Central Administrative Tribunal - Jaipur
Dr Sahi Ram Meena vs Central Excise &Amp; Customs on 29 July, 2019
OA No. 291/270/2019 1
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPUR
ORIGINAL APPLICATION NO. 291/270/2019
Order reserved on 23.07.2019
DATE OF ORDER: 29.07.2019
CORAM
HON'BLE MR. SURESH KUMAR MONGA, JUDICIAL MEMBER
HON'BLE MR. A. MUKHOPADHAYA, ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER
Dr. Sahi Ram Meena Son of Shri Gulab Chand Meena, aged
about 59½ years, Deputy Narcotics Commissioner, Central
Bureau of Narcotics, Kota (Presently under suspension,
headquarter at Office of the Chief Commissioner, of CGST,
Bhopal Zone, Bhopal), Resident of Jeevli P.S. Wazirpur, District
Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan - Ph. No. 8905122396
....Applicant
Mr. Sunil Samadaria, counsel for applicant.
VERSUS
1. Union of India through its Secretary (Revenue), Ministry of
Finance, Department of Revenue, North Block, New Delhi -
110001.
2. Chairman, Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs
(CBIC), North Block, New Delhi - 110001.
3. Chief Vigilance Officer, Department of Revenue, Central
Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC), Ministry of
Finance, 6th Floor, HUDCO Vishala Building, Bhikaji Cama
Place, New Delhi - 66.
....Respondents
Mr. Kinshuk Jain, counsel for respondents.
ORDER
Per: Suresh Kumar Monga, Judicial Member The applicant is an officer of Indian Revenue Services. His pleaded case is that while he was posted as Deputy Narcotics Commissioner at Central Bureau of Narcotics, Kota in the State of Rajasthan, an FIR No. 20/2009 dated 27.01.2019 was registered against him OA No. 291/270/2019 2 under Sections 7, 7A and 8 of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code with the allegations that some illegal gratification was demanded by him from one Kamlesh Dhakar in lieu of appointment of his father as 'Mukhiya' for opium crops. It has further been averred that although no trap was laid down but a team of Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan conducted a random search at his house where they found a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- allegedly given to him by Kamlesh Dhakar. Apart from this, some more amount was also found at his residence. The applicant denied receiving any amount from Kamlesh Dhakar and explained that the said amount belongs to his wife and daughter's savings but the officials of Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan without any credible evidence, registered the aforesaid FIR and arrested him on the same very day. He was placed under suspension after his arrest vide order dated 01st February, 2019 (Annexure A/1) by the respondents under Rule 10(1)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter called as the '1965 Rules'). During his suspension period, his headquarter was kept at the office of Narcotics Commissioner, Central Board of Narcotics, Gwalior in the State of Madhya Pradesh. It OA No. 291/270/2019 3 has further been averred that after registration of the aforesaid FIR, one more FIR No. 29/2019 dated 11.02.2019 was registered under Sections 13(1)(b), 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Sections 467, 468, 471, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code against the applicant, his wife Smt. Prem Lata Meena, his son Manish Meena, and his daughter in law Smt. Vijay Laxmi Meena for possessing the assets disproportionate to his known source of income and for making a conspiracy. However, the applicant was released on bail by the Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan in FIR No. 20/2019 on 03.04.2019. The charge-sheet was also filed by the investigating agency in the said case on 25.03.2019 before the competent court. Thereafter, the applicant submitted an application dated 13.04.2019 with the respondents and requested them for revocation of his suspension order. The said application was followed by another application dated 02.05.2019 wherein the applicant requested for revocation of his suspension order, change of headquarter and increase of subsistence allowance from 50% to 75% of his pay. The applicant has further pleaded that without taking into consideration the relevant facts and circumstances of the entire case, the respondents have refused to revoke the suspension OA No. 291/270/2019 4 order and further extended the same vide order dated 23rd April, 2019 (Annexure A/2) till the date of his superannuation i.e. 31.07.2019. Aggrieved by the said action, the applicant has invoked the jurisdiction of this Tribunal under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 making therein the following prayer: -
"(i) The initial suspension order F.No. C-
14011/02/2019-Ad.V/911 dated 01.02.2019 (Annexure A-1) may kindly be revoked and the respondents may be directed to reinstate the applicant on his original post and further the order no. F.No. C-14011/02/2019-Ad. V/3518 dated 23.04.2019 (Annexure A-2) by which the suspension of the applicant has been extended till his date of superannuation may kindly be quashed and set aside;
(ii) Respondents may also be directed to reinstate the applicant with all the consequential benefits during the suspension period.
Any other appropriate relief, order which may be deemed fit and proper by this Hon'ble Tribunal may also kindly be passed in favour of the applicant."
2. The respondents by way of filing a joint reply have joined the defence and opposed the Original Application filed by the applicant. It has been pleaded that on the basis of a complaint regarding illegal gratification being accepted by the Narcotics Department, Kota in lieu of grant of licences for opium cultivation, a trap was laid by the Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan, wherein the OA No. 291/270/2019 5 applicant was caught red handed while accepting a bribe of a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/-. In addition, a sum of Rs. 3,95,000/- was also recovered from him for which he could not offer any satisfactory explanation. Accordingly, FIR No. 20/2019 was registered by the Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan against the applicant under Sections 7, 7A and 8 of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The investigation has been completed in the said case and the Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan has already filed a charge-sheet in the Court on 02.03.2019. It has further been averred that as an offshoot of illegal gratification accepted by the applicant, another FIR No. 29/2019 dated 11.02.2019 was registered against the applicant under Sections 13(1)(b), 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Sections 467, 468, 471, 120-B of Indian Penal Code for possessing the assets disproportionate to his income from the known sources. It has further been averred that the applicant has been found in possession of disproportionate assets to the extent of Rs.13,05,95,391/-, which are 288.52% of his known source of income. It has further been averred in the reply that after the applicant's arrest on 26.01.2019, he OA No. 291/270/2019 6 was placed under suspension vide order dated 01.02.2019 from the date of his detention by Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan in terms of Rule 10(1)(b) of the '1965 Rules'. His period of suspension has further been extended vide order dated 23.04.2019 till the date of his retirement i.e. 31.07.2019 under Rule 10(1)(b) and 10(6) of the '1965 Rules'. It has further been pleaded that the Suspension Review Committee did not recommend the extension of suspension period of the applicant mechanically rather; there was due application of mind based upon the material facts available on record. While relying upon the provisions of Rule 10(1)(b) and 10(6) of the '1965 Rules', the order dated 23.04.2019 passed by the respondents has been sought to be justified on the ground that the applicant's suspension order cannot be revoked in order to restrain him to have access to official records so that he is not able to manipulate the same as the investigation in FIR No. 29/2019 is still under progress. With all these assertions, the respondents have prayed for dismissal of the Original Application.
3. During the course of hearing on 22.07.2019, the respondents have also filed an additional affidavit dated 19.07.2019 narrating therein the sequence of facts about the registration of criminal cases by the Anti OA No. 291/270/2019 7 Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan as well as correspondence with Central Vigilance Commission regarding preparation of charge-sheet for initiating the departmental proceedings against the applicant.
4. Heard learned counsels for the parties.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant vehemently argued that the respondents have failed to issue the charge memo within three months from the date of applicant's suspension. Therefore, the respondents could not have issued the order dated 23.04.2019 (Annexure A/2) extending his suspension period uptil the date of his retirement, i.e. 31.07.2019. Contention of learned counsel is that the applicant cannot be continued under suspension beyond the period of three months unless a charge-sheet is issued in the interregnum. In order to support his contention, he relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary vs. Union of India and another 2015 (7) SCC 291. Learned counsel submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has declared the law to the extent that the currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months and if within this period the memorandum of charges is not served upon the delinquent; and if the OA No. 291/270/2019 8 memorandum of charges is served, a reasoned order must be passed for extension of the suspension period. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamilnadu vs. Promod Kumar in Civil Appeal No.8427-8428 of 2018 decided on 21.08.2018 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court while relying upon Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) has held that suspension must necessarily be for a short duration. Learned counsel further submitted that exactly the similar view has been taken by the Principal Bench of this Tribunal in the case of B. B. Rajendra Prasad vs. Ministry of Finance & Others in OA No.432/2018 decided on 29.05.2018.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents while referring to the provisions of Rule 10 (1) (b) of the '1965 Rules' submitted that a delinquent can be placed under suspension where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, enquiry or trial. Learned counsel, while referring to the provisions of Rule 10(6) of the said rules, further submitted that the disciplinary authority after reviewing the suspension order before expiry of a period of 90 days can extend or revoke the suspension OA No. 291/270/2019 9 order. Learned counsel further submitted that there is no fetter in the rules restraining the power of the authority to extend the suspension period if the charge memo is not served within a period of 90 days from the date of suspension of a delinquent. Learned counsel further submitted that in the case in hand, the applicant was initially suspended vide order dated 01.02.2019 (Annexure A/1) as he was taken into custody by the Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan in case FIR No.20/2019 dated 26.01.2019 registered under the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018. Thereafter, another FIR No.29/2019 was registered against the applicant on 11.02.2019 under Sections 13(1)(b), 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code as the applicant was found to have assets disproportionate to his income from known sources. The investigation in the second FIR registered on 11.02.2019 is under process and the Suspension Review Committee while taking into consideration various factors recommended the extension of applicant's suspension period and consequent thereto, the competent authority issued the order dated 23.04.2019. While placing reliance upon a judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case OA No. 291/270/2019 10 of Govt. of NCT of Delhi vs. Dr. Rishi Anand in W.P. (C) No.8134/2017 decided on 13.09.2017 and a judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Uttarakhand in the case of Naresh Kumar vs. State of Uttarakhand and Others in Special Appeal No.576 of 2019 decided on 18.06.2019, learned counsel submitted that the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) cannot be applied in the present case as the attention of Hon'ble Supreme Court was not drawn to its earlier judgments i.e Union of India vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2013) 16 SCC 147, Khem Chand vs. Union of India & others AIR 1963 SC 687, R.P.Kapoor vs.Union of India & others AIR 1964 SC 787. He thus submitted that there is no fallacy in the order dated 23.04.2019 (Annexure A/2) passed by the respondents where in the applicant's suspension period has been extended.
7. Expanding his argument further, learned counsel further submitted that the suspension is not a punishment and to keep the applicant away from establishment, his suspension period has been extended so that he may not temper with the official records with the help of his sympathizers. OA No. 291/270/2019 11
8. On a close scrutiny of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), we find that it was a case where the delinquent was suspended on 30.09.2011. On 28.12.2011, his suspension period was extended for the first time for a further period of 180 days. The said order of extension of suspension period became the subject matter of challenge before the Chandigarh Bench of this Tribunal. During pendency of the proceedings, the second extension was ordered with effect from 26.06.2012 for another period of 180 days. The challenge to these extensions did not meet with success before the Tribunal. Therefore, the third extension of the delinquent's suspension was ordered on 21.12.2012 for a period of 90 days. It came to be followed by the fourth extension for another period of 90 days w.e.f. 22.03.2013. In the facts and circumstances of that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court enunciated the principle that the currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months if within that period memorandum of charges is not served on the delinquent and if the memorandum of charges is served, a reasoned order must be passed for extension of the suspension period. Still in that case, the Hon'ble OA No. 291/270/2019 12 Supreme Court refrained from quashing the suspension order as during pendency of the proceedings before it, the delinquent was served with a charge-sheet.
9. The principle enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) was pressed into service before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Dr. Rishi Anand (supra). After undertaking a detailed scrutiny, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held that the direction issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that the currency of suspension should not be extended beyond three months, if memorandum of charge is not issued within a period of three months of suspension, but it does not say that if it is so extended, the order would be null and void and of no effect. The power of the competent authority to pass order under Rule 10(6) of the '1965 Rules' extending the suspension period has not been extinguished by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The said power can be exercised if good reasons are forthcoming. The court has further held that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) itself shows that there cannot be a hard and fast rule in this regard and in view of the provisions of Rule 10 of the '1965 OA No. 291/270/2019 13 Rules' the Government is obliged to record its reasons for extension of suspension which, if assailed, would be open to judicial review.
10. While keeping in view the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Dr. Rishi Anand (supra), we examined the record which was produced by the respondents, in original, and found that sufficient reasons are there for extending the applicant's suspension period. A perusal of the FIR No.20/1019 dated 27.01.2019 (Annexure A/3) reveals that the Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan received secret information that the officials of Narcotics Department, Kota in collusion with the village heads (the men appointed by the Narcotics Bureau for better coordination of licensed opium cultivators) are indulging into illegal activities and have been receiving huge amounts as illegal gratification and one Kamlesh Dhakar S/o Nand Lal, who has been working as a conduit, was taken into custody along with the applicant herein. Thereafter, the respondents placed the applicant under suspension vide order dated 01.02.2019 (Annexure A/1). After about a period of 15 days, another FIR No.29/2019 dated 11.02.2019 was registered against the applicant, his wife, his son and OA No. 291/270/2019 14 his daughter in law under Sections 13(1)(b), 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. Apart from the allegations of owning assets disproportionate to the applicant's income from known sources, the allegations of forgery of various documents are also levelled in the said FIR. The officers of Anti Corruption Bureau also seized property related documents, including those of 23 plots registered in the name of the applicant, 42 plots in the name of his wife, 23 plots in the name of his son, allotment papers of 22 shops in the name of his wife, ownership documents of marriage gardens, plots in housing societies, papers of flats in New Delhi and Mumbai apart from ownership documents of agricultural land as well.
11. The investigation in the aforesaid case is under process and looking towards the serious allegations which includes the fabrication of documents also and the facts and circumstances available on record, in our considered view, service of charge-sheet within a period of 90 days cannot be made possible. OA No. 291/270/2019 15
12. In UP Rajya Krishi Utpadan vs. Sanjiv Ranjan 1993 Supp (3) SCC 483, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has ruled that ordinarily, when there is an accusation of defalcation of monies, the delinquent employees have to be kept away from the establishment till the charges are finally disposed of. It has further been observed that it is possible that in some cases, the authorities do not proceed with the matter as expeditiously as they ought to, which results in prolongation of the sufferings of the delinquent. But the remedy in such cases is either to call for an explanation from the authorities in the matter, and if it is found unsatisfactory, to direct them to complete the enquiry within a stipulated period. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further ruled that the court has to examine each case on its own facts and decide whether the delay in serving the charge-sheet and completing the inquiry is justified or not.
13. Suspension in the present case is not a substantive punishment and is an interim order pending enquiry/criminal proceedings. An order of suspension can be passed against a delinquent while enquiry/investigation is pending in terms of Rule 10(1)
(b) of the '1965 Rules'. We do not find any fetter OA No. 291/270/2019 16 in Rule 10(6) of the '1965 Rules' on the power of competent authority to extend the suspension period of a delinquent and there is no time limit prescribed in the said rule for issuance of a charge memo. In the present case, in our considered view, the competent authority has rightly taken the view while extending the applicant's suspension period and to keep him away from the establishment during pendency of enquiry. We find that the view taken by the respondents is in consonance with the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sanjiv Ranjan's case (supra). Para 10 of the said judgment reads thus:
"10. We find from the charge-sheet that the allegations against the 1st respondent are grave in as much as they indicate that the amounts mentioned there in are not deposited in the bank and forged entries have been made in the pass book of the relevant accounts and the amounts are shown as having been deposited. In the circumstances, the High Court should not have interfered with the order of suspension passed by the authorities. The Division Bench has given no reason for upholding the learned Single Judge's order revoking the suspension order. In matters of this kind, it is advisable that the concerned employees are kept out of the mischief's range. If they are exonerated, they would be entitled to all their benefits from the date of the order of suspension. Whether the employees should or should not continue in their office during the period of inquiry is a matter to be assessed by the concerned authority ordinarily, the Court should not interfere with the orders of suspension unless they are passed mala fide and without there being OA No. 291/270/2019 17 even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the employees with the misconduct in question. In the present case, before the preliminary report was received, the Director was impressed by the 1st respondent-employee's representation. However after the report, it was noticed that the employee could not be innocent. Since this is the conclusion arrived at by the management on the basis of the material in their possession, no conclusions to the contrary could be drawn by the Court at the interlocutory stage and without going through the entire evidence on record. In the circumstances, there was no justification for the High Court to revoke the order of suspension."
14. The principle enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) was also relied upon before the Hon'ble High Court of Uttarakhand in the case of Naresh Kumar (supra). Hon'ble High Court of Uttarakhand found that the judgment in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) was rendered by a two Judges Bench. The attention of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not drawn to its earlier judgments in Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra), Sanjeev Ranjan (supra), Prohibition and Excise Department vs. L. Srinivasan (1996) 3 SCC 157 and Allahabad Bank and another vs. Deepak Kumar Bhola, 1998 (4) SCC 154 wherein it was held that mere delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings or criminal proceedings or long period of suspension would not OA No. 291/270/2019 18 render the order of suspension invalid. The observations made by the Hon'ble High Court of Uttarakhand in paras 27 to 30, 34 & 35 of the judgment read thus:-
"27. In Khem Chand, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that suspension of a government servant pending enquiry is a necessary part of the procedure for taking disciplinary action against him; and such action is necessary in the interest of the general public for serving whose interests the government machinery exists and functions. In V.P. Gidroniya, the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court held that suspending an employee, from performing the duties of his office, is an implied term in every contract of employment; when an employee is suspended in this sense, it means that the employer merely issues a direction to him that he should not do the service required of him during a particular period; in other words, the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee, which, because the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey.
28. In R.P. Kapur, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the public servant may be suspended pending investigation, enquiry or trial relating a criminal charge; if the trial of the criminal charge results in conviction, disciplinary proceedings are bound to follow against the public servant so convicted; even in case of acquittal, disciplinary proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable; the usual practice is that where a public servant is being tried on a criminal charge, the Government postpones holding a departmental enquiry, and awaits the result of the criminal trial; and therefore suspension, during investigation, enquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge, is intimately related to disciplinary matters.OA No. 291/270/2019 19
29. While taking note of the fact that disciplinary proceedings may commence after completion of the criminal proceedings, the Constitution Bench, in R.P. Kapur, was of the view that suspension during investigation, enquiry or trial relating a criminal charge is intimately related to disciplinary matters. The fact that an order of suspension could continue during the trial of a criminal charge, and even thereafter till completion of disciplinary proceedings, if any, initiated against the Government servant was recognised in R.P. Kapur by the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court. None of the aforesaid Constitution bench judgments of the Supreme Court in Khem Chand; V.P. Gidroniya and R.P. Kapur were noticed in the latter two bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary
30. All subsequent decisions by benches comprised of lesser number of Judges should be read in the light of the earlier Constitution Bench decisions. (N. Meera Rani v. Govt. of T.N). In cases where a High Court finds any conflict between the views expressed by larger and smaller benches of the Supreme Court, it cannot disregard or skirt the views expressed by the larger benches. The proper course for a High Court, in such a case, is to try to find out and follow the opinion expressed by larger benches of the Supreme Court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Court which practice, hardened as it has into a rule of law, is followed by the Supreme Court itself. (State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi; Union of India v. K.S. Subramanian). The legal position is that, in the hierarchical set up of Courts, the High Court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. However, when a smaller bench of the Supreme Court lays down a proposition contrary to and without noticing the ratio decidendi of the earlier larger Benches, such a decision will not become the law declared by the Supreme Court so as to have a binding effect under Article 141 of the Constitution OA No. 291/270/2019 20 on all the Courts within the country. (Sakinala Harinath v. State of A.P). Judicial discipline requires that the opinion expressed by larger benches of the Supreme Court, in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of the Supreme Court, should be followed. (K.S.Subramanian; O. Ramachandra Reddi v. The Director, DRDL, Hyderabad and Buddana Venkata Murali Krishna).
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34. The attention of the Supreme Court, in Ajay Kumar Choudhary, was not drawn to its earlier judgments in Ashok Kumar Aggarwal; Sanjiv Rajan; L. Srinivasan and Deepak Kumar Bhola, wherein it was held that mere delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings or criminal cases or long period of suspension would not render the order of suspension invalid.
35. This Court may not, therefore, be justified in quashing the order of suspension following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary, as that would require it to ignore the Constitution bench judgments of the Supreme Court in Khem Chand; R.P. Kapur and V.P. Girdroniya, as also the other judgments of the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Aggarwal; Sanjiv Rajan; L. Srinivasan; and Deepak Kumar Bhola. The order under appeal does not, therefore, necessitate interference on this score."
15. Learned counsel for the applicant while placing reliance upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja and Another OA No. 291/270/2019 21 vs. State of Gujarat (1995) 5 SCC 302 further submitted that the Suspension Review Committee could not have acted upon the recommendation of Anti Corruption Bureau for extension of applicant's suspension period. The argument of learned counsel is that an administrative decision by a competent authority cannot be sustained if it is influenced by an outside agency.
16. We are unable to accept the aforesaid argument of learned counsel for the applicant as after perusal of the record, we found that in response to a communication given by the respondents vide their letter dated 07.03.2019, Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan vide letter dated 14.03.2019 informed that the applicant, in the eventuality of his reinstatement, may affect the witnesses and the documentary evidence adversely and further stated that it will not be appropriate to reinstate him. In our considered view, this cannot be said to be a recommendation by the Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan, which according to Mr. Sunil Samadariya, learned counsel for the applicant is an outside agency, vitiating the impugned order vide which the applicant's suspension period has been extended. We do not see any fallacy in the said communication given by the Anti OA No. 291/270/2019 22 Corruption Bureau as, in any case, there is an onerous duty cast upon the investigating agency to present such a charge-sheet, which is neither influenced by those witnesses who are under pressure or on the basis of documents, which an ordinary prudent man, arrayed as an accused, may attempt to destroy the same, if he gets an opportunity.
17. Even otherwise, the record, nowhere suggests that the communication given by the Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan termed as a recommendation was the sole basis for extension of applicant's suspension period. The major factor, which was taken into consideration by the respondents while extending the applicant's suspension period was that he being a high ranking officer may try to get access to official correspondence in his matter to higher formations and to his previous office DNC, Kota with the help of his sympathisers. The purpose of keeping the officer under suspension during the period of enquiry is primarily to deny him access to official records so that he cannot manipulate them or hamper investigation in any way. The decision to continue the suspension period is supported by elaborate reasoning which in our considered view cannot be interfered in our jurisdiction OA No. 291/270/2019 23 under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
18. The argument of learned counsel for the applicant can be looked into from one more angle and the same cannot be accepted for the reason that the specific allegations of accumulation of assets disproportionate to applicant's income formed the basis of registration of another FIR No. No. 29/2019 dated 11.02.2019 by the Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan and in order to justify the said assets, the applicant has pleaded that his son namely Manish Meena is in business and, therefore, all the properties, which are described in the FIR cannot be said to be purchased with any other income. On a specific query given during the course of arguments to learned counsel for the applicant, it was disclosed that the applicant's son is running a Petrol Station at Jaipur. On our further query about the dealership of said Petrol Station, the learned counsel on instructions from the applicant, stated that the dealership of the said Petrol Station is in the name of his son-in-law.
19. With the given situation, where the applicant, who is facing serious allegations as narrated in FIR No. OA No. 291/270/2019 24 20/2019 and FIR No. 29/2019, a detailed exercise will have to be undertaken by the competent authority before issuance of the charge-sheet and revocation of suspension order would not only hamper the investigation by the Anti Corruption Bureau, rather; it may also hamper the process of drafting the articles of charges and the statement of imputations thereof. A possibility of tampering with and manipulation of documentary evidence cannot be ruled out because of the reason that initially the Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan received a report to the effect that the illegal activities are taking place in collusion with the departmental officials.
20. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that the order dated 23rd April, 2019 (Annexure A/2) is an offshoot of order dated 01st February, 2019 (Annexure A/1) vide which the applicant was initially suspended. He further submitted that since while issuing the order dated 01st February, 2019 (Annexure A/1), the applicant's detention and pendency of investigation by Anti Corruption Bureau became the basis of said order and as the applicant has got bail from the Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan on 03.04.2019 in the case FIR No. 20/2019, therefore, the very basis of continuation of OA No. 291/270/2019 25 suspension order dated 01.02.2019 (Annexure A/1) has vanished. Learned counsel further submitted that the order dated 01st February, 2019 (Annexure A/2) extending the applicant's suspension period cannot be sustained as the same is passed in continuation of earlier order dated 01st February, 2019 (Annexure A/1), which itself has lost its sanctity. According to learned counsel, when the basis of suspension order dated 01st February, 2019 (Annexure A/1) has vanished, the respondents ought to have withdrawn the said order and should have passed a fresh suspension order after registration of second FIR No.29/2019, in case it necessitated.
21. We are not inclined to accept the learned counsel's aforesaid argument as well.
22. The applicant was in custody in FIR No.20/2019 dated 27.01.2019, when another FIR No.29/2019 dated 11.02.2019 came to be registered under Sections 13(1)(b), 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Sections 467, 468, 471, 120-B IPC as an offshoot of earlier FIR as the applicant has been found possessing the assets disproportionate to his income from the known sources. In the said FIR, the OA No. 291/270/2019 26 allegations of forgery of certain property related documents are also levelled. However, during pendency of the investigation of said FIR, the applicant filed a bail application before the Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur in earlier FIR No.20/2019 dated 27.01.2019. The Hon'ble High Court, while making an observation that since challan has already been filed and the conclusion of trial may take time, granted the concession of bail to applicant on 03.04.2019 in FIR No.20/2019. Immediately, thereafter, the applicant moved a representation before the respondents for revocation of his suspension order dated 01.02.2019 (Annexure A/1). However, the Suspension Review Committee while taking into consideration the fact that the applicant being a high ranking officer may try to gain access to official correspondence in his matter to higher formations and to his previous office DNC, Kota with the help of his sympathisers and the fact with regard to pendency of investigation in FIR No.29/2019, formed a view to keep the officer under suspension so that he remains away from the establishment and is not able to manipulate or hamper the enquiry/investigation in any manner. The argument of learned counsel for the applicant that since the basis of suspension order dated 01.02.2019 (Annexure A/1) has OA No. 291/270/2019 27 vanished, therefore, the respondents ought to have withdrawn the order dated 01.02.2019 (Annexure A/1) and should have passed a fresh suspension order after registration of second FIR No.29/2019, in our considered view, is without any substance as he could not support the said argument with rules or any Government instructions on the subject. Neither he could cite any judgment of any High Court or the Hon'ble Supreme Court to support his said contention.
23. In the conspectus of discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs, we do not find any merit in the present Original Application and the same deserves to be dismissed.
24. Accordingly, the Original Application is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
25. Before parting with the judgment, we feel that a note deserves to be recorded to the extent that as per record, the Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan had initially received an information with regard to officials of Central Bureau of Narcotics, Kota indulging into illegal activities in connivance with the village heads (the men appointed by the Narcotics Bureau for OA No. 291/270/2019 28 better coordination of licensed opium cultivators) and therefore, the FIR No.20/2019 was registered after a trap and the applicant herein and one Kamlesh Dhakar, a conduit, were taken into custody. From the facts and circumstances, it appears that it was not the applicant only allegedly indulging into illegal activities, whereas, other officials of Central Bureau of Narcotics, Kota are also involved in those illegal activities. In this view of the matter, we shall be failing in discharge of our duty, if a direction is not issued to the respondents to take appropriate action against all those officials about whom the Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan initially received the information. Therefore, the respondents are directed to act accordingly and take appropriate steps against all those officials in accordance with law. The respondents may also take assistance of the Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan, if they feel it appropriate.
26. Apart from the above, we find that the respondents could not issue the charge memo to applicant herein as the Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan (which is considered to be a premier investigation agency in the State of Rajasthan) is in the process of investigation of the crime and has not yet OA No. 291/270/2019 29 filed a charge sheet in case FIR No.29/2019 dated 11.02.2019 before the competent court having jurisdiction over the matter. Since the Anti Corruption Bureau, Rajasthan is functioning under the administrative control of the Additional Chief Secretary (Home), Rajasthan, therefore, we deem it appropriate to issue a direction to Additional Chief Secretary (Home), Rajasthan to keep a vigil over the whole process of investigation and ensure that the charge sheet is filed in the court as expeditiously as possible, so that the respondents may proceed further to initiate process of issuance of charge memo to the applicant, if deemed appropriate.
27. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this order to Additional Chief Secretary (Home), Rajasthan as well, enabling him to take appropriate action pursuant to our aforesaid directions.
(A. MUKHOPADHAYA) (SURESH KUMAR MONGA) ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER Kumawat/kdr OA No. 291/270/2019 30