Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Shri Ajit Kumar vs Govt. Of Nctd on 11 January, 2010
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH OA 1498/2008 New Delhi this the 11th day of January, 2010 Honble Mr. Justice M. Ramachandran, Vice Chairman (J) Honble Dr. Veena Chhotray, Member (A) Shri Ajit Kumar, Roll No. 800396, S/o Shri Tej Kumar, C/o Shri Rajender, H. No. A-13, Police Colony Mehram Nagar, Near Domestic Airport, New Delhi. Applicant. (By Advocate Shri Sachin Chauhan) Versus 1. Govt. of NCTD, Through the Commissioner of Police, Police Headquarters, I.P. Estate, MSO Building, New Delhi. 2. Dy. Commissioner of Police, 4th Bn, DAP, Through the Commissioner of Police, Police Headquarters, IP Estate, MSO Building, New Delhi. Respondents. (By Advocate Shri R.N. Singh) O R D E R
M. Ramachandran, Vice Chairman (J) FIR No. 78/2002 had been registered by the Vasant Vihar Police Station, New Delhi against the applicant and two others (one of them being his father), who was an officer in the CBI. The learned Addl.Sessions Judge in SC 81/2003 had convicted the accused. They were to undergo rigorous imprisonment as well as simple imprisonment and were to pay fine; the sentences to run concurrently. In the appeal filed (Crl. A. No.105/2004), the High Court had expressed an opinion that the Sessions Judge was to examine whether the matter could be examined with reference to Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. This was taking notice of the plea that a conviction as such would have landed the accused to enormous prejudice. On such remand, the Sessions Judge had directed that the accused were to be released on probation under the Probation of Offenders Act after furnishing a bond and for keeping good behaviour, character and conduct for a period of two years. This was on 21.05.2004.
2. In the meanwhile, Delhi Police had notified for selection of Constables during 2005 and the applicant had been selected, subject to medical fitness and clearance of antecedents.
3. The applicant had given the details of the criminal proceedings, in the application filed by him. Before the actual appointment, the Deputy Commissioner of Police felt that the background of the applicant viz that he had been convicted by the Court and later on had been released on probation could not have been lightly brushed aside. He was asked to show cause as to why his candidature for the post should not be cancelled. A detailed reply has been given by the applicant by way of Annexure A-3 but by the impugned order (Annexure A-2), the applicant had been advised by the Deputy Commissioner of Police that he had been found as not suitable for appointment as Constable (Male). The candidature was, therefore, cancelled. This order is under challenge.
4. Mr. Chauhan had addressed us about the protection given by Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. He submits that the decision arrived at patently was taking notice of only superficial facts. The Sessions Judge had duly taken notice of the circumstances in which the applicant had been implicated, his antecedents, and had thought it fit to release him on presentation of a bond. During the period of the bond and thereafter, there was no untoward incident, landing him in jail. If that be the case, the full protection spoken to by Section 12 should have been made available to him. True, a formal show cause notice is given, but the matter as highlighted in the explanation had been sidelined. The impugned order cannot be considered as a speaking order as the civil rights of the applicant have been overthrown.
5. On behalf of the respondents, however, Mr. R.N. Singh submits that before the actual appointment, the full background of a person requires to be subjected to scrutiny. It was a case of conviction for serious offences and although at the instance of the High Court on a second time the Sessions Judge examined the possibility of giving the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, nevertheless the conviction was a matter of record. He submits that the object of the Probation of Offenders Act is to give opportunities to persons who get themselves reformed. It is also to avoid a social stigma that one had to undergo imprisonment. According to him, the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the rights of Department for weeding out ineligibles at their discretion as could be found in Sushil Kumar (Civil Appeal No. 13231 of 1996). The observation of the Supreme Court was that verification of character and antecedents is one of the important criteria so as to see whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post. Although the Tribunal in the above case had held that acquittal of the person was sufficient to clear him, the view taken as above had been overruled. It had been ruled that the appointing authority had the right to consider the desirability of the candidature even in cases one had been discharged or acquitted. The Court had observed that .Though, he was discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same has nothing to do with the question. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of a candidate to be appointed to a service It was submitted that if this was the benchmark, the present case requires no interference.
6. Although Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, refers to a situation where a presumption is presented, we do not think it is relevant for us to hold that the past period of life of a person thereby automatically is to be wished away. So long as there is a bonafide consideration of factors, a decision by the administrative authority about the desirability of a person to be introduced into service normally vests in themselves. In Government service, mostly the weeding exercises can be done only till the time of appointment and once a person becomes member of a service even if undesirable, procedural formalities may pose problems to get rid of the person. Therefore, adoption of strict standards, after a holistic view of the situation may not be objectionable.
7. The impugned orders, therefore, according to us, cannot be considered as arbitrary in nature as there has been application of mind as is normally expected of. Although the subject is not discussed in detail, the purport is clear. In exercise of our discretionary powers, this is not a case where we should interfere. O.A. is dismissed. No costs.
(Dr. Veena Chhotray) (M. Ramachandran) Member (A) Vice Chairman (J) `SRD