Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Sri Venkateswara Engineering ... vs State Of Andhra Pradesh, Rep., By Its ... on 6 October, 1993
Equivalent citations: 1993(3)ALT347
JUDGMENT P. Ramakrishnam Raju, J.
C.M.A.No. 1532 of 1992:-
1. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed against the decree and judgment in O.S.No. 1 of 1992 dated September 22,1992 on the file of the District Judge's Court, Karimnagar.
2. The appellant filed originally - O.S.No. 93 of 1991 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Karimnagar which was transferred and renumbered as O.S.No. 1 of 1992 on the file of the District Judge's Court, Karimnagar. The suit was filed under Sections 8, 20 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, to direct the defendants to file the arbitration agreement dated 30-12-1988; and to appoint one of the persons from the panel of arbitrators submitted by him as arbitrator and for other reliefs. As the suit was dismissed, the plaintiff filed this appeal.
C.M.A.No. 1533 of 1992:-
3. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed challenging the decree and judgment passed in O.S.No. 2 of 1992 on the file of the District Judge's Court Karimnagar (O.S.No. 94 of 1991 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Karimnagar), filed under Sections 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act, to direct the defendants to file the agreement dated 4-1-1988 and for appointment of one of the persons as arbitrator from out of the panel of arbitrators submitted by the plaintiff and for other reliefs. As the suit was dismissed, this appeal.
C.M.A.No. 299 of 1990 (Converted as CRP No. 3531/93):-
4. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against the order made in I.A.No. 91 of 1992 in O.S.No. 94 of 1991 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Karimnagar dated February 12, 1992 and now transferred and renumbered as O.S.No. 2 of 1992 on the file of the District Judge's Court, Karimnagar. It may be stated at this juncture that as the suit - O.S.No. 2 of 1992 itself was disposed of on September 22, 1992, this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal has become infructuous.
C.M.A.No. 247ofl992:-
5. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against the decree and judgment in O.S.No. 633 of 1991 on the file of the IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad dated February 6, 1992. The appellant filed the suit to appoint an arbitrator and make an order of reference to him and for other reliefs. As the suit was dismissed, this appeal.
C.M.A.No. 248 of 1992:-
6. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed against the decree and judgment in O.S.No. 634 of 1991 on the file of the IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad dated February 6, 1992. The plaintiff-appellant sought for appointment of a sole arbitrator and to make an order of reference to him to adjudicate the disputes between him and the defendant-Government. As the suit was dismissed, this appeal was filed.
C.M.A.No. 268 of 1992 (Converted as CRP No. 3528/93):-
7. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed by the first defendant in O.S.No. 336 of 1990 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Warangal questioning the proceedings dated October 24, 1990 issued by the second appellant and for other reliefs. The plaintiff also filed I.A.No. 1270 of 1990 for an injunction restraining the appellants from withdrawing the bank guarantee amount in pursuance of the letter dated October 24, 1990. As the temporary injunction was granted on November 15, 1990, this appeal.
C.M.A.No. 269 of 1992 (Converted as CRP No. 3530/93):-
8. The respondent filed O.S.No. 334 of 1990 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Warangal seeking for a declaration that the proceedings of the second appellant Vide Lr.No. TS/T6/10 251-53 dated October 16, 1990 as illegal. He also filed I.A.No. 1273 of 1990 for a temporary injunction restraining the appellants from taking any action in pursuance of the letter dated October 16, 1990. As temporary injunction was granted on November 15, 1990, this appeal.
C.M.A.No. 270 of 1992 (Converted as CRP No. 3529/93):-
9. The 1st respondent filed O.S.No. 335 of 1990 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Warangal for a declaration that the proceedings in Lr.No.TS/T6/10247-50, dated October 16, 1990 issued by the second appellant as illegal. He also filed I.A.No. 1276 of 1990 for a temporary injunction restraining the appellants from enforcing the bank guarantee in pursuance of the letter dated October 16, 1990. As the temporary injunction was granted on November 15, 1990, this appeal.
C.M.A.No. 478 of 1992 (Converted as CRP No. 3532/93):-
10. The respondent filed O.S.No. 208 of 1991 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Warangal under Sections 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act for appointment of an arbitrator. He also filed I.A.No. 1359 of 1991 for a temporary injunction restraining the appellants from taking action in pursuance of Clauses 9, 50 and 51 of the agreement for recovery of back guarantee, pending the suit. As the injunction restraining the appellants from invoking the bank guarantee was granted on February 24, 1992, this appeal.
C.M.A.No. 493 of 1992 (Converted as CRP No. 3533/93):-
11. The 1st respondent filed O.S.No. 207 of 1991 on the file of the principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Warangal under Sections 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act, for appointment of an arbitrator. He also filed I.A.No. 1361 of 1991 for an injunction restraining the appellants from taking action in pursuance of Clauses 9, 50 and 51 of the agreement for recovery of bank guarantee, pending the suit. As injunction was granted restraining the appellants from invoking the bank guarantee, this appeal.
C.M.A.No. 503 of 1992 (Converted as CRP No. 3535/93):-
12. The 1st respondent filed O.S.No. 209 of 1991 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Warangal under Sections 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act, for appointment of an arbitrator. He also filed I.A.No. 1360 of 1991 for an injunction restraining the appellants from taking action in pursuance of Clauses 9, 50 and 51 of the agreement for recovery of bank guarantee, pending the suit. As injunction was granted, this appeal.
C.M.A.No. 495 of 1992 (Converted as CRP No. 3534/93):-
13. The 1st respondent filed O.S.No. 258 of 1991 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Warangal to appoint an arbitrator from out of the panel of arbitrators submitted by him and for other reliefs. He also filed I.A.No. 1371 of 1991 for a temporary injunction restraining the appellants from initiating any action for recovery of bank guarantee, pending the suit. As temporary injunction was granted on February 24, 1992, this appeal.
14. The plaintiffs who have filed the suits, out of which these appeals arise, are all Contractors. They entered into contracts with the defendants for the works awarded under the world bank package loans. In short, the grievance of the plaintiffs, as per their plaint averments, is that after entering into contracts, the defendants did not co-operate, failed to extend the time for performance of the contract and thus committed breach of contract resulting in loss to the plaintiffs and as such, they are entitled to seek for reference to arbitration. It is also their case that they have furnished bank guarantee for the mobilisation advance paid to them and also towards performance guarantee. In the written statement it is stated that the plaintiffs did not utilise the advance exclusively for mobilisation expenditure and the plaintiffs did not acquire paver to start lining work and as the plaintiffs have not been able to perform the work as per the time-schedule, the world bank authorities have taken serious view and that they have expressed dissatisfaction over the progress of the work and they have given an ultimatum to withdraw the aid rendered by them for these projects. The aim of the plaintiffs is only to secure the appointment of an arbitrator, contrary to the terms of the agreement and they have prayed of recovery of huge amount alleging that the defendants have committed the breach of the terms of the agreement. As already stated the plaintiffs have filed appeals when the suits were dismissed. The defendants have also filed some appeals as interim orders of injunction were granted restraining them from invoking the bank guarantee. 15. Sri E. Manohar, advancing leading arguments on behalf of some of the appellants, submitted that the lower Court erroneously held that the suits are not maintainable, while the remedy available to the plaintiffs at this stage is only to file suits seeking for production of the arbitration agreement and for appointment of an arbitrator. Relying upon a decision reported in Everest Co-owners, A.B.C. v. M.P. State Ware Housing Corporation, , he contends that in similar circumstances the Supreme Court found that the suit is maintainable under Sections 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act and the Court has to appoint an arbitrator under Section 20 of the Act. To appreciate this contention, a look at the relevant clauses of the agreement in dispute, is necessary.
"56 SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES:
If any dispute or difference of any kind whatsoever shall arise between the Engineer or Employer and the contractor in connection with, or arising out of the contract, or the execution of the works, whether during the progress of the works or after their completion and whether before or after the termination, abandonment or breach of the contract, it shall, in the first place, be referred to and settled by the Engineer who shall, within a period of thirty days after being requested by the contractor to do so, give written notice of his decision to the contractor. Upon receipt of the written notice of the decision of the Engineer the Contractor shall promptly proceed without delay to comply with such notice of decision.
If the Engineer fails to give notice of his decision in writing within a period of thirty days after being requested, or if the contractor is dissatisfied with the notice of decision of the Engineer, the Contractor may within thirty days after receiving the notice of decision appeal to the Employer who shall afford an opportunity to the contractor to be heard and to offer evidence in support of his appeal. The Employer shall give notice of his decision within a period of thirty days after the contractor has given the said evidence in support of his appeal. subject to arbitration, as hereinafter provided, such decision of the Employer in respect of every matter so referred shall be final and binding upon the contractor and shall forthwith be given effect to by the contractor, who shall proceed with the execution of the works with all due diligence whether he requires arbitration, as hereinafter provided, or not. If the employer has given written notice of his decision to the Contractor and no claim to arbitration has been communicated to him by the contractor within a period of thirty days from receipt of such notice, the said decision shall remain final and binding upon the contractor. If the employer shall fail to give notice or his decision, as aforesaid, within a period of thirty days after being requested as aforesaid, or if the contractor be dissatisfied with any such decision, then and in any such case the contractor within thirty days after the expiration of the first-named period of thirty days, as the case may be, require that the matter or matters in dispute be referred to arbitration as hereinafter provided.
57. RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES:
1. Settlement of claims for Rs. 50,000 and below by arbitration:-All disputes or differences in respect of which the decision, if any, of the Engineer of Employer has not become final and binding as aforesaid, shall on the initiative of either party in dispute be referred to the adjudication as follows:-
(a) Claims upto a value of Rs. 10,000/- ... Superintending Engineer,
Irrigation Circle, Warangal.
(b) Claims above Rs. 10,000/- and upto
Rs. 50,000/- ... Chief Engineer.
The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Indian Arbitration Act of 1940 or any statutory modification thereof.
2. Settlement of claims above Rs. 50,000/-; All Claims of above Rs.50,000/- are to be settled by a Court of competent jurisdiction by way of Civil Suits.
Contractor Superintending Engineer& "
16. A reading of the above two clauses, does not leave a semblance of doubt that in case of any dispute or difference, the decision of the Engineer or the Employer is not acceptable, either party to the dispute can file a Civil suit when the value of the claim exceeds Rs. 50,000/-. In some of the suits, it is specifically stated that the value of the suit exceeds Rs. 50,000/- and therefore, the suits are filed in the Subordinate Judge's Court. However, in some other suits, the value is not specifically quantified, but it is clear from a reading of the plaint that the value of the suit in respect of the claims made therein, exceeds Rs. 50,000/-. The value of the contract is admittedly in lakhs of which breach is complained of. Therefore, the civil suit is the proper remedy.
17. A similar question has come up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in a case reported in Government of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its Superintending Engineer, P & CAD, GVC-IV. LMD, Karimnagar v. The United Construction Company, represented by its Managing Partner, 1990 (2) APLJ 230, wherein it is held that in all cases where the agreements are entered into after June 1,1987, disputes or differences exceeding the value of Rs. 50,000/- have to be decided by a regular civil suit.
18. A reading of Clause 56 of the agreement shows that it provides for settlement of disputes between the plaintiff and the Executive Engineer in the first instance and if the plaintiff is not satisfied about the decision of the Executive Engineer, he is entitled to prefer an appeal before the Employer i.e., the Superintending Engineer and in case the plaintiff is aggrieved by the decision of the appellate authority, then it is open to him to take recourse under Clause 57 of the agreement, since the following words occurring in Clause 56 viz., "that the matter or matters in dispute be referred to arbitration as hereinafter provided", would only imply reference to arbitration under Clause-57. In the decision cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant, these Clauses-56 and 57 are not the subject-matter of consideration. On the other hand, the arbitration agreement which came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Everest Co-owners, A.B.C. v. M.P. State Warehousing Corporation (1 supra), contains arbitration clause under which "all disputes and differences arising out of or in any way touching or concerning the lease agreement shall be referred to sole arbitration of any person appointed by both parties". As the appellant therein, claimed damages to the tune of Rs. 4.76 lakhs, it was not accepted by the respondent and the respondent had not taken any steps to appoint an arbitrator in terms of the arbitration clause in spite of several demands made by the appellant, and therefore, the appellant approached the Court with an application for appointment of an arbitrator. As the facts and circumstances and the relevant clauses in the two arbitration agreements are entirely different, the decision cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant has no application to the facts of this case.
19. The learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State of Andhra Pradesh, relying upon a decision reported in U.P.C.F. Ltd. v. Singh Consultants and Engineers (P) Ltd., , submits that though suits have been filed for production of agreement or for appointment of arbitrator, they are in effect an attempt to prevent the respondents from invoking the bank guarantees. He submits that the civil Court shall not grant injunctions restraining the parties from invoking the bank guarantees unless there is fraud or special equities in the form of preventing irretrievable injustice. In this case there is not even an allegation of fraud or attempt to show special equities preventing any injustice between the parties. The same view was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court again in a decision reported in G. E.T. Services Company Inc. v. Punj Sons (P) Ltd., .
20. Sri E. Manohar, the learned Counsel for the appellants relying upon a decision reported in State of Karnataka v. Rameshwara Rice Mills, Thirthahalli, AIR 1987 SC 1359 submits that no man can be a judge of his own case. According to the learned Counsel Clause-56 of the agreement is nothing but illegal, inasmuch as it directs the contractor to approach the Employer i.e., The Executive Engineer and later, the Superintending Engineer who is a party to the agreement for redressal of his grievance and therefore, according to the learned Counsel under this Clause, a party to the agreement is also an arbitrator, which is not permissible under law. Perhaps the learned Counsel would be right if the agreement had stopped there with Clause-56, but it contains Clause-57 which as discussed above, provides for reference to arbitration by filing a civil suit in case the contractor is not satisfied with the decision of the appellate authority viz., the Superintending Engineer. In the face of Clause-57, it cannot be said that a party to the lis is an arbitrator or a judge, and therefore, the decision cited by the learned Counsel has no application to this case.
21. The learned Counsel has also cited another decision reported in Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., , to show that State actions in contractual matters can be reviewed under Article 14 of the Constitution. There cannot be any dispute for this proposition. The learned Counsel for the appellant has also submitted that in view of the fact that arbitration agreement is not denied and that the existence of differences is also not denied and therefore, both the conditions are satisfied to attract the application of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. He relies upon a decision reported in R.N. Kumar v. R.K. Soral, , and contends that when both the conditions are satisfied invocation of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act is proper and therefore, the suit is maintainable for appointment of an arbitrator. In this case, the Supreme Court observed that Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act, gives an option to the parties by the use of expression 'may' but the other Sub-section if the conditions are fulfilled, makes it obligatory for the Court to direct filing of an arbitration agreement. It is also observed in that case that indisputably there is an arbitration clause in the agreement, and therefore, the parties have applied for reference and there was nothing to desentitle the parties to have their rights adjudicated in terms of the arbitration clause. But, the position obtaining in the present case is not the one similar to the position in the said case, and it is altogether different, in view of Clause-57 of the agreement which clearly says that if the value exceeds Rs. 50,000/- the remedy is only before a civil Court of competent jurisdiction.
22. The learned Advocate General also submits that pending the suit, applications for injunction restraining the Government or its Engineers from invoking the bank guarantee cannot be entertained, inasmuch as this cannot be granted as an interim relief in furtherence of the relief claimed in the main suit. He relies upon a decision reported in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal, , wherein, it is held that an interim relief can be granted only in aid of and as ancillary to the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceeding. The same view was again followed in another decision reported in Amarsarjit Singh v. State of Punjab, . Applying this test propounded by the Supreme Court, it has to be seen, whether in a suit for appointment of an arbitrator, recovery of bank guarantee given by the plaintiff can be stalled? In our opinion invoking the bank guarantee will not in any way affect the rights of the plaintiff in the suit and as such, no prima facie case or balance of convenience is made out by the plaintiff. It cannot be said that in the event of plaintiffs' success, they will not be able to recover the suit amount from the Government. Therefore, viewed from any angle granting interim injunction restraining the Government from encashing the bank guarantee cannot be said to be just or proper.
23. The learned Advocate General relied upon an unreported decision in A.A.O.No. 1450 of 1990 dated November 15, 1991. The appellant in C.M.A.Nos. 247 and 248 of 1992 is the appellant therein. He filed a suit O.S.No. 782 of 1990 for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from encashing the bank guarantee. As the application for interim injunction was dismissed, the matter was carried in appeal before the High Court. A Division Bench of this Court found that the appellant had stopped the work on January 4,1990 and shifted the machinery on January 19, 1990. Therefore, the Bench came to the conclusion that the appellant has diverted the advance mobilisation loan for some other purpose and accordingly, dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant has neither prima facie case nor balance of convenience in his favour. The decision reported in U.P.C.F. Ltd v. Singh Consultants and Engineers (P) Ltd. (3 supra) and G.E.T. Services Company Inc. v. Punj Sons (P) Ltd. (4 supra), are also relied on in this case. In similar circumstances another Division Bench of this Court in A.A.O.No. 526 of 1992 dated 13-11-1992 considered the maintainability of the suit. For the purpose of bringing the suit within the jurisdiction of Subordinate Judge's Court, the suit value is shown as exceeding Rs. 50,000/- as in these cases. The Bench observed that "it is not comprehensible how the claims are not capable of definite valuation; it is a matter of common knowledge that before an arbitrator also, the claimant has to file a claim statement giving particulars of claims and the amount claimed under each claim", and finally held that the suit is not maintainable. We respectfully agree. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the suits are not maintainable and that applications for injunction restraining the defendants from invoking the bank guarantees are also not maintainable.
24. The learned Counsel for the appellant placing reliance on another decision reported in Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry, , submits that under Clause-41(b) of the Arbitration Act, the Court can grant interim injunction, pending the suit, when read with Rule-4 Schedule II. It is true in the said case, the Supreme Court has found that the Court has got power under Section 41(b) of the Act, to grant interim orders when the claim is pending adjudication, and accordingly, the appellant could be restrained from recovering monies by appropriating other amounts due to the respondent. But, in this case, we have already held that the suit itself is not maintainable, and the petition for injunction in such a suit, cannot be ordered.
25. The learned Counsel for the appellants further submitted that under Clause-9 of the agreement, unless the contractor misappropriates any portion of the advanced loan, the question of taking action against the contractor does not arise and there is no allegation of misappropriation against the contractor in this case. Although we need not go into the merits of this contention, in view of our finding that the suits are not maintainable, however, if a finding is necessary on this aspect also it is discussed hereinafter and recorded.
26. Clause 9 of the agreement cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read in conjunction with the other clauses of the agreement. Clause-5 contemplates guarantees for due performance by way of bond or bank guarantee. From the other clauses it is seen that the obligations undertaken by the contractor shall be duly performed, within the time frame, as agreed to between the parties. Therefore, it cannot be said that unless there is proof of misappropriation by the contractor, no action can be taken against him. The cumulative effect of all the relevant clauses clearly indicates that the contractor has undertaken due performance of the obligations cast on him under the agreement and on violation of any such obligations, he would be visited with penal consequences. It is the case of the Government that in spite of notice, the plaintiffs did not secure paver, nor produced vouchers, nor performed the lining work. The details of work done, as stated by the learned Advocate General, clearly indicate that substantial part of the work could not be done within the time frame. Though the contractors admit that the work could not be completed on time, they attribute the reason for delay to non-co-operation of the defendants, and therefore, they claimed extension of time. As seen from the record, it is clear that the plaintiffs could not complete the work as per the time schedule. Therefore, we have no hesitation to up-hold the contention of the learned Advocate General that the Government is entitled to invoke the bank guarantees in view of the default committed by the plaintiffs.
27. The learned Counsel for the appellants also submits that inasmuch as the Civil Court has no power to appoint an arbitrator, it is only under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, such a relief can be granted and therefore, the suits under Section 20 are maintainable. We have already held that in view of Clause-57 of the arbitration agreement, it is only the Civil Suit that is maintainable before the Court of competent jurisdiction.
28. Coming to the Civil Miscellaneous Appeals filed by the State, Sri E. Manohar, the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, submits that the appeals are not maintainable. He relies upon a decision reported in State of W.B. v. Gourangalal Chatterjee, . The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider identical question about the maintainability of appeals. Considering the language of Section 39(1) and (2) of the Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court held that appeals are not maintainable. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the appeals filed by the State are not maintainable.
29. The learned Advocate General has sought for leave to convert the appeals into revision petitions under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and consider them. In view of our finding that the suits are not maintainable, we have no hesitation in granting permission to convert the appeals into revisions. Sri E. Manohar, the learned Counsel for the appellants, opposing the same, submitted that he should be given an opportunity to file counters. As the appeals are sought to be converted into revisions, on oral application, we do not feel it necessary to grant time for filing counter at this stage, but we should afford sufficient opportunity to raise his objections for converting the appeals into revisions. Accordingly, he submitted that Section 115 CPC cannot be invoked, since there is no error of jurisdiction. He also submitted that under Section 41 (b) of the Arbitration Act, the Court has got ample power to make appropriate orders in any of the matters set out in the second schedule. So far as the second submission of the learned Counsel is concerned, we have already held that when the suits are not maintainable, granting interim orders in such suits, is also not permissible. So far as the other submission that there is no error of jurisdiction, we must say that in view of our finding that the suits are not maintainable, the impugned orders are certainly without jurisdiction.
30. The learned Advocate General relying upon a decision reported in Mehta Teja Singh & Company v. Fertilizer Corporation of India, , contends that conversion of appeals into revisions, is the proper course having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Justice Dua, as he then was, observed in the said decision as follows:-
"In our opinion, if an appeal is held to be incompetent, then the memorandum of appeal can, in a fit case, be treated as a revision provided there is no other legal infirmity in adopting this course. It may be pointed out that the label placed on a cause is not conclusive and does not ordinarily affect the jurisdiction of the Court to allow the label to be corrected by treating an appeal as a revision or a revision as an appeal, provided of course the cause of justice so demands. We would, therefore, have no hesitation in both conceding the appellant's prayer to treat the memorandum of appeal as a memorandum of revision or to dispose of on the merits the revisions separately presented."
To the similar effect is the judgment reported in Rupam Pictures v. Brijmohan, , wherein it is observed as follows:-
"In cases where an appeal lies but a revision application is wrongly preferred, there Court has wide discretion to treat it as an appeal if conditions laid down by law are fully satisfied. I find that all the necessary conditions are satisfied in the present case. Therefore, it will not be proper to dismiss this revision application at this stage on such technical ground".
In view of these authorities, we have no difficulty in acceding to the request of the learned Advocate General to convert the appeals into revisions. However, Sri E. Monohar, the learned Counsel for the appellants cited a decision reported in Krishnawati Devi v. H.M. Misra, . The said decision is no authority for the proposition that appeal wrongly filed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, cannot be converted into a revision petition under Section 115 CPC. On the other hand, the learned Judge felt that converting the appeal as revision and considering the same as such, would not in any way alter the position. The case was considered from the angle of a revision and found that there is nothing to show that the Court below exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Therefore, it is clear that the case was considered as a revision and found that there are no merits. In this case, we have already held that the lower Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the suits are not maintainable. Therefore, this decision does not help the plaintiffs.
31. For all the above reasons, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeals filed by the contractors have to be dismissed and the Civil Miscellaneous Appeals (converted as revisions) filed by the State have to be allowed. Accordingly, Civil Miscellaneous Appeals Nos. 1532 of 1992; 1533 of 1992; 247 of 1992; 248 of 1992; are dismissed and Civil Miscellaneous Appeals Nos. 299 of 1992; 478 of 1992; 493 of 1992; 495 of 1992; 503 of 1992; 268 of 1992; 269 of 1992 and 270 of 1992 which are converted as C.R.P. Nos. 3531/93, 3532/93, 3533/93, 3534/93, 3535/93, 3528/93, 3530/93 and 3529/92 respectively are allowed, but in the circumstances, without costs.