Patna High Court
Ganga Ram vs Ram Lachan Singh And Ors. on 21 September, 1964
Equivalent citations: AIR1965PAT205, AIR 1965 PATNA 205
JUDGMENT Mahapatra, J.
1. This second appeal is by defendant No. 1, who was a respondent in the lower appellate Court. The appeal arises out of a suit brought for declaration of title and for recovery of rent from two tenants occupying a house. The plaintiff's case was that his vendor Ujagir Ram entered into an agreement with the owner of this premises for sale of the same to him on the 8th September, 1947. The original owner was Sarjug Ram. Sarjug Ram in pursuance of that agreement to sell, executed a deed of sale in favour of Ujagir Ram on the 3rd of October, 1947 and received the entire consideration money, a part of which had been taken before that date but the document could not be registered as Sarjug Ram fell ill. He died on the 14th of October, 1947. Ujagir Ram presented the document for registration, but he failed as the execution was not admitted. Ultimately, he filed a suit under Section 77 of the Indian Registration Act for a decree directing that document to be registered. But on the 4th of October, 1947, the present appellant (defendant No. 1) took a sale deed executed by Sarjug Ram for the same property, and it was registered on the 6th of October, 1947. The suit under Section 77 of the Registration Act was Title Suit No. 103 of 1949, and Sarjug Ram's widow, brother, the present appellant and the two tenants were defendants; the judgment was passed in favour of the present plaintiff's vendor on the 15th July, 1953. The decree was drawn up and signed on the 23rd July, 1953 and 28th July, 1953, respectively. The decoument was ultimately registered on the 12th March, 1954, having been presented for that purpose by the Court which had passed the decree under Section 77 of the Registration Act. Thereafter, on the 16th October, 1954, UJagir Ram transferred the property to the plaintiff. But, as there was difficulty in his way, the plaintiff instituted the suit for the declaration and the other relief, as I have stated above.
2. The trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit holding that the sale in favour of the plaintiff's vendor as executed by Sarjug Ram was not valid, genuine and for consideration; and, therefore, he had got no title to transfer the same to the plaintiff. Secondly, that Court also held that there was no valid presentation or registration of that sale deed under Section 77 read with Section 75 of the Registration Act. On appeal by the plaintiff, the appellate Court took a different view and held that the sale deed, dated the 3rd October, 1947 was properly and validly executed on that date by Sarjug Ram in favour of Ujagir Ram and that it was for consideration and also that it was validly registered after the decree was passed in Tile Suit No. 103 of 1949. Defendant No. 1 has felt aggrieved by that judgment and decree and has come in appeal to this Court.
3. The main point canvassed on behalf of the appellant was that the sale deed of the 3rd October, 1947 executed by Sarjug Ram in favour of Ujagir Ram has not been registered according to law as it was not presented within thirty days of the making of the decree in Title Suit No. 103 of 1949. Learned counsel pointed out that the judgment in that suit was passed on the 15th July, 1953 and the date of the decree should be taken to be that date, although it was signed on the 28th July, 1953. Even assuming that the computation of thirty days as provided under Section 77 read with Section 75 will begin from the 28th July, 1953, the document was not presented within thirty days therefrom and, therefore, the registration accorded by the registering officer was without jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid. From the facts brought out by him, it is clear that after the decree was signed on the 28th July 1953, the defendant in that suit filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the ex parte decree and also applied for stay of the operation of the decree, on the 18th August, 1953. In response to it, an order of stay was passed by that Court on the 28th August, 1953; and the case under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was disposed of by dismissing that application on the 13th February, 1954.
As the defendant, who was directed under the decree of the title suit to get the document registered within thirty days of the passing of the decree, failed to carry out that order, the plaintiff made an application to the Court on the 8th March, 1954 praying that the document may be sent by the Court to the Registrar for registration, following which it was presented at the instance of that Court and was registered on the 12th March, 1954. It also appears and that is admitted on both sides that the document was first sent by the Munsif to the Sub-Registrar but was returned with a query about the date of the decree and then it was re-sent on the 12th March, 1954, on which date it was also registered. The decree passed in that title suit has not been brought on the record at the instance of either of the parties. We were referred to the ordersheet in that case (Ex. 4); one of the entries under the date "15-7-1953", shows that a compromise petition was filed between the plaintiff and one of the defendants. The order reads like this:
"Compromise petition put up. Suit taken up ex parte against defendant No. 2. P. W. 1 Ujagir Ram examined. Ex. 3 marked Ordered Claim proved. Let compromise be recorded and suit decreed in terms thereof against defendant No. 1 and ex parte against defendant No. 2 with cost and pleader's fee 21/2 p.c., defendant must register sale deed within 30 days from today falling which plaintiff shall be entitled to have it registered through Court."
We were asked to presume that the decree was in those terms also, according to the provision of Order XX, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The direction given under the Judgment and decree must be to mean that defendants Nos. 1 and 2, namely, the widow and the undivided brother of Sarjug Ram, were asked to get the sale deed registered within thirty dayi from the 15th July, 1053, falling which the plaintiff was to get it registered through the assistance of that Court.
4. Section 77, Clause (1) lays down the circumstances in which a party, who has failed to get a document registered, can Institute a suit for a decree directing the document to be registered in such office if it be duly presented for registration within thirty days after the passing of such decree. In Clause (2) of that section, it is provided as follows:
"The provisions contained in Sub-sections (2) and (8) of Section 75 shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to all documents 'presented for registration in accordance with any such decree' (underline (here into ' ') is mine) and notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the document shall be receivable in evidence in such suit."
Section 75, Sub-section (1) is to the effect that "if the Registrar finds that the document has been executed and that the said requirements have been complied with, he shall order the document to be registered."
It is, therefore clear that Sub-sections (2) and (3) of 8, 75 are attracted to a case covered by Section 77 for the purpose of registration in regard to the documents which are presented for registration in accordance with any decree that may have been passed under Section 77 (1); in other words, if any direction has been given in the decree as to by whom and when a document will be presented for registration, that will be mandatory; and applying Sub-section (2) of Section 75 mutatis mutandis the registering officer "shall obey the same" (same means the decree). If in the present case, reading the order portion as contained in Ex. 4 under dated 15-7-1953" and taking that to be the terms of the decree also, we find that the defendants in that case were directed to get the document registered within thirty days from that date; and It was on failure of that only that the plaintiff was given the option of getting the document registered through the assistance of the Court. To that extent the period of thirty days mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 75 will he modified. Then in the present case we have only to see if those terms of the decree were or were not observed for presentation and registration of the document.
5. There are a few other circumstances that occurred in that suit which we have to bear in mind. An order of stay of the operation of the order as passed on the 15th July, 1953 and the decree signed in accordance therewith, on the 28th July, 1953, was passed by that Court on the 28th August, 1953, and it came to be dissolved after the dismissal of the miscellaneous case under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the 13th February, 1954. Therefore, by operation of the stay order of the Court, both the parties were kept out of complying with the directions of the decree for the period between the 28th August, 1953 and 13th February, 1954. Before the order of stay was passed on the 28th August, 1953, thirty days that had been allowed to the defendant, both under the order passed on the 15th July, 1953 and the decree signed on the 28th July, 1953 for getting the document registered, had elapased: and the occasion for the plaintiff to get the document registered through the assistance of the Court had arisen, but that could not be availed of on account of the stay order till the 13th February, 1954, and before the expiry of thirty days after the dismissal of the miscellaneous case the plaintiff applied on the 8th March, 1954 to the Court to take steps for presentation of that document, and, as a matter of fact it was presented and registered by that Court on the 12th of March, 1954, that is, within thirty days after the expiry of the period appointed for the defendants in the decree (excluding the time from the making to the dissolution of the stay order). In that view, we do not find that there has been any violation of the directions given in the decree in regard to the presentation or registration of the document, and therefore, there was no invalidity on either account.
6. The contention of learned counsel was that Irrespective of any direction given in the decree passed in the suit under Section 77 of the Indian Registration Act, thirty days' limitation has to be clamped for the purposes of presentation of a document for registration, and he relied upon Sub-section (2) of Section 75 for that purpose, wherein it is laid down that "If the document is duly presented for registration within thirty days after the making of such order (in this case the decree), registering officer shall obey the same and thereupon shall, so far as may be practicable, follow the procedure prescribed in Sections 58, 59 and 60."
That period of thirty days will certainly be applicable provided if there is nothing to the contrary In the decree or if the decree is silent in that respect. In a case where a suit has been instituted under Section 77 (1) of the Registration Act and a decree has been passed for registration if a document, the decree will be the mandate for the registering officer, and he is called upon to obey that. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 77, the document has to be presented for registration in accordance with such decree. Therefore, in the present case, the direction given for the registration of the document in the decree will be the decisive factor, and as I have referred to the details thereof, there has not been any failure in regard to the presentation or registration of the document in accordance with the terms of the decree which we have presumed to be in accordance with the order passed on the 15th of July, 1953 in Ex. 4.
Learned counsel referred us to a decision reported in Mirza Muhammad Ismail Beg v. Sricharan Das, AIR 1922 Pat 408 (2) where the learned Judges said that reading Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 75 with Section 77, it appeared to them that the registering officer had jurisdiction to register a document if it was duly presented for registration within thirty days of the decree passed by the Civil Court under Section 77 (1) of the Registration Act. Before making that observation, the learned Judge, who delivered the judgment, had taken particular care to mention in stating the Facts of that case that the Civil Court had passed a decree in favour of the respondents but did not specify the time within which the document was to be presented for registration. There cannot he the slightest doubt in mind if any such time was given in such a decree, in that case, the rule of thirty days as mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 75 will stand modified (mutatis mutandis). The reason for that is obvious, as I nave already stated, because the presentation of a document will have to be in accordance with the terms of the decree. We do not see that the case reported is of any avail to the appellant.
Another case that was cited before as is reported in Keshwar Mehra v. Rejeswari Pershad Singh, AIR 1935 Pat 497, on which reliance was also placed by the lower appellate Court. In that case, the decree was passed in the appellate Court in a suit instituted under Section 77 of the Indian Registration Act, on the 20th of August 1932, and a second appeal was brought to the High Court against that. Meanwhile, on the 6th September, 1932, the plaintiffs applied to the appellate Court to return the document to them so that they might present it for registration within the period of thirty days of the decree; but the Court refused that, obviously thinking that no document should be returned before the expiry of thirty days provided for an appeal against a decree. On the 2nd November 1932, the plaintiffs renewed his prayer by filing another petition, and on the 4th November, 1932 the Court permitted the presentation of the document for registration and subsequently it was registered. When the second appeal was taken up in the High Court, a point was raised that the document had been invalidly presented and registered, and, therefore, no title had accrued to the plaintiff to press his claim on the basis of such transaction in the second appeal. The learned Judge held that the calculation of thirty days from the date of the decree will mean thirty days from the date of the decree of the appellate Court also. In that case, however, as a special safeguard against any future controversy on the ground of delayed presentation and registration, the learned Judge allowed thirty days more for registration of the document from the date of the decree to be passed in the second appeal by the High Court.
In my view, this case docs not support the appellant's contention in any way as learned counsel wanted to argue by saying that the observation that thirty days should be computed from the date of the making of the appellate Court order was merely an obiter, because the High Court itself extended the period of thirty clays by prescribing another thirty days from the date of the decree in the second appeal. It cannot be said that what was observed by the learned Judge was obiter, but the course adopted was a special one with a view to providing a safeguard for the plaintiff in that suit for future.
7. Learned counsel further contended that the period covered by the stay order by the Munsif before whom the suit under Section 77 (1) was instituted should not he available to the advantage of the plaintiff For registration in this case, inasmuch as when both Section 77 (1) as well as Section 75 (2) refers to thirty days from the date of the decree, that will prevail against anything else. I cannot concede to this argument for the simple reason that:
"One of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to lake care that the act of the Court docs no injury to any of the suitors and when the expression 'the act of the Court', is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of Appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case."
(See Rodger v. Comptoir d' Escompte de paris, (1871) 3 PC 465, at p. 475 and Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath, 49 Ind. App. 351, at p. 356: AIR 1922 PC 269 at p. 371). When the stay order was passed by the learned Munsif, and that was within his competence, the parties who had been directed to get the document registered, one way or the other, could not have followed those directions and they were restrained from doing so. In that view, the period covered by that act of the Court cannot work to the disadvantage of any of the parties ultimately.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant next contended that the finding of the lower appellate Court to the effect that the document was really executed on the 3rd October, 1947 by Sarjug Ram In favour of Ujagir Ram and that was for consideration could not be sustained, because the lower appellate Court reversed the finding to the contrary of the trial Court without considering all the reasons given in support of that finding by the trial Court and without discussing in detail and in full all the witnesses who had been referred to by the trial Court in that connection. It is clear from a perusal of the appellate Court's judgment that P. W. 2 was an attesting witness to the document; P. W. 11 was the scribe; P. W. 13 was Ujagir Ram--the person in whose favour the document was executed; and P. W. 14 was the expert who had examined the thumb impression on that document. The lower appellate Court considered their evidence in detail and accepted their testimony and on that it based its finding in favour of the plaintiff to the effect that the document was validly executed for consideration on the 3rd October, 1947. Another fact which weighed with the Court below was that a document bearing a date will prima facie be presumed to have been executed or that date. Such presumption is not conclusive, but in the present case that prima facie presumption gained great support from the positive sworn testimony of four witnesses, It is true that D. W. 9 Gangaram's evidence was referred and considered by the trial Court in this connection. That has not been dealt with by the lower appellate Court, but to me that docs not seem to be any material omission that would upset the finding of Fact of the last Court of facts. It is not always necessary that the appellate Court shall have to deal with each and every reason given by the trial Court or discuss in detail or cover in detail the same ground as has been done by the trial court. It will be enough if, from a perusal of the appellate Court's judgment, one comes to the conclusion that the appellate Court had fully and adequately applied its mind to all the relevant materials and evidence in connection with a particular issue and gave its own reasons which set at naught the reasons of the trial Court and if it then reversed the finding of the Court of origin, that would be a proper discharge of its duties. In my view, therefore, the finding that that the document dated the 3rd October, 1947 was validly executed and was for consideration cannot be assailed.
9. The result, therefore, is that both the points raised in support of the appeal fail, and the appeal is dismissed; but in the circumstances of the case, mere will be no order for cost in this Court.
A.B.N. Sinha, J.
10. I agree.