Delhi High Court
Delhi Public School And Anr. vs The Director Of Education And Ors. on 23 September, 2002
Author: S.B. Sinha
Bench: S.B. Sinha, D.K. Jain, A.K. Sikri
JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, C.J.
1. This reference to a large Bench has been made by a learned Single Judge of this court noticing a conflict in the decisions of the Division Bench in Anand Dev Tyagi v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors. , and Prem Sehgal and Anr. v. The Director of Education, Delhi Administration, Delhi & Ors. , in CW 2333/1984 passed on 19th July 1984 as regard interpretation of Section 8(4) and (5) of the Delhi School Education Act (hereinafter called 'the Act' for short) and Rules 115 and 118 of the Rules. Section 8 of the Act is as under:
"8. Terms and conditions of service of employees of recognised private schools-
(4) Where the managing committee of a recognized private school intends to suspend any of its employees, such intention shall be communicated to the Director and no such suspension shall be made except with the prior approval of the Director.
Provided that the managing committee may suspend an employee with immediate effect and without the prior approval of the Director if it is satisfied that such immediate suspension is necessary by reason of the gross misconduct within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed under Section 9, of the employee:
Provided further that no such immediate suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of fifteen days from the date of suspension unless it has been communicated to the Director and approved by him before the expiry of the said period.
(5) Where the intention to suspend, or the immediate suspension of a an employee is communicated to the Director, he may, if he is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such suspension, accord his approval to such suspension.
2. Rules 115 and 118 of the Delhi Public School Education Rules, 1973, and thus:
"115. Suspension.--(1) Subject to the provision of Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 8, the managing committee may place an employee of a recognized private school, whether aided or not, under suspension-
(a) where a disciplinary proceeding against such employee is contemplated or pending; or
(b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial; or
(c) where he is charged with embezzlement; or
(d) Where he is charged with cruelty towards any student or other employee of the school; or
(e) where he is charged with misbehavior towards any parent, guardian, student or employee of the school; or
(f) where he is charged with the breach of any other code of conduct.
(2) No order for suspension shall remain in force for more than six months unless the managing committee, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, directs the continuation of the suspension beyond the period of six months:
Provided that where a suspension is continued beyond a period of six months, the Director may, if he is of opinion that the suspension is being unreasonably prolonged, revoke the order of suspension.
(3) An employee of a recognized private school, whether aided or not,shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of the appointing authority;
(a) with effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody for a period exceeding forty eight hours on a period exceeding forty eight hours on a charge of an offence which in the opinion of the managing committee involves moral turpitude;
(b) with effect from the date of his conviction, if in the event of a conviction for an offence involving, in the opinion of the managing committee, moral turpitude, he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding forty-eight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired from service consequent on such conviction.
Explanation. --The period of forty eight hours referred to in this rule shall be computed or conviction, as the case may be, and for this purpose, intermittent periods of detention shall be taken into account.
(4) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon an employee is set aside or rendered void in consequence of, or by, a decision of a court of law or of the Tribunal; and the disciplinary authority on a consideration of the circumstances of the case decides to hold further inquiry against such employee on the same allegations on which the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, such employee shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the managing committee from the date of original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders:
Provided that no such further enquiry shall be ordered unless it is intended to meet a situation where the court has passed an order purely on technical grounds without going into the merits of the case.
(5)(a) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made in these rules shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the managing committee or the Director.
(b) Where an employee is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during the continuance of that suspension, the managing committee may for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, direct that the employee shall continue to be under suspension until the termination of all or any such proceeding.
(c) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under these rules may, at any time be modified or revoked by the managing committee or in the case of an aided school, by the Director.
118. Disciplinary authorities in respect of employees-- The disciplinary committee in respect of every recognized private school whether aided or not, shall consist of-
(i) the chairman of the managing committee of the school;
(ii) the manager of the school;
(iii) a nominee of the director, in the case of an aided school, or a nominee of the appropriate authority, in the case of an unaided school;
(iv) the head of the school, except where the disciplinary proceeding is against him and where the disciplinary proceeding is against the Head of the School, the Head of any other school, nominated by the Director,
(v) a teacher who is a member of the managing committee of the school, nominated by the Chairman of such managing committee."
3. The Delhi Public School (hereinafter called and referred to for the sake of brevity as "the school") is aggrieved by the letter dated 10th June 1998 issued by the first respondent whereby and whereunder the order of suspension of the third to fifth respondents herein, who are teachers of the first respondent-school, was disapproved.
4. The said school is not an aided private school but is duly recognized under the Delhi School Education Act and the Rules framed there under.
5. The School is said to be a pioneer School of the Delhi Public School Society and was the first school to be established by it and now the Delhi Public School Society is running various schools all over India.
6. A decision to suspend the respondent No. 3 was taken on 5th May 1998. A communication to the same effect was made by the Managing Committee of the School to the respondent No. 1 on 13th May 1998 in the following terms:
" Suspension of Smt. Indrani Ghosh, TGT Maths.
At an Emergent meeting of the Managing Committee of D.P.S. Mathura Road held on 05.05.1998 it was unanimously resolved that Smt. Indrani Ghosh, TGT at this school be placed under suspension with immediate effect. Accordingly order dated 13.5.1998 suspending Mrs. Indrani Ghosh has been issued vide Section 8(4) of Delhi School Education Act 1973. A copy each of the minutes of the Managing Committee meeting held on 05.05.1998 and the suspension order are enclosed herewith.
It is requested that the suspension of Smt. Indrani Ghosh be approved and Director's nominee on the Disciplinary Committee of the school be nominated so that disciplinary proceedings against Smt. Indrani Ghosh are initiated without any delay. A copy of the charge sheet is also enclosed.
It may be recalled that our request made to your office on 20th Oct. 97 forwarding a copy of the Resolution of the Managing Committee recommending suspension of Mrs. Indrani Ghosh is still awaiting approval. You are requested to expedite your approval so that the disciplinary proceedings are not delayed any more."
7. Certain queries were raised by the Director of Education to the authorities of the school and by letter dated 18th May 1998, the school replied thereto stating:
"1. As your are aware, the Managing Committee of DPS Mathura Road at an Emergent meeting on 5th May, 1998 had unanimously approved the suspension of the following teachers under Section 8(4) of DSEA 1973:-
(a) Shri. B. Das, PGT
(b) Smt. Indrani Ghosh, TGT
(c) Shri. Ajit Singh, PET
2. It may be recalled that we are still awaiting your approval of our request dated 20.10.97 for the suspension of Smt. Indrani Ghosh. I must emphasise that the above-named teachers, by their continued intransigence, disruptive activities, in subordination, baseless protests and venomous pronouncements have so seriously undermined the academic peace of the School that there is a real risk of the institution being engulfed in bedlam and disorder, if they are allowed to continue to have a free run of the place with impunity, and hold the school to ranson. The collective wisdom of the Managing Committee suspending these three teachers, ought to be enough to convince you beyond any doubt about the very urgent need for Director Education to uphold this decision.
The Charge-sheets in respect of the above-named teachers, sent to you by the Principal of the School on 13th May, 98 and 15th May, 98 clearly portray the gravity of the situation. I therefore request that the suspension of the above named teachers be approved immediately, so that the process of disciplinary action against them be set in motion without any delay.
3. I would like to thank you for nominating Shri. Jagat Narayan, Principal, Govt. Sr. Secondary School Begumpur as your Nominee on the disciplinary committee in respect of Smt. Indrani Ghosh. You are requested to allow your Nominee to consider he cases of Shri. B. Das and Shri. Ajit Singh also so that the disciplinary action against all the three is taken speedily."
8. The impugned order dated 10th June 1998 was, therefore, issued stating:
"Sub: Reg. suspension of the three teachers of the school.
Sir, I am directed to say that the proposed suspension cases of the following teachers of your school were placed before the Director of Education, Delhi.
1. Mrs. Indrani Ghosh, TGT
2. Sh. Ajit Singh, PET
3. SH. B. Das, PGT The DE has desired that the Disciplinary Enquiry may be conducted for which nominee of the Director has already been given in the case of Mrs. Ghosh and in the case of other two teachers is being provided separately.
The DE has also ordered that the suspension is not approved."
9. In the writ petition, the petitioners, as noticed hereinbefore, have questioned the said order and prayed for the following reliefs:
"(a) certiorari quashing the letter dated 10th June, 1998 (Annexure P8) bearing No. 965 of respondent No. 1 to the extent of non approval of suspension of respondent Nos. 3 to 5.
(b) mandamus directing the respondent No. 1 and 2 to grant approval of suspension of respondent Nos. 3 to 5 under Rule 8(4) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973.
(c) any other order or further orders as this Hon'ble Court may just deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, be passed."
10. The contention of the petitioner is that having regard to the scheme of the Act and the Rules, grant of approval of an order of suspension is almost automatic and as such, in the event the Director of Education thinks otherwise, he must assign sufficient an cogent reasons therefor. The further contention of the petitioners is that only because approval is not received within a period of 15 days, it would not automatically lead to reinstatement of the concerned employee and for the said purpose the provisions of the Act or the Rules are required to be read down, particularly in view of the fact that the consequence of non-communication of the order of the statutory authority within the specified period had been laid down.
11. The contention of the respondents, on the other hand is that in the event an order of approval of suspension of a teacher/employee is not received by the school within a period of 15 days, reinstatement of the concerned employee would be automatic.
12. Mr. V.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners would contend that the provisions of the Act and the Rules should be read down. Strong reliance in this connection has been placed by the learned counsel on Prem Sehgal and Anr. v. The Director of Education, Delhi Administration, Delhi and Ors. (supra), Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra , and Anand Dev Tyagi v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors. (supra).
13. The learned counsel would contend that in the afore-mentioned cases, it had clearly been held that when a prima facie case is made out, the Director of Education is statutorily obliged to grant approval of the order of suspension.
14. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, in Anand Dev Tyagi v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors. (supra), the Division Bench did not notice the earlier binding precedent in Prem Sehgal (supra) and thus, the same cannot be said to have laid down a good law.
15. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would submit that the question is not covered by a decision of the apex court in Mrs. Y. Thelclamma v. Union of India and Ors. , . In that case, the court referred to its earlier decision in Frank Anthony Public Employees Association v. Union of India and Ors. , and All Saints High School v. Government of Andhra Pradesh , and held:
"Section 8(4) would be inapplicable to minority institutions if it had conferred blanket power on the Director to grant or withhold prior approval in every case where a management proposed to suspend an employee but we see that it is not so. The management has the right to order immediate suspension of an employee in case of gross misconduct but in order to prevent an abuse of power by the management a safeguard is provided to the employee that approval should be obtained within 15 days. The director is also bound to accord his approval if there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such suspension. The provision appears to be eminently reasonable and sound and the answer to the question in regard to this provision is directly covered by the decision in All Sants High School, where Chandrachud, CJ, and Kailasam, J. upheld Section 3(3)(a) of the Act impugned therein."
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act mandates that subject to any rule that may be made, no employee of a recognised private school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor his services shall otherwise be terminated except with the prior approval of the Director. Sub-section (3) of Section 8 provides for a right of appeal upon such employee to the Tribunal. Sub-section (4), as has been referred to and quoted above, relates to the power of suspension. Sub-section (5) of Section 8 provides that where intention to suspend or immediate suspension of an employee is communicated to Director, he may, if he satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such suspension, accord his approval thereto.
18. A statutory requirement to obtain approval of the Director of Education, in the event an employee is placed under suspension, was upheld in Frank Anthony's case (supra).
19. The decision of the apex court in Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina and Ors. , , however, was not noticed in Frank Anthony's case (supra). The apex court in Mrs. Y. Thelclamma (supra) held:
"11. It would be seen that the decision of the Court in Frank Anthony Public School's case with regard to the applicability of Sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act to the unaided minority educational institutions is based on the view taken by the majority in All Saints High School's case which, on its turn, was based on the several decisions right from IN RE: The Kerala Education Bill, 1957 down to St. Xavier including that in Lilly Kurian. It is therefore difficult to sustain the argument of learned counsel for the respondents that the decision in Frank Anthony Public School's case holding that Sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act was applicable to such institutions was in conflict with the decision of the Constitution Bench in Lilly Kurian's case and therefore required reconsideration. The contention of learned counsel for the respondents that Sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act requiring the prior approval of the Director for the suspension of a teacher was a flagrant encroachment upon the right of the minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution to administer educational institutions established by them is answered in all the earlier decisions of this Court right from IN RE THE KERALA EDUCATION BILL, 1957 down to that in ALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL'S case which have been referred to by the Court in FRANK ANTHONY PUBLIC SCHOOL'S case.
These decisions unequivocally lay down that while the right of the minorities, religious or linguistic, to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice cannot be interfered with, restrictions by way of regulations for the purpose of ensuring educational standards and maintaining excellence thereof can validly be prescribed."
20. The apex court further observed:
"13. One should have thought that in a case like the present where the management charged the petitioner with diversion of funds and communicated the impugned order of suspension pending departmental inquiry to the Director, there would be some response from him. The management did not formally apply for his prior approval in terms of Sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act in view of the declaration by the High Court that it being a linguistic minority educational institution, it was protected under Article 30(1) and no prior approval of the Director was required. Nevertheless, it took the precaution of communicating the impugned order of suspension to the Director. Presumably, the Director refrained from passing any order according or refusing approval having regard to the judgment of the High Court. In view of the recent decision in Frank Anthony Public School's case, it must be held that the institution was governed by Sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act and therefore there was a duty cast on the Director to come to a decision whether such immediate suspension was necessary by reason of the gross misconduct of the petitioner as required by Sub-section (5) of Section 8. We refrain from expressing any opinion as to the seriousness or otherwise of the charges as that isa matter to be enquired into by a departmental proceeding. The fact however remains that there was no response from the Director within the period of 15 days as envisaged by the second proviso to Section 8(4). As a result of this, the impugned order of suspension has lapsed and it is so declared . Although the impugned order of suspension has lapsed, the management may yet move the Director for his prior approval under Sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, and the Director shall deal with such application, if made, in accordance with the principles laid down in Frank Anthony Public School's case."
(Emphasis supplied)
21. In view of the afore-mentioned pronouncement of the apex court, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that on the expiry of 15 days from the date of communication of the order of suspension, an order of suspension lapses, in the event no order of the Director of Education approving the same is received within the said period.
22. A Division Bench of this court in Anand Dev Tyagi (supra), upon taking into consideration various decisions of the apex court, held:
"13. In the instant case respondent No. 4 placed the petitioner under suspension forthwith on 10.7.1994 and it is contended that the order was communicated to the Director and his approval was sought. The record reveals that respondent No. 4 merely forwarded a copy of memorandum Annexure PX to the Director saying this is being intimated to Director of Education as well". Copy was also sent to District Education Officer. The communication, which thereafter was sent by respondent No. 4 to the Director of Education is Annexure R-4/24 dated 26.7.1994 with a copy of Education Officer. The petitioner was placed under suspension on 10.7.1994. In case the petitioner had been put under suspension on 10.7.1994 by the Managing Committee, in exercise of its power to put an employee under suspension with immediate effect on its satisfaction that immediate suspension was necessary by reason of gross misconduct, the same could remain in force at the most for a period of 15 days from the date of suspension. Suspension thereafter could remain operative only on the Director's according his approval before the expiry of the period of 15 days. No doubt the suspension was communicated by respondent No. 4 to the Director but no approval was granted by the Director before the expiry of period of 15 days. Director was required to take a decision within the ambit of Sub-section (5) of Section 8 on his satisfaction that there were adequate and reasonable grounds for suspension. There is nothing in the Act or in the Rules that in the event of Director not according his approval, the same will be deemed to have been accorded. In other words, there is no deeming provision. Communication of the fact of suspension to the Director of Education and according of his approval to this act of placing an employee under suspension before the expiry of period of fifteen days is a sina qua non for the period of suspension before the expiry of period of fifteen days. On approval not being granted the suspension will cease to be operative. Power lies with the Director either to approve or not to approve. It is only on approval being granted that period of suspension will extend beyond fifteen days. Not taking decision by the Director within fifteen days will also amount to approval not being accorded. No doubt that management in an emergent situation, as is referred to in the second proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section has a right to forthwith place the employee under suspension, but this act of placing suspension requires approval. Approval has to be accorded by the Director on his satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for such suspension. It requires positive decision to be taken. Approval may be either accorded or withheld or may not be accorded at all. There is no question deemed approval as is contended on behalf of respondent No. 4. Reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in HPMC v. Shri Suman Behari Sharma, 1996 (5) SC 40 ."
23. We, with respect, agree with the said findings. The petitioners herein had not questioned the vires of the afore-mentioned provisions nor having regard to the Frank Anthony's case (supra), the same could be done.
24. Mr. Singh, the learned senior counsel appearing for the School wanted us to read down the afore-said provision. However, such an exercise is permissible only when the constitutionality of the provision is questioned. In Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra (supra), whereon strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Singh, the apex court took recourse to the doctrine of 'reading down' as therein the constitutionality of rules for admission was in question.
25. In Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , , it was held:
"26. Further we wish to clarify that it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the law-giver. The courts have adhered to the principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being in apposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute."
26. In Prem Sehgal's case (supra), the Division Bench did not lay down any law to the contrary nor such a question arose before the court.
27. In Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. , , it has been held "9. ...It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitute a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyze a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi . According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates--(i) findings of material fats, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision in only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis . It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi ."
28. The decision in Prem Sehgal's case (supra), therefore, cannot be said to be an authority on the proposition as to whether on the expiry of 15 days from the date of order of suspension, in the event, no approval is granted, the order of suspension lapsed or not. Apart from the fact that the Director of School Education in terms of the provisions of the Act is bound to accord his approval only when he comes to the requisite conclusion as is required. We may notice that in terms of the provisions of the Act, the Director is bound to accord his approval only if there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such suspension. In terms of Sub-section (4) of the Section 8, an order of suspension has to be passed only upon obtaining prior approval of the Director. Proviso appended to Sub-section (4) of Section 8 is an exception to the main provision. An order of suspension can be passed only when the Managing Committee is satisfied that such immediate suspension is necessary by reason of a gross misconduct. The second proviso appended thereto, in no uncertain terms, fixes the period during which the said order of suspension shall remain in force. Such a provision has been made for the benefit of the teachers against whom an interim order of suspension has been passed whereas departmental proceedings are pending or are contemplated; and having regard to the clear provisions of the statute, he cannot continue to remain under suspension although no approval therefore is granted within the period of 15 days.
29. An interim order of suspension, it will bear a repetition to state, must be passed by the managing committee of the institution in an exceptional situation.
30. In fairness to Mr. V.P. Singh, we may state that the main ground on which he wanted reading down of the provisions of Section 8 of the Act was his apprehension to the effect that even in a case where the alleged misconduct committed by an employee of the school is serious warranting immediate suspension and further even when the circumstances of the case justify the approval by the Director of Education, the Director of Education and/or his subordinate functionaries may defeat the objective by intentionally delaying the matter and thereby ensuring that no decision is taken within 15 days from the date of communication of the order of suspension. We have already stated that the petitioner has not challenged the vires of Section 8 of the Act. That apart, in such a situation the Managing Committee of the second would not be remediless. Illegal and/or arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction by the Director of Education in a given case can always be subject matter of judicial review and in such a case it would always be open to the Managing Committee of the school to challenge the inaction and/or wrong decision of the Director of Education. We may observe here that it is the statutory duty cast upon the Director to take appropriate decision within 15 days as to whether approval is to be given or not. He cannot, by delaying the matter beyond 15 days, make it a fait accompli. No doubt, if no decision is taken within 15 days from the date of communication of the order of suspension, the necessary consequence thereof is that the suspension order lapses. However, that does not mean that if no decision is taken at all or the matter is unnecessarily delayed,it would not be permissible for the Managing Committee of the school to insist the Director of Education to take a decision even after 15 days of the communication of the order of suspension. If such a decision is taken, though belatedly, the fresh order of suspension can always be passed. Further, if the Director of Education takes a decision and refuses to accord his approval to the order of suspension and if the Managing Committee in such a case feels aggrieved by the decision, it is always open for the Managing Committee to challenge the decision of the Director of Education by appropriate proceedings on well-established grounds of judicial review that would be available to the Managing Committee in a given case.
31. What we are called upon to decide in this case is the effect on the suspension order passed by the Managing Committee under first proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act and the effect of non-grant of approval in such a case within a period of 15 days from the date of suspension as contemplated in the second proviso thereof. To that, our answer is that such an order of suspension lapses after a period of 15 days as is clearly contemplated by the second proviso.
32. It is for the Director of School Education, therefore, to consider as to whether such immediacy was required in the facts and circumstances of the case.
33. The matter may also be considered from another angle.
34. An employer has an inherent right of suspension in the sense that it may not take any work from its employees. But in such a situation, he has to pay the entire to the employee. Thus, where in terms of an order of suspension passed under a statute, the employee would be entitled only to the subsistence allowance, as provided for in the rules, he would, in the event the inherent power of suspension of the employer is taken recourse to, be entitled to full salary.
35. In that view of the matter too, despite non-grant of approval by the Director of School Education, the Managing Committee, in the event it is found that it is expedient not to take work from the employee concerned, may take recourse thereto but as noticed hereinbefore, in such a situation, it will have to pay the entire salary and not the subsistence allowance alone.
36. We, therefore, are of the opinion that upon expiry of 15 days from the date of order of suspension, the order of suspension lapsed and the employee shall be entitled to all consequential benefits.
37. These writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. There shall, however, be no orders as to costs.