Madras High Court
A. Lakshmanan And Ors. vs Kanniammal Alias Pattammal on 23 March, 1995
Equivalent citations: (1995)2MLJ178, 1995 A I H C 4642, (1995) 2 RENCR 661, (1995) 2 RENTLR 543, (1995) 2 MAD LJ 178, (1995) 1 MAD LW 632, (1996) 2 RENCJ 457
Author: Ar. Lakshmanan
Bench: Ar. Lakshmanan
ORDER AR. Lakshmanan, J.
1. The tenants are the petitioners in both the revisions. The respondent/landlady instituted R.C.O.P. Nos. 16 and 17 of 1985 on the file of the Rent Controller/District Munsif, Arni, for eviction of the tenants under Section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The tenants resisted the eviction petitions contending inter alia, that the landlady is not the owner of the superstructure and that the applications for demolition and reconstruction under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act are not maintainable. They also resisted the applications contending that the tenancy premises is in good state of repairs, that the landlady is not possessed of funds to put up construction, that the petitions are devoid of merits and lacks bona fides and that therefore, there is no reason to order eviction. The learned Rent Controller by a common order dated 28.8.1986 dismissed the eviction-petitions. Being aggrieved, the landlady preferred R.C.A. Nos. 3 and 8 of 1987 before the Appellate Authority/Subordinate Judge, Arni. The learned Appellate Authority by a common judgment dated 20.10.1987, allowed the appeals filed by the landlady and set aside the order of the learned Rent Controller. Being aggrieved, the tenants have preferred the present revisions for the various grounds set out in the memorandum of grounds of revisions.
2. I have heard Mr. E. Padmanabhan, learned Counsel for the revision petitioners/tenants and Mr. V. Raghavachari, learned Counsel for the respondent/landlady.
3. According to Mr. E. Padmanabhan the Appellate Authority has acted illegally in ordering eviction under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act when no case has been made out for the applications being ordered under the said section. It is contended that the landlady has not let in any evidence by examining a qualified engineer or commissioner to show that the building is in a dilapidated condition and that it requires immediate demolition and reconstruction and in the absence of such material, the order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority is liable to be set aside by this Court. It is further contended that the landlady has no funds to commence and complete the construction as prayed for and that the application for sanction of the building plan has been applied during the year 1981 and that the eviction petition has been filed only during 1984, which clearly demonstrates the incapacity of the (sic) and her inability to undertake the construction proposed. It is then contended that with the consent of the landlady, the tenants have effected repairs and keep the building in good state of repairs consequent to the recent pulling down of cirtain portions of the building by the Public Works Department authorities and in the nature of the building that exists, the Appellate Authority Ought to have rejected the case of the landlady and should have held that the building does not require demolition and reconstruction.
4. Mr. V. Raghavachari, learned Counsel for the respondent/landlady would support the order of the Appellate Authority. He would contend that none of the grounds raised by the tenants merit any consideration or acceptance and that the Appellate Authority considering the claim of the landlady and the bona fide nature of her claim, has rightly ordered eviction and therefore, on the facts of the case no interference is called for by this Court. He submitted that the judgment of the Appellate Authority is legal, sound and is liable to be confirmed by this Court.
5. I have been taken through the entire pleadings and the documents filed by both parties and also the evidence let in. I have carefully gone through the order of the Appellate Authority also. In my opinion, the Appellate Authority has carefully considered all the aspects of the matter and has rightly ordered eviction. While ordering eviction, the Appellate Authority has also considered the evidence tendered, both oral and documentary in its proper perspective. I have also gone through the evidence tendered by both parties and a perusal of the entire evidence would only go to show that the requirement of the landlady is bona fide. It is not in dispute that the building is old and therefore the landlady requires the same for demolition and for putting up a new building.
6. Though Mr. E. Padmanabhan at the time of argument alleged certain motives to the landlady, I am of the view, that in an eviction petition filed on the ground of demolition and reconstruction, motive for demolition and reconstruction is wholly irrelevant. It is in evidence that the building in question was put up more than thirty years ago and that the same is not in a sound condition and therefore, the landlady requires the building for demolition and reconstruction. Though a plea was raised on behalf of the tenants that there is a motive for the landlady to evict the tenants and to lease out the building to others for a higher rent, such a plea has not been substantiated by any acceptable evidence. In fact R.Ws.2 and 3 have in their evidence clearly stated in cross-examination that the building is more than 30 to 40 years old and that R.W.3 was a tenant of the building for the last 22 years. In fact, the landlady intends to put up a R.C.C. building in the site in question.
7. Mere carrying out minor repairs here and there occasionally by the tenants and keeping the building in good state of repairs will not in any way prevent the landlady from seeking eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction. It is always open to the landlady to demolish an admittedly old building arid put up a new building in that place with a view to augment her income. I am also of the view that the non-examination of the Commissioner or an engineer is not fatal to the case. In this case, the landlady has proved that she has enough funds and has also taken steps by obtaining the plan for demolition and reconstruction, which would, in my opinion, be sufficient to hold that the landlady requires the building for immediate demolition and reconstruction. In fact, the landlady in her evidence has stated that if necessary, she may even sell the lands of an extent of two cawnies with pump set and also the two houses in Arni and raise funds by such sale. This apart, she has also stated in her evidence that she has got Rs. 10,000 in savings bank account and Rs. 5,000 on hand. The tenants have not disputed the statement of the landlady that she has got fund's in the bank account.
8. It is contended by one of the tenants viz., A. Lakhmanan, that since a portion of the building in his occupation was demolished by the Highways Department, he had spent money for reconstruction of the portion which was demolished and therefore, the building does not require any demolition and reconstruction. As rightly pointed out by the Appellate Authority, except the ipse dixit of R.W.3, there is no other acceptable evidence placed before court to substantiate the said contention. It is also not made clear whether such construction has been made by the tenant A. Lakshmanan, with the written consent of the landlady. In these days, no landlord or landlady will keep quiet when a tenant puts up a building in their property without his or her written consent. In my opinion, the tenants have miserably failed to establish that there is no bona fide on the part of the landlady in seeking eviction on the ground of demolition and reconstruction. It is settled law that a concrete and immediate proposal or scheme to demolish an existing building and reconstruct it into a bigger, more productive and higher income yielding one, cannot by any means be said to be mala fide. This view was taken in many judgments by this Court and other High Courts. The case of the landlady should be scrutinised to find out whether she bona fide intends to demolish the building or whether the said provision is invoked by her merely with a view to evict the tenants with oblique motive. In this context, the plans or schemes Of the landlady, her resources, her getting sanction from the municipal authorities for the reconstruction, etc., would have a bearing to establish the bona fide requirement of the landlady.
9. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the landlady, Section 14(1)(b) of the Act is not rendered inapplicable merely because the building is not old or dilapidated but is in a good condition. In other words, if the intention of the landlady for demolition and reconstruction is proved to be genuine and not spurious or specious, the landlady would be entitled to obtain an order for eviction under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, whether or not the condition of the building is such as to require immediate demolition, the age and dilapidated condition of the building not being sine qua non for such eviction. As held by our High Court in the decision reported in Arugmugham v. D.R. Srinivasan (1982)2 M.L.J. 298, if the landlady wanted to pull down a relatively recent construction and put up a multi-storeyed building according to modern requirements, the law does not prevent her provided it was bona fide. The decision of the Supreme Court will come into play only when the landlady relies on the age and condition of the building for the purpose-of Section 14(1)(b) of the Act.
10. Likewise, it is well established in this case that the means of the landlady to carry out the work of demolition and reconstruction is a relevant factor to be taken note of by this Court and consider while testing her bona fides. As observed in the decision reported in Rukmani Ammal v. Izudden , this does not necessarily mean that the landlady should jingle the coins before the Controller to establish this factor. I am, therefore, unable to hold that the applications have been filed merely with a view to evict the tenants. The contention of Mr. E. Padmanabhan, that the entire eviction proceedings is nothing but a device to evict the tenants and in view of the conduct of the landlady, no order of eviction could be passed on the facts of this case is not based on any acceptable material. Therefore, I reject the same. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in P. Orr. & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Associated Publishers (Madras) Ltd. (1990)2 L. W. 547, in order to satisfy the test under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, the condition of the building need not have deteriorated to the extent of the building being in danger of crumbling down but the condition must be such as to indicate a bona fide requirement for the timely, genuine and direct purpose of demolition and reconstruction.
11. An affidavit was filed in both the revisions by the tenants inviting the attention of this Court to certain facts which have taken place pending the revisions. The petitioners/tenants prayed that the said subsequent event may be taken into consideration while deciding the bona fide requirements of the landlady. It is stayed in the affidavit that R.C.O.P. Nos. 16, 17 and 23 of 1995 were filed by the landlady against three tenants before the Rent Controller, Ami, that all the petitions were tried jointly and dismissed by the Rent Controller and as against the same, the landlady preferred R.C.A. Nos. 3, 7 and 8 of 1987 before the Appellate Authority, Arni. Two revisions were filed in respect of the orders passed in R.C.A. Nos. 3 and 8 of 1987 but in respect R.C.A. No. 7 of 1987, though an order was passed by the Appellate Authority, the tenant therein has not chosen to file any revision in this Court. The landlady also has not chosen to execute the order of eviction against the tenant in R.C.A. No. 7 of 1987 but the tenant is continuing in the shop bearing Door No. 102-A. Likewise, in respect of Door No. 101, which is under the occupation of A. Lakshmanan, revision petition in C.R.P. No. 4404 of 1987, the landlady by a deed of conveyance dated 22.3.1993, had conveyed the same to one N. Krishnamurthi, son of Balarama Chettiar, residing at No. 15, Kalathi Annamalai Chetty Street, Arni, a certified copy of which is filed along with the affidavit. Under the said sale deed, the landlady has conveyed the property in the occupation of tenant A. Lakshmanan. Therefore, by filing the affidavit, the tenants contend that the very requirement of the building for demolition and reconstruction by the landlady of the two premises which are adjacent and which have common walls in between, cannot be undertaken by the landlady as in respect of Door No. 101, she ceases to be the owner and she continued to be the owner in respect of the premises bearing Door No. 102.
12. A counter affidavit has been filed by the landlady in regard to the objection raised by the tenants that she has sold a portion of the property to one Krishnamurthi and as such, she cannot act as per the undertaking. She has stated in paragraph 2 of the counter affidavit that the said Krishnamurthi is her brother's son, that she is residing with her brother and that she will abide to execute the decree and perform as per the undertaking given to court and that Krishnamurthi her brother's son, shall also abide by the undertaking. A consent affidavit from the said Krishnamurthi has also been filed.
13. In my opinion the objection raised by the tenants does not survive in view of the several judgments of our High Court and of the Supreme Court which, have clearly held that the successor in interest can avail of the benefit of the decree in favour of the vendor. However, in view of the consent affidavit filed by Krishnamurthi, there is no need to consider the objection raised by the tenants and also to consider the three decisions cited by Mr. E. Padmanabhan relating to the consideration of subsequent events reported in Narasu's Coffee Co. v. M. Mohammed Ibrahim Rowther (1983)2 M.L.J. 203, Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders and Krishnaveni Ammal v. Premavathi 99 L.W. 921.
14. In fact, the decision of D. Raju in Sultan Hardware Corporation v. C. T. Meyyammai Achi 1993 T.L.N.J. 263 can be looked into in answer to the submission made by Mr. E. Padmanabhan in regard to the sale of a portion of the property by the landlady in favour of her brother's son, wherein the learned Judge has considered the rights of the legal representatives to continue the proceedings.
15. The decision reported in Shanmugham v. Satyanarayana Prasad (1964)2 M.L.J. 96 can also be usefully referred to in this context. S. Ramachandra Iyer, C.J., has observed that a landlord who satisfied the Rent Controller that the building required immediate demolition and reconstruction and obtains an order for delivery of possession will be bound to comply with the undertaking given by him to demolish and reconstruct and if he sells the property, the sale is not valid, nor will the order for eviction be deemed to lapse. The executing court is bound to execute the order at the instance of the successor in interest of the landlord.
16. The decision reported in N. Devarajan v. D.V. Muniratnam 94 L.W. 435, was a judgment rendered by V. Ratnam, J., as he then was. In that case, pending an appeal by the tenant against an order of eviction, the owner sold the property. The purchaser applied for bringing himself on record and impleaded himself in the appeal as a respondent. The Appellate Authority allowed the petition and directed his being impleaded. The revision was filed against that order in this Court. The learned Judge, while rejecting the revision has observed in paragraph 13 as follows:
Therefore, the Appellate Authority has not only the power to implead the purchaser as a party to the proceedings in order to effectively adjudicate upon the controversy between the parties, but the purchaser has also the right to take advantage of the order of eviction secured by his predecessor-in-interest, especially when the purchase has not in any manner been disputed by the tenant and it is not the case of the tenant that there was any contract to the contrary.
17. The decision reported in V. Somasundara Mudaliar v. The Madras Provincial Co-op, Marketing Society (1950)1 M.L.J. 655 : 63 L.W. 610, is a case where subletting had. admittedly taken place after the commencement of the Act without the written consent of the then landlord, i.e., the landlord at the time of such sub-letting. The Division Bench consisting of Rajamannar, C.J. and Somasundaram, J., held that a subsequent purchaser of the landlord can avail himself of such sub-letting and file a petition for eviction under the provisions of the Act, and even where a portion of the premises had been sub-let prior to the commencement of the Act, and there was change in the sub-tenant after the commencement of the Act that would constitute sub-letting after the commencement of the Act within the meaning of the said statutory provision so as to enable the landlord to file an application for eviction.
18. Before adverting to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishna Rao , it is useful to look into the evidence tendered in this case in regard to the condition and age of the building and also the denial of title. It was elicited in the cross-examination of R.W.2 that the building is 30 to 40 years old and that the building is in a dilapidated condition. It has been specifically elicited from R.W.4 that the wall and the roof had fallen in the year 1978 itself and the same was reconstructed with bamboo sticks and the roof with old and new tiles and that he has not obtained any permission from the landlady for carrying our certain repairs. He has further deposed that again he has reconstructed the building which was demolished by the Highways Department without the written consent of the landlady.
19. Pointing out the averments in the counter affidavit of the tenants denying the title of the landlady, it was contended that the tenants should be evicted from the premises on the question of denial of title of the landlady, which is apparent. It is stated in the counter affidavit that the landlady is not the owner of the two buildings under the occupation of the tenants, that she is the owner of only the vacant site, that the buildings were put up only by one C.T. Venugopal and he alone is entitled to evict the tenants and that the landlady has no authority to demolish the building put up by the said Venugopal. In the decision reported in Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishna Rao , the Supreme Court has observed that the denial of title in the course of eviction petition constitutes a ground for eviction provided the denial is not bona fide and it is not necessary that in order to constitute a ground for eviction, the denial of title must be anterior to the filing of the eviction petition. In this case, the tenants have taken the plea in the counter filed before the Rent Controller, keeping the title of the property in question on one Venugopal. As admitted by the tenants themselves in their evidence, they have been in occupation of the building as such tenants for the last 20 years and odd and all along they have been paying rent only to the landlady. Under such circumstances I am of the view, the landlady is entitled to take this plea in this revision itself seeking eviction on the ground of denial of title even though there is omission on her part to amend the petitions by including disclaimer as a ground for eviction. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, the tenant has no right to raise objection for such a plea being taken. Therefore, I am of the view, the landlady is entitled for an order of eviction on the ground of denial of title as well.
20. The decision reported in Annamalai Nadar v. D. Thangamani (1991)2 L.W. 609, is a judgment by a Division Bench consisting of Nainar Sundaram, J. as he then was, and Thanikkachalam, J., where again by applying the test laid down in P. Orr. & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Associated Publishers (Madras) Ltd. (1990)2 L.W. 547, the Bench held that the condition of the building need not have deteriorated to the extent of its being in danger of crumbling down but it should indicate the bona fide requirement for the timely, genuine and direct purpose of demolition and reconstruction As pointed out earlier, Mr. E. Padmanabhan learned Counsel for the tenants, made his submissions that the Appellate Authority ignored to take note of and adjudicate a vital and relevant factor viz., the condition of the building. The learned Counsel for the tenants was at pains to impress upon me that the existing condition of the building does not warrant the upholding of the case of the landlady for demolition and reconstruction.
21. Mr. V. Raghavachari, learned Counsel for the landlady, on the other hand, submitted that there is no gain saying that the condition of the building is a vital and a relevant factor but the Appellate Authority did advert to this aspect and has come to the conclusion on facts that the existing condition of the building did warrant the countenancing the plea of the landlady to get the same for demolition and reconstruction. I have been taken through the judgments of the authorities below. It is true that the Rent Controller has rejected the petitions for eviction but the Appellate Authority has, in my view, referred to the various aspects of the matter and only after adverting to and analysing all the materials placed, come to the conclusion that even the existing condition of the building did warrant eviction being ordered and the plea of the landlady to be entertained. I am convinced that there has been advertence to the correct tests and there has been an appropriate consideration of the relevant factual materials over the questions and the finding rendered by the Appellate Authority, in my opinion, is not liable to be questioned in the revisional jurisdiction. The order of the Appellate Authority is, therefore, correct and cannot be in any manner assailed nor does it suffer from any illegality or irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction.
22. For the foregoing reasons, both the revisions fail and are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.