Bombay High Court
The Maharashtra State Financial ... vs M/S. Jaycee Drugs & Pharmaceuticals ... on 10 July, 1990
Equivalent citations: AIR1991BOM96, 1990(3)BOMCR1, (1987)89BOMLR149, AIR 1991 BOMBAY 96, (1990) 3 BOM CR 1, (1990) MAH LJ 732, (1990) BANKJ 508, (1991) 1 CIVLJ 256, (1991) 71 COMCAS 345, (1990) 2 BANKCLR 400, 1990BOM LR402
Author: S.P. Bharucha
Bench: S.P. Bharucha
ORDER
C. Mookerjee, C. J.
1. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 10th February 1987 passed by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Suresh dismissing its Misc. Petition No. 29 of 1986 filed u/S. 31 and 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act (Act 63 of 1951), the Maharashtra State Financial Corporation has preferred this Appeal.
2. M/s. Jaycee Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., Respondent No. 1 had executed an Indenture of Mortgage dated 29th June 1979 in favour of the Appellant, the Maharashtra State Financial Corporation, in respect of certain immoveable property, machinery and plant, etc., described in the schedule to the said Indenture and also goodwill and uncalled capital of the mortgagor company to secure repayment of the loan of the sum of Rs. 30,00,000/- to the Corporation and interest thereon. On 29th June 1979, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents executed another Indenture in favour of Maharashtra State Financial Corporation, the Appellant, covenanting, agreeing and declaring inter alia that if at any time default shall be made by the 1st Respondent herein in making payment of the principal sum or the interest thereon under the aforesaid Deed of Mortgage, as the Guarantors they would pay to the Corporation on demand the said monies. Under the said Indenture, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents agreed that the guarantee shall be enforceable notwithstanding that the security specified in the mortgage still remains outstanding and unrealised. The said guarantee/surety was in the nature of a personal bond and the guarantors did not furnish any property by way of security for performance of their obligation towards the Appellant Corporation.
3. On 24th December 1985 the Appellants Maharashtra State Financial Corporation in the instant Misc. Petition No. 29 of 1986 u/Ss. 31 and 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Act praying that M/s. Jaycee Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. the principal debtor and also 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents who were sureties be jointly, and severally ordered and decreed to pay to the Petitioners the sum of Rs. 15,87,391.20 p. as per the particulars given and interest at the rate of 14 1/2% per annum and also costs of the petition. The case of the petitioner Corporation was that under the mortgage deed executed by the principal debtor a sum of Rs. 15,87,391.20 was due towards the principal and interest. The further case of the Corporation was that as provided under the Act they had taken possession of the assets of Respondent No. 1 company sometime in Sept. 1984. Thereafter they had advertised for sale on three on four occasions. The best offer they could get was Rs. 5,00,000/- for the land. According to the Appellant Corporation, Respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4 having guaranteed repayment of the said amount due they were also bound and liable for the said sum payable to the Petitioner Corporation.
4. In their affidavit-in-reply, the Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 had raised various contentions but only two of them were principally urged before the learned single Judge who heard the Misc. Petition. The first submission was that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain Ihe Petition u/S. 31 read with S. 32 of the Act. The second submission on behalf of the Respondents was that no relief by way of decree for payment of money can be obtained in a proceeding under S. 31 against Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 who had furnished a personal bond standing as sureties.
5. The attention of the learned single Judge was drawn to a judgment given by a learned single Judge of this Court in Misc. Petition No. 357 of 1985 TThe Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Hindtex Engineers Pvt. Ltd.) since reported in 1987 Man. Law Journal, page 243, inter alia holding that the High Court alone and not Bombay City Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition u/ S. 31 against an industrial concern carrying on business in the Presidency town of Bombay. The learned single Judge himself, therefore, did not decide the question of jurisdiction but proceeded on the assumption that he had jurisdiction to entertain the Misc. Petition u/S. 31 of the Act. The learned single Judge, however, upheld the contention of the Respondents that the sureties having given only personal assurance to the Petitioners, the Corporation's claim against Respondent No. 2 to 4 could be enforced only in the ordinary court and not under the special machinery provided under the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951.
6. Before the amendments were effected by State Financial Corporations (Amend-
ment Act), 1985, the State Finacial Corporations Act could apply u/S. 3(1) to the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carried on whole or a substantial part of its business for the following reliefs :
(a) for order" for the sale of the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothicated or assigned to the Financial Corporation as security for the loan or advance;
(b) for transferring the management of the industrial concerns to the Financial Corporation;
(c) for an ad-interim injunction restraining industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery or plaint or equipments from the premises of the industrial concern without the permission of the Court. S. 19 of the State Financial Corporations (Amendment Act), 1985 has added in S. 31(1) the following clause (aa) :
"(aa) for enforcing the liability of any surety".
S. 32 of the Act prescribes the procedure in respect of the applications u/S. 31 of the Act. The aforesaid Amendment Act of 1985 has also made several amendments in S. 32 of the principal Act.
7. In the case of the Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Natson Manufactring Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others , while adjudicating the question of Court Fees to be paid upon an application u/S. 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, the Supreme Court had considered at length the nature of the proceedings u/Ss. 31 and 32 of the said Act (as the s'aid provisions stood before enactment of State Financial Corporations (Amendment) Act 1985. Delivering the judgment of the Court, D. A. Desai, J., in paragraph 9 of his judgment had observed that S. 31(1) prescribed a special procedure for enforcement of claims by the Financial Corporation. The said proceedings were not in the nature of money recovery proceedings. Therefore Art 1 of Sch. 1 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1978 which prescribed ad valorem fees was not attracted. The learned judge also held that under sub-sec. (6) of S. 32, it might be necessary to specify the figure for the purpose of determining how much of the security should be sold. But the investigation of the claim did not involve all the contentions that could be raised in a suit. According to the Supreme Court the provisions contained in sub-sec. (6) of S. 32 did not expand the contest in an application u/S. 31(1) so as to render the application to be a suit between the mortgagor and the creditor for the sale of mortgaged property. In the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Natson Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court described the substantive reliefs obtainable in an application u/S. 31 (1) as "something akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree". The same could not be styled as substantive relief for repayment of mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property. Nor could it be said to be a proceeding to obtain substantive relief capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss. The form of the application, the nature of the relief, the compulsion to make interim order, the limited enquiry contemplated by sub-sec. (6) of S. 32 and the nature of relief that can be granted and the manner of execution clearly showed that the application u/S. 31(1) was neither a plaint as contemplated by Art. 1 of Sch. I nor an application in the nature of a plaint as contemplated by Art, 7 of Sch. I of Bombay Court Fees Act. The Supreme Court held that an application u/S. 31 was covered by the residuary Art. 1(c) of Sch. II of the Court Fees Act and it should bear a fixed court fee.
8. In their two later decisions viz. Everest Industrial Corporation v. Gujarat State Financial Corporation, , and Maganlal v. M/s. Jaiswal Industries, , the Supreme Court had referred with approval the above observations made in their earlier decision in the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Natson Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. (supra) about the nature of the proceedings u/ S. 31(1) read with S. 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. In the case of Maganlal v. M/s. Jaiswal Industries (supra) in paragraph 18 of their judgment, Supreme Court had observed, "In view of these two decisions the law seems to be settled that an application u/S. 31(1) of the Act cannot be put on par to a suit for enforcement of a mortgage nor the order passed thereon u/ S. 32 of the Act be put on par as if it was an order in a suit between a mortgagee and the mortgagor for sale of mortgaged property. On the other hand the substantive relief in an application u/ S. 31(1) is something akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree".
9. Mr. Andhyarujina, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants, has submitted that after insertion of cl. (aa) in S. 31(1) and consequential amendments made in different sub-sections of S. 32 of the Act, by presenting an application u/S. 31(1) of the Act the Financial Corporation may now apply also for enforcement of its dues against the surety irrespective of the fact whether the surety had furnished some property as security or had personally undertaken to repay the sum borrowed by the principal debtor. According to Mr. Andhyarujina when the statute as amended by the Amendment Act of 1985 did not contain any word restricting the nature of the liability of the surety, in the absence of any ambiguity in clause (aa) it was not permissible to import words and to make distinction between one class of surety from another class. Reliance has been placed upon several reported decisions which affirmed the canon of interpretation that once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. Vide . See also , etc.
10. The learned counsel for the Appellant Corporation has relied upon dictionary meaning of the expression 'enforce' and 'enforcement'. One of the meanings of the word 'enforce' given is to compel observance of. 'Enforcement' also means, the forcible exaction of a payment, an action, etc. On behalf of the Appellant it has been submitted that the Court u/S.31 can compel performance of all obligations of a surety.
11. The learned advocate on behalf of the Respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the meaning of the expression enforcing the liability of the surety ought to be read in the context of the provisions of S. 25(2), 31 and 32 of the Act.
12. The expression for 'enforcing the liability of any surety' is not unambiguous. The meaning of the said expression is in fact not clear and explicit on the face of it as suggested by the learned counsel for the Appellants. "The enforcement" of the liability as surety may contemplate various situations. It may be a case of a surety who has furnished some property as security to back his agreement to guarantee the obligations of the principal debtor. In another case, the surety might have also furnished only a personal bond. In a third case, the surety may have agreed to personally indemnify the creditor and in addition furnished some property by way of security. The adjudication of the liability of the surety and the manner of enforcement of the creditor's claim as against him would certainly depend upon the nature of the proceeding in which these questions are to be dealt with. Therefore we ought to examine the context in which the words 'enforcing the liability of have been used.
13. We haye already referred to the reported decisions of the Supreme Court which have repeatedly emphasised the limited scope of the proceeding u/S. 31 read with S. 32 of the Act. We are unable to hold that the amendments made in Ss. 31 and 32 by the Amendment Act of 1985 have expanded the scope of the proceedings u/S. 31 read with S. 32 of the Act. The said amendments have not resulted in converting the said proceeding in which reliefs are prayed u/ S. 31(1 )(aa) into fullfledged money suits for enforcing pecuniary claims of the Corporation as against sureties. It is not disputed that even after the said amendments the Corporation u/S. 31 read with S. 32 cannot obtain any relief personally against the principal debtor and the remedies under these provisions are still against the properties mortgaged by sale or by way of taking over management or by obtaining temporary injunction. It is therefore not possible to contemplate that by effecting amendments in Ss. 31 and 32, the Parliament intended to enlarge the scope of enquiry as against only the surety. Examination of the amended provisions of Ss. 31 and 32 would clearly establish that the said proceedings still remain limited ones for giving only the four specified reliefs. The Corporation is at liberty to pursue its claim for other reliefs in a fullfiedged civil suit.
14. Before us, the learned counsel both for the appellant Corporation and for the Respondent sureties, have made submissions about the scope of S. 29 and as to whether the S. 29 and S. 31 are independent and separate provisions for obtaining different kinds of reliefs by the Financial Corporation. For deciding this case, it is unnecessary for us to decide this point. We may only observe that in case of default by industrial concern which is under a liability to the Financial Corporation, the Financial Corporation has been given right to take over the management or possession of both the industrial concern as well as to exercise its right to transfer by lease or sell and realise the property pledged or mortgaged to the Financial Corporation. Section 29 does not necessarily require filing of an application u/S. 31 before the District Judge. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 by using the expression, with out prejudice to S. 29 of the Act and S. 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, has indicated that provisions oi S. 31 Tor enforcement of the claims by the Financial Corporation are not in derogation of the rights of the Corporation either u/S. 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act or u/S. 69 of the Transfer of Property Act.
15. We proceed to examine the different sub-sections of S. 32. In case the Corporation prays for reliefs mentioned in cls. (a), (b) and (c) of sub-sees. (1) of S. 31, it is obligatory for the District Judge to pass ad interim orders vide sub-sees. (1) and (2) of S. 32. In case an application is made for obtaining relief under cl. (aa) of S. 31 the District Judge cannot pass any ad interim order but is required to issue u/S. 32(1A) a notice calling upon the surety to show cause why his liability should not be enforced. The sub-sec. (3) of S. 32 has given discreation to the District Judge to examine the Officer of the Corporation making the application before passing any order under sub-sees. (1), (1A) or (2) of S. 32.
16. The Amendment Act of 1985 has deleted the original sub-sec. (4) and has inserted new sub-sees. (4) and (4A).
17. The amended sub-sec. (4) of S. 32 provides for the service of show cause notice upon the debtor industrial concern and also upon the owner of the security after interim order of attachment is effected under sub-sec. (1) of S. 32. Before us, some submissions have been made about the meaning of the expression 'owner of the security' appearing in amended sub-sec. (4) of S. 32.
18. The learned single Judge in his judgment has also referred to the said provisions; It is possible to contemplate that owner of a security would be other than the industrial concern which has defaulted in repayment of any loan or advance, etc., taken by it from the Corporation. But the said expression 'owner of the security' does not necessarily mean only the surety for the loan for the advance taken by an industrial concern. In case the principal debtor industrial concern is not the owner but a licencee or a lessee of the property which is pledged, mortgaged, etc., in favour of the Financial Corporation, a notice to the owner of the surety in terms of sub-sec. (4) of S. 32 has been provided for. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Munnalal Gupata v. Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation , while considering the scope of S. 31(1)(a) and the other related provisions of the State Financial Corporations Act (before the same were amended by Amendment Act of 1985) had overruled a Division Bench decision of the same High Court reported in 1971 All Law Journal 756 and had come to the conclusion that the property of a surety who is not a partner or otherwise injerested in the industrial concern, could not be proceeded against u/S. 31. District Judge u/S. 31 and S. 32 (as the said provisions stood then) could not order attachment and sale of the property of the surety. Surety could be proceeded against only under the general law.
19. Mr. Andhyarujina, appearing on behalf of the Appellant Corporation, has submitted that in view of the above difficulties in the way of the Corporation proceeding u/S. 31 against sureties, changes were made in Ss. 31 and 32 by Amendment Act of 1985. In our view even assuming that Mr. Andhyarujina is right in his submission, still the question would remain as to what extent, if any, the scope of the proceedings u/ S. 31 read with S. 32 had been enlarged by the said Amendment Act. Even if the Corporation is now entitled to obtain relief also against any property which might have been given as security by the surety, the further question would remain whether the Corporation is entitled u/S. 31(1)(aa) to obtain any relief personally against such a surety. We may also point out that in case the Corporation applies for relief u/S. 31(1)(aa) notice upon the surety is to be given u/S. 32(1A) and not u/S. 32(4) of the Act. When the surety does not show cause the District Judge u/S. 32(4A) may order enforcement of the liability of the surety. In case cause is shown, the District Judge is enjoined to investigate u/S. 32(6) the claim of the Financial Corporation in accordance with the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure in so far as such provisions may be applied thereto. It is also significant that the amendment Act has not brought about any change in the scope of such an investigation under sub-sec. (6) of S. 32 of the Act. Therefore the pronouncement made in Gujarat State Financial Corporation's case (supra) would continue to apply in its full force about the ambit of an investigation under sub-sec. (6) of S. 32 of the Act. The sub-sec. (7) of S. 32 lays down the orders which the District Judge is competent to make after making investigations under sub-sec. (6). Only change effected by the amendment Act in sub-sec. (7) of S. 32 is to insert clause (da) empowering the District Judge to direct the enforcement of the liability of the surety or to reject the claim made in this behalf.
20. The second proviso to sub-sec. (7) of S. 32 applies when the District Judge u/sub-sec. (7c) releases any property from attachment or reject, under sub-sec, (da) of sub-sec. 7 the claim for enforcing the liability of the surety or rejects the claim to transfer the management to the Corporation u/s. (e) of the said sub-section.
21. Sub-sec. (8) of S. 32 makes applicable, as far as practicable the provisions relating to attachment or sale of a property in a execution or decree contained in Civil Procedure Code in carrying out an order for attachment or sale of property u/S. 31(1)(a) read with S. 32(7)(a) or (b). Similarly, an order u/S. 31(1)(b) read with S. 32(7)(e) is to be carried out in the manner provided in the Civil Procedure Code for possession of immoveable property or delivery of immove-able property in execution of a decree.
22. Even after providing by amendment for grant of relief u/S. 31(1)(aa) for enforcing the surety's liability, the statute has not made any separate provision for execution or carrying out the order which may be passed under cl. (da) of sub-sec. (7) of S. 32 of the Act. It could not be assumed that it was a case of casus omissus on the part of the Legislature. The Court always ought to endeavour to give an interpretation which would be consistent with the provisions of the Act and would effectuate the intention of the Legislature for inserting el. (aa) in sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 and in making consequential amendments in diffe-
rent sub-sections of S. 32 of the Act if it is possible to do so without doing violence to the language in the said two sections. The liability of the surety in S. 31(1)(aa) read with S. 32(7)(da) can be enforced only by attachment or sale of the property furnished by the surety in the manner prescribed by sub-sec. (8) of S. 31 of the Act. Cl. (aa) of S. 31(1) is available only for obtaining relief against the property furnished by the surety or security for the loan or advance etc. to the debtor industrial concern. Therefore the reliefs contemplated by both clauses (a) and (aa) are by way of converting security furnished by the principal debtor and his surety into money for repaying the loan or advance made by the Corporation. The Financial Corporation no doubt can seek other reliefs including enforcement of personal liability either of the principal debtor or of his surety in a properly constituted suit in the regular Court. S. 31 enables the Corporation to obtain only certain specified reliefs. The statute has not excluded Civil Courts jurisdiction to entertain suits in respect of loans and advances between the Financial Corporation on one hand and the debtor Industrial concern and its surety on the other.
23. Mr. Andhyrujina, the learned counsel for the Appellant Corporation, submitted that an Order passed u/S. 31(1)(aa) read with S. 32(7)(da) of the Act can be enforced u/S. 32G which also was inserted by the Amendment Act of 1985. We are unable to accept this submission. S. 32G is an independent provision for recovery of any amount which is due to the Financial Corporation by an authority specified by the Government as an arrear of land revenue. The said S. 32G can not be construed as one for execution of orders passed u/S. 31(1)(aa) read with S. 32(7)(da). S. 32G cannot also be relied upon in order to expand the reliefs obtainable u/S. 31(1)(aa) and to enlarge the scope of an investigation u/S. 32(6) of the Act. Ss. 31 and 32 contain respectively the provisions relating the enforcement of certain specified claims of the Corporation and the procedure in respect of the same including execution of orders passed by the District Judge upon the said claims of the Corporation.
24. For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that the learned single Judge has correctly held that the Appellant Corporation's claim for passing a decree for recovering money against 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents who stood sureties for the principal debtor 1st respondent, but did not furnish any property as security, could not be entertained under S. 31(1) read with S. 32 of the Act.
25. Shri Mehta, the learned counsel for the Resopondents, has next submitted that this Court had no jurisdiction to enteretain the petition u/S. 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. The debtor Industrial concern carried on its business within the limits of the Presidency town of Bombay, therefore, the functions of the District Judge u/Ss. 31 and 32 of the Act are exercisable only by a Judge of the City Civil Court. Shri Andhyarujina, the learned counsel for the Appellant Corporation, on the other hand, has contended that the City Civil Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition u/S. 31 of the Act. In the absence of City Civil Court's jurisdiction only this High Court was competent to deal with the instant petition u/S. 31 of the Act. In support of his submission Shri Andhyarujina has relied upon the decision of the learned single Judge in the case of Maharashtra State Finance Corporation v. Hindtex Engineers Pvt. Ltd. reported in 1987 Maharashtra law Journal, 243.
26. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 31, inter alia, lays down that where an industrial concern makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance, etc., any officer of the Financial Corporation authorised in this behalf "may apply to the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carried on the whole or a substantial part of the business for one or more of the following reliefs....."
27. The expression the District Judge also appears in sub-sees. (1) to (7) of S. 32 of the Act. The sub-sec. (9) of S. 32 provides for an appeal to the High Court against orders passed under sub-sec. (4A), sub-sec. (5) or sub-sec. (7) of S. 32. Thesub-sec. (11) of S. 32 provides :
"The functions of a District Judge under this section be exercisable -
(a) in a presidency town, where there is a city civil court having jurisdiction, by a judge of that court and in the absence of such court, by the High Court; and
(b) elsewhere, also by an additional district Judge or by any Judge of the principal court of civil jurisdiction".
28. The Stale Financial Corporations Act does not contain any definition of the expression District Judge. The said expression District Judge has been thus defined in S. 3(17) of the General Clauses Act. 1897, "..... shall mean the Judge of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, but shall not include a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction". The expression "Presidency-town" u/S. 3(44) of the General Clauses Act "....mean the local limits for the time being of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, as the case may be".
29. The sub-sec., (1) of S. 31 plainly provides that the forum for filing a petition under the said sub-section shall be according to the territorial jurisdiction of the District Judge. The situs or place of the business of the industrial concern shall determine the jurisdiction of the District Judge to entertain a petition of the Corporation for obtaining all or any of the reliefs mentioned in the four clauses of said sub-sec. (1). We have also already referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Natson Manufacturing Pvt. Ltd. (supra) that a proceeding u/Ss. 31 and 32 were not in the nature of money suit or proceeding for recovery of money and the reliefs u/S. 31 not capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or loss. Therefore, it follows that the question of pecuniary value of an application made u/S. 31 is irrelevant. The further question whether the value of such an application is unknown does not at all arise.
30. The expression City Civil Court having jurisdiction in sub-sec. (11)(a) of S. 32 is also referable to the territorial and not to the limits of pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court in the three Presidency towns. There is no reason to hold that S. 32(11)(a) engrafts an exception to S. 31(1) under which the jurisdiction of the District Judge means his territorial jurisdiction and nothing else. We hold that the word jurisdiction both in S. 31(1) and S. 32(11)(a) bears the same mean-ing i.e. territorial. Therefore where there is a City Civil Court having jurisdiction over a Presidency town and an industrial concern carries on whole or a substantial part of Us business within that Presidency town, a Judge of that Court shall exercise the jurisdiction of the District Judge. Where there is no City Civil Court in a Presidency town, the High Court shall exercise the functions of the District Judge u/ S. 31 read with S. 32 of the Act. While both in Presidency towns of Madras and Bombay City Civil Courts were already in existence on the date of commencement of the State Financial Corporations Act, on the said date no City Civil Court had been established in the Presidency town of Calcutta. On September 1, 1953, the president of india had given his assent to the City Civil Court Act, 1953 passed by West Bengal Legislature. The City Civil Court was brought into force thereafter.
31. It is also pertinent to note that the Ss. 31 and 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act 1951 confer special jurisdiction upon the District Judges including Judges of City Civil Court in the Presidency towns to entertain the Corporation's applications for granting all or any of the reliefs under cls. (a), (aa), (b) and (c) of S. 31(1). The Court functions u.Ss. 31 and 32 as Court of special jurisdiction. In our view, the decision of the single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in West Bengal Financial Corporation v. Gluco Series Private Ltd. on the question of jurisdiction u/S. 32 (11) can-not be considered to be good law for the reasons already indicated by us. Further, the learned Judge in West Bengal Financial Corporation v. Gluco Series Pvt. Ltd. (supra) took a view about the nature of the pro-
cetedings u/Ss. 31 and 32 contrary to the law subsequently laid down by the Supreme Cou\t in the case of The Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Natson Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. (supra). The question of the City Civil Courts jurisdiction to exercis the functions of the District Judge u/S. 31 and 32 ought to be decided without reference to the scope of S. 3 of the Bombay City Civil Court's Act and the clauses of the Letters Patent of this Court. We ovurule the decision of the warned single Judge in the case of The Maharashtra State Financial Cor poration v. Hindtex Engineers Pvt. Ltd.
(supra) which had taken a contrary view on the question of City Civil Court's jurisdiction.
Therefore, we conclude that in all the Presi dency towns of Bombay the City Civil Court and not this Court can exercise the functions of the District Judge u\Ss. 31 and 32 of the Act.
32. For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this Appeal. In the circumstances of this case, there would be-no order as to costs.
33. We reject the oral application made by Mr. Andhyarujina on behalf of the Appel lants for a certificate under Article 133(1) read with Article 134A of the Constitution of India for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
34. Appeal dismissed.