Delhi District Court
The Decision Of Hon'Ble Supreme Court In ... vs S B on 17 August, 2011
1/23 C C No. 191/97
IN THE COURT OF MS. CHARU GUPTA, MM (NI ACT)01
SOUTHEAST DISTT. SAKET COURTS, NEW DELHI
Mr Basu Dev,
M/s Link Enterprises,
Import Export & Industrial Consultant,
st
Durha (1 Floor) 28A,
Jia Sarai, New Delhi . . ........ Complainant
Vs
M/s Rexnord Electronics & Control Ltd,
Regd. Office 92D, Govt. Industrial Estate,
Charkop, Kandivili (W),
Bombay400067 . . .......... Accused
C C No. : 1006/10 (Original C C No.191/97)
OFFENCE COMPLAINED OF : U/s 138 Negotiable Instruments
Act
PLEA OF ACCUSED : Not Guilty.
DATE OF INSTITUTION : 29.05.1997
DATE OF RESERVING ORDER : 26.05.2011
FINAL ORDER :Convicted
DATE OF ORDER :17.08.2011
Judgment
Brief reasons for judgment :
Brief facts of the case:
1.The present is a complaint filed under section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 ( hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). It has 2/23 C C No. 191/97 been averred in the complaint that the complainant is in the business of rendering services as Import Export and Industrial Consultant, having its office at 28A, Jia Sarai, New Delhi. It has been averred that the accused no.1 is a company, registered under the Companies Act, 1956 which deals in manufacturing of Cooling Fans and accused no.2 is its Director. It has further been averred that towards the balance payment of the professional services rendered to the accused by the complainant in procuring two advance licenses for the import of components and materials from Director General Foreign Trade, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as DGFT, Delhi), the accused issued a post dated cheque bearing no. 397147 dated 28.02.1997 in sum of Rs. 86,000/ drawn on Saraswat Coop. Bank Ltd., Linking Road, Khar, Bombay in favour of the complainant.
2. It has been alleged that the cheque was deposited in the complainant's bank, State Bank of Patiala, Kalkaji, New Delhi on 13.03.1997 which got dishonoured and was returned unpaid with remarks "Exceeds Arrangement" vide debit advice dated 15.04.1997. The complainant further avers that legal notice dated 30.04.1997 was sent to the accused to make payment within the stipulated period despite which the accused failed to pay the cheque amount. It has been averred that the complaint has been filed within limitation.
3/23 C C No. 191/97
3. The accused was summoned vide order dated 17.11.2001 for the offence under section 138 of the Act. Thereafter, the accused appeared and was admitted to bail. Notice under section 251 Cr.P.C. was framed and served upon the accused for committing an offence under section 138 of the Act vide order dated 04.07.2005. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
4. The complainant in support of his case, led evidence by way of affidavit. The bill raised for the balance dues in respect of professional services rendered by the complainant is Ex CW1/A. Letters requesting the accused to make payment are Ex. CW1/B, C & D. Impugned Cheque is Ex. CW1/E. Letter dated 10.03.1997 intimating the accused about presentation of the cheque and to make funds available is Ex CW/F. Debit advice is Ex CW1/G, H, I & J. Copy of the legal notice is Ex CW1/K. Postal receipts are Ex. CW1/L & M. AD cards received back are Ex CW1/O, P & Q. Complaint is Ex CW1/R. CW1 was duly cross examined by counsel for the accused. During his cross examination and in response to suggestion put by the defence counsel, CW1 also produced mark CW1/D1. Complainant also examined formal witness, Sh R K Aggarwal, Window Operator, State Bank of Patiala, Kalkaji as CW2 who tendered statement of account of the complainant as Ex CW2/A. CW2 was duly cross examined by the defence counsel.
5. Thereafter, statement of the accused was recorded under section 4/23 C C No. 191/97 313 Cr.P.C. wherein all the incriminating evidence available on record along with all the exhibited documents were put to the accused. The stand of the accused, to all the incriminating evidence, was of general denial. The accused stated that the impugned cheque was not issued by him in discharge of any liability but only a blank cheque was handed over to the complainant as a guarantee document or bank limit through Chartered Accountant (hereinafter referred to as CA) of the complainant. He further stated that the cheque was not filled up by him. He denied having ever received any legal notice regarding dishonour of cheque in question. He denied the receipt of legal notice Ex CW1/K. He pleaded that he is innocent and alleged that the cheque in question Ex CW1/E is a fabricated document prepared in order to harass him.
6. The accused did not choose to lead any defence evidence and matter was fixed for final arguments. It has been argued on behalf of complainant that the complainant has rendered professional services by way of obtaining import licences for the accused. It has been argued that the impugned cheque has been issued by the accused against the balance payment of the professional charges. It is further argued that the accused has admitted his legal liability in Mark CW1/D1 which was produced during the cross examination of CW1. It is further argued that the cheque on presentation was dishonoured for insufficient funds and despite service of legal notice 5/23 C C No. 191/97 dated 30.04.1997, no payment was made by the accused. It is argued that the accused is guilty of committing an offence under section 138 of the Act and deserves to be convicted.
7. Per contra, it is the argument of the accused that the cheque was never issued against any liability, in fact the same was given to the CA of the complainant, as security / guarantee document for obtaining bank limit on working capital. It is argued in defence of accused that the complainant in his own testimony has admittedly sent demands by way of FAX to the accused prior to sending legal notice Ex CW1/K. As such the claim of the complainant is barred by limitation. Defence counsel has pleaded lack of jurisdiction of this court as a ground for acquittal of accused.
Appreciation of Evidence:
8. As regards, the plea of the defence regarding the lack of jurisdiction of the court, the same cannot be a ground for acquittal. The law, as it stood at the time of summoning the accused in 1997 i.e. prior to the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in K Bhaskaran Vs S B Balan AIR 1999 SC 3762 as also in Harman Electronics Pvt Ltd Vs National Panasonic India Pvt Ltd. 2009 (Vol.1) SCC 720, did not rule out the jurisdiction of the courts where the complainant had its registered office and from where legal notice was sent. Thus, the court at the time of taking cognizance, very well had the jurisdiction irrespective of the fact that the accused was a permanent resident of 6/23 C C No. 191/97 Bangalore or that the accused's bank was situated at Bangalore. While the jurisdictional issue, needs to be set up at the preliminary or the very initial stages of the trial, record reveals that it is for the first time that the defence counsel has questioned the jurisdiction of this court. It is also a settled law under section 460 (e) Cr.P.C. that lack of jurisdiction, would not vitiate the trial.
9. Further, the fact that the jurisdiction of this court remained unchallenged so far and that the accused was represented at all the stages and hearings during the course of trial, is evidence of the fact that no prejudice has been caused to the accused. As such, the argument of the defence regarding the lack of jurisdiction does not hold any merits.
10.As regards the other arguments of the counsels, I have carefully considered the contentions of both the Ld. counsels in the light of material placed on record. In order to determine the question whether offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act is made out against the accused, it is necessary to prove all the following ingredients:
(I) There is legally enforceable liability / debt. (II) The drawer of the cheques issued the cheques to satisfy part or whole of the debt or other liability.
(III) The cheques so issued has been returned due to insufficiency of funds.7/23 C C No. 191/97
(IV) Payment not made by the accused despite service of the legal demand notice.
11. Before further adverting to the facts of the case, it is convenient for the sake of clarity to reproduce section 118 (a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, Section 118 (a) read as:
"That every ne instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration."
and section 139 reads as under:
"It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, or any debt or other liability."
12.Further section 118 (a) of the Act, inter alia directs that it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, Section 139 of Act stipulates that unless contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the discharge, whole or part of any debt of liability. The presumption raised under 8/23 C C No. 191/97 Section 118 and 139, however, is rebuttable. It is pertinent to quote the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/S Kumar Exports V/s M/S Sharma Carpets 2009 (1) Civil Court Cases 778 (Supreme Court).
"To rebut the statutory presumption an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, the court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the nonexistence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of accused." ( emphasis supplied) Ingredient No. I & II.
13.In order to rebut the presumption of his legal liability and prove his innocence, defence counsel throughly cross examined CW1. CW1 was questioned on the factum of his being the proprietor of complainant firm. CW1 proved the same by examining CW2, Sh R K 9/23 C C No. 191/97 Aggarwal, Window Operator, State Bank of Patiala, Kalkaji, who testified account no.1072 as belonging to M/s Link Enterprises, a proprietorship concern of the complainant. During cross examination, CW1 deposed that the complainant firm had rendered its services to the accused four to five times. CW1 admitted, as correct, suggestion put by the defence counsel that CW1 had performed no other work except providing licenses for three to four times prior to obtaining two licenses in question for the accused. Such a suggestion makes it amply clear that it is an undisputed fact that the complainant had rendered its services to the accused for obtaining the licenses three to four times prior to obtaining the two licenses in question.
14.During his lengthy cross examination, it further came on record as to the manner in which CW1 used to render its services for obtaining Export licenses by preparing documents and making presentations before DGFT. CW1, admittedly received a sum of Rs.1.74 lacs and Rs.2.19 lacs approximately towards its service charges and acknowledged as correct, the deduction of amount so received out of the pending claim.
15.In order to strengthen his claim, CW1 relied upon Ex CW1/B which is a communication vide FAX dated 20.10.1995 sent by the complainant to the accused, asking the accused to make the balance payment. Ex CW1/C is another FAX dated 05.06.1996 10/23 C C No. 191/97 referring to bouncing of a cheque dated 15.04.1996 for an amount of Rs.86,000/. Complainant has further relied upon Ex CW1/D which is a FAX generated on the letter head of the complainant firm by Sh Prabhakar Banthiya, CA of the complainant firm and addressed to the accused wherein Sh Prabhakar Banthiya has acknowledged receipt of letter dated 17.08.1996 from the accused and requiring the accused to disclose existing and revised limit to be sanctioned with breakup of fund based and non fund based working capital limit. Though, Ex CW1/D did not require the issuance of any cheque by the accused to the CA of the complainant, however, as per statement of accused under section 313 Cr.P.C., it is the same purpose for which the cheque was admittedly issued by the accused to the CA of the complainant. It is a noteworthy fact that vide Ex CW1/D, the CA of the complainant has again reminded and requested the accused to clear prior dues of Rs.86,000/.
16.The complainant has further relied upon Ex CW1/F which is again a FAX addressed to the accused by the complainant, referring to a post dated cheque dated 20.02.1997 (impugned cheque) issued by the accused against balance payment and intimating the accused of presenting the same with a request to ensure adequate funds in his account. Throughout the cross examination of CW1, the defence counsel has no where denied or disputed the receipt of Ex CW1/B to Ex CW1/F or even questioned the genuineness of any of these 11/23 C C No. 191/97 exhibits.
17. The chronological study of Ex CW1/B to CW1/F gives an understanding that an amount of Rs.86,000/ was outstanding / due against the accused since 20.10.1995. The accused thereafter, on repeated requests and insistence by the complainant, issued a cheque for an amount of Rs.86,000/ dated 15.04.1996 which got bounced and was intimated to the accused vide Ex CW1/C. Thereafter, the accused sent some letter dated 17.08.1996 to the complainant and vide correspondence dated 21.08.1996 was again requested by the CA of the complainant on behalf of complainant to clear pending dues of Rs.86,000/ to the complainant company. Vide the same correspondence, accused was required to disclose his existing limit and revised limit to be sanctioned with break up of fund based and non fund based working capital limit which is a pre requisite in obtaining Import - Export licenses in the customary practice of the trade. Ex CW1/F further reveals that the accused gave the impugned cheque as a post dated cheque against the pending dues of Rs.86,000/.
18.At the time of cross examination, CW1 was questioned on having any proof wherein the accused admitted his liability. On this, CW1 produced mark X, which is a photocopy of a FAX allegedly sent by the accused acknowledging an amount of Rs.86,000/ as due towards the complainant. Record reveals that Mark X was not 12/23 C C No. 191/97 objected to by the defence counsel at the time of its being produced and tendered but reflects his objection on a subsequent date of cross examination. CW1 justified his not filing of the original of Mark X on the ground that the original FAX had got eroded by passage of time. The suggestion as to the complainant being in possession of any document wherein the accused admitted his liability instead of a suggestion of the complainant having any proof of liability against the accused, raises fingers of suspicion at the accused. Such a suggestion shows that the existence of a document containing the admission of liability by the accused, was within the specific knowledge of the accused.
19.Mark X, though, a copy of a FAX, adequately fits into the chronology of facts as an obvious correspondence after Ex CW1/D. The evidentiary value of Mark X cannot be struck off merely for the reason of it being a photocopy. It is common knowledge that the original FAX is not possible to be preserved in perpetuity as any originally generated FAX has a tendency of being eroded by passage of time and it is always the copy of FAX which is preserved in such cases.
20.Complainant further supports his claim through Ex CW1/A which is a handwritten tele FAX showing the professional / service charges, charged by the complainant for submission, follow up and obtaining two advance licenses dated 04.09.1995 as Rs. 1,74,043.75/ and Rs. 13/23 C C No. 191/97 2,19,193.75/ respectively making out the total as Rs.3,93,237.50/. Ex CW1/A further provides the amount of Rs.1,27,000/ received as advance and payments of Rs.1,00,000/ and Rs 80,000/ as deductions from the total gross charges. As per the calculations of the complainant, the net due against the accused is Rs.86,237/. It is argued in defence that the cheque amount does not match with the exact figure drawn by the complainant in Ex CW1/A.
21.In the considered opinion of the court, it is reasonably possible for the accused to have drawn and the complainant to have accepted a cheque for a round of figure of Rs.86,000/. The defence counsel has disputed Ex CW1/A only on the ground that it appears to be a statement of account rather than bills for services and expenses incurred by the complainant. Even if Ex CW1/A is taken as a statement of account, it sufficiently corroborates the claim of the complainant.
22.For further appreciating the rival contentions of both the parties, it is necessary to examine the issue of existence of legally enforceable debt of liability in the light of decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rangappa Vs Sri Mohan 2010 AIAR Cri 584 (SC) wherein the court while upholding the decision and observation of the Hon'ble High Court that:
" ... once the cheque relates to the account of the accused and he accepts and admits the signatures 14/23 C C No. 191/97 on the said cheques, then initial presumption as contemplated under section 139 of the Act has to be raised by the court in favour of the complainant. The presumption referred to in section 139 of the Act is a mandatory presumption and not a general presumption, but the accused is entitled to rebut the said presumption. What is required to be established by the accused in order to rebut the presumption is different from each case under given circumstances. But the facts remains that mere plausible explanation is not expected from the accused and it must be more than a plausible explanation by way of rebuttal evidence. In other words, the defence raised by way of rebuttal evidence must be probable and capable of being accepted by the court..."
The Apex Court categorically ruled that the presumption mandated by section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
23.The accused has placed nothing on record to show that he never obtained any services of the complainant or that he had made the payment of the services so obtained from the complainant. Accused has cited no plausible or probable reason as to why he issued a blank cheque to the CA of the complainant and even if this plea of 15/23 C C No. 191/97 the accused is assumed to be true, it further fortifies the fact that the accused was obtaining services of the complainant through his CA which again corroborates the claim of the complainant.
24.A careful perusal of the testimony of the complainant shows that there was no suggestion made to the complainant that the complainant and the accused never entered into a business transaction for providing of Import - Export licenses. The presumption set against the accused does not get dislodged on raising vague and improbable defences. As such the accused failed to rebut the presumption of his legal liability in respect of the impugned cheque. As such ingredient no. I & II is stands proved against the accused.
Ingredient No. III
25.As regards ingredient no. III, the cheque must have been returned unpaid for insufficiency of funds. Return of cheque for " Exceeds arrangement" is duly established from the cheque return memos Ex. CW1/I & J. Further, section 146 of the Act raises a rebuttable presumption of dishonour of cheque, on production of bank's slip and memo having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured. These cheque return memos have not been disputed by the accused. The accused has led no evidence to rebut this presumption. As such, ingredient no. III stands proved against the accused.
16/23 C C No. 191/97Ingredient No. IV
26. Service of legal demand notice is a precondition for making out an offence under section 138 of the Act. Before adverting to the contentions of both the parties on service of legal notice on the accused, it is necessary to examine the nature of a legal notice as contemplated under section 138 of the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in V Raja Kumari vs Subbarama Naidu, AIR 2005 SC 109, has clearly explicated the nature of legal notice as a demand and distinguished it from a request or mere reminder. The court categorically observed :
"...the words in Cl (b) of the proviso to S. 138 of the Act show that the payee has the statutory obligation to "make a demand" by giving notice. The thrust in the clause is on the need to "make a demand". It is only the mode of making such demand which the Legislature has prescribed. A payee can send the notice for doing his part for giving the notice. Once it is dispatched his part is over and next depends on what the sendee does..."
27. It is the case of the complainant that he sent a legal notice dated 30.04.1997 Ex CW1/K to the accused vide registered AD and UPC. Complainant exhibited UPC receipt as Ex CW1/M and duly received AD cards as Ex CW1/O, P & Q. It is submitted that the legal notice 17/23 C C No. 191/97 was sent on the same address which is mentioned by the accused on his bail bond and therefore, deemed to have been duly served upon the accused. Per contra, accused has raised a defence that as per cross examination of CW1, it has come on record that the complainant had informed the accused by way of FAX and telephonically about the dishonour of impugned cheque and demanded the amount of cheque many times prior to sending of legal demand notice Ex CW1/K. It is the defence of the accused that since the complainant had sent legal notices by way of FAX prior to Ex CW1/K, his claim is barred by limitation.
28.For determining the rival contentions of the parties on the issue of multiple legal notices, it is necessary to read the statement of complainant given during his cross examination as it is. The same is reproduced as under:
"..... I had presented the cheque three to four times and it was dishonoured every time. After every dishonour of the said cheque Ex CW1/E, I informed the accused by way of FAX and by way of telephone and demanded the amount of cheque. I do not remember the date when I presented the cheuqe for the first time...."
At the same time, the accused in his statements under section 313 Cr.P.C. has taken a stand that he never ever received any legal notice from the complainant. More particularly, he did not ever 18/23 C C No. 191/97 receive the legal notice Ex CW1/K.
29.For ascertaining whether the FAX admittedly sent by the complainant prior to the issuance of legal notice Ex CW1/K creates a bar under the law, it must be determined whether the FAX messages so sent, satisfy the definition of "legal notice". Law does not mandate any particular form of legal notice and a legal demand of dishonoured cheque amount made by way of a written document such as FAX would fall under purview of a "legal notice".
30.Certainly, a legal notice as contemplated under 138 of the Act presupposes a "demand" as distinguished from a mere intimation of dishonour of cheque or request to the drawer of the cheque to make payment. In the considered opinion of this court, the FAX messages so sent by the complainant do not bar his claim in respect of limitation for threefold reasons.
31. Firstly, as per the cross examination of CW1, the defence counsel could not cull out the date on which such FAX was sent. Without there being any clue about the date on which such FAX was first sent, it is difficult as well as dangerous to conclude that legal notice Ex CW1/K is time barred. The bar under the law does not lie in sending of multiple legal notices but in the time period within which first of such legal notices is validly sent and delivered to the accused. It may be a possibility that of the multiple legal notices so sent, both, the first and the last, may be within the limitation period. 19/23 C C No. 191/97 It may also be possible that despite sending multiple legal notices, only the last one is received by the accused. It may further be possible that out of multiple legal notices, the last of such notices is received by the accused before the first sent legal notice. In all such situations, cause of action under section 138 of the Act would arise on the date when the legal notice is first "received" by the accused. This would give rise to a situation where the claim of the complainant would be just and permissible under the law. In the present case, in the absence of any proof about the date on which FAX messages were sent or the receipt of such FAX messages by the accused, it is difficult to conclude that the legal notice Ex CW1/K is time barred.
32.Secondly, even this being so, the defence counsel never sought to get it clarified as to which of the FAX messages have been referred in this regard by CW1 during his cross examination. If the FAX messages referred by CW1 are Ex CW1/B to CW1/F, then the same cannot be taken as legal notices stricto senso. The language used in Ex CW1/B to CW1/F reflects expressions in the nature of intimations or requests made to the accused but certainly not "demands" as understood in the legal terminology. Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that a layman would not, generally, distinguish a request from a demand while deposing in general sense of terms. Also, it is rule of evidence that the burden to prove a fact lies on the 20/23 C C No. 191/97 person who asserts it. Thus, it is the accused to prove that the FAX messages sent by the complainant bar the claim of the complainant.
33.Thirdly, the categorical denial by the accused in his statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein he denied having ever received the legal notice regarding dishonour of cheque in question as also of never having received the demand notice Ex CW1/K, suggests the fact that despite any such FAX messages been sent, the same were not received by the accused. As such though the sending of FAX messages is admitted by the complainant, their receipt has not been admitted. As such the delivery of FAX messages, as per the accused, never took effect. This is to say that even if it is assumed that the complainant did send legal demand notices by way of FAX, the accused did not receive either of them. The decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in SIL Import vs Exim Aides Silk Exporters, (1999) 4 SCC 567, as relied upon by the defence counsel, is distinguished on facts of that case wherein the complainant had admitted the fact of written notice being sent by FAX as well as the accused admitting its receipt.
34.In view of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in V Raja Kumari vs Subbarama Naidu, AIR 2005 SC 109, wherein the court observed that:
"....On the part of the payee he has to make a demand by "giving a notice" in writing. If that was the only 21/23 C C No. 191/97 requirement to complete the offence on the failure of the drawer to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of such "giving", travails of the prosecution would have been very much lessened. But the Legislature says that failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount should be within 15 days "of the receipt"
of the said notice. It is, therefore, clear that "giving notice" in the context is not the same as receipt of notice. Giving is a process of which receipt is the accomplishment. It is for the payee to perform the former process by sending the notice to the drawer at the correct address...."
It is a settled law that only such legal demand notice shall take effect which has been either duly served upon the accused or deemed under the law to have been served upon the accused. A legal notice sent to the accused as many number of times cannot be regarded as duly served or as an ingredient towards making an offence under section 138 of the Act, until and unless the same is duly received or deemed to have been received by the accused or proved to have been delivered. Also, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Raghuvir Goswami vs Nirmal Thakur, 122 ( 2005 ) DLT 350, held that " it is only when one valid notice is given under section of the Act that the limitation starts running. Any notice 22/23 C C No. 191/97 which is not in conformity with the requirement of section 138 of the Act is not a valid notice for the purpose of putting into motion the process of law under Negotiable Instrument Act. "
35.As regards the legal demand notice Ex CW1/K, the same is deemed to have been served upon the accused even if he denies receiving of the same by virtue of section 27 General Clauses Act. Presumption under section 27 of General Clauses Act provides that where no notice is sent to the correct address, the same shall be presumed to have been duly served. In M/s Darbar Exports & Others vs Bank of India, 2003 (2) SCC (NI) 132 (Delhi), the court held that a presumption of service of notice is to be drawn where the notice is sent through registered post as well as UPC on correct address. In the light of the same, legal notice is deemed to have been served upon the accused. The accused has failed to adduce any evidence to rebut the presumption of due service. As such, the legal notice stood served upon the accused but no payment was made despite the service.
Final Order
36.From the material on record, it stands established that the cheque was issued by the accused, the same was returned dishonoured for the reason "exceeds arrangement", legal notice was served upon the accused despite which no payment was made. Accused has 23/23 C C No. 191/97 failed to rebut his liability under section 138 of the Act even on preponderance of probabilities. Accordingly, the complainant has proved his case beyond reasonable doubt. As such, the accused is convicted for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act.
Announced in the open court (CHARU GUPTA) 17.08.2011. MM1(N I Act):SE Distt: 17.08.2011