthan and on the basis of the said complaint, an FIR Case being No.23(4)2013 was registered and the investigation proceeded. It is stated that in the course of investigation, one of the accused namely Nganingmi Vashi was arrested and on interrogation, he admitted himself to have committed the offence and stated that the petitioner directed him to send children particularly female to his Grace Home. In his statement, Nganingmi Vashi stated that as directed by the petitioner, he sent around 13 children from Ukhrul District on two different occasions.
[6] It is stated that based on the statement given by the Nganingmi Vashi and based on the investigation, the name of the petitioner was reflected in the FIR and arrested on 13.6.2013 from Nagaland Jail, Dimapur under production warrant as per the order dated 6.6.2013 passed in Criminal Misc. Case No.39 of 2013 on the file of the CJM, Ukhrul for the purpose of thorough investigation of the case. According to the petitioner, after a thorough investigation of the case, prima facie evidence against the petitioner was established and accordingly, a charge sheet was submitted against the petitioner and five others before the Special Judge (POCSO), Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 6 of 29 Manipur East. It is also stated in the affidavit-in-opposition that though the place of occurrence may be one and the same, the nature of offences, date of occurrences and victims are different in the FIR lodged at Ukhrul Police Station. Hence, prayed for dismissal of the petition. [7] Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the instant FIR, which was registered subsequently on the offences disclosed from the raid conducted at the petitioner's orphanages on 12.3.2013 are only documenting the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are same and inherent parts of the same transaction and thus, the subsequent FIRs and investigations are liable to bequashed.
[8] Learned counsel further submitted that the course adopted in the instant case, namely, registration of the information as the second FIR in regard to the same incident and making a fresh investigation when investigation in the first FIR No.145 of 2013 was pending is not permissible under the scheme of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. as pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T.T.Antony v. State of Kerala and others, reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181 and, therefore, the investigation undertaken in FIR No.23(4)2013 and the report thereof is invalid. According Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 7 of 29 to learned counsel, subsequent FIRs are not covered under the exceptions to the rule laid down in T.T.Antony's case (supra) and that a fresh FIR for the same cognizable offences or transaction of offences is not permissible. Secondly, when the second FIR consists of alleged offences which are in the nature of the cross case/cross complaint or counter complaint which presents a different version of events concerning the same incident, such cross complaint may be permitted. He would submit that a cursory glance of the subsequent FIRs registered after the registration of FIR No.145/2013 would reveal that none of them are covered under the exceptions to T.T.Antony's rule of prohibition against the second FIR. [9] Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the filing of the second FIR and a fresh charge sheet for the same offence is contrary to the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and a second FIR in respect of an offence or different offences committed in the course of the same transaction is not only impermissible, but it violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the FIR No.23(4)2013 of Ukhrul PS and its further proceedings are liable to be quashed.
[10] On the other hand, learned Government counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that based on the written complaint lodged by the Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 8 of 29 Chairman and two Members of the Child Welfare Committee, Ukhrul, the instant FIR No.23(4)2013 was registered and the investigation proceeded and that based on the statement made by one of the accused namely Nganingmi Vashi, the petitioner was implicated in this case as he only directed Nganingmi Vashi to send children particularly female to his Grace Home, Jaipur and accordingly, Nganingmi Vashi sent nearly 13 children from Ukhrul District to Grace Home, Jaipur.
[11] Learned Government counsel further submitted that not only the statement given by one of the accused, but also based on the statements given by the victims, the involvement of the petitioner as the main accused was established and the petitioner was arrested on 13.6.2013 from Dimapur Jail pursuant to the order of the CJM, Ukhrul. In fact, the investigation reveal the involvement of the petitioner in the crime and accordingly, after completion of the investigation, the respondent police filed charge sheet against the petitioner and five others. [12] Learned Government counsel next submitted that though the place of occurrence may be one and at the same place, but the nature of offences, date of occurrences, co-accused, victims and modus operandi are different in the case lodged at Ukhrul Police Station. According to learned Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 9 of 29 counsel, as far as the case registered by the Paren PS is concerned, the same was registered against the petitioner only, whereas in the case of FIR lodged at Ukhrul PS, charge sheet was filed against six accused, which includes the petitioner. According to learned Government counsel, the allegations made in the petition are totally baseless and unfounded and prayed for dismissal of the petition.
[13] This Court considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and also perused the materials available on record. [14] The grievance of the petitioner is that on the same set of allegations, three FIRs have been lodged and out of it, one has been quashed and that allegation constituting offence of rape and POCSO were the same at Ukhrul and Nagaland as that of the allegation made in connection with Jaipur case and, therefore, the Gauhati High Court quashed the FIR taking it to be the second FIR of the same allegation. Since FIR No.145 of 2013 is pending, the instant FIR No.23(4)2013 is not maintainable for the same offence and thus prayed for setting aside the FIR No.23(4)2013.
[15] Per contra, it is the say of the respondent State that it is true that few allegations may be common, but accused persons are different and Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 10 of 29 even the date of offence is different in the cases lodged at Ukhrul and at Mansarovar and therefore, the petitioner has to face the trial of the case in FIR No.23(4)2013.
[16] For proper appreciation, the complaint lodged by Lata Singh, as stated in Column 12 of FIR No.145 of 2013 of Mansarovar PS, is quoted hereunder:
" ... On 12th March, 2013, 29 children have been rescued from one of the Shelter Home (illegal) operating from 51/6, Mansarover, Jaipur. The rescue was done in collaboration with FXB India Suraksha, Rajasthan State Commission (RSCPCR) Child Welfare Committee, Jaipur administration and local police. The children rescued had been trafficked from North East, Punjab, Chhattisgarh and other parts of India and were confined illegally at the Grace Home TFC in deplorable condition. The children had been locked inside the home and were not allowed to go out either for education or entertainment. The owner of the home, Pastor Jacob John was unable to furnish any document for the Shelter Home. I request you to lodge an FIR against Pastor Jacob John and other who are involved in trafficking."
[17] It appears that pursuant to the aforesaid complaint, investigation was conducted by the Investigating Officer of Mansarover PS and it was found that the children had been locked inside the Home and were not allowed to go out either for education or entertainment and the petitioner Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 11 of 29 sexually assaulted the victims. It also appears that based on the directions of the Police Commissioner, Commissionerate, Jaipur, Rajasthan, a special team under the leadership of Shri Gurusharan Rao, ACP was sent to Ukhrul, Imphal, Manipur for enquiry and, accordingly, the special team enquired the victims and recorded their statements. In fact, the statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. of the victims in Ukhrul and Imphal were recorded. According to the prosecution, the petitioner had illegally kept 29 children (boys and girls) of Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, Nepal, Chhattishgarh and Delhi in the House No.52/6, Mansarovar, Jaipur, including 13 children from Manipur in his Home.
[18] As is evident from the records, based on the complaint lodged by Lata Singh, Coordinator of Rajasthan State Commission of Protection of Child Right in concert with the Child Welfare Academy and the local administration, 29 children (boys and girls) were rescued from the Home run by the petitioner.
[19] However, it is the case of the petitioner that the children rescued from his Home were kept by him with the permission of parents of the children and he had provided education, food etc. to them and in fact, there was no complaint from the parents and that in their 161 Cr.P.C. Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 12 of 29 statements, the victims stated that they had come with the permission of their parents and boarding and lodging facilities were proper at the place where they were resided and they were not allowed to go outside the house freely, but used to go in park opposite to their house as and when the petitioner permitted. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, all the victims state that they had neither any problem nor harassed by any person in the house where they were resided and they used to talk with their parents on phone there. Highlighting the aforesaid statements, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner never illegally kept the children in his Home and the petitioner has not sexually assaulted any of the children as alleged by the prosecution.
[20] On a perusal of the charge sheet filed by the Investigating Officer in the impugned FIR, this Court finds that the statements of 10 victims girls have been recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., wherein they all stated that they were raped and sexually assaulted by accused Jacob John (petitioner herein) at Grace Home, Jaipur. Whether or not the petitioner illegally detained the children or he sexually assaulted the children is the matter of trial. It cannot now be come to the conclusion that the petitioner has not involved in the crime alleged against him.
Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 13 of 29 [21] Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that for the same offence, an FIR No.6 of 2013 was registered by the Jalukie PS and after completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer filed charge sheet against the petitioner and by the order dated 27.1.2014, the District and Sessions Judge, Peren has framed charges against the petitioner under Sections 354(A)(ii)(v)/344/346/376 IPC read with Sections 23/28 of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000. Challenging the order dated 27.1.2014, the petitioner has filed Crl. Revision Petition No.5(K) of 2016 before the Gauhati High Court on the ground that there can be no successive FIRs against the petitioner for the same offence and the same incident which has taken place in the same place i.e. Jaipur. By the order dated 2.9.2016, the order dated 27.1.2014 of the District and Sessions Judge, Peren was quashed and accordingly, the petitioner was discharged from the charges. Therefore, the instant FIR No.23(4)2013 is not maintainable on the same offence. [22] At this juncture, it is pertinent to extract the complaint dated 6.4.2013 lodged by the Chairman and two other Members of the Child Welfare Committee, Ukhrul, which reads as under:
"Sir, Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 14 of 29 Whereas, an information has been gathered from the statement given by the above mentioned children that these under ... persons are responsible for carrying the said children to the Grace Home Jaipur, Rajasthan.
They are:-
1. Mr. Ngainungrei Vashi of Teinem (Tuisem) village, P/S & P/O Somdal, Ukhrul District accompanied by Phaishoyai and Phaibol
2. Leishipam Chamroy.
3. Anderson Yangya of Paorei Village, Ukhrul District accompanied by Angam.
4. Leiyashim Longleng of Paorei Village, Ukhrul District.
5. Grace Vasha, W/o Songachan Vasha of Greenland, Ukhrul accompanied by Soyao, Shiratyo, Akan and Gracession.
The above identified persons be immediately book ... justice at the earliest possible time.
Kindly treat this as confidential."
[23] Based on the aforesaid complaint, initially, the respondent police registered the case in FIR No.23(4)2013 against the above said five accused and on interrogation of accused Nganingmi, he had stated that he sent 13 children from Ukhrul District, Manipur to Grace Home, Jaipur and the Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 15 of 29 statement of Nganingmi also prima facie reveal that he was aware of the illicit activities carried out by the petitioner with the teachers and the students who were under his care at Grace Home, Jaipur. Thus, based on the statements of the victims and the co-accused Nganingmi, the petitioner was cited as prime accused in the instant FIR and accordingly, he was arrested and later on released on bail.
[24] Stating that on the similar offence as stated in FIR No.23(4)2013 on the file of Ukhrul PS, already a case in FIR No.145 of 2013 is pending before the Mansarovar PS, Jaipur, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the successive FIRs against the petitioner for the same offence and the same incident is not maintainable.
[25] It is apposite to mention at this juncture that FIR No.145 of 2013 was registered against the petitioner and charge sheet was filed for the offences under Sections 344, 323, 354A, 376 IPC and Sections 23 and 28 of the Juvenile Justice Act and under Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of POCSO Act and under Sections 3 and 14 of the Child Labour Act and under Section 24 of the Orphanages and other Charitable Homes (Supervision and Control) Act. Whereas, the instant FIR namely FIR No.23(4)2013 was initially registered by the Ukhrul PS against (1) Nganingmi Vashi, (2) Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 16 of 29 Leishipam Chamroy, (3) Anderson Yangpa, (4) Leiyashim Long and (5) Grace Vasha. Upon investigation, the petitioner was implicated into the crime as prime accused and filed charge sheet on 6.10.2013 against six accused, including the petitioner for the offences under Sections 370(5), 376(2) (6) (i), 120-B IPC and under Sections 6, 10, 12 of POCSO Act. Thus, it is clear that though the place of occurrence may be one and at the same place, the nature of offences, date of occurrences, accused, victims are different. As stated supra, in the instant FIR, the Ukhrul PS filed charge sheet against six accused and the specific statement of one of the accused Nganingmi Vashi is that as directed by the petitioner, he trafficked the rescued girls from Ukhrul to Grace Home, Jaipur and as regards the FIR lodged before the Mansarovar PS, Jaipur is concerned, the victims involved are two while in the instant FIR and charge sheet of Ukhrul PS, the victims involved are 10 to 13, who were not admittedly included as victims in FIR No.145 of 2013 on the file of Mansarovar PS as well as in the charge sheet. [26] At this juncture, by citing the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and others, (2010) 12 SCC 254 and P.Sreekumar v. State of Kerala and others, (2018) 4 SCC 579, Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 17 of 29 learned Government counsel submitted that if two FIRs pertain to two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. [27] In Babubhai (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after considering the decision in the case of T.T.Antony (supra), held as under:
"16. In Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292, this Court considered the judgment in T.T.Antony, (2001) 6 SCC 181 and explained that the judgment in the said case doesnot exclude the registration of a complaint in the nature of counterclaim from the purview of the court. What had been laid down by this Court in the aforesaid case is that any further complaint by the same complainant against the same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under CrPC because an investigation in this regard would have already started and further the complaint against the same accused will amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162 CrPC. However, this rule will not apply to a counterclaim by the accused in the first complaint or on his behalf alleging a different version of the said incident. Thus, in the case, there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, the investigating agency would take the same on two different FIRs and investigation can be carried under both of them by the same investigating Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 18 of 29 agency and thus filing an FIR pertaining to a counterclaim in respect of the same incident having a different version of events, is permissible."
[28] In Sreekumar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"29. The aforesaid principle was reiterated by this Court (two-Judge Bench) in Surender Kaushik v. State of U.P. (2013) 5 SCC 148 in the following words:
"24. From the aforesaid decisions, it is quite luminous that the lodgment of two FIRs is not permissible in respect of one and the same incident. The concept of sameness has been given a restricted meaning. It does not encompass filing of a counter-FIR relating to the same or connected cognizable offence. What is prohibited is any further complaint by the same complainant and others against the same accused subsequent to the registration of the case under the Code, for an investigation in that regard would have already commenced and allowing registration of further complaint would amount to an improvement of the facts mentioned in the original complaint. As is further made clear by the three-Judge Bench in Upkar Singh (2004) 13 SCC 292, the prohibition does not cover the allegations made by the accused in the first FIR alleging different version of the same incident.Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 19 of 29
Thus, rival versions in respect of the same incident do tae different shapes and in that event, lodgment of two FIRs ispermissible."
[29] Admittedly, in the case on hand, there are different versions of events. Firstly, the second FIR was not filed by the same person, who had filed the first FIR. As stated supra, FIR No.145 of 2013 relates to the occurrence on 12.3.2013 and the accused involved therein is the petitioner only, whereas in FIR No.24(3)2013, there are six accused involved, including the petitioner, wherein the nature of offence and victims involved are different. Since FIR No.145 of 2013 was against the petitioner alone based on one set of allegations, whereas the FIR No.24(3)2013 was based on the allegations different from the allegations made in FIR No.145 of 2013, the aforesaid two FIRs have to be decided separately. Therefore, the petitioner cannot contend that there can be no successive FIRs in respect of the petitioner for the same incident.
[30] Since, the nature of offences in the two FIRs in FIR No.145 of 2013 and FIR No.24(3)2013 are entirely different, the question of successive FIRs canvassed by the petitioner cannot be countenanced and the same is rejected. Since serious allegation of trafficking levelled against the petitioner and other accused and also sexual assault complained against the Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 20 of 29 petitioner, the same has to be taken seriously considering the problems faced by the children who were kept illegally in the Homes run by the petitioner. Prima facie, there appears to be an overt act against the petitioner for the commission of the offences alleged against him. [31] It is apposite to mention that child trafficking is the act of illegally hiring or selling, transporting, receiving or sheltering children for any form of exploitation. Children are abducted, worked as bonded laborers or forced to marry early. Victims are recruited to manufacture drugs and weapons. A large number of children are victims of forced labour, begging and sexual exploitation. Innocent children, boys and girls are exposed to vulnerable situations, violence and sexual abuse. It is a violation of human rights and children are deprived. It disrupts the mental and physical capacity of the child which is primary for the development of every child.
[32] Children lose their childhood due to the practice of child trafficking. Children are robbed of them, irrespective of their basic rights, economic status, caste or gender. Traffickers are aware of the fact that children have less developed mental ability to understand wrong and right and are able to reduce their trauma than adults. Thus, the children are an easy target. This practice deprives the child of proper development with love and Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 21 of 29 family care. There is a need to make people aware and educated about child trafficking. There should be strict laws to prevent child trafficking and these laws shouldbe implemented effectively.
[33] The plea of the petitioners that the respondent police subjected the petitioner to unjust and unfair trial spread across two different States wherein the petitioner is facing prosecution in two different FIRs and the pursuant criminal proceedings all pertaining to the same incident of raid dated 12.3.2013 conducted at the petitioner's orphanages in Jaipur disclosing the same set of offences from the said incident, cannot be countenanced. As stated supra, the victims involved in these cases are different and they are residing in different parts of the country and the victims involved in FIR 23(4)2013 on the file of Ukhrul PS cannot be compelled to go Jaipur jurisdictional Court and give evidence. Moreover, the two complaints are different nature of offences. Hence, this Court is of the view that the petitioner has to face the trial of the two cases in two different States and he cannot sought quashing of FIR No.23(4)2013 on the said ground. [34] Coming to the power conferred under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings, the law is well settled that criminal proceedings arising out of commercial transactions or matrimonial or family Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 22 of 29 disputes when having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character may be quashed when parties have resolved entire dispute amongst themselves, but such power cannot be used in respect of heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape and dacoity etc. [35] Offences under Sections 370(5), 376(2)(6)(i) IPC and Sections 6, 10 and 12 of the POCSO Act involved in the instant case would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore, they are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone and, thus, the criminal proceedings in FIR No.23(4)2013 on the file of Ukhrul PS which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC on the ground made by the petitioner. [36] The scope of the jurisdiction to quash an FIR either in the exercise of statutory jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the law is well settled and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions laid down clear principles and indicated parameters which justify the quashing of an FIR. This Court is proposed to catalogue the following two cases:
(i) R.P.Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866. Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 23 of 29 (ii) State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604. [37] In R.P.Kapur (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
"6. Before dealing with the merits of the appeal it is necessary to consider the nature and scope of the inherent power of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code. The said section saves the inherent power of the High Courtto make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. There is no doubt that this inherent power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. In the present case the Magistrate before whom the police report has been filed under Section 173 of the Code has yet not applied his mind to the merits of the said report and it may be assumed in favour of the appellant that his request for the quashing of the proceedings is not at the present stage covered by any specific provision of the Code. It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 24 of 29 this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possiblefor the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 25 of 29 allegations made against the accused person do constitute offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point (Vide: In Re: Shripad G. Chandavarkar [AIR 1928 Bom 184] , Jagat Chandra Mozumdar v. Queen Empress [(1899) ILR 26 Cal 786] , Shanker Singh (Dr) v. State of Punjab [(1954) 56 Punjab LR 54] , Nripendra Bhusan Ray v. Gobind Bandhu Majumdar [AIR 1924 Cal 1018] and Ramanathan Chettiyar v. K. Sivarama Subrahmanya Ayyar [ILR 47 Mad 722]."
[38] In Bhajan Lal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 26 of 29
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 27 of 29 report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basisof which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 28 of 29 continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a viewto spite him due to private and personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice."
[39] Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and applying the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above mentioned decisions, the impugned FIR No.23(4)2013 on the file of Ukhrul Police Station and the further proceedings of the said case do not merit interference, as it is not a fit case that the impugned FIR is required to be quashed on any one of the grounds raised by the petitioner to be sufficient ground. Since the offences involved in the instant case are heinous and Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017 Page 29 of 29 serious offences and are to be treated as crime against the society, this Court is of the prima facie view that the petitioner has to face the trial of the cases in two different places. There is no merit in the petition and, accordingly, the same is liable to be dismissed.
[40] In the result, the criminal petition is dismissed. No costs. [41] Registry is directed to issue copy of this order to both the parties through their whatsapp/e-mail.
JUDGE FR/NFR
-Larson Cril.Petn. No.8 of 2017