Punjab-Haryana High Court
Ishwar Chand Walia vs State Of Haryana on 26 July, 2000
Author: V.S. Aggarwal
Bench: V.S. Aggarwal
JUDGMENT V.S. Aggarwal, J.
1. Ishwar Chand Walia, hereinafter described as "the petitioner", seeks quashing of (he order dated 11.3.1997 purported to have been passed by the Director, Secondary Education, Haryana, respondent No. 2 and for a direction that he should be granted Ihe pay which has been paid to the juniors in accordance with Note 6 of Rule 7 of the Haryana Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1987.
2. The relevant facts are that the petitioner joined as S.S. Master on 31.8.1970. Laxmi Chand, respondent No. 4, joined his service on 16.9.1972. The basic pay of the petitioner before 1.4.1979 was Rs. 292/- and that of Laxmi Chand was Rs. 276/-, On revision of the pay-scales on 1.4,1979, the petitioner was granted basic pay of Rs. 730/- while Laxmi Chand was granted Rs. 700/-. Thereafter, the basic pay of the petitioner was Rs. 2050/- and that of Laxmi Chand was also Rs. 2050/-
3. The petitioner was promoted as Lecturer on 2.2.1993. His basic pay was fixed at Rs. 2675/- on 1.4.1995. Laxmi Chand was promoted on 20.5.1995 and his basic pay was fixed at Rs. 2750/-. Presently, it is claimed that the basic pay of the petitioner was Rs. 8500/-on 1.4.1996 while that of Laxmi Chand was Rs. 8700/- on 1.4.1997. It is asserted that though the petitioner is much senior to Laxmi Chand, respondent No. 4, and had been promoted earlier, he should not draw salary less than Laxmi Chand. His representation has since been rejected. This promoted (prompted ?) the petitioner to file the present writ petition.
4. In the written statement that was filed, the petition as such has been contested. It is admitted that the petitioner and Laxmi Chand were getting the same basic salary on 1.4.1979 and 1.4.1987 respeclively. It is not in controversy that the petitioner is senior to Laxmi Chand. The petitioner was promoted on 2,2.1993 and Laxmi Chand was promoted on 20.5.1995. Respondent No. 1 Laxmi Chand was granted the higher standard pay scale from 1.1.1994. Thus, respondent No. 4 was receiving more pay than the petitioner. The petitioner could not be granted the benefit of higher standard pay scale because he had been promoted on 2.2.1993.
5. In the face of the aforesaid, the short question that comes up for consideration is as to whether the petitioner is entitled to the same salary as Laxmi Chand, respondent No. 4, who was not only junior to the petitioner but even has been promoted much later.
6. It is well known that the principle of equal pay for equal work referred to in the Directive Principles of State Policy as contained in Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India when read with Article 14 of the Constitution of India gives a person a right to enforce the same. Though equal pay for equal work is not a fundamental right under the Constitution, but it is a constitutional goal. It would colour the interpretation of Article 14 of the Constitution so as to be elevated to the rank of fundamental right. Ignoring the same would result in irrational classification.
7. In the case of Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognised) and others v. Union of India and others, (1988)3 Supreme Court Cases 91, the Supreme Court elucidated the principle of equal pay for equal work. It was held as under :-
"Equal pay for equal work is a fundamental right. But equal pay must depend upon the nature of the work done, it cannot be judged by the mere value of work, there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. So long as such value judgment is made bona fide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. It is important to emphasise that equal pay for equal work is a concomitant of Article 14 of the Constitution. But if follows naturally that equal pay for unequal work will be a negation of that right."
8. Few years later in the case of Food Corporation of India Workers' Union v. Food Corporation of India and others, AIR 1990 S.C. 2178, the same principle was reiterated that irrational differentiation made by the State cannot be justified.
9. Identical was the view point in the case of Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers Union v. Union of India and others, (1991)1 Supreme Court Cases 619:1991(1) SCT95 (SC), wherein the Supreme Court held as under :-
"Equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared by the Constitution as fundamental right but in view of the Directive Principles of State Policy as contained in Articled 39(d) of the Constitution "Equal pay for equal work" has assumed the statues of fundamental right in service jurisprudence having regard to the constitutional mandate of equality in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Equal pay for equal work and providing security for service by regularising casual employment within a reasonable period has been accepted by this Court as a constitutional goal to our socialistic pattern. It has ceased to be a Judge-made law as it is the part of the constitutional philosophy which ensures a welfare socialistic pattern of a State providing equal opportunity to all and equal pay for equal work for similarly placed employees of the State. This Court has zealously enforced the fundamental right of equal work for equal work in effectuating the constitutional goal of equality and social justice in a number of decisions...."
10. More recently in the case of Kamlakar and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1999 Supreme Court 2300 : 1999(3) SCT 731 (SC), the Supreme Court held that no distinction can be made between identical persons in the pay scale who are in the same cadre. It has concluded that births marks have no relevance in this connection.
11. In the present case in hand, admittedly, the petitioner not only is in the same cadre but is also senior to respondent No. 4 Laxmi Chand. The petitioner had been promoted before respondent No. 4. If there was any anomaly in refixation of the salary of the petitioner vis-a-vis respondent No. 4, it should have been decided at the earliest rather than perm it the petitioner to rush to the Court. When the petitioner is drawing less salary than his juniors then there must have been some cogent reasons. No such cogent reasons are forthcoming. When the petitioner is getting less salary than his juniors, necessarily he would be entitled to step up of the salary. The same principle was echoed in the decision of (he Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. P. Jagdish, 1997(2) Service Cases Today 664 (SC), wherein it was held that when a government servant is promoted or appointed, the principle of stepping up should be done. The pay of the senior officer is required to be stepped up to a figure equivalent to the pay as fixed for the junior.
12. The position in the present case is identical. There has to be equality in treatment and the principle of equality before law strikes at arbitrariness. Once that has been noticed and pointed, indeed, there is no justification for not allowing the petitioner the same pay scales as granted to his junior.
13. Accordingly, the present writ petition is allowed and it is directed that respondents No. 1 to 3 will fix the pay of the petitioner as that of respondent No. 4. However, with respect to the arrears, it shall be confined to three years and two months before the filing of the present writ petition.
14. Petition allowed.