Madhya Pradesh High Court
The National Highways Authority Of ... vs Smt Sobha Jain on 27 November, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-GWL:31266
1 AA No. 44 of 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 27th OF NOVEMBER, 2025
ARBITRATION APPEAL No. 44 of 2022
THE NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA (MINISTRY OF
ROAD TRANSPORT AND HIGHWAYS)
Versus
SMT SOBHA JAIN AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Ashish Saraswat with Shri H.K. Goyal- Advocates for appellant.
Shri S.K. Jain with Shri Akshat Jain - Advocates for respondents.
JUDGMENT
1. This arbitration appeal under section 37(1)(C) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act has been filed against the order dated 14.02.2022 passed by Fourth District Judge, Shivpuri in MJC AV No.35/2018, by which the application filed under section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act has been allowed, and the award dated 28.08.2017 passed by Arbitrator cum Divisional Commissioner, Division, Gwalior in case No.193/2015-16/jk-jk-ekxZ has been set aside.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: AMAN TIWARI Signing time: 05-12-2025 03:56:51 PMNEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-GWL:31266 2 AA No. 44 of 2022
2. Challenging the award passed by the Court below, it is submitted by counsel for appellant that in an identical case, this Court by judgment dated 25.07.2025 passed in A.A. No.37/2022 [The National Highways Authority of India (Ministry of Road Transport and Highways) Govt. of India Vs. Sanjay Kumar and Others], it was held that since the Divisional Commissioner, Division Gwalior was the Arbitrator, therefore, the Principal Court of original jurisdiction would be District Court, Gwalior, and not District Court, Shivpuri, and accordingly, the order passed by the District Court, Shivpuri, was set aside by holding that the said Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. It is further submitted that by order dated 10.09.2025 passed in RP No.1545/2025 (Sanjay Kumar Vs. National Highways Authority of India Ministry of Road Transport and Highways Government of India Thr and Others), this Court had modified the judgment dated 25.07.2025 passed in A.A. No. 37/2022 and directed the trial Court to return the application filed by the applicant under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act so as to enable him to approach the appropriate forum, subject to principles of limitation. It is further submitted that this case is duly covered by the judgment dated 25.07.2025 passed by this Court in A.A. No.37/2022 as well as the order dated 10.09.2025 passed in R.P. No.1545/2025.
3. Per contra, the appeal is vehemently opposed by counsel for respondents. By referring to judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of Union of India (UOI) versus Pam Development Pvt. Ltd. decided on 18.02.2014 in Civil Appeal No.5618/2006, it is submitted that once the respondents had submitted to Signature Not Verified Signed by: AMAN TIWARI Signing time: 05-12-2025 03:56:51 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-GWL:31266 3 AA No. 44 of 2022 the jurisdiction of District Court Shivpuri without any demur and objection, then they cannot raise the question of lack of jurisdiction at a later stage.
4. Considered the submissions made by counsel for the parties.
5. In the case of Pam Development Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), the question before the Court was as to whether the party aggrieved by the award passed by the arbitrator can challenge jurisdiction of Arbitrator specifically when no objection was ever raised by the said aggrieved party. In nutshell, the question before the Supreme Court in the case of Pam Development Pvt. Ltd. (Supra) was with regard to submission to the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal. Here the case is with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court before whom an application under section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act was filed. The law laid down by Supreme Court in the case of Pam Development Pvt. Ltd. (Supra) is distinguishable on account of aforesaid aspect.
6. This Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar & Ors. (supra) passed in A.A. No.37/2022 had passed the following judgment :
"This appeal, under Section 37(1)(C) of Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996, has been filed against the order dated 26.11.2021 passed by IV District Judge, Shivpuri (M.P.) in Case No.MJC AV 100/2015 by which an application filed by respondent under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act has been allowed and award dated 18.05.2015 passed by Arbitrator-cum-Divisional Commissioner, Gwalior Division, Gwalior (M.P.) in Case No.102/11-12/Arbitration has been set aside.
2. The facts, necessary for disposal of present appeal, in short, are that on 27.09.2004 and 17.06.2005 a gazette notification was published by Ministry of Road Transport and Highways for acquiring the land situated in District Shivpuri, adjacent to the National Highway of Village Karera, Tahsil Karera, District Shivpuri (M.P.) for widening/construction of the National Highway No.25 and 76. On 19.05.2005 and 05.05.2005 a Gazette Notification was published as per Section 3(D) of the National Highways Act and the scheduled land stood absolutely vested in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. In Case No.07/2004-05/v-82 the order/award was passed by the Sub Divisional Officer-cum-Competent Authority Land Acquisition Signature Not Verified Signed by: AMAN TIWARI Signing time: 05-12-2025 03:56:51 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-GWL:31266 4 AA No. 44 of 2022 National Highway No.25, Tahsil-Karera, District Shivpuri on 01/06/2006 as provided under Section 3G(1) of the National Highways Act. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Competent Authority (Land Acquisition), an application under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act was preferred by respondent No.1 before the Arbitrator-cum-Divisional Commissioner, Division Gwalior for enhancement of compensation amount but no plea was raised in the application as provided under Section 23 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act about the applicability of the provisions of the Right To Fair Compensation And Transparency In Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation And Resettlement Act, 2013. A reply was submitted by the appellant before the Arbitrator-cum-Divisional Commissioner, Division Gwalior. No Award was passed by the Arbitrator-cum-Divisional Commissioner, Division Gwalior on 19.07.2011 and the application preferred under Section 3G(5) of National Highways Act was allowed and the matter was remanded as a whole to the competent authority (Land Acquisition)-cum-Sub Divisional Officer, Tahsil Karera, District Shivpuri (M.P.) to re-decide the matter on merits after granting opportunity of hearing. The said order was challenged by the respondent No.1 before the High Court by filing WP. No.5882/2011. The writ petition was allowed by High Court by order dated 11.10.2011 by holding that the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to remand the matter. Accordingly, the Arbitrator-cum-Divisional Commissioner, Gwalior Division, Gwalior, was directed to decide the case on merits itself instead of remanding the same to the Land Acquisition Officer. By order dated 18.05.2015, Arbitrator-cum- Divisional Commissioner, Gwalior Division, Gwalior, dismissed the application filed by respondent No.1 under Section 3G(5) of National Highways Act. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Arbitrator-cum- Divisional Commissioner, Gwalior Division, Gwalior, respondent No.1 preferred an application under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, before the District Judge, Shivpuri (M.P.). Reply was filed by NHAI and by impugned order dated 26.11.2021, the IV District Judge, Shivpuri (M.P.) allowed the application preferred by respondent No.1.
3. Challenging the order passed by IV District Judge, Shivpuri (M.P.) in MJC AV No.100/2015, it is submitted by counsel for appellant that the order passed by the IV District Judge, Shivpuri (M.P.) is without jurisdiction in the light of law laid down by this Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation V. Baisakhu @ Sadhu reported in AIR 2021 MP 125. It is further submitted that even if the question of territorial jurisdiction is not raised before the Court below, the same can be raised at any point of time as any judgment passed by a Court having no jurisdiction is a nullity. It is submitted that the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain an application under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act would be determined on the basis of seat of Arbitration as opposed to, on the basis of cause of action. It is submitted that once the seat of arbitration is designated, then the same operates as an exclusive jurisdiction clause, as a result of which Signature Not Verified Signed by: AMAN TIWARI Signing time: 05-12-2025 03:56:51 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-GWL:31266 5 AA No. 44 of 2022 only the Courts where the seat is located would have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other Courts, even courts where part of cause of action may have arisen. It is submitted that since the arbitration was conducted by Divisional Commissioner, Gwalior Division, Gwalior at Gwalior, therefore, only the Principal Civil Court at Gwalior had jurisdiction to entertain an application filed under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Thus, it is submitted that the order passed by the IV District Judge, Shivpuri (M.P.) in Case No.MJC AV 100/2015 is nullity and is without jurisdiction.
4. Per contra, the submission made by counsel for appellant is vehemently opposed by counsel for the respondent. It is submitted that if the seat of the arbitration is not designated, then the court where the cause of action had arisen will assume jurisdiction to decide the application filed under Section 34 Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Since the land which was acquired is situated within the jurisdiction of Principal Civil Court, Shivpuri, therefore, the IV District Judge, Shivpuri (M.P.) did not commit any mistake by entertaining the application filed under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
6. Section 3G of National Highways Act, 1956, reads as under:
"3G. Determination of amount payable as compensation.-- (1) Where any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount which shall be determined by an order of the competent authority.
(2) Where the right of user or any right in the nature of an easement on, any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount to the owner and any other person whose right of enjoyment in that land has been affected in any manner whatsoever by reason of such acquisition an amount calculated at ten per cent. of the amount determined under sub-section (1), for that land. (3) Before proceeding to determine the amount under sub-
section (1) or sub-section (2), the competent authority shall give a public notice published in two local newspapers, one of which will be in a vernacular language inviting claims from all persons interested in the land to be acquired.
(4) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land and shall require all persons interested in such land to appear in person or by an agent or by a legal practitioner referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3C, before the competent authority, at a time and place and to state the nature of their respective interest in such land. (5) If the amount determined by the competent authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by either of the parties, Signature Not Verified Signed by: AMAN TIWARI Signing time: 05-12-2025 03:56:51 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-GWL:31266 6 AA No. 44 of 2022 be determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government.
(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration under this Act.
(7) The competent authority or the arbitrator while determining the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section (5), as the case may be, shall take into consideration--
(a) the market value of the land on the date of
publication of the notification under section 3A;
(b) the damage, if any, sustained by the person
interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the severing of such land from other land;
(c) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other immovable property in any manner, or his earnings;
(d) if, in consequences of the acquisition of the land, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses, if any, incidental to such change."
7. From the plain reading of the aforesaid section, it is clear that if amount determined by the competent authority under sub-section (1) or sub- section (2) is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by either of the parties, be determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government.
8. Letter dated 11/2/2002 issued by GAD, State of M.P. reads as under:-
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9. By referring to the letter dated 11.02.2002 issued by GAD, State of Madhya Pradesh, it is submitted that Commissioner, Gwalior Division, Gwalior, Chambal Division, Chambal, Sagar Division, Sagar and Jabalpur Division, Jabalpur were appointed as Arbitrators. Therefore, it is the case of the appellant that the Commissioner, Gwalior Division, Gwalior was appointed as an Arbitrator. It is submitted that either the seat may be designated in the arbitration agreement itself or the authority based at any place may be appointed as an Arbitrator and in that case the place of office of the said authority shall be a designated seat for arbitration. Accordingly, it is the case of appellant that since the Commissioner, Gwalior Division, Gwalior was appointed as an Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) of National Highways Act, 1956, therefore, the Principal Court of original jurisdiction, Gwalior was competent to entertain the application filed under Section 34 of Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. Vs. NHPC Ltd. And Another reported in (2020) 4 SCC 310 has held as under:
3. This Court in Civil Appeal No. 9307 of 2019 entitled BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC [BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC, (2020) 4 SCC 234] delivered a judgment on 10-12-2019 i.e. after the impugned judgment was Signature Not Verified Signed by: AMAN TIWARI Signing time: 05-12-2025 03:56:51 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-GWL:31266 8 AA No. 44 of 2022 delivered, in which reference was made to Section 42 of the Act and a finding recorded thus : (SCC pp. 287-88, para 59) "59. Equally incorrect is the finding in Antrix Corpn.
Ltd. [Antrix Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9338] that Section 42 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would be rendered ineffective and useless. Section 42 is meant to avoid conflicts in jurisdiction of courts by placing the supervisory jurisdiction over all arbitral proceedings in connection with the arbitration in one court exclusively. This is why the section begins with a non-obstante clause, and then goes on to state '...where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this Part has been made in a court...' It is obvious that the application made under this part to a court must be a court which has jurisdiction to decide such application. The subsequent holdings of this Court, that where a seat is designated in an agreement, the courts of the seat alone have jurisdiction, would require that all applications under Part I be made only in the Court where the seat is located, and that Court alone then has jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of the arbitral agreement. So read, Section 42 is not rendered ineffective or useless. Also, where it is found on the facts of a particular case that either no "seat" is designated by agreement, or the so-called "seat" is only a convenient "venue", then there may be several courts where a part of the cause of action arises that may have jurisdiction. Again, an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 may be preferred before a court in which part of the cause of action arises in a case where parties have not agreed on the "seat" of arbitration, and before such "seat" may have been determined, on the facts of a particular case, by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 20(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. In both these situations, the earliest application having been made to a court in which a part of the cause of action arises would then be the exclusive court under Section 42, which would have control over the arbitral proceedings. For all these reasons, the law stated by the Bombay [Konkola Copper Mines v. Stewarts & Lloyds of India Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 777 : (2013) 5 Bom CR 29] , [Nivaran Solutions v. Aura Thia Spa Services (P) Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 5062 : (2016) 5 Mah LJ 234] and Delhi [Antrix Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9338] High Courts in this regard is incorrect and is overruled."
(emphasis in original)
4. This was made in the backdrop of explaining para 96 of BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 Signature Not Verified Signed by: AMAN TIWARI Signing time: 05-12-2025 03:56:51 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-GWL:31266 9 AA No. 44 of 2022 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , which judgment read as a whole declares that once the seat of arbitration is designated, such clause then becomes an exclusive jurisdiction clause as a result of which only the courts where the seat is located would then have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
5. Given the finding in this case that New Delhi was the chosen seat of the parties, even if an application was first made to the Faridabad Court, that application would be made to a court without jurisdiction. This being the case, the impugned judgment is set aside following BGS SGS Soma JV [BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC, (2020) 4 SCC 234] , as a result of which it is the courts at New Delhi alone which would have jurisdiction for the purposes of challenge to the award.
6. As a result of this judgment, the Section 34 application that has been filed at Faridabad Court, will stand transferred to the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. Any objections taken on the ground that such objection filed under Section 34 is out of time hence cannot be countenanced. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
11. From the above-mentioned judgment, it is clear that once the seat of arbitration is designated, then such clause becomes an exclusive jurisdiction clause, as a result of which only the Courts where the seat is located would then have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other Courts. The seat of arbitration can be determined by the arbitration agreement, conduct of parties or the arbitrators designated. In the present case, the seat of arbitration was determined by Arbitrator's Designation. By letter dated 11.02.2002, various Divisional Commissioners of different divisions were appointed as Arbitrators for the districts mentioned in the order. The said letter was issued in view of the notification issued by the Union of India dated 31.12.2001. Thus, it is clear that for the purposes of this dispute the Commissioner, Gwalior Division, Gwalior was appointed as the Arbitrator. It is not out of place to mention here that thereafter the Union of India by notification dated 03.01.2022 issued under Section 3G of National Highways Act, 1956, had appointed the Collectors of respective districts as Arbitrators. Therefore, the legal position has changed after the notification dated 03.01.2022 and now every Collector of the respective district where the subject matter is situated has been appointed as the Arbitrator. But in the present case, the arbitration was conducted by the Commissioner, Gwalior Division Gwalior as per the notification issued by the Union of India under Section 3G of National Highways Act, 1956. Accordingly, this Court is of considered opinion that by issuing a notification under Section 3G of National Highways Act, 1956, the Union of India had designated the seat of arbitration by arbitrator's designation. Accordingly, this Court is of considered opinion that the District Court, Shivpuri had no territorial Signature Not Verified Signed by: AMAN TIWARI Signing time: 05-12-2025 03:56:51 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-GWL:31266 10 AA No. 44 of 2022 jurisdiction to entertain the application filed under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
12. Now, the next question for consideration is as to whether any judgment passed by Court having no jurisdiction can be challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction at any stage or the objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction should have been raised at the earliest.
13. The Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Singh And Others Vs. Chaman Paswan And Others reported in AIR 1954 SC 340 has held that it is a fundamental principle, well established, that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.
14. The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Power Trading Co. Ltd. v. Narmada Equipments (P) Ltd., (2021) 14 SCC 548
13. We refer now to the second argument raised on behalf of the respondent, that the appellant cannot raise an objection relying on Section 86(1)(f) of the 2003 Act in the second application filed by it under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act, when it had not raised the same objection in the first application under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act or before the arbitrators so appointed. It is pertinent to note that this argument was rejected by the Single Judge of the High Court in the impugned judgment and order dated 30-11-2016 [Narmada Equipments (P) Ltd. v. M.P. Power Trading Co. Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine MP 11903] in the following terms : (Narmada Equipments case [Narmada Equipments (P) Ltd. v. M.P. Power Trading Co. Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine MP 11903] , SCC OnLine MP para 9) "9. I will be failing in my duty if the basic objection raised by Shri Manoj Dubey about maintainability of this application is not dealt with. Merely because in earlier round of litigation, the objection of maintainability was not taken, it will not preclude the other side to raise such objection if it goes to the root of the matter. This is trite law that jurisdiction cannot be assumed by consent of the parties. If a statute does not provide jurisdiction to entertain an application/petition, the petition cannot be entertained for any reason whatsoever. Thus, I am not inclined to hold that since for the reason that in the earlier round of litigation i.e. AC No. 76 of 2011 parties reached to a consensus for appointment of arbitrators, this application is also maintainable. I deem it proper to examine whether because of operation of Section 174 of the Act of 2003, the present application under the Act of 1996 is not maintainable."
Signature Not Verified Signed by: AMAN TIWARI Signing time: 05-12-2025 03:56:51 PMNEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-GWL:31266 11 AA No. 44 of 2022
14. A similar issue was raised before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Hindustan Zinc Ltd. [Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd., (2019) 17 SCC 82 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 363] , where an arbitrator was appointed by the State Electricity Commission under Section 86(1)(f) of the 2003 Act with the consent of the parties. Subsequently, the arbitral award was challenged under Section 34 of the 1996 Act before a Commercial Court, and the Commercial Court's decision was challenged in an appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act where it was held that the State Electricity Commission had no jurisdiction to appoint the arbitrator since Section 86(1)
(f) refers to disputes only between licensees and generating companies, and not licensees and consumers. When the matter reached this Court, the contention was that the objection to jurisdiction could not have been raised in a proceeding under Section 37 of the 1996 Act once the parties had consented to arbitration earlier. Speaking for the Court, Rohinton F. Nariman, J. held that if there is inherent lack of jurisdiction, the plea can be taken at any stage and also in collateral proceedings. He highlighted the well-established principle that a decree passed by a court without subject- matter jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon. Such a defect of jurisdiction cannot be cured even by the consent of the parties. The above dictum would apply to the present case.
15. In the above view of the matter, the order of the High Court appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act is unsustainable. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 30-11-2016 in Narmada Equipments (P) Ltd. v. M.P. Power Trading Co. Ltd. [Narmada Equipments (P) Ltd. v. M.P. Power Trading Co. Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine MP 11903] However, this will not come in the way of the respondent in taking recourse to such remedies as are available in law. However, we have expressed no opinion either on the merits or the objections of the appellant which, when urged, would be considered by the appropriate forum. There shall be no order as to costs.
15. Therefore, the objection with regard to the lack of territorial jurisdiction can be raised at any point of time and even in the execution stage. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Ravi Ranjan Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Aditya Kumar Chatterjee reported in 2022 (5) Scale 372.
16. Thus, it is held that the objection with regard to lack of territorial jurisdiction can be raised at any point of time and therefore the ground raised by the appellant in the present appeal that IV District Judge, Shivpuri (M.P.) had no territorial jurisdiction to decide the application filed under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, has to be upheld.
17. Accordingly, it is held that order dated 26.11.2021 passed by IV District Judge, Shivpuri (M.P.) in Case No.MJC AV 100/2015 is bad in law as Signature Not Verified Signed by: AMAN TIWARI Signing time: 05-12-2025 03:56:51 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-GWL:31266 12 AA No. 44 of 2022 it was passed by a Court having no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application filed under Section 34 of Arbitration Conciliation Act.
18. Ex consequenti, order dated 26.11.2021 passed by IV District Judge, Shivpuri (M.P.) in Case No.MJC AV 100/2015 is hereby set aside on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
19. Accordingly, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed."
7. This order was further reviewed by order dated 10th September 2025 in R.P. No.1545/2025. In Review Petition No.1545/2025, the following order was passed :
"1. This review petition under Order 47 Rule 1 & 2 of CPC has been filed against the judgment dated 25.7.2025 passed by this Court in Arbitration Appeal No.37/2022.
2. A solitary ground has been raised by counsel for applicant that this Court by judgment dated 25.07.2025 in Arbitration Appeal No.37/2022 has held that the IVth District Judge Shivpuri had no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. However, it is submitted that this Court may direct for return of application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act for presentation before the appropriate forum.
3. Per contra, the review petition is vehemently opposed by counsel for respondent No.1. It is submitted that once the application filed by applicant under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was held to be not maintainable before the Principal Civil Court Shivpuri, then the principle of res judicata would not apply and by taking advantage of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the applicant can always approach the appropriate forum.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
5. This Court after having come to a conclusion that the IVth District Judge Shivpuri had no territorial jurisdiction to decide the application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, could have directed for return of the application filed under Section 34 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act with liberty to the applicant to file the same before appropriate forum. Even otherwise, if no such observation is made, still in case if the applicant approaches the appropriate forum, the said proceedings cannot be dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
6. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that in order to avoid any further legal complication, this review petition can be allowed and accordingly, judgment dated 25.07.2025 passed by this Court in Arbitration Appeal No.37/2022 is modified and after holding that application Signature Not Verified Signed by: AMAN TIWARI Signing time: 05-12-2025 03:56:51 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO.2025:MPHC-GWL:31266 13 AA No. 44 of 2022 filed by applicant before IVth District Judge Shivpuri was not maintainable, it is directed that the application filed by applicant under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act shall stand returned to the applicant so as to enable him to approach appropriate forum subject to principles of limitation.
7. This order shall be treated as part of judgment dated 25.07.2025 passed in Arbitration Appeal No.37/2022.
8. With the aforesaid observation, this review petition is allowed."
8. Since the case in hand is duly covered by the aforementioned judgment and order, therefore, this appeal is also allowed and the order dated 14.02.2022 passed by Fourth District Judge, Shivpuri, in MJC AV No.35/2018 is held to be without jurisdiction. Accordingly, it is set-aside. The trial Court is directed to return the application filed by the respondents under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act so as to enable them to file the said application before the competent Court having jurisdiction. It is, however, made clear that the aforesaid liberty shall be subject to the principles of limitation.
9. The appeal succeeds and is allowed.
(G.S. Ahluwalia) Judge Aman Signature Not Verified Signed by: AMAN TIWARI Signing time: 05-12-2025 03:56:51 PM