Allahabad High Court
Kaneez Fatima vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others on 9 November, 2022
Author: Saurabh Srivastava
Bench: Surya Prakash Kesarwani, Saurabh Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR (Judgment Reserved on 09.09.2022) (Judgment delivered on 09.11.2022) Court No. - 03 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 25065 of 2022 Petitioner :- Kaneez Fatima Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Araf Khan,Sonakshi Arora Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Arti Raje Hon'ble Surya Prakash Kesarwani,J.
Hon'ble Saurabh Srivastava,J.
(Per: Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J.)
1. Heard Shri Araf Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned standing counsel for the State-respondent and Shri M.C.Chaturvedi, learned Senior Advicate assisted by Ms. Arti Raje, learned counsel for respondent nos. 2 to 4.
Brief Facts:-
2. Briefly stated, facts of the present case are that the petitioner's husband, namely Hani Khan died on 10.04.2022 on account of electrocution by 11 KV overhead line which was installed by the respondents at a height of less than 4.7 meters in breach of Rule 77 of of the Rules, 1956 and non-maintenance of the aforesaid line by the respondents as per provisions of Rule 29 of the Rules, 1956.
3. As per admitted case of the respondents, the death of the husband of the petitioner was caused on 10.04.2022. The petitioner submitted entire desired papers including certificate of Maharani Laxmi Bai Medical College and Hospital, Jhansi, dated 10.04.2022 in which cause of death of her husband has been shown as electric current, Panchnama dated 10.04.2022 and death certificate dated 20.04.2022 etc. of her husband.
4. Petitioner's statement was recorded by the competent authority/Electricity Safety Officer on 13.04.2022. Form 4 under Section 161(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 was submitted by the Deputy Director, Electricity Safety, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Jhansi, Region, Jhansi on 18.04.2022 in which the entire particulars of the incidence and the investigation report etc. were well mentioned with reference to documentary evidences, namely, first information report dated 11.04.2022, detailed report dated 11.04.2022, police report, medical report received on 15.04.2022 and investigation report dated 13.04.2022 etc. The fact of cause of death of the petitioner's husband being electric current and negligence of officers and employees were also recorded in the said report.
5. On 18.04.2022 the Deputy Director, Electricity Safety, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Jhansi Region, Jhansi, submitted a report to the respondent no.2 requesting him to take action as per relevant Government orders and also submitted that investigation under Section 161 of the Electricity Act, 2003 has been completed and recommendation for compensation to the petitioner has been made which is to be paid by the Electricity Distribution Corporation. Thus, by 18.04.2022 all the required investigation and reports were submitted by the competent authorities to the respondent no.2 for payment of compensation to the petitioner.
6. In paragraph 8 of the writ petition, the petitioner has specifically stated that her deceased husband was working as a contractor of M/s. Sri Ramdoot Steelfab and his total income was around Rs.3,50,000/- per annum and in support thereof she has also submitted proof of income namely income tax return/acknowledgement relating to A.Ys. 2017-18, 2019-20 (Net Total Income Rs.3,47,630/-) and 2021-22 (Net Total Income Rs.3,71,230/-), copies of which have been collectively filed as Annexure 7 to the writ petition. The contents of paragraph-8 of the writ petition regarding annual income of the deceased to be Rs.3,50,000/- supported by documentary evidences as aforementioned has been admitted by the respondents in paragraph-7 of the counter affidavit/ affidavit of compliance dated 06.09.2022.
7. Thus, it is undisputed that the income of the deceased based on average income of last three years, was more than Rs.3,50,000/- per annum. It has also been admitted by the respondents in paragraph-6 of the aforesaid personal affidavit/ counter affidavit dated 06.09.2022 that the death of the petitioner's husband was caused due to defective installation of 11 KV overhead line.
8. Thus, as per admitted case of the respondents, the death of the petitioner's husband was caused on 10.04.2022 due to defective installation of 11 KV overhead line of the respondents. Since on admitted facts of the case, the respondents have not paid compensation to the petitioner, therefore, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition praying for the following relief:
"i) Issue writ, order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS commanding/ directing the Respondents to compensate the victim's family with such justifiable/ reasonable amount which this Hon'ble court may deem fit and necessary in the interest of justice at the earliest.
ii) Pass any other order or direction which this Hon'ble court may deem fit and necessary in the interest of justice"
Submissions:-
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is entitled for just compensation on the basis of her deceased husband's admitted annual income, in terms of the law laid down in two Division Bench judgments of the this court in Shiv Ranshu Chhuneja vs. State Of U.P. And Others (WRIT - C No. - 10191 of 2009, decided on 10.04.2018) and in Yash Pal Singh (Minor)& Anr. vs. State Of U.P. Thru.Prin. Secy. (Electricity) & 5 Ors. (MISC. BENCH No. - 6929 of 2014, decided on 24.04.2017). Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner is a widow lady and there are four dependents of the deceased and she is running from pillar to post to get just compensation in terms of the aforesaid judgments read with the policy decision of the respondents dated 25.09.2021 but compensation has not been paid to them and she and her family have been left with no source of income for their survival. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that it is only after this court passed the order dated 01.09.2022 and 08.09.2022, the respondents have paid merely a sum of Rs.5 lacs and stated on 09.09.2022 before this Court that the total compensation is Rs.7,23,506/- out of which Rs.5 lacs have been paid as per sanction letter dated 03.09.2022 and the balance amount of Rs.2,23,500/- shall be paid soon. He submits that the aforesaid computation of the compensation is based merely on notional income of Rs.51,000/- per annum whereas it has been admitted by the respondents that the actual annual income of the deceased from contract work was Rs.3,50,000/-. He submits that under the circumstances, the writ petition deserves to be allowed with exemplary cost.
10. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the facts of incident causing death of the petitioner's husband due to defective installation of 11 KV overhead line and his income have been admitted by the respondents in paragraphs-6 and 7 of their personal affidavit/ counter affidavit dated 06.09.2022. He submits that the aforesaid judgments relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner have no application on facts of the present case inasmuch as subsequent to the aforesaid judgments, a policy decision providing compensation has been taken by the U.P. Power Corporation on 25.09.2021 in 169th Meeting and compensation is liable to be paid accordingly.
Discussion and Findings:-
11. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties and perused the records of the writ petition.
12. It is admitted by the respondents that the deceased husband of the petitioner namely Hani Khan died on 10.04.2022 due to electrocution on account of defective installation of 11 KV overhead line by the respondents. It has also been admitted by the respondents in their personal/ counter affidavit dated 06.09.2022 that the actual income of the deceased husband of the petitioner was Rs.3,50,000/- per annum based on last three years income tax return.
13. The policy decision of the U.P. Power Corporation dated 25.09.2021 for payment of compensation in case of death or disability due to electrocution, much relied by the respondents, is reproduced below:
^^m0iz0 ikoj dkjiksjs'ku fyfeVsM ¼m0iz0 ljdkj dk miØe½ U.P. Power Corporation Limited (Govt. of Uttar Pradesh Undertaking) 'kfDr Hkou foLrkj] 14 v'kksd ekxZ] y[kuÅ&226001 la[;k%& 2828&vkSl@2021&19¼125½&,0,l0@01 fnukad 25 flrEcj] 2021 fo"k;%& =`fViw.kZ fo|qr vf/k"Bkiu ds dkj.k gqbZ fo|qrh; nq?kZVuk essa ckgjh O;fDr dh e`R;q vFkok viaxrk@i'kqvks dh e`R;q@Qly vfXudk.M rFkk lEifRr ds izdj.kksa esa {kfriwfrZ iznku fd;s tkus ds lEcU/k esaA dk;kZy; Kki m0 iz0 ikoj dkjiksjs'ku fy0 ds funs'kd dh 169oha cSBd esa fy, x;s fu.kZ; ds vuqlkj m0 iz0 ikoj dkjiksjs'ku fy0 ,oa mlds lg;ksxh fMLdke ds fu;a=.kk/khu {ks=ksa esa =qfViw.kZ fo|qrh; vf/k"Bkiu ds QyLo:i ?kfVr nq?kZVukvksa esa fdlh ckgjh O;fDr dh e`R;q vFkok viaxrk@i'kqvksa dh e`R;q@ Qly vfXudk.M rFkk lEifRr ds uqdlku gksus dh fLFkfr esa izHkkfor O;fDr vFkok mlds oS/kkfud okfjl dks fu/kkZfjr le;&lhek esa {kfriwfrZ iznku fd;s tkus ,oa fuLrkj.k ds lEcU/k esa dkjiksjs'ku ds vkns'k la[;k& 1890&bZ0,0@jk0fo0i0@ vkS0la0&18@92&8@ fofo/k@92 fnukad 26-09-1992] vkns'k la[;k& 4570& vkS0la0&17@ikdkfy@2004 fnukad 25-09-2004] vkns'k la[;k& 3286&vkS0la0@ 2011 fnukad 19-10-2011 vkns'k la[;k& 4095&vkS0la0@2016 fnukad 13-10-16 vkns'k la[;k& 1816&vkS0la0@2017 fnukad 10-04-2017] vkns'k la[;k& 4004& vkS0la0@2018 fnukad 06-10-2018 lifBr vkns'k la[;k& 402&vkS0la0@2019 fnukad 21-02-2019 dks voØfer djrs gq, {kfriwfrZ izfØ;k ds ljyhdj.k o Rofjr fuLrkj.k gsrq ,dy O;oLFkk ,rn~}kjk fuEuor izfrikfnr dh tkrh gS%& fo|qr nq?kZVuk dh fLFkfr esa tkWp izfØ;k%& 1- =`fViw.kZ fo|qr vf/k"Bku ds dkj.k gqbZ fo|qrh; nq?kZVuk esa ckgjh O;fDr dh e`R;q vFkok viaxrk@i'kqvksa dh e`R;q@ Qly vfXudk.M rFkk lEifRr ds izdj.kksa ds lEcU/k esaA
- fo|qr vf/kfu;e] 2003 dh /kkjk 53 ds izkfo/kkuksa ds vuqlkj lqjf{kr fo|qr vkiwfrZ esa foQyrk ds dkj.k fdlh tugkfu@i'kqgkfu@Qly vFkok lEifRr ds uqdlku dh lwpuk izkIr gksus ij] lEcfU/kr mi[k.M vf/kdkjh@ lgk;d vfHk;Urk 24 ?k.Vs ds vUnj fo|qr lqj{kk funs'kky; dks lwfpr djsxk ,oa 02 fnol ds vUnj fo|qr nq?kZVuk ds lEcU/k esa fu/kkZfjr izi= la0& 44¼,½ ij lgk;d funs'kd@ mi funs'kd@ funs'kd] fo|qr lqj{kk funs'kky; dks lwfpr djsxs rFkk lkFk esa fo|qr lqj{kk funs'kk;y] m0iz0 }kjk lapkfyr csolkbV Vidyutsuraksha.org ij ?kVuk dk fooj.k viyksM Hkh djasxsA blds vfrfjDr fo|qr nq?kZVuk dh lwpuk ftyk iz'kklu@ iqfyl iz'kklu ,oa fudVre fpfdRlky; dks nsxsa rFkk dkWjiksjs'ku ds mPp vf/kdkfj;ksa dks Hkh laKkfur djk;saxsA
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- dfri; dkj.kksa ls ;fn e`rd dh iksLVekVZe fjiksVZ ,oa ,Q0vkbZ0vkj0 fjiksVZ vkfn vfHkys[kksa dh vuqiyC/krk gksus dh fLFkfr esa {kfriwfrZ ¼vuqxzg jkf'k½ ds Hkqxrku esa mRiUu gqbZ leL;kvksa ij tk¡p desVh cukdj o ftykf/kdkjh ds le{k rF;ksa dks ykdj izdj.k dk fu;ekuqlkj fof/kor Li"V :i ls fuLrkj.k lqfuf'pr fd;k tk;sxkA
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- fo|qr nq?kZVuk esa e`R;q] LFkk;h@ iw.kZ viaxrk@ vkaf'kd viaxrk gksus ij] {kfriwfrZ nq?kZVukxzLr O;fDr dh fookfgr@ vfookfgr fLFkfr] vk;q ,oa ifjokj dh la[;k ds vk/kkj ij lfefr dh fjiksVZ ¼rkfydk&1 ,oa 2½ esa nh xbZ lkjf.k;ksa ds vuqlkj vuqeU; fd;k tk;sxkA
- l{ke vf/kdkjh }kjk ?kkrd@ v?kkrd fo|qr nq?kZVukvksa esa dkjiksjs'ku ds vf/k"Bkiu dh =`fV u gksus dh fLFkfr esa No fault liability ds :i esa vuqxzg /kujkf'k dh {kfriwfrZ Lohd`r dh tk;sxhA
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- vuqxzg /kujkf'k@ {kfriwfZrZ gsrq lEcfU/kr vf/k'kklh vfHk;Urk }kjk fuEu çfØ;k dk ikyu fd;k tk;sxk%&
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- vkifRr izkIr djus dh le;kof/k lekIr gksus ij] 07 fnu ds vUnj mRrjkf/kdkjh ls mudk vk/kkj dkMZ@ pquko igpku&i= ¼oksVj vkbZ0 Mh0½@ iSudkMZ@ jk'kudkMZ@ ikliksVZ@ ys[kiky vFkok xzke fodkl vf/kdkjh }kjk iznRr dqVqEc jftLVj ds vk/kkj ij ihfM+r ifjokj ds mRrjkf/kdkjh dk fu/kkZj.k fof/kd ekin.Mksa ds vk/kkj ij djrs gq;s izdj.k esa {kfriwfrZ Lohd`fr dk dkj.k] vkns'k esa fyf[kr :i ls vafdr ¼Recording reason in writing½ djrs gq, vkns'k fuxZr djasxsA mRrkjkf/kdkjh ds lEcU/k eas fdlh Hkh izdkj ds fookn dh fLFkfr esa fof/kd :i ls le{k vf/kdkjh }kjk iznRr mRrkjkf/kdkj izek.ki= izkIr gksus ds mijkUr gh vfxze dk;Zokgh dh tk;sA
- {kfriwfrZ ds :i esa vuqxzg jkf'k izkIr djus okys dks v.MjVsfdax nsuk gksxk fd ;fn fdlh Hkh izdkj dk fookn mRiUu gksus ij muds }kjk mDr /kujkf'k foHkkx dks okil dh tk;sxh vkSj vxj rF; xyr ik;s x;s rks muds fo:) fof/kd dk;Zokgh Hkh dh tk;sxhA
- fdlh ckgjh O;fDr dh fo|qrh; nq?kZVuk esa e`R;q dh n'kk esa] {kfriwfrZ ds :i esa nh x;h vuqxzg jkf'k ds vfrfjDr] e`rd vkfJr ds v/khu fdlh Hkh izdkj dk lsok;kstu vFkok dksbZ vU; vuqrks"k vuqeU; ugha gksxsA 3- ckgjh O;fDr dh fo|qr nq?kZVuk esa ?kk;y gksus dh n'kk esaA
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- v?kkrd fo|qr nq?kZVuk esa fdlh O;fDr ds vkaf'kd@ iw.kZ viaxrk gksus ij rkfydk&1 esa fn;s x;s fodykaxrk izfr'kr ds vk/kkj ij {kfriwfrZ@ vuqxzg jkf'k dk vkadyu fd;k tk;sxkA
- fo|qr lqj{kk funs'kky; }kjk izLrqr tkap vk[;k] eq[r fpfdRlk vf/kdkjh }kjk fuxZr fodykaxrk izek.k&i=] ,Q0vkbZ0vkj0 dh izfr ,oa foHkkxh; tkap esa izkIr laLrqfr ds vk/kkj ij {kfriwfrZ dh dk;Zokgh lqfuf'pr dh tk;sxhA
- {kfriwfrZ ds :i esa vuqxzg jkf'k izkIr djus okys dks 'kiFk&i= nsuk gksxk fd ;fn fdlh Hkh izdkj dk fookn mRiUu gksus ij muds }kjk mDr /kujkf'k foHkkx dks okil dh tk;sxh vkSj vxj rF; xyr ik;s x;s rks mlds fo:) fof/kd dk;Zokgh Hkh dh tk;sxhA 4- fo|qr nq?kZVuk esa i'kq dh e`R;q gksus dh n'kk esaA
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- {kfriwfrZ ds :i esa vuqxzg jkf'k izkIr djus okys dks 'kiFk&i= nsuk gksxk fd ;fn fdlh Hkh izdkj dk fookn mRiUu gksrk gS rks muds }kjk mDr /kujkf'k foHkkx dks okil dh tk;sxh vkSj vxj rF; xyr ik;s x;s rks muds fo:) fof/kd dk;Zokgh Hkh dh tk;sxhA 5- fo|qrh; vfXudk.M esa Qlyksa@ lEifRr;ksa dh gqbZ {kfr ds lEcU/k esaA
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- lEcfU/kr ftys ds rglhynkj ,oa ftykf/kdkjh ds }kjk {kfr dk vkadyu ,oa laLr`fr rFkk funs'kd] fo|qr lqj{kk funs'kky;] m0iz0 'kklu dh laLr`fr ds vk/kkj ij lEcfU/kr eq[; vfHk;Urk ¼fooj.k½ }kjk vuqxzg /kujkf'k dh Lohd`fr iznku dh tk,xhA Lohd`r /kujkf'k dk Hkqxrku [k.M Lrj ij fd;k tk;sxkA
- fo|qr nq?kZVuk eas ckgjh O;fDr;ksa@ i'kqvksa ds izdj.kksa ds fuLrkj.k esa fo|qr lqj{kk funs'kky; dh tkWp vk[;k ,oa laLr`fr izkIr gksus ds 10 fnuksa ds vUnj {kfriwfrZ dh /kujkf'k dk Hkqxrku dj fn;k tk;s rFkk lEiw.kZ izfØ;k 30 fnuksa esa iw.kZ dj yh tk;sA blds vfrfjDr Qly@ lEifRr;ksa dh gqbZ {kfr ds QyLo:i {kfriwfrZ ds izdj.kks dks fo|qr lqj{kk funs'kk;y dh laLr`fr o ftykf/kdkjh dh vk[;k izkIr gksus ds vk/kkj ij 07 dk;Z fnolksa ds Hkhrj Lohd`r ,oa fuLrkfjr fd;k tk;sA
- eq[; vfHk;Urk ¼forj.k½ fo|qr nq?kZVuk ds QyLo:i {kfriwfrZ ds izdj.kksa dk ekfld vk/kkj ij vuqJo.k djsaxs ,oa Hkqxrku ls lEcfU/kr leLr lwpuk;sa {ks=h; dk;kZy; esa lajf{kr j[ksaxs ,oa nq?kZVukvks dks jksdus gsrq fd;s x;s iz;klksa dh ekfld fjiksVZ izcU/k funs'kd] fMLdke dks HkstsaxsA lEcfU/kr fMLdke@ {ks=@ e.My@ [k.M dk nkf;Ro gksxk fd os vius dk;kZy; es fo|qr nq?kZVukvksa ds izdkj.kks dh lwph cukdj lqjf{kr j[ksaxs ,oa =`fViw.kZ vf/k"Bkiu dks Bhd fd;s tkus gsrq fd;s x;s iz;klks dks Hkh fyfic) djsaxsA GUIDE LINES FOR COMPENSATION ON ELECTROCUTION FAULT LIABILITY A-Fatal Accident
1. Notional Income (N.I.) of victim shall be taken in to consideration as Rs. 51,000 (Fifty One Thousand) per annum (about Rs. 140 per day).
2. Multiplier shall be adopted as per following chart Age of Victim Multiplier Applied (M.A.) Up to 15 years 15 Above 15 years but not exceeding 20 years 16 Above 20 years but not exceeding 25 years 17 Above 25 years but not exceeding 30 years 18 Above 30 years but not exceeding 35 years 17 Above 35 years but not exceeding 40 years 16 Above 40 years but not exceeding 45 years 15 Above 45 years but not exceeding 50 years 13 Above 50 years but not exceeding 55 years 11 Above 55 years but not exceeding 60 years 8 Above 60 years but not exceeding 65 years 6 Above 65 years 5
3. The amount of compensation so arrived at in the case of fatal accident claims shall be deducted towards Personal and living Expenses (P.E.) by
(i) 1/2nd if deceased was unmarried but if family of a bachelor is large and dependent on the income of the deceased, the deduction shall be 1/3rd (33.33%)
(ii) 1/3rd if deceased was married where dependent family members are 2 to 3 in number, 1/4th where dependent family members 4 to 6 in number and 1/5th where dependent family members are more than 6 in number.
(iii) For the purpose of calculation of number of family members in clause (ii), a minor dependent will be counted as half.
Spouse, parents and grand-parents having no income and minor children shall be deemed dependent family members. (Parivar Register and affidavit may be considered as proof of family members and dependency).
4. The following General Damages shall also be payable in addition to Compensation Outlined (C.O.) above:
(i) Compensation for Loss of Estate (L.E.) Rs. 5,000 (Five Thousand).
(ii) Compensation for Loss of Consortium (L.C.), if beneficiary is spouse Rs. 5.000 (Five Thousand).
(iii) Compensation for Loss of love and Affection (L.A.) Rs. 5,000 (Five Thousand).
(iv) Funeral Expenses costs of transportation of body (F.E.) Rs. 5,000 (Five Thousand) or actual expenses whichever is less.
(v)Medical Expenses (M.E.) -Actual expenses incurred before death supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding Rs. 20,000 (Twenty Thousand).
Formula: N.I.*M.A.=C.O. C.O.:P.E.= Amount C.O.-Amount+L.E.+L.C.+L.A.+F.E.+M.E.=Total Compensation.
Example for spot death of a person aged 14 years leaving behind mother and father:
Rs.51000*15 (Multiplier) =765000 Rs.765000/3 =255000 Rs.765000-255000+ 5000+5000+5000 =525000 B-Non-Fatal General Damages in case of Injuries and Disabilities:
(i) Pain and Suffering Grievous injuries
(ii) Grievous injuries (G.I.) -- Rs. 10,000/-
(iii) Simple injuries (S.I.) --Rs. 5,000/-
(ii) Medical Expenses (M.E.) :- Actual expenses incurred, supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding Rs. 20,000 for grievous injury and - Rs. 10,000 for simple injury (on medical report) Disability in non-fatal accidents:
The following compensation shall be payable in cases of disabilities to the victim arising out of non-fatal accidents:
C- Temporary Disability Loss of income, if any, for actual period of disablement not exceeding fifty two weeks.
D- Permanent Disability
(a) In case of permanent total disablement the amount payable shall be arrived at by multiplying the annual loss of income by the Multiplier applicable to the age on the date of determining the compensation, or
(b) In case of permanent partial disablement such percentage of compensation, which would have been payable in the case of permanent total disablement as specified under item (a) above.
Injuries deemed to result in Permanent Total Disablement/Permanent Partial Disablement and percentage of loss of earning capacity shall be as per Schedule I under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, Disability Certificate from Medical Board mentioning percentage of disablement shall be final and shall be taken in to consideration.
Notional Income of victim shall be taken in to consideration as Rs. 51,000 (Fifty One Thousand) per annum.
Example for 100% permanent disability of person aged 14 years with medical bills for amount. Rs. 20.000 (Twenty Thousand):
51000*15 =765000 765000*100/100 =765000 765000+10000+20000 =795000 No Fault Liability 1. In death - Rs. 1.000,00 (One Lac) 2. In permanent disability - Rs. 1,25,000 (One Lac and Twenty Five Thousand) 3. Grievous injury - Rs. 3000 (Eight Thousand 4. Simple injury - Rs. 2000 (Three Thousand)
No compensation shall be paid if victim was involved in illegal activities like theft of electricity or riots etc. Third party insurance system may also be introduced to meet out compensation.
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14. As per para-2 read with "guidelines for compensation on electrocution" of the afore-quoted policy decision dated 25.09.2021 of the respondents, the compensation is to be determined on the basis of income of the victim with minimum compensation of Rs.5 lakhs. However, in the absence of proof of actual income so as to avoid litigation and to grant compensation quickly to the dependents of the deceased, a notional income of Rs.51,000/-, i.e. Rs.140/- per day has been provided in the aforesaid policy decision. In the present set of facts, the actual annual income of the deceased husband of the petitioner has been admitted by the respondents at Rs.3,50,000/- per annum and yet the compensation of merely Rs.7,23,500/- has been determined by them on the basis of notional income of Rs.51,000/- per annum. A computation chart and the policy decision dated 25.09.2021 produced by the respondents before us on 08.09.2022 have been kept on record. In the aforesaid computation chart, the respondents have admitted the number of dependents of the deceased to be four and the age of the deceased to 27 years.
15. Thus, as per admitted case of the respondents, the compensation for death of the husband of the petitioner due to electrocution on 10.04.2022 is payable to the petitioner applying the multiplier of 18 as per aforequoted policy decision of the corporation dated 25.09.2021.
Compensation - should be just, reasonable and guided by principles of fairness, equity and good conscience:-
16. In Kirti v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2021) 2 SCC 166 (Para-10), Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the law that any compensation awarded by a court ought to be just, reasonable and consequently must undoubtedly be guided by principles of fairness, equity and good conscience. In the case of Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 4 SCC 413 (para-33), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is well settled law that in the motor accident claim petitions, the Court must award the just compensation and, in case, the just compensation is more than the amount claimed, that must be awarded especially where the claimant is a minor. In the case of Kajal (Supra) (Paras-8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14), Hon'ble Supreme Court quoted with approval certain foreign judgments and its own judgment and held as under:
"8. In Phillips v. London & South Western Railway Co., (1879) [L.R.] 5 Q.B.D. 78 (CA), Field, J., while emphasising that damages must be full and adequate, held thus : (QBD p. 79) "... You cannot put the plaintiff back again into his original position, but you must bring your reasonable common sense to bear, and you must always recollect that this is the only occasion on which compensation can be given. The plaintiff can never sue again for it. You have, therefore, now to give him compensation once and for all. He has done no wrong, he has suffered a wrong at the hands of the defendants and you must take care to give him full fair compensation for that which he has suffered."
Besides, the Tribunals should always remember that the measures of damages in all these cases "should be such as to enable even a tortfeasor to say that he had amply atoned for his misadventure".
9. In Mediana, In re, 1900 AC 113 (HL), Lord Halsbury held : (AC pp. 116-17) "... Of course the whole region of inquiry into damages is one of extreme difficulty. You very often cannot even lay down any principle upon which you can give damages; nevertheless, it is remitted to the jury, or those who stand in place of the jury, to consider what compensation in money shall be given for what is a wrongful act. Take the most familiar and ordinary case : how is anybody to measure pain and suffering in moneys counted? Nobody can suggest that you can by any arithmetical calculation establish what is the exact amount of money which would represent such a thing as the pain and suffering which a person has undergone by reason of an accident. In truth, I think it would be very arguable to say that a person would be entitled to no damages for such things. What manly mind cares about pain and suffering that is past? But nevertheless the law recognises that as a topic upon which damages may be given."
10. The following observations of Lord Morris in his speech in H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard, 1964 AC 326 : (1963) 2 WLR 1359 (HL), are very pertinent : (AC p. 346) "... Money may be awarded so that something tangible may be procured to replace something else of the like nature which has been destroyed or lost. But money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered and shattered. All that Judges and courts can do is to award sums which must be regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In the process there must be the endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. Furthermore, it is eminently desirable that so far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by comparable awards."
In the same case, Lord Devlin observed (at p. 357) that the proper approach to the problem was to adopt a test as to what contemporary society would deem to be a fair sum, such as would allow the wrongdoer to "hold up his head among his neighbours and say with their approval that he has done the fair thing?", which should be kept in mind by the court in determining compensation in personal injury cases.
11. Lord Denning while speaking for the Court of Appeal in Ward v. James, (1966) 1 QB 273 : (1965) 2 WLR 455 : (1965) 1 All ER 563 (CA), laid down the following three basic principles to be followed in such like cases : (QB pp. 299-300) "First, assessibility : In cases of grave injury, where the body is wrecked or the brain destroyed, it is very difficult to assess a fair compensation in money, so difficult that the award must basically be a conventional figure, derived from experience or from awards in comparable cases. Secondly, uniformity : There should be some measure of uniformity in awards so that similar decisions are given in similar cases; otherwise there will be great dissatisfaction in the community, and much criticism of the administration of justice. Thirdly, predictability : Parties should be able to predict with some measure of accuracy the sum which is likely to be awarded in a particular case, for by this means cases can be settled peaceably and not brought to court, a thing very much to the public good."
12. The assessment of damages in personal injury cases raises great difficulties. It is not easy to convert the physical and mental loss into monetary terms. There has to be a measure of calculated guesswork and conjecture. An assessment, as best as can, in the circumstances, should be made.
13. McGregor's Treatise on Damages, 14th Edition, Para 1157, referring to heads of damages in personal injury actions states:
"The person physically injured may recover both for his pecuniary losses and his non-pecuniary losses. Of these the pecuniary losses themselves comprise two separate items viz. the loss of earnings and other gains which the plaintiff would have made had he not been injured and the medical and other expenses to which he is put as a result of the injury, and the courts have sub-divided the non-pecuniary losses into three categories viz. pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life and loss of expectation of life."
14. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi, (1979) 4 SCC 365 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 996 : 1980 ACJ 55, this Court held : (SCC p. 366, para 2) "2. ... the determination of the quantum must be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb in a free country in generous scales."
17. Thus, as per settled principles of law, the respondents are bound to award just compensation to the petitioner for fatal accident on account of their own negligence which caused the death of the husband of the petitioner on 10.04.2022. However, despite there being admitted proof of actual income of the deceased to be Rs.3,50,000/- per annum, the respondents have computed compensation on the basis of assumed notional income of the deceased as Rs.51,000/- per annum.
Concept of Notional Income:-
18. Kirti v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) (Para-17, 18 and 19), Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that there are two distinct categories of situations wherein the court usually determines notional income of a victim. The first category of cases relates to those wherein the victim was employed, but the claimants are not able to prove victim's actual income, before the court. In such a situation, the court "guesses" the income of the victim on the basis of the evidence on record, like the quality of life being led by the victim and her family, the general earning of an individual employed in that field, the qualifications of the victim, and other considerations. The second category of cases relates to those situations wherein the Court is called upon to determine the income of a non-earning victim, such as a child, a student or a homemaker. Different principles are adopted by courts for determining the compensation towards a non-earning victim in order to arrive at the just compensation. Some of these involve the determination of notional income. In the case of Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 197 (Para-10), Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with compensation for the victims of a fire during a function, granted compensation to housewives on the basis of services rendered by them in the house and their age. Thus, in the absence of proof of actual income, notional income is determined to compute compensation.
Compensation for Future Prospect and loss of consortium:-
19. Once notional or actual income has been determined, the question remains as to whether escalation for future prospect should be granted with regard to it. In the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 (Para-57), a Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court extended the benefit of future prospects to even self-employed persons or those on a fixed salary and laid down the law that an addition of 40% of the established income of the deceased towards future prospects would be reasonable to grant where the deceased was below 40 years and an addition of 25% should be granted where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years. The principle laid down by the Constitution Bench of Honb'le Supreme Court in the case of Pranay Sethi (supra) has been followed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in several judgments including in the case of Kirti (supra).
20. "Consortium" is a compendious term which encompasses "spousal consortium", "parental consortium", and "filial consortium". The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of "company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation". Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of "parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training". Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit.
21. In the case of Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram, (2018) 18 SCC 130 (Paras-15, 21.1, 21.2, 21.3 and 22), Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the issue of future prospects and compensation for loss of consortium and referring its earlier Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54, held as under:
"15. With respect to the issue of future prospects, a Constitution Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 has held that in case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, and was below 40 years of age, an addition of 40% of the established income should be granted towards future prospects. Future prospects are to be awarded on the basis of:
(i) the nature of the deceased's employment; and
(ii) the age of the deceased.
In the present case, it is claimed by the family of the deceased that he was engaged in making namkeen, and was earning a monthly income of about Rs 15,000 per month. However, no evidence was brought on record to establish the same. MACT as well as the High Court assessed the income of the deceased on the basis of the minimum wage of an unskilled worker. The nature of his employment being taken as a self-employed person. The deceased was 24 years old at the time of the accident. Hence, future prospects ought to have been awarded at 40% of the actual income of the deceased, instead of 50% as awarded by the High Court. Hence, the judgment1 of the High Court on this issue is modified to that extent.
21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, "consortium" is a compendious term which encompasses "spousal consortium", "parental consortium", and "filial consortium". The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse:
21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of "company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation".
21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of "parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training".
21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit.
22. Consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions world-over have recognised that the value of a child's consortium far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child."
22. In the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (supra) (Paras 59.3 to 59.8), Hon'ble Supreme Court summarised the law on the point of addition for future prospect and loss of consortium etc. and held as under:-
"59.3. While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax.
59.4. In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component.
59.5. For determination of the multiplicand, the deduction for personal and living expenses, the tribunals and the courts shall be guided by paras 30 to 32 of Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 which we have reproduced hereinbefore.
59.6. The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table in Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 read with para 42 of that judgment.
59.7. The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying the multiplier.
59.8. Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs 15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000 respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years."
23. In the case of Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 (Paras-17, 18, 19, 30, 31 and 32) as affirmed by the Constitution Bench judgment (Pranay Sethi's case), Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
"17. Assessment of compensation though involving certain hypothetical considerations, should nevertheless be objective. Justice and justness emanate from equality in treatment, consistency and thoroughness in adjudication, and fairness and uniformity in the decision-making process and the decisions. While it may not be possible to have mathematical precision or identical awards in assessing compensation, same or similar facts should lead to awards in the same range. When the factors/inputs are the same, and the formula/legal principles are the same, consistency and uniformity, and not divergence and freakiness, should be the result of adjudication to arrive at just compensation. In General Manager, Kerala S.R.T.C vs Susamma Thomas, (1994) 2 SCC 176, this Court stated: (SCC p. 185, para 16) "16. ... The proper method of computation is the multiplier method. Any departure, except in exceptional and extraordinary cases, would introduce inconsistency of principle, lack of uniformity and an element of unpredictability, for the assessment of compensation."
18. Basically only three facts need to be established by the claimants for assessing compensation in the case of death:
(a) age of the deceased;
(b) income of the deceased; and
(c) the number of dependants.
The issues to be determined by the Tribunal to arrive at the loss of dependency are:
(i) additions/deductions to be made for arriving at the income;
(ii) the deduction to be made towards the personal living expenses of the deceased; and
(iii) the multiplier to be applied with reference to the age of the deceased.
If these determinants are standardised, there will be uniformity and consistency in the decisions. There will be lesser need for detailed evidence. It will also be easier for the insurance companies to settle accident claims without delay.
19. To have uniformity and consistency, the Tribunals should determine compensation in cases of death, by the following well-settled steps:
Step 1 (Ascertaining the multiplicand) The income of the deceased per annum should be determined. Out of the said income a deduction should be made in regard to the amount which the deceased would have spent on himself by way of personal and living expenses. The balance, which is considered to be the contribution to the dependant family, constitutes the multiplicand.
Step 2 (Ascertaining the multiplier) Having regard to the age of the deceased and period of active career, the appropriate multiplier should be selected. This does not mean ascertaining the number of years he would have lived or worked but for the accident. Having regard to several imponderables in life and economic factors, a table of multipliers with reference to the age has been identified by this Court. The multiplier should be chosen from the said table with reference to the age of the deceased.
Step 3 (Actual calculation) The annual contribution to the family (multiplicand) when multiplied by such multiplier gives the "loss of dependency" to the family.
Thereafter, a conventional amount in the range of Rs 5000 to Rs 10,000 may be added as loss of estate. Where the deceased is survived by his widow, another conventional amount in the range of 5000 to 10,000 should be added under the head of loss of consortium. But no amount is to be awarded under the head of pain, suffering or hardship caused to the legal heirs of the deceased.
The funeral expenses, cost of transportation of the body (if incurred) and cost of any medical treatment of the deceased before death (if incurred) should also be added.
30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362, the general practice is to apply standardised deductions. Having considered several subsequent decisions of this Court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of dependent family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5th) where the number of dependent family members exceeds six.
31. Where the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants are the parents, the deduction follows a different principle. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event the contribution to the parent(s) and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will not be considered as a dependant and the mother alone will be considered as a dependant. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependants, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependent on the father.
32. Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be considered to be a dependant, and 50% would be treated as the personal and living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the family. However, where family of the bachelor is large and dependant on the income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted to one-third and contribution to the family will be taken as two-third."
Assessment of Compensation:-
24. For assessment of damages to compensate the dependants, it has to take into account many imponderables, as to the life expectancy of the deceased and the dependants, the amount that the deceased would have earned during the remainder of his life, the amount that he would have contributed to the dependants during that period, the chances that the deceased may not have lived or the dependants may not live up to the estimated remaining period of their life expectancy, the chances that the deceased might have got better employment or income or might have lost his employment or income altogether. The manner of arriving at the damages is to ascertain the net income of the deceased available for the support of himself and his dependants, and to deduct therefrom such part of his income as the deceased was accustomed to spend upon himself, as regards both self-maintenance and pleasure, and to ascertain what part of his net income the deceased was accustomed to spend for the benefit of the dependants and, thereafter, it should be capitalised by multiplying it by a figure representing the proper number of years. The court must try to assess as best as it can, the loss suffered. The multiplier method is logically sound and legally well-established method of ensuring a ''just' compensation which will make for uniformity and certainty of the awards. A departure from this method can only be justified in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases.
25. In the case of Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (supra) (Para-8), Hon'ble Supreme Court entertained a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for grant of compensation to victims due to fire accident attributable to inadequate safety measures adopted by the organizers and held as under:-
"8. So far as the determination of compensation in death cases is concerned, apart from the three decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which had been mentioned in the order of this Court dated 15-12-1993, this Court in the case of G.M., Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas, (1994) 2 SCC 176 exhaustively dealt with the question. It has been held in the aforesaid case that for assessment of damages to compensate the dependants, it has to take into account many imponderables, as to the life expectancy of the deceased and the dependants, the amount that the deceased would have earned during the remainder of his life, the amount that he would have contributed to the dependants during that period, the chances that the deceased may not have lived or the dependants may not live up to the estimated remaining period of their life expectancy, the chances that the deceased might have got better employment or income or might have lost his employment or income altogether. The Court further observed that the manner of arriving at the damages is to ascertain the net income of the deceased available for the support of himself and his dependants, and to deduct therefrom such part of his income as the deceased was accustomed to spend upon himself, as regards both self-maintenance and pleasure, and to ascertain what part of his net income the deceased was accustomed to spend for the benefit of the dependants and, thereafter, it should be capitalised by multiplying it by a figure representing the proper number of years' purchase. It was also stated that much of the calculation necessarily remains in the realm of hypothesis and in that region, arithmetic is a good servant but a bad master, since there are so often many imponderables. In every case, "it is the overall picture that matters", and the court must try to assess as best as it can, the loss suffered. On the acceptability of the multiplier method, the Court observed:
"The multiplier method is logically sound and legally well-established method of ensuring a ''just' compensation which will make for uniformity and certainty of the awards. A departure from this method can only be justified in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases."
The Court also further observed that the proper method of computation is the multiplier method and any departure, except in exceptional and extraordinary cases, would introduce inconsistency of principle, lack of uniformity and an element of unpredictability in the assessment of compensation. The Court disapproved the contrary views taken by some of the High Courts and explained away the earlier view of the Supreme Court on the point. After considering a series of English decisions, it was held that the multiplier method involves the ascertainment of the loss of dependency or the multiplicand having regard to the circumstances of the case and capitalizing the multiplicand by an appropriate multiplier. The choice of the multiplier is determined by the age of the deceased (or that of the claimants, whichever is higher) and by the calculation as to what capital sum, if invested at a rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy, would yield the multiplicand by way of annual interest. In ascertaining this, regard should also be had to the fact that ultimately the capital sum should also be consumed up over the period for which the dependency is expected to last. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of this Court and having regard to the determination made in the Report by Shri Justice Chandrachud, on the basis of the aforesaid multiplier method, it is difficult for us to accept the contention of Ms Rani Jethmalani that the settled principle for determination of compensation has not been followed in the present case. The further submission of the learned counsel that the determination made is arbitrary, is devoid of any substance, as Shri Justice Chandrachud has correctly applied the multiplier, on consideration of all the relevant factors. Damages are awarded on the basis of financial loss and the financial loss is assessed in the same way as prospective loss of earnings. The basic figure, instead of being the net earnings, is the net contribution to the support of the dependants, which would have been derived from the future income of the deceased. When the basic figure is fixed, then an estimate has to be made of the probable length of time for which the earnings or contribution would have continued and then a suitable multiple has to be determined (a number of years' purchase), which will reduce the total loss to its present value, taking into account the proved risks of rise or fall in the income. In the case of Mallett v. McMonagle, 1970 AC 166 : (1969) 2 All ER 178 (HL), Lord Diplock gave a full analysis of the uncertainties, which arise at various stages in the estimate and the practical ways of dealing with them. In the case of Davies v. Taylor, 1974 AC 207 : (1972) 3 All ER 836 (HL), it was held that the Court, in looking at future uncertain events, does not decide whether on balance one thing is more likely to happen than another, but merely puts a value on the chances. A possibility may be ignored if it is slight and remote. Any method of calculation is subordinate to the necessity for compensating the real loss. But a practical approach to the calculation of the damages has been stated by Lord Wright, in a passage which is frequently quoted, in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd., (1942) 1 All ER 657 (HL) to the following effect: (All ER p. 665 A-B) "The starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased was earning, the ascertainment of which to some extent may depend on the regularity of his employment. Then there is an estimate of how much was required or expended for his own personal and living expenses. The balance will give a datum or basic figure which will generally be turned into a lump sum by taking a certain number of years' purchase."
(Emphasis supplied by us) Compensation for Negligence - Tort - Strict Liability:-
26. In the case of Maharaja Agrasen Hospital v. Rishabh Sharma, (2020) 6 SCC 501 (Para-12.5.4), Hon'ble Supreme Court while granting compensation of Rs.76,00,000/- for medical negligence, held as under:-
"12.5.4. The grant of compensation to remedy the wrong of medical negligence is within the realm of law of torts. It is based on the principle of restitution in integrum. The said principle provides that a person is entitled to damages which should as nearly as possible get that sum of money which would put him in the same position as he would have been if he had not sustained the wrong."
27. In the case of Raman v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., (2014) 15 SCC 1 (Paras-16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21), Hon'ble Supreme Court considered a judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.14046 of 2012 and L.P.A. No.1631 of 2013 granting compensation for 100% permanent disability suffered by a five years old boy due to electrocution on 03.11.2011 and affirming the compensation of Rs.60,00,000/- and after referring to large number of judgments, held as under:
"16. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has awarded compensation keeping all these aspects of the matter and has applied the guiding principle of multiplier method after adverting to the case of Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 for the purpose of computation of just and reasonable compensation in favour of the appellant which method should not have been applied to the case on hand, particularly, having regard to the statutory negligence on the part of the respondents in not providing the safety measures to see that live electric wires should not fall on the roof of the building by strictly following the Rules to protect the lives of the public in the residential area. This Court in Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha, (2014) 1 SCC 384, has deviated from following the multiplier method to award just and reasonable compensation in favour of the claimant in a medical negligence case. The same principle will hold good in the case on hand too. The following case law is followed by this Court in the abovereferred case, the relevant paragraphs are extracted herein to award just and reasonable compensation in favour of the appellant: (SCC pp. 425, 437-39 & 445, paras 68, 99, 101, 103.1. & 112) "68. ... three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Indian Medical Assn. v. V.P. Shantha, (1995) 6 SCC 651, wherein this Court has categorically disagreed on this specific point in another case wherein ''medical negligence' was involved. In the said decision, it has been held at para 53 that to deny a legitimate claim or to restrict arbitrarily the size of an award would amount to substantial injustice to the claimant.
* * *
99. In Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 10 SCC 683 this Court at para 15 observed as under which got reiterated at SCC pp. 639-40, para 13 of Ibrahim v. Raju, (2011) 10 SCC 634 : (Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 10 SCC 683 , SCC pp. 691-92) ''15. In Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2009) 13 SCC 422 this Court reiterated that the compensation awarded under the Act should be just and also identified the factors which should be kept in mind while determining the amount of compensation. The relevant portions of the judgment are extracted below: (SCC pp. 431-32 & 440-41, paras 26-27 & 46-47) "26. The compensation which is required to be determined must be just. While the claimants are required to be compensated for the loss of their dependency, the same should not be considered to be a windfall. Unjust enrichment should be discouraged. This Court cannot also lose sight of the fact that in given cases, as for example death of the only son to a mother, she can never be compensated in monetary terms.
27. The question as to the methodology required to be applied for determination of compensation as regards prospective loss of future earnings, however, as far as possible should be based on certain principles. A person may have a bright future prospect; he might have become eligible to promotion immediately; there might have been chances of an immediate pay revision, whereas in another (sic situation) the nature of employment was such that he might not have continued in service; his chance of promotion, having regard to the nature of employment may be distant or remote. It is, therefore, difficult for any court to lay down rigid tests which should be applied in all situations. There are divergent views. In some cases it has been suggested that some sort of hypotheses or guesswork may be inevitable. That may be so.
* * *
46. In the Indian context several other factors should be taken into consideration including education of the dependants and the nature of job. In the wake of changed societal conditions and global scenario, future prospects may have to be taken into consideration not only having regard to the status of the employee, his educational qualification; his past performance but also other relevant factors, namely, the higher salaries and perks which are being offered by the private companies these days. In fact while determining the multiplicand this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jashuben, (2008) 4 SCC 162 held that even dearness allowance and perks with regard thereto from which the family would have derived monthly benefit, must be taken into consideration.
47. One of the incidental issues which has also to be taken into consideration is inflation. Is the practice of taking inflation into consideration wholly incorrect? Unfortunately, unlike other developed countries, in India there has been no scientific study. It is expected that with the rising inflation the rate of interest would go up. In India it does not happen. It, therefore, may be a relevant factor which may be taken into consideration for determining the actual ground reality. No hard-and-fast rule, however, can be laid down therefor."' * * *
101. ... he has also strongly placed reliance upon the observations made at para 170 in Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Sukumar Mukherjee, (2009) 9 SCC 221 referred to supra wherein this Court has made observations as thus: (SCC p. 282) ''170. Indisputably, grant of compensation involving an accident is within the realm of law of torts. It is based on the principle of restitutio in integrum. The said principle provides that a person entitled to damages should, as nearly as possible, get that sum of money which would put him in the same position as he would have been if he had not sustained the wrong. [See Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., (1880) LR 5 AC 25 (HL)]' * * * 103.1. In Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2009) 13 SCC 710 this Court has observed at para 34 which reads thus: (SCC p. 721) ''34. ... in our considered opinion a party should not be deprived from getting "just compensation" in case the claimant is able to make out a case under any provision of law. Needless to say, the MVA is beneficial and welfare legislation. In fact, the court is duty-bound and entitled to award ''just compensation' irrespective of the fact whether any plea in that behalf was raised by the claimant or not.' * * *
112. The claimant has also placed reliance upon Nizam's Institute of Medical Sciences v. Prasanth S. Dhananka, (2009) 6 SCC 1 in support of his submission that if a case is made out, then the Court must not be chary of awarding adequate compensation. The relevant paragraph reads as under: (SCC pp. 38-39, para 88) ''88. We must emphasise that the court has to strike a balance between the inflated and unreasonable demands of a victim and the equally untenable claim of the opposite party saying that nothing is payable. Sympathy for the victim does not, and should not, come in the way of making a correct assessment, but if a case is made out, the court must not be chary of awarding adequate compensation. The "adequate compensation" that we speak of, must to some extent, be a rule of thumb measure, and as a balance has to be struck, it would be difficult to satisfy all the parties concerned.'"
17. Further in para 119, it is held ( Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha, (2014) 1 SCC 384, SCC pp.447-48) "119...........this Court has rejected the use of multiplier system to calculate and award the quantum of compensation which must be just and reasonable. The relevant paragraph is quoted hereunder: (Nizam's Institute of Medical Sciences v. Prasanth S. Dhananka, (2009) 6 SCC 1 , SCC para 92) "92. Mr Tandale, the learned counsel for the respondent has, further submitted that the proper method for determining compensation would be the multiplier method. We find absolutely no merit in this plea. The kind of damage that the complainant has suffered, the expenditure that he has incurred and is likely to incur in the future and the possibility that his [pic]rise in his chosen field would now be restricted, are matters which cannot be taken care of under the multiplier method."
(emphasis in original)
18. Further under para 121, the relevant paragraph from United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan, (2002) 6 SCC 281 reads as under: (Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha, (2014) 1 SCC 384, SCC p. 448) "121. ... ''20. The court cannot be totally oblivious to the realities. The Second Schedule while prescribing the multiplier, had maximum income of Rs 40,000 p.a. in mind, but it is considered to be a safe guide for applying the prescribed multiplier in cases of higher income also but in cases where the gap in income is so wide as in the present case income is 2,26,297 dollars, in such a situation, it cannot be said that some deviation in the multiplier would be impermissible. Therefore, a deviation from applying the multiplier as provided in the Second Schedule may have to be made in this case. Apart from factors indicated earlier the amount of multiplicand also becomes a factor to be taken into account which in this case comes to 2,26,297 dollars, that is to say, an amount of around Rs 68 lakhs per annum by converting it at the rate of Rs 30. By Indian standards it is certainly a high amount. Therefore, for the purposes of fair compensation, a lesser multiplier can be applied to a heavy amount of multiplicand. A deviation would be reasonably permissible in the figure of multiplier even according to the observations made in Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas, (1994) 2 SCC 176 where a specific example was given about a person dying at the age of 45 leaving no heirs being a bachelor except his parents.' (United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan, (2002) 6 SCC 281, SCC p. 295, para 20)"
19. Further, in para 177, it was held as under: (Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha, (2014) 1 SCC 384, SCC p. 475) "177. Under the heading of loss due to pain and suffering and loss of amenities of the wife of the claimant, Kemp and Kemp write as under:
''The award to a plaintiff of damages under the head "pain and suffering" depends as Lord Scarman said in Lim Poh Choo v. Camden and Islington Area Health Authority19, upon the claimant's personal awareness of pain, her capacity of suffering. Accordingly, no award is appropriate if and insofar as the claimant has not suffered and is not likely to suffer pain, and has not endured and is not likely to endure suffering, for example, because he was rendered immediately and permanently unconscious in the accident. By contrast, an award of damages in respect of loss of amenities is appropriate whenever there is in fact such a loss regardless of the claimant's awareness of the loss.' * * * ''Even though the claimant may die from his injuries shortly after the accident, the evidence may justify an award under this head. Shock should also be taken account of as an ingredient of pain and suffering and the claimant's particular circumstances may well be highly relevant to the extent of her suffering.
* * * By considering the nature of amenities lost and the injury and pain in the particular case, the court must assess the effect upon the particular claimant. In deciding the appropriate award of damages, an important consideration is how long he be deprived of those amenities and how long the pain and suffering has been and will be endured. If it is for the rest of his life the court will need to take into account in assessing damages the claimant's age and his expectation in life. ...'"
20. Further, in Rekha Jain v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2013) 8 SCC 389 this Court at paras 34-35, 38-39 and 41-43, with regard to the quantum of damages, has held as under: (SCC pp. 407-408) "34. ... ''24. In deciding on the quantum of damages to be paid to a person for the personal injuries suffered by him, the court is bound to ascertain all considerations which will make good to the sufferer of the injuries, as far as money can do, the loss which he has suffered as a natural consequence of the wrong done to him.' (K. Narasimha Murthy v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2004 SCC OnLine Kar 104 : ILR 2004 KAR 2471, SCC OnLine Kar : ILR pp. 2483-84, para 24)
35. ... ''26. Therefore, the general principle which should govern the assessment of damages in personal injury cases is that the court should award to injured person such a sum of money as will put him in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the injuries. But, it is manifest that no award of money can possibly compensate an injured man and renew a shattered human frame.' (K. Narasimha Murthy v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2004 SCC OnLine Kar 104 : ILR 2004 KAR 2471, SCC OnLine Kar : ILR p. 2484, para 26) * * *
38. In Fowler v. Grace, (1970) 114 Sol Jo 193 (CA), Edmund Davies, L.J. has said that:
''It is the manifest duty of the Tribunal to give as perfect a sum as was within its power. There are many losses which cannot easily be expressed in terms of money. If a person, in an accident, loses his sight, hearing or smelling faculty or a limb, value of such deprivation cannot be assessed in terms of market value because there is no market value for the personal asset which has been lost in the accident, and there is no easy way of expressing its equivalent in terms of money. ...'
39. In Mediana, In re, 1900 AC 113 : (1900-03) All ER Rep 126 (HL), it is held at para 32 which is extracted as herein:
''32. In personal injury cases, the court is constantly required to form an estimate of chances and risks which cannot be determined with precision. It is because, the law will disregard possibilities which are slight or chances which are nebulous; otherwise, all the circumstances of the situation must be taken into account, whether they relate to the future which the plaintiff would have enjoyed if the accident had not happened, or to the future of his injuries and his earning power after the accident. Damages are compensation for an injury or loss, that is to say, the full equivalent of money so far as the nature of money admits; and difficulty or uncertainty does not prevent an assessment.' (K. Narasimha Murthy v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2004 SCC OnLine Kar 104 : ILR 2004 KAR 2471, SCC OnLine Kar : ILR p. 2486, para 32) * * *
41. McGregor on Damages (14th Edn.) at Para 1157, referring to the heads of damages in personal injury actions, states as under:
''The person physically injured may recover both for his pecuniary losses and his non-pecuniary losses. Of these the pecuniary losses themselves comprise two separate items viz. the loss of earnings and other gains which the plaintiff would have made had he not been injured and the medical and other expenses to which he is put as a result of the injury, and the courts have sub-divided the non-pecuniary losses into three categories viz. pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life and loss of expectation of life.
Besides, the Court is well advised to remember that the measures of damages in all these cases "should be such as to enable even a tortfeasor to say that he had amply atoned for his misadventure". The observation of Lord Devlin that the proper approach to the problem or to adopt a test as to what contemporary society would deem to be a fair sum, such as would allow the wrongdoer to "hold up his head among his neighbours and say with their approval that he has done the fair thing", is quite apposite to be kept in mind by the court in assessing compensation in personal injury cases.'
42. In R. Venkatesh v. P. Saravanan, 2000 SCC OnLine Kar 472 : (2001) 1 Kant LJ 411 the High Court of Karnataka while dealing with a personal injury case wherein the claimant sustained certain crushing injuries due to which his left lower limb was amputated, held that in terms of functional disability, the disability sustained by the claimant is total and 100% though only the claimant's left lower limb was amputated. In para 9 of the judgment, the Court held as under: (Kant LJ p. 415) ''9. As a result of the amputation, the claimant had been rendered a cripple. He requires the help of crutches even for walking. He has become unfit for any kind of manual work. As he was earlier a loader doing manual work, the amputation of his left leg below the knee, has rendered him unfit for any kind of manual work. He has no education. In such cases, it is well settled that the economic and functional disability will have to be treated as total, even though the physical disability is not 100%.'
43. Lord Reid in Baker v. Willoughby, 1970 AC 467 : (1970) 2 WLR 50 : (1969) 3 All ER 1528 (HL) has said: (AC p. 492 A) ''... A man is not compensated for the physical injury: he is compensated for the loss which he suffers as a result of that injury. His loss is not in having a stiff leg: it is in his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those amenities which depend on freedom of movement and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned....'"
21. In view of the law laid down by this Court in the abovereferred cases which are extensively considered and granted just and reasonable compensation, in our considered view, the compensation awarded at Rs 60 lakhs in the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court, out of which Rs 30 lakhs were to be deposited jointly in the name of the appellant represented by his parents as natural guardian and the Chief Engineer or his nominee representing the respondent Nigam in a nationalised bank in a fixed deposit till he attains the age of majority, is just and proper but we have to set aside that portion of the judgment of the learned Single Judge directing that if he survives, he is permitted to withdraw the amount, otherwise the deposit amount shall be reverted back to the respondents as the same is not legal and valid for the reason that once the compensation amount is awarded by the court, it should go to the claimant/appellant. Therefore, the victims/claimants are legally entitled for compensation to be awarded in their favour as per the principles/guiding factors laid down by this Court in a catena of cases, particularly, in Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha, (2014) 1 SCC 384 referred to supra. Therefore, the compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals/Consumer Forums/State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions/National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission or the High Courts would absolutely belong to such victims/claimants. If the claimants die, then the Succession Act of their respective religion would apply to succeed to such estate by the legal heirs of victims/claimants or legal representatives as per the testamentary document if they choose to execute the will indicating their desire as to whom such estate shall go after their death. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that portion of the direction of the learned Single Judge contained in sub-para (v), to the effect of Rs 30 lakhs compensation to be awarded in favour of the appellant, if he is not alive at the time he attains majority, the same shall revert back to the respondent Nigam after paying Rs 5 lakhs to the parents of the appellant, is wholly unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, we set aside the same and modify the same as indicated in the operative portion of the order."
28. In the case of M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, (2002) 2 SCC 162 (Paras 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13), Hon'ble Supreme Court appled the rule of strict liability and held as under:
"9. The doctrine of strict liability has its origin in English common law when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1. Blackburn, J., the author of the said rule had observed thus in the said decision: (All ER p. 7E-F) "[T]he true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape."
10. There are seven exceptions formulated by means of case-law to the doctrine of strict liability. It is unnecessary to enumerate those exceptions barring one which is this: "Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply." (Vide p. 535, Winfield on Tort, 15th Edn.)
11. The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in many subsequent decisions in England. A recent decision in recognition of the said doctrine is rendered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc. (1994) 1 All ER 53 (HL). The said principle gained approval in India, and decisions of the High Courts are a legion to that effect. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 613 and a Division Bench in Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, (1987) 3 SCC 234 had followed with approval the principle in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1. By referring to the above two decisions a two-Judge Bench of this Court has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2001) 2 SCC 9.
12. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395, this Court has gone even beyond the rule of strict liability by holding that: (SCC p. 421, para 31) Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on anyone on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident; such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1.
13. In the present case, the Board made an endeavour to rely on the exception to the rule of strict liability (Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1) being "an act of stranger". The said exception is not available to the Board as the act attributed to the third respondent should reasonably have been anticipated or at any rate its consequences should have been prevented by the appellant-Board. In Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. London Guarantee and Accident Co. Ltd., 1936 AC 108 : 105 LJPC 18 : 154 LT 89, the Privy Council repelled the contention of the defendant based on the aforecited exception. In that case a hotel belonging to the plaintiffs was destroyed in a fire caused by the escape and ignition of natural gas. The gas had percolated into the hotel basement from a fractured welded joint in an intermediate pressure main situated below the street level and belonging to the defendants which was a public utility company. The fracture was caused during the construction involving underground work by a third party. The Privy Council held that the risk involved in the operation undertaken by the defendant was so great that a high-degree care was expected of him since the defendant ought to have appreciated the possibility of such a leakage.
(Emphasis supplied by us)
29. In the case of Shiv Ranshu Chhuneja vs. State of U.P. and Ors, in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.10191 of 2009 (decided on 10.04.2018), a coordinate bench of this Court considered the question of compensation to a victim who suffered 100% disability on account of electrocution and held as under:
"10. The first issue, therefore, that we have to determine is as to whether the present writ petition can be entertained and maintained for the award of such compensation and for quashing of the order passed by the respondent - Corporation. We may put on record that the orders, which have been passed for awarding compensation is in the statutory exercise of power under Section 161 of the 2003 Act. Such an order being an order awarding compensation partakes the nature of not only an administrative order which touches quasi judicial functions as it is an order pertaining to award of compensation to a person having suffered an injury and also that virtually affects his fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In such circumstances, the order passed by the Chief Electrical Inspector can be made amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is not only to be tested on the principle of administrative law and reasonableness but also on the ground of protection and enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which is one of the primary duties of this Court as enshrined under the Constitution of India. A writ petition can be maintained before this Court for which we find ample support from the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Railway Boad and others Vs. Chandrima Das (Mrs.) and others, (2000) 2 SCC 465. Paragraphs 9 to 11 that are extracted hereinunder :
"9. Various aspects of the Public Law field were considered. It was found that though initially a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution relating to contractual matters was held not to lie, the law underwent a change by subsequent decisions and it was noticed that even though the petition may relate essentially to a contractual matter, it would still be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The Public Law remedies have also been extended to the realm of tort. This Court, in its various decisions, has entertained petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution on a number of occasions and has awarded compensation to the petitioners who had suffered personal injuries at the hands of the officers of the Govt. The causing of injuries, which amounted to tortious act, was compensated by this Court in many of its decisions beginning from Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141 . (See also Bhim Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1985) 4 SCC 577; Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 265; Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights v. Police Commissioner, Delhi Police Headquarters (1989) 4 SCC 730; Saheli, A Women's Resources center v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi (1990) 1 SCC 422; Arvinder Singh Bagga v. State of U.P., AIR 1995 SC 117; P. Rathinam v. Union of India 1989 Supp (2) SCC 716; Death of Sawinder Singh Grower In re 1995 Supp (4) SCC 450; Inder Singh v. State of Punjab (1995) 3 SCC 702; and D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416.
10. In cases relating to custodial deaths and those relating to medical negligence, this Court awarded compensation under Public Law domain in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746; State of M.P. v. Shyamsunder Trivedi (1995) 4 SCC 262; People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 433 and Kaushalya v. State of Punjab (1999) 6 SCC 754; Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee v. State of Bihar (1991) 3 SCC 482; Jacob George (Dr) v. State of Kerala (1994) 3 SCC 430; Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37 and Manju Bhatia v. New Delhi Municipal Council (1997) 6 SCC 370
11. Having regard to what has been stated above, the contention that Smt. Hanuffa Khatoon should have approached the Civil Court for damages and the matter should not have been considered in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot be accepted. Where public functionaries are involved and the matter relates to the violation of Fundamental Rights or the enforcement of public duties, the remedy would still be available under the Public Law notwithstanding that a suit could be filed for damages under Private Law."
31. Coming to the issue of running expenses of the petitioner, since the petitioner himself is now engaged and is earning then in the said background, the minimum expenses in the event of loss of total earning has to be construed in favour of the petitioner. In the circumstances, the formula adopted in the case of Yash Pal Singh (Minor) & Anr. (supra) of giving at least Rs.10,000/- per month calculating the longevity of his life upto 70 years would be a just and fair calculation and we award compensation accordingly. The petitioner for the time being is approximately 26 years of age. Thus, he would have a life expectancy of 44 years and consequently a sum of Rs.1,20,000/- multiplied by 44 would be a just and fair compensation in order to enable the petitioner to meet his usual normal expenses in the light of what has been stated above. This would come to the tune of Rs.52.80 lakhs.
32. Adding all the three amounts as indicated above, the petitioner would, therefore, be entitled to a total amount of Rs.86,20,000/-.
33. Accordingly we allow the writ petition with a direction to the respondents to make available the entire amount to the petitioner as above within three months from today. The payment shall be made by the respondents accordingly and any delay in payment would carry 9% simple interest per annum on the unpaid amount."
Matainability of writ petition:
30. The order for compensation has been passed by the authority in exercise of statutory power under Section 161 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and the policy decision to award just compensation. If just compensation is not awarded, it would affect fundamental rights of the sufferer guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, order so passed would be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Computation of Compensation:-
31. In the light of the discussions made above and applying the law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in various judgments aforementioned, we find that the petitioner is entitled for compensation on the basis of undisputed actual annual income of the deceased at Rs.3,50,000/-. The notional income of Rs.51,000/- as given in the policy decision of the Corporation dated 25.09.2021 shall not be applicable where the actual income of the deceased husband of the petitioner has been admitted by the respondents to be Rs.3,50,000/- per annum.
32. In a recent judgment dated 10.02.2022 in the case of R. Valli & Ors. vs. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd. (2022) 5 SCC 107, Hon'ble Supreme Court computed compensation in the matter of a deceased aged about 54 years, as under:
"6. The judgment in Sarla Verma was affirmed in Reshma Kumari & Ors. v. Madan Mohan & Anr. 3 . Both the judgments were affirmed by the Constitution Bench of this Court reported as National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi & Ors. 4 . This Court in Pranay Sethi held as under:
"44. At this stage, we must immediately say that insofar as the aforesaid multiplicand/multiplier is concerned, it has to be accepted on the basis of income established by the legal representatives of the deceased. Future prospects are to be added to the sum on the percentage basis and "income" means actual income less the tax paid. The multiplier has already been fixed in Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] which has been approved in Reshma Kumari [Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 826] with which we concur.
xx xx xx 59.3. While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. 59.4. In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component.
xx xx xx 59.7. The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying the multiplier."
10. A three-Judge Bench in an order reported as United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur alia Satwinder Kaur & Ors. 8 has applied the multiplier keeping in view the age of the deceased even if he was a bachelor. The Court held as under:
"48. Another three-judge bench in Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mandala Yadagari Goud, (2019) 5 SCC 554 traced out the law on this issue, and held that the compensation is to be computed based on what the deceased would have contributed to support the dependants. In the case of the death of a married person, it is an accepted norm that the age of the deceased would be taken into account. Thus, even in the case of a bachelor, the same principle must be applied."
12. Hence, the compensation on the basis of income assessed by the Tribunal would be as under:
Head A Monthly Dependency Rs.20,756/-
B Future Prospects (15% of monthly dependency) Rs.3,113/-
C 1/4th Deduction towards Personal Expenses Rs.5,967/-
D Total Dependency (A + B - C) Rs.17,902/-
E Age Multiplier 11 F Compensation (D x 12 x 11) Rs.23,63,064/-
G Loss of Estate Rs.15,000/-
H Funeral Expenses Rs.15,000/-
I Consortium Rs.40,000/-
Total Rs.24,33,064/-
13. Thus, the appellants are found entitled to compensation of Rs. 24,33,064/- with interest @ 9% from the date of filing of the claim application till realisation.
14. The appeal thus stands disposed of with costs throughout."
33. Admitted facts of the case as discussed in forgoing paragraphs of this judgment are that the husband of the petitioner namely Sri Hani Khan died on 10.04.2022 on account of electrocution by 11 KV overhead line due to negligence of the respondents. At the time of his death, he was aged about 27 years and left behind four dependents including the petitioner. His average annual income on the basis of past income tax returns was about Rs.3,50,000/-. Applying the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment aforementioned read with the policy decision of the respondents dated 25.09.2021, the compensation payable to the petitioner on the basis of actual income of the deceased and the multiplier provided in the policy of the respondents dated 25.09.2021, is computed as under:-
Sl.No. Head Amount (Rs.) A Monthly income 29,167/-
B Future prospects (40% of monthly income) 11,667/-
C 1/4th Deduction towards personal expenses 10,209/-
D Total Dependency (A+B-C) 30,625/-
E Age Multiplier 18 F Compensation (D x 12 x 18) 66,15,000/-
G Loss of Estate 15,000/-
H Funeral Expenses 15,000 I Consortium 40,000/-
Total = 66,85,000/-
34. The amount of compensation determined above shall be distributed amongst the dependents of the deceased as under:-
(a) The respondents shall pay to the dependents of the deceased the above mentioned amount of compensation of Rs.66,85,000/- with simple interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim application till realisation, after adjusting the amount earlier paid by them to the petitioner.
(b) Out of the aforesaid amount of compensation, a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- shall be paid in the name of the minor daughter of the deceased through the petitioner as guardian which shall be kept by the petitioner in the highest interest bearing fixed deposit with interest payable monthly/ quarterly, in a Nationalized Bank till the aforesaid minor daughter attains majority. The interest so received by the petitioner shall be spent by the petitioner only for the purposes of education and maintenance of her aforesaid minor daughter-Amayera Khan (vek;jk [kku). After the aforesaid minor daughter shall attain majority, the aforesaid principal amount may be utilised or invested by the petitioner as per need and after her, the remaining amount, if any, by her aforesaid daughter.
(c) Out of the aforesaid amount of compensation, another sum of Rs.10,00,000/- shall also be paid in the name of the aforesaid minor daughter of the deceased through the petitioner as guardian which shall also be kept by the petitioner in a highest interest bearing fixed deposit in a Nationalized Bank in the name of the aforesaid minor daughter with provision for accumulation of interest, for the purposes of higher education and marriage of the aforesaid minor daughter.
(d) The other two dependents of deceased shall be paid Rs.10,00,000/- each out of the compensation amount determined above.
(e) The interest and the balance amount of compensation (after adjusting the aforesaid amount of Rs.40,00,000/- payable to three dependents and also after adjusting the amount already paid), shall be paid to the petitioner.
Directions:-
35. Decision of the respondents dated 25.09.2021 to compute and pay compensation only on the basis of notional income, is not only arbitrary and violative of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India but is also in conflict of the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in judgments aforementioned directing for payment of just compensation. Therefore, we issue a general mandamus to the respondents to compute and pay just compensation on the basis of actual income of the injured person/ victim/ deceased wherever actual income is ascertainable or may be proved by claimant with future prospect as per law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the various judgments aforenoted and apply the multiplier as provided in the policy decision dated 25.09.2021. If actual income of injured/ victim/ deceased is either not ascertainable or is not proved by claimant, then notional income as given in the policy decision dated 25.09.2021, shall be applied for computation and payment of compensation. The amount of compensation for loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses shall be determined and paid by the respondents in accordance with the law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi (supra), which is binding under Articles 141 of the Constitution of India.
Conclusions:
36. The discussions, findings and directions made above are briefly summarized as under:-
(A) Compensation awarded ought to be just, reasonable and consequently must undoubtedly be guided by principles of fairness, equity and good conscience and, in case, the just compensation is more than the amount claimed, that must be awarded especially where the claimant is a minor.
(B) The respondents are bound to award just compensation to the petitioner for fatal accident on account of their own negligence which caused the death of the husband of the petitioner on 10.04.2022. However, despite there being admitted proof of actual income of the deceased to be Rs.3,50,000/- per annum, the respondents have computed compensation on the basis of assumed notional income of the deceased as Rs.51,000/- per annum, which is arbitrary and illegal.
(C) There are two distinct categories of situations wherein the court usually determines notional income of a victim. The first category of cases relates to those wherein the victim was employed, but the claimants are not able to prove victim's actual income, before the court. In such a situation, the court "guesses" the income of the victim on the basis of the evidence on record, like the quality of life being led by the victim and her family, the general earning of an individual employed in that field, the qualifications of the victim, and other considerations. The second category of cases relates to those situations wherein the Court is called upon to determine the income of a non-earning victim, such as a child, a student or a homemaker. Different principles are adopted by courts for determining the compensation towards a non-earning victim in order to arrive at the just compensation.
(D) In the absence of proof of actual income, notional income is applied to compute compensation.
(E) "Consortium" is a compendious term which encompasses "spousal consortium", "parental consortium", and "filial consortium". The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse.
(F) To deny a legitimate claim or to restrict arbitrarily the size of an award would amount to substantial injustice to the claimant. The compensation which is required to be determined must be just. Grant of compensation involving an accident is within the realm of law of torts. It is based on the principle of restitution in integrum. The said principle provides that a person entitled to damages should, as nearly as possible, get that sum of money which would put him in the same position as he would have been if he had not sustained the wrong.
(G) The order for compensation has been passed by the authority in exercise of statutory power under Section 161 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and the policy decision to award just compensation. If just compensation is not awarded, it would affect fundamental rights of the sufferer guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, order so passed would be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
(H) Decision of the respondents dated 25.09.2021 to compute and pay compensation only on the basis of notional income, is not only arbitrary and violative of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India but is also in conflict of the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in judgments aforementioned directing for payment of just compensation. Therefore, we issue a general mandamus to the respondents to compute and pay just compensation on the basis of actual income of the injured person/ victim/ deceased wherever actual income is ascertainable or may be proved by claimant with future prospect as per law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the various judgments aforenoted and apply the multiplier as provided in the policy decision dated 25.09.2021. If actual income of injured/ victim/ deceased is either not ascertainable or is not proved by claimant, then notional income as given in the policy decision dated 25.09.2021, shall be applied for computation and payment of compensation. The amount of compensation for loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses shall be determined and paid by the respondents in accordance with the law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi (supra), which is binding under Articles 141 of the Constitution of India.
(I) The amount of compensation determined above shall be distributed amongst the dependents of the deceased as under:-
(a) The respondents shall pay to the dependents of the deceased the above mentioned amount of compensation of Rs.66,85,000/- with simple interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim application till realisation, after adjusting the amount earlier paid by them to the petitioner.
(b) Out of the aforesaid amount of compensation, a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- shall be paid in the name of the minor daughter of the deceased through the petitioner as guardian which shall be kept by the petitioner in the highest interest bearing fixed deposit with interest payable monthly/ quarterly, in a Nationalized Bank till the aforesaid minor daughter attains majority. The interest so received by the petitioner shall be spent by the petitioner only for the purposes of education and maintenance of her aforesaid minor daughter-Amayera Khan (vek;jk [kku). After the aforesaid minor daughter shall attain majority, the aforesaid principal amount may be utilised or invested by the petitioner as per need and after her, the remaining amount, if any, by her aforesaid daughter.
(c) Out of the aforesaid amount of compensation, another sum of Rs.10,00,000/- shall also be paid in the name of the aforesaid minor daughter of the deceased through the petitioner as guardian which shall also be kept by the petitioner in a highest interest bearing fixed deposit in a Nationalized Bank in the name of the aforesaid minor daughter with provision for accumulation of interest, for the purposes of higher education and marriage of the aforesaid minor daughter.
(d) The other two dependents of deceased shall be paid Rs.10,00,000/- each out of the compensation amount determined above.
(e) The interest and the balance amount of compensation (after adjusting the aforesaid amount of Rs.40,00,000/- payable to three dependents and also after adjusting the amount already paid), shall be paid to the petitioner.
37. With the aforesaid directions, the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above.
38. The papers kept in sealed cover under order dated 09.09.2022 shall be returned by the office to the learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation.
Order Date :- 09.11.2022 NLY