Chattisgarh High Court
Arjun Yadav @ Golu vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 24 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:18917-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 97 of 2025
Arjun Yadav @ Golu S/o- Balaram Yadav Aged About 34 Years R/o-
Karma Chowk Nimora, Police Station- Rakhi, Tahsil And District- Raipur
(C.G.)
... Appellant
versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer Police of Police
Station- Rakhi, District- Raipur (C.G.)
2 - XYZ Nil
... Respondent
For Appellant : Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Sourabh Sahu, Panel Lawyer.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice.
24.04.2026
1. Heard Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Sourabh Sahu, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the State/respondent.
ROHIT
2. Though the matter is listed today for hearing on I.A. No. 01 of KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR 2025 (application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail), CHANDRA however, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is taken up for final hearing.
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3. Learned State counsel submits that notice issued to the father of the victim (PW-2) has been duly served; however, no one has appeared on behalf of the victim to contest the present appeal.
4. The present criminal appeal, preferred under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.11.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge 2nd (POCSO) Fast Track Special Court, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) (for short, 'learned trial Court') in Session Case No. 53 of 2020, whereby the appellant has been convicted under Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act, 2012 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 20 years and fine of Rs. 3,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional RI for 01 month.
5. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the victim filed a written report at Rakhi Police Station stating that on 31.12.2019, at approximately 8:00 p.m., the accused, a resident of her village, came and asked her to come to the Panchayat Bhawan, which she refused. Subsequently, while she was returning home after purchasing groceries from Dhannu Grocery Store, the accused forcibly took her to the Nimora Health Center, hugged her, and began kissing her. He then began undressing her. She refused, but the accused denied, lifting her up with his hands raped her while standing. When she returned home, her father and brother began assaulting her without question. However, she refused to disclose the incident to anyone. On 02.01.2020, when her father invited relatives to the house, she disclosed the incident to them. 3 Then a written complaint regarding the incident was lodged at Rakhi police station.
6. On the basis of this written complaint Ex.P.-01, First Information Report Ex.P.-02 was registered against the accused in Police Station Rakhi in Crime No. 03/2020 under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4, 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act.
7. During the investigation, a site map of the incident Ex.P.-03, Ex.P.- 18 and a Patwari map Ex.P.-04 were prepared. Regarding the victim's date of birth, in which the victim's date of birth is mentioned, the original progress report of class 5th of the victim Ex.P.-06 and the attested copy of the admission and rejection register of the victim's school Ex.P-34'C' were seized as per seizure memo Ex.P.-29. As per seizure memo Ex.P.- 10, the caste certificate of the victim Ex.P.-08 was seized. For the examination of the private parts of the victim, after taking consent from the victim and her mother as per Ex.P.-05 and Ex.P.-12, her private parts were examined as per Ex.P.-14 and Ex.P.-15 respectively and the clothes seized from her were examined. According to Ex.P.-16 and Ex.P.-17, the private parts of the accused and the clothes seized from him were examined. As per seizure memo Ex.P.-07, the cream colored underwear of the victim was seized and as per seizure memo Ex.P.-19, the grey colored underwear of the accused was seized. As per Ex.P.-09, the statement of the victim under section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded. The accused was arrested and proceedings were initiated under arrest memo Ex.P.-32. The seized exhibits were sent to State Forensic 4 Science Laboratory, Raipur for FSL, whose exhibit receipt is Ex.P.-3C and test report is Ex.P.-31. During the investigation, statements of witnesses were recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. and after other necessary proceedings of investigation, a case was registered against the accused under section 376 IPC. A charge sheet was prepared under Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, and presented before the Special Court for Atrocities, Raipur. Subsequently, the case was transferred to the trial Court for trial.
8. On framing of charges against the accused under sections 363, 366, 376(3) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4(2) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Sections 3(1)(f)(i) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 2012, and being read out and explained to him, he denied having committed the alleged crime and claimed trial.
9. The accused pleaded not guilty under Section 313 of the CrPC. No witness was examined in his defense.
10. To prove the alleged crime against the accused, the prosecution examined the witnesses namely the victim (PW-01), the victim's father (PW-02), the victim's elder mother (PW-03), the victim's aunt (PW-04), Dr. Lily Sahu (PW-05), Dr. Sharda Prasad Sahu (PW-06), Ravi Shankar Sahu Patwari (PW-07), Meena Yadav Assistant Sub Inspector (PW-08), Satyendra Pandey retired Deputy Superintendent of Police (PW-09) and the Headmaster of the victim's school (PW-10). 5
11. The documents produced by the prosecution include written complaint Ex.P.-01, First Information Report Ex.P.-02, site map of the incident Ex.P.-03 and Ex.P.-18, Patwari map Ex.P.-04, consent letter taken from the victim for examination of the private parts of the victim Ex.P.-05, original progress report of class 5th of the victim Ex.P.-06, seizure letter prepared regarding seizure of one cream coloured underwear of the victim Ex.P.-07, caste certificate of the victim Ex.P.-08, victim's statement taken before the magistrate under section 164 Cr.P.C. Ex.P-09, seizure memo prepared regarding seizure of caste certificate (Ex.P-08) of the victim Ex.P-10, notice given to the father of the victim for production of caste certificate of the victim Ex.P-11 and Ex.P-28, consent letter taken from the mother of the victim for private part test of the victim Ex.P-12, police statement of the aunt of the victim Ex.P-13, private part test report of the victim Ex.P-14, examination report of the underwear seized from the victim Ex.P-15, private part test report of the accused Ex.P-16. Application Ex.P.-17'A' written to Community Health Centre Rakhi for testing the underwear seized from the accused and test report Ex.P.-17 on the back side, seizure memo Ex.P.-19 prepared regarding seizure of one grey colour underwear from the accused, application written to Community Health Centre Abhanpur for examination of private parts of the victim and examination of clothes seized from her, Ex.P.-20, Ex.P.-21, application written to Community Health Centre Rakhi for examination of private parts of the accused Ex.P.-22, application written to Community Health Centre Rakhi for physical examination of the accused Ex.P.-23. Seizure memo Ex.P.-24 6 prepared regarding seizure of the victim's underwear in a sealed packet and slides of the victim in a sealed packet after examination of the victim. Seizure memo Ex.P.-25 prepared regarding seizure of the accused's underwear in a sealed packet and pubic hair in a sealed packet after examination of the accused. Application written to the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur for recording the statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Ex.P.-26, Application given by the Patwari to the Tehsildar, Abhanpur for preparing the map of the incident spot Ex.P.-27. Seizure memo Ex.P.-29 prepared regarding seizure of admission rejection register of the victim's school and original progress report of class 5th of the victim Ex.P.-06. Regarding sending the seized exhibits to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur for chemical test, its exhibit receipt is Ex.P.-30, F.S.L. Report Ex.P.-31, Arrest memo Ex.P.-32, Arrest intimation Ex.P.-33, Original Dakhil Kharij Register Ex.P.-34 and its attested copy Ex.P.-34C.
12. Among the documents produced, the police statement of the victim has been exhibited by the defence as Ex.D.-01.
13. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant under Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act in the manner detailed in paragraph 04 of this judgment. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred the present appeal.
14. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the appellant has been falsely implicated and that the prosecution has 7 utterly failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is contended that the prosecution case is full of material contradictions, omissions, and inherent inconsistencies, which strike at the very root of the case and render it wholly unreliable. It is further urged that the learned trial Court has committed a grave error in convicting the appellant under the provisions of the POCSO Act, as the prosecution has failed to conclusively prove that the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged incident. The reliance placed on the Admission-Discharge Register (Ex.P/34C) and Marksheet of Class-V, is wholly misplaced as the Headmaster (PW-10), in his cross-examination, has categorically admitted that he is neither the author of the said entry nor in a position to testify for its correctness or authenticity. It is further contended that the medical evidence does not bring any support to the prosecution version. As per the MLC report (Ex.P/12), no external or internal injuries were found on the private part of the victim, though the FSL report (Ex.P/31) is found to be positive, thus it does not corroborate the allegations, which creates a serious doubt regarding the veracity of the allegations. In such circumstances, the appellant is clearly entitled to the benefit of doubt. Accordingly, it is prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the appellant be acquitted of all the charges.
15. Per contra, learned counsel for the State has opposed the aforesaid submissions and supported the impugned judgment. It is submitted that the offences alleged are grave and heinous in nature, and that the learned trial Court has rightly recorded the conviction after a thorough and proper appreciation of the evidence on record. It is 8 further contended that the testimony of the victim is cogent, consistent, and inspires confidence. It is a settled principle of law that conviction can be based solely on the testimony of the victim, if it is found to be reliable and trustworthy, even in the absence of corroboration. It is also submitted that the learned trial Court has duly considered all the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant and has recorded findings based on sound reasoning and evidence. Therefore, it is urged that no illegality, perversity, or infirmity is discernible in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, warranting interference by this Court. The appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed.
16. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the entire record of the learned trial Court with due care and circumspection.
17. The foremost question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the victim was a minor, i.e., below 18 years of age, on the date of the alleged incident.
18. For the purpose of determination of the age of the victim, this Court has carefully scrutinized the evidence available on record. The prosecution has primarily relied upon the entry in the Admission- Discharge Register (Ex.P/34C), the progress report of Class-V of the victim (Ex.P-6), and the testimony of the victim (PW-1). As per the Admission-Discharge Register (Ex.P/34C) and the progress report (Ex.P-6), the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 28.11.2004, but, the victim (PW-1) in her deposition has not stated anything about her 9 date of birth as well as the father of the victim (PW-2), in his testimony, has specifically admitted that he is illiterate and unaware of the precise date of birth of the victim.
19. The Headmaster (PW-10) of the victim's school deposed that the particulars of the victim were entered at Serial No. 431 in the Admission-Discharge Register (Ex.P/34C), and that the victim was admitted to Class I on 16.06.2010. As per the said register, the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 28.11.2004. However, in his cross- examination, he candidly admitted that the said entries were not made by him and that he could not state the basis or the document on which the date of birth of the victim had been recorded. This admission substantially diminishes the evidentiary value and reliability of the said document.
20. Upon an overall and cumulative consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the evidence on record, it becomes apparent that the prosecution has failed to produce cogent, reliable, and legally admissible evidence to conclusively establish the date of birth or age of the victim so as to prove that she was below 18 years of age at the time of the alleged incident. Mere reliance on the school Admission-Discharge Register (Ex.P/34C) and the progress report (Ex.P-6), in the absence of any foundational evidence regarding their authenticity or the source of the recorded date of birth, is insufficient to safely conclude that the victim was a minor.
21. Furthermore, the oral testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on 10 the aspect of age are neither consistent nor definite and do not inspire confidence. In such circumstances, this Court is not persuaded to accept the prosecution's assertion that the victim's date of birth was 28.11.2004 or that she was a minor at the relevant point of time. The benefit of doubt, therefore, must necessarily ensure to the appellant.
22. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of UP, (2006) 5 SCC 584, relying upon its earlier judgment in case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 supp. SCC 604, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :-
"26. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded."
23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, reported in (2011) 2 SCC 385, has observed as under:
"40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the 11 alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.
42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:-
"The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the 12 circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted."
43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:-
"The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue."
44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl.
48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:-
"The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of 13 law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted."
24. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:-
"33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:
33.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be.
XXXX XXXX XXXX 14 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.
33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.
33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance.
33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case.
33.7. This Court has observed that a 15 hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile.
33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.
33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents.
33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.
33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015."
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25. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paras 14 to 17 as under :
"14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test"
conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.
15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules 17 (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:
"20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year."
16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that:
"Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the 18 corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)
(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category.
17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference."
26. Upon an appreciation of the evidence on record, it emerges that the victim (PW-1) has not stated anything in her deposition regarding her date of birth. Further, PW-2, the father of the victim, in his testimony, has specifically admitted that he is illiterate and unaware of the precise date of birth of the victim. PW-10, the Headmaster of the victim's school, referred to the Admission-Discharge Register (Ex.P/34C), wherein the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 28.11.2004. However, in his cross-examination, PW-10 candidly admitted that the relevant entries were not made by him and that he could not state the basis or the document on which the said date of birth had been recorded. 19
27. In view of the aforesaid evidence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to produce reliable, cogent, and legally admissible evidence to conclusively establish the age of the victim. The age of the victim has, therefore, not been proved in accordance with law, giving rise to a serious doubt in the prosecution case on this crucial aspect.
28. Apart from the aforesaid evidence, no primary or foundational document, such as a birth certificate or any contemporaneous public record (for instance, entries in a Kotwari Register) has been produced by the prosecution to establish that the victim was below 18 years of age on the date of the incident. The oral testimonies of PW-1 (victim) and PW-2 (father of the victim), coupled with the school records, including the Admission-Discharge Register (Ex.P/34C) and the progress report of the victim (Ex.P-6), do not inspire confidence in the absence of proof regarding the source or basis of the recorded date of birth.
29. In the absence of any foundational evidence, it cannot be ruled out that the date of birth recorded in the school documents was based on approximation or assumption. The prosecution has also failed to produce the underlying documents on the basis of which such entries were originally made in the school records. Consequently, the evidence relating to the age of the victim falls short of the standard required to conclusively establish her minority. Despite these deficiencies, the learned trial Court proceeded to hold the victim to be a minor, which, in the considered opinion of this Court, is unsustainable in law. 20
30. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the appellant has committed rape upon the victim.
31. The victim (PW-1), in her deposition, stated that while she was returning home after purchasing groceries from Dhannu Grocery Store at 8.00 to 8.30 PM, the accused caught her hand near the road, pulled her and closed her mouth and kissed her. She was scared. She was wearing salwar suit at that time, so the accused took off her clothes and leggings. She was shouting, and when she shouted, the accused closed her mouth. After that, the accused did wrong things to her while standing. By wrong things, she mean the accused raped her. She further stated that after returning to home, she told about the incident to her sister, but since it was occasion of new year, her sister did not told anyone about the incident and her sister informed about the incident to other family members on 02.01.2020, thereafter, the FIR has lodged against the accused. In her cross-examination, she has specially admitted that she was not injured at the time of the incident. While the accused was raping her, she tried to break free to protect herself. She further admitted that despite that attempt, she did not receive any cuts or scratches. However, she denied that the accused did not rape her. She has also admitted that on the next day of incident, she has washed the clothes worn at the time of incident while bathing.
32. The medical examination of the victim was conducted on 02.01.2020 by Dr. Lilly Sahu (PW-5), and her report Ex.P/14 and Ex.P/15 are on record. The Doctor deposed that during the examination of victim, she found that the victim was fully conscious. Her mental and 21 physical condition was normal. Her last menstrual period was on 03.12.2019. She began menstruating at the age of 14. The victim was unmarried. Her secondary sexual characteristics were fully developed. There were no external injuries on the victim's body. She further deposed that no injuries were found on the victim's genitals. Her hymen was torn and pink in color. During the examination, the victim experienced pain in the internal parts of her genitals. Two slides were made from the victim's genital secretions and were sealed and handed to Assistant Sub-Inspector Meena Yadav, who was advised to conduct a chemical examination. She opined that based on the examination, she found signs of sexual intercourse with the victim, but no signs of forced intercourse. She recommended chemical testing of two slides to confirm immediate sexual intercourse. In her cross-examination, this witness has admitted that there were no visible injuries on the victim's body, she cannot determine how long ago the victim had been sexually assaulted. She also admitted that the pain, which the victim described, would have occurred without sexual intercourse.
33. Dr. Sharda Prasad Sahu (PW-6), who examined the appellant, deposed that he conducted the medical examination on 02.01.2020, and his reports are exhibited as Exs.P/16 and P/17. On examination, he found the accused to be fully conscious, there were no external injuries on his body and opined that the accused was capable of performing sexual intercourse. He further stated that the underwear of the accused was duly sealed and handed over to the concerned constable for chemical examination. However, the Doctor did not render any opinion 22 linking the appellant with the alleged act, nor do the findings indicate the time or occurrence of any sexual activity. It is well settled that the mere opinion regarding potency is not conclusive proof of commission of rape, and in the absence of any corroborative forensic evidence, such medical findings do not materially advance the prosecution case.
34. As per the report of the State Forensic Science Laboratory (Ex.P/31), though semen stains and human spermatozoa are found in the slides of the victim, her undergarment as well as in the underwear of the accused, but as per the report, semen stains and human spermatozoa found in the undergarment of the victim as well as in the underwear of the accused were not found to be sufficient for serological examination.
35. After a thorough examination of the entire record, including the testimonies of witnesses, medical and forensic evidence, and the arguments advanced by both parties, this Court finds significant gaps in the prosecution's case that cast serious doubt on the conviction of the appellant. The trial court's judgment, convicting the appellant for the offense of rape, is flawed for the following reasons:
1. Inconsistent and uncorroborated Testimony of the Victim:
While the victim (PW-1) claims that the appellant forcibly assaulted her, there are several inconsistencies in her testimony that raise doubts about the veracity of her allegations. The victim admitted that she had no external 23 injuries despite her claims of resisting the accused, including shouting and trying to break free. The absence of physical injuries in cases where the victim allegedly resisted sexual assault is highly unusual and requires careful scrutiny. Additionally, the victim washed her clothes worn during the incident the next day, which severely hampers the ability to corroborate her version through forensic evidence. Such actions suggest a lack of immediacy in reporting the crime and weaken the reliability of the victim's account
2. Delay in Lodging the FIR:
The delay of several days in reporting the incident, until 02.01.2020, without a convincing explanation, raises doubts about the authenticity of the allegations. While the victim has claimed that she told her sister but did not report it immediately due to the New Year celebrations, this explanation appears insufficient to justify the delay in lodging the FIR. In cases of sexual assault, prompt reporting is often critical for both the credibility of the victim's story and the preservation of evidence. The unexplained delay in this case casts a shadow over the truthfulness of the victim's statements.
3. Inconclusive Medical and Forensic Evidence:
The medical examination of the victim revealed no external injuries or definitive signs of forced intercourse. 24 While the doctor (PW-5) observed that the victim's hymen was torn, this finding does not necessarily establish the occurrence of recent rape, particularly in the absence of any visible injuries. Furthermore, the doctor's report failed to conclusively link the appellant to the alleged sexual act. The forensic report, though indicating the presence of semen and spermatozoa on the victim's undergarment and the appellant's underwear, also clarified that the samples were insufficient for detailed serological analysis. This absence of definitive DNA or serological evidence linking the appellant to the crime raises reasonable doubt regarding his involvement.
4. Lack of Corroborative Evidence:
The prosecution's case relies heavily on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, with no corroborative physical evidence or reliable forensic analysis to substantiate the claim of rape. The absence of any injuries, the washing of clothes, and the lack of timely reporting further diminish the weight of the victim's testimony. In cases of rape, the law recognizes that the testimony of the victim can be sufficient for conviction, provided it is credible and consistent. However, in this case, the lack of supporting evidence and the inconsistencies in the victim's account undermine the reliability of her testimony.25
5. Defence not disproven :
The appellant has consistently denied the allegations, and the prosecution has failed to provide concrete evidence to disprove his version. The medical examination of the appellant found no injuries or signs of recent sexual activity, and there was no conclusive forensic evidence to link him to the crime. The mere presence of semen does not conclusively prove that the appellant was involved in the sexual act, particularly when no force or coercion can be established through the available evidence.
36. Given the inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, the delay in lodging the FIR, the lack of physical injuries, the inconclusive medical and forensic evidence, and the absence of any corroborative evidence, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
37. The conviction of the appellant is based on a fragile foundation that does not meet the legal standard required for a criminal conviction. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.11.2024 are hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. He is reported to be in custody, he shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
38. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the CrPC (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the 26 appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
39. The learned trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Chandra