National Consumer Disputes Redressal
M/S. Air India vs Kamalpreet Kaur on 18 July, 2025
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
SECOND APPEAL NO. NC/SA/358/2025
(Against the Order dated 22nd April 2025 in Appeal SC/7/FA/158/2025 of the State Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission Delhi)
WITH
NC/IA/7884/2025 (STAY)
NC/IA/8683/2025 (PLACING RECORD)
NC/IA/7883/2025 (EXEMPTION FROM FILING THE CERTIFIED COPY)
NC/IA/7882/2025 (EXCEMPTION OF FILE TYPED COPIES OF DOCUMENTS)
M/S. AIR INDIA
PRESENT ADDRESS - BLOCK 4 LEVEL 6 VATIKA ONE ON ONE IDC , INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT AREA SECTOR 16SOUTH,DELHI.
.......Petitioner(s)
Versus
KAMALPREET KAUR
PRESENT ADDRESS - R/O VILLAGE 3B CHHOTI DISTRICT SHRI GANGANAGAR
RAJESTHAN-335001GANGANAGAR,RAJASTHAN.
.......Respondent(s)
BEFORE:
HON'BLE DR. INDER JIT SINGH , PRESIDING MEMBER
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE SUDHIR KUMAR JAIN , MEMBER
FOR THE PETITIONER:
MR. RAJESH RANJAN & MS. DEEKSHA ARORA, ADV
FOR THE RESPONDENT:
MR. HARSH, ADV
DATED: 18/07/2025
ORDER
1. Heard counsel for both sides.
2. Challenge is to the order dated 21.04.2025 of the State Commission, vide which appeal ( First Appeal) filed by the appellant herein was dismissed on account of limitation having been filed with delay of 171 days. The delay is calculated by taking the date of District Commission's order as the starting date which was 27.08.2024. It is the case of the Appellant herein that he did not have the knowledge of the said order till it was brought to his knowledge by the complainant on 06.01.2025. Thereafter, he went to the State Commission to file his appeal which is dated 10.02.2025 and was accompanied by an affidavit dated 10.02.2025 but he could not file the said appeal as the Registry of the State Commission insisted on certified copy of the order of the District Commission, which he got subsequently on 24.03.2025 only and then filed the appeal on 01.04.2025, which is seen registered with the State Commission on 04.04.2025. Hence, the appellant herein contends that if counted from the date of knowledge, the delay is only about 79 days and if counted from the date of receipt of certified copy, there is no delay. He contends that as per settled law, limitation has to be calculated from the date of knowledge of the order and not the date of order. As per Regulation 18 (6) and Regulation 21 of Consumer Protection ( Consumer Commission Procedure) Regulation 2020, the District Commission / State Commission as the case may be is obligated to supply free certified copy of the final order to all the parties and all subsequent paid certified copies should have details as on which date free certified copy was supplied. A perusal of the certified copy of the District Forum shows that no such details have been given by the District Commission which are required to be given in accordance with above stated Regulations. In D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India, (2003) 6 SCC 186, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that a person concerned or aggrieved cannot be expected to exercise the right of review unless the order is communicated to or known to them, either actually or constructively. Therefore, the phrase "the date of that order" must be interpreted to mean the date of communication or knowledge, whether actual or constructive, of the order sought to be reviewed.
3. The main question for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the State Commission was justified in declining condonation of delay in filing the Appeal and dismiss it as barred by limitation. We have carefully gone through the orders of the State Commission, other relevant records and contentions of the Petitioner herein. We have also considered the reasons for delay as contained in the condonation of delay application filed by the petitioner herein before the State Commission in the light of observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Commission in various cases.
4. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the term "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic, allowing courts to interpret it in a way that promotes justice, aligning with the judiciary's fundamental purpose. Substantial justice should take precedence over technicalities, as the opposing party does not have a vested right in benefiting from non-deliberate delays. In State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the expression "sufficient cause" should be considered pragmatically with a justice-oriented approach rather than through a technical analysis of every day's delay. It asserted that matters should be decided on their merits unless they are hopelessly without merit. In the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the condonation of delay is at the discretion of the court, as Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not impose any specific time limit for this discretion. The length of the delay is no matter; rather, the acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. A short delay may be uncondonable without a acceptable explanation, while a long delay can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory. If the initial court refuses to condone the delay, the superior court is free to reconsider the cause for delay and reach its own conclusion independently of the lower court's decision. The term "sufficient cause" should be interpreted liberally to promote substantial justice. In Ram Nath Sao Vs. Gobardhan Sao (2002) 3 SCC 195, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the term "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or similar provisions should be liberally construed to promote substantial justice, provided there is no negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides attributable to the party. Determining whether the explanation constitutes "sufficient cause" depends on the facts of each case, without a rigid formula. Courts should generally accept explanations for delays and refuse them only exceptionally, especially when no fault can be ascribed to the defaulting party. However, the courts must also consider that a delay might confer a valuable right to the other party, which should not be dismissed lightly. Courts should avoid a pedantic and hyper- technical approach, particularly when significant stakes or arguable points of fact and law are involved, ensuring decisions are made on merit to prevent irreparable injury and loss. In the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom Vs. Bhargavi Amma (2008) 8 SCC 321, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while outlining the principles for considering applications to set aside abatement, emphasized that "sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation" should be interpreted reasonably, pragmatically, practically, and liberally, depending on the case's specifics. The term "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be liberally construed to promote substantial justice, particularly when delays are not due to dilatory tactics, bad faith, deliberate inaction, or negligence by the appellant. The critical factor in condoning delay is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. The degree of leniency shown by the court varies based on the nature of the application and the case's circumstances.
5. We have carefully gone through the order of the State Commission and other relevant records. Even if we assume that the delay is of 171 days as calculated by the State Commission, we are of the considered view that in the given facts and circumstances, delay can be condoned and we hereby condone the same and remand the matter back to the State Commission for fresh disposal on merits after hearing both sides. As both sides are represented before us today, they are directed to appear before the State Commission on 06.08.2025. SA stands disposed off.
6. Pending IAs, if any, also stand disposed off.
..................
DR. INDER JIT SINGH PRESIDING MEMBER ..................J JUSTICE SUDHIR KUMAR JAIN MEMBER