Delhi District Court
Smt. Bimla Devi vs Sh. Rajesh Solomon on 5 January, 2013
In the Court of Sh. Rakesh KumarII: Additional Rent Controller
of East Delhi District at Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
Eviction Petition No.66/11
Unique I.D. No:02402C0199572012
In the matter of :
Smt. Bimla Devi
W/o late Sh. R.S. Dogra,
R/o 432G, Third Floor,
Pocket II, PhaseI,
Mayur Vihar, Delhi110091. ..... Petitioner
VERSUS
Sh. Rajesh Solomon
S/o late Sh. G.F. Solomon,
R/o 432G, Top Floor,
Pocket II, PhaseI,
Mayur Vihar, Delhi110091. .....Respondent
Date of Institution : 18.07.2012 Date on which arguments heard : 17.11.2012 Date of Decision : 05.01.2013
Application for Eviction of Tenant under Section 14D read with Section 25B of Delhi Rent Control Act.
Judgment
1. This is an application for the recovery of possession of one room alongwith attach W.C.cumbath situated at fourth/top floor in the property bearing No. 432G, Top Floor, PocketII, E66/12 Smt. Bimla Devi v. Rajesh Solomon Page 1 of 12 PhaseI, Mayur Vihar, Delhi110091 (hereinafter referred to as 'the premises') made by the landlady Smt. Bimla Devi against the tenant Rajesh Solomon on the grounds mentioned in clause D of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the DRC Act').
2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent has been inducted as a tenant by the petitioner in April 2007 at a monthly rent of Rs.3000/ per month and the petitioner is the co owner/landlady of the premises in dispute which was let out to the respondent for residential purposes and the family of the petitioner consists of petitioner and her three daughters namely Bhawna Malhotra, Vandana Dogra and Neha Dogra. It is stated that Kr. Neha Dogra is studying in LL.B from Kurukshetra and is residing in a hostel at Kuruksthtra. It is submitted that flat no.57A, Una Enclave, Mayur Vihar, PhaseI, Delhi was originally alloted to the husband of the petitioner namely R.S. Dogra and R.S. Dogra died on17.06.96 and after his death, the said flat has been mutated in the name of the petitioner and Kr. Neha Dogra and in this flat, second daughter of the petitioner namely Vandana Dogra, w/o Virender Singh has been residing alongwith her husband since her marriage i.e. May 2008. It is submitted that Smt. Krishna Devi widow of Sh. Nanak Chand aged about 77 years, the cousin sister of the petitioner who is also a widow and issueless is residing with the petitioner in flat occupied by the E66/12 Smt. Bimla Devi v. Rajesh Solomon Page 2 of 12 petitioner bearing no.432G, PocketII, Mayur Vihar, PhaseI, Delhi. It is stated that Kr. Neha Dogra comes in holiday and resides with the petitioner and she requires a separate room as and when she visits the petitioner and the other daughter namely Bhawna Malhotra and Vandana Dogra also visit the petitioner alongwith her family and the premises in dispute is required by the petitioner bonafidely for herself and her family members dependent upon her as the accommodation available with the petitioner is highly insufficient for the residence of the petitioner and her family members. It is further stated that the petitioner is a patient of heart and blood pressure and the petitioner requires assistance of one attendant as and when she suffers from the ailment and the daughters will be attending her in that eventuality. It is stated that the petitioner is in possession of one bedroom, one drawing room, kitchen,WC and bathroom at third floor at the flat and the petitioner being a religious lady requires a separate pooja room also and prayed to pass an eviction against the respondent.
3. On notice, the respondent appeared and filed the leave to defend application stating therein that the petitioner is neither the owner nor the landlord of the property and she is living illegally in the property no.432G, IIIrd Floor, Pocket 2, PhaseI, Mayur Vihar, Delhi91. It is submitted that originally the property at Mayur Vihar was allotted to one Smt. Sumitra Devi by the DDA E66/12 Smt. Bimla Devi v. Rajesh Solomon Page 3 of 12 in the year 1983 and one Smt. Krishna Devi and her late husband Sh. Nanak Chand were also living with Smt. Sumitra Devi and Smt. Sumitra Devi died on 1983 and after the death of Smt. Sumitra Devi, Smt. Krishna Devi and Nanak Chand occupied the property. It is submitted that in the year 2007, the petitioner introduced the respondent with Smt. Krishna Devi and Nanak Chand as owners and the respondent started giving rent to Nanak Chand and later on to Smt. Krishna Devi and when Smt. Krishna Devi remained at her native place at that time, the respondent gave the rent to the petitioner and in the month of May 2012, the petitioner started harassing the respondent and a civil suit for permanent injunction was filed by the respondent against the petitioner.
4. The petitioner filed counter affidavit wherein she denied the contentions raised by the respondent in the leave to defend application and reiterated the allegations made in the petition.
5. I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record carefully.
6. Before I come to the contentions of learned counsel appearing for either parties, let us discuss the essential ingredients of Section 14D of DRC Act on which the petitioner may be entitled to an order of eviction as follows: "14D Right to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue to a widow. (1) Where the E66/12 Smt. Bimla Devi v. Rajesh Solomon Page 4 of 12 landlord is a widow and the premises let out by her, or by her husband, are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.
(2) Where the landlord referred to in subsection (1) has left out more than one premises, it shall be open to her to make an application under that subsection in respect of anyone of the premises chosen by her."
On bare reading of this section make it clear that landlady who filed the petition must be a widow and that she required the premises for her own residence. So to prove her case under Section 14(D) of the DRC Act, the petitioner has only to prove that (1)that she is a landlady and widow; and (2)She needs the premises for her own residence.
7. The main contention raised by the respondent is that the petitioner is neither the owner nor the landlord of the property in question and she is living illegally in the property in question.
8. So far as relationship of landlord and tenant is concerned, E66/12 Smt. Bimla Devi v. Rajesh Solomon Page 5 of 12 the respondent has admitted in para 4 of his leave to defend application that he has paid the rent to the petitioner therefore the relationship between the parties is admitted. Now having admitted the petitioner to be the landlady, the respondent has estopped from denying the title of the petitioner to the property in question as per Section 116 of the Evidence Act and reference in this context may be made to the judgment in Amar Kaur Vs.Dhanesh Kumar 97 (2002) DLT 772 and Rital Lal Vs. Raj Kumar Singh (2220) VIII AD (SC) 43. In a very recent case of Ramesh Chand Vs. Ugani Devi 157 (2009) DLT 450, our own Hon'ble High Court has specifically held that:
"It is settled preposition of law that in order to consider the concept of ownership under Delhi Rent Control Act, the Court has to see the title and right of the landlord qua the tenant. The only thing to be seen by the Court is that the landlord had been receiving rent for his own benefit and not for and on behalf of someone else. If the landlord was receiving rent for himself and not on behalf of someone else, he is to be considered as the owner, howsoever imperfect his title over the premises may be. The imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot stand in the way of an eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of the D.R.C. Act, neither the tenant can be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has been paying rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates estoppel against such tenant. A tenant can challenge the title of landlord only after vacating the premises and not when he is occupying the premises. In fact, such a tenant who denies the title of the landlord, qua the premises, to whom he is paying rent, acts dishonestly. I, therefore, find that there was no infirmity in the order of learned ARC in this respect".E66/12 Smt. Bimla Devi v. Rajesh Solomon Page 6 of 12
9. On the other hand the respondent has not averred as to who else is the owner of the property if not the petitioner. The respondent has not disclosed the name of any person who according to him is the owner of the property. It is therefore, cannot be said that any triable issue qua the ownership of the property has been raised and in Meenakshi Vs. Ramesh Khanna & Anr. 60 (1995) DLT 524 it was held that: "Mere denial of ownership is no denial at all. It has to be something more. For this, first and foremost thing which has always been considered as a good guide is does that tenant say who else is the owner of the premises if not the petitioner? In the present case, the tenant does not say anything except denying petitioner's ownership. The tenant is completely silent on this aspect. Merely by saying that the petitioner is not the owner, the tenant is trying to ensure that the case drags on for years for trial. If leave is granted on the basis of such vague pleas, it will encourage the tenants to deny ownership of the petitioners in every case. The tenants are well aware that once leave to contest is granted, the cases go on for trial for years. Their purpose is achieved. Keeping this in mind, the Controllers should rather have positive approach in such matters so as to discourage such vague and frivolous pleas which are most of the time false to the knowledge of persons raising them."
10. Ld. counsel for the respondent argued that the petitioner is alleging herself to be the coowner of the property and she has no right to file a petition as she has not obtained any authority letter from the other coowner. It is well settled law that the coowner has every right to file the eviction petition. It is held by Hon'ble High court of Delhi in K. C. Agarwal Vs. Hardip Singh 2005 (1) E66/12 Smt. Bimla Devi v. Rajesh Solomon Page 7 of 12 RCR that "A coowner is owner of premises and deemed to be landlord for purposes of Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act. It is not for the tenant to challenge the inter se arrangement of owners as to how they should manage the property. So long as there is no dispute between the owners themselves, no advantage can be taken by the tenant."
11. Ld. counsel for the respondent argued that the petitioner is having a flat bearing no.57A, Plot No.11, Una CGHS, Mayur Vihar, Delhi91 and it is a big flat of two bedrooms and she also occupies the third floor at premises no.432G, Mayur Vihar and her children are having alternative accommodation and at present, she is living there without any trouble. It is stated that the petitioner and her daughters have sufficient space to reside either in the MIG flat at Una CGHS, Mayur Vihar, Delhi or in the property no.432 G, IIIrd Floor, Mayur Vihar, Delhi.
12. In Mahendra Trivedi v. Jai Prakash Verma 157 (2009) DLT 690, it was held by Hon'ble High Court that: "It is settled law that each member of the family requires atleast a comfortable place where he/she can sleep. There are around 09 members in the family existing and the landlord has no separate Pooja Ghar with him. It is settled law that neither the Court nor the tenant can dictate to the landlord the mode and manner in which he should live or to prescribe for him the residential standard on their own. The landlord must be left to assess his requirement in the background of his position, circumstances and status in the life and social and other responsibilities and other relevant factors. In judging his special need and convenience, certainly the landlord would have a choice."
E66/12 Smt. Bimla Devi v. Rajesh Solomon Page 8 of 1213. In Brij Mohan Vs. Sirpal Jain, 49 (1993) DLT 543 the Hon'ble High Court held that: "It is the settled law that even those children who have capacity to earn themselves could always be dependent upon their father for the purpose of their residence. The circumstances of earning does not prevent them to be included in the list of dependents of their father for the purpose of residence."
14. In Praveen Sarin v. Manbir Singh & Others, 20 (1981) DLT 61 Hon'ble High Court has held that: "Minimum requirement - separate bed rooms for self and wife, sons and daughter as also for guests e.g. Married daughter Landlord being of status, e.g. Advocate, his need for drawing and dinning room also valid."
15. In Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (1998) 8 SCC 119 the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that: "The Crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14 (1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bonafide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bonafide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bonafide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bonafides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavor as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself."
16. As per the Section 14D of the DRC Act, if the landlord is a E66/12 Smt. Bimla Devi v. Rajesh Solomon Page 9 of 12 widow and she requires that portion for her own residence, she may apply for recovering the possession. The benefit conferred on a widow under Section 14D for applying for eviction of her premises is at par with the general benefit conferred on the landlord to seek for eviction on the ground of bonafide need. Admittedly on the face of it, on which the benefit was granted by Section 14D is per se different from the class where rights have been protected by Section 14(1) (e) and reference can be made to K.L. Malhotra v. Smt. Prakash Mehra AIR 1991 SC 99.
17. The word "required" in Section 14D must mean something more than mere desire of the landlord to live in the premises in question. The word "required by her" must mean that the premises are needed by her for her residence and reference can be made to Dr. P.P. Kapur v. Union of India AIR 1990 Delhi 290.
18. Ld. Counsel for the respondent argued that petition of the petitioner under Section 14D of the DRC Act is not maintainable as the eviction petition has been filed by the petitioner after she has become widow. Section 14D makes no distinction between the landladies who becomes widow before and after letting out the premises. It merely says that where the landlady is widow and the premises was let out by her or by her husband are required by her for her own residence she may apply to the controller for immediate possession of such premises. The language of the E66/12 Smt. Bimla Devi v. Rajesh Solomon Page 10 of 12 section in that respect is very clear. The premises might have been let out by her as a widow or they might have been let out by her husband or even by herself before she had become widow, the legislature wanted to give a special privilege to the landlady who is a widow notwithstanding whether the premises were let out before or after she became widow and reference can be made to Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi (2005) 2 SCC 271 and E.M.C. Steel Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr. AIR 1991 SC 481.
19. The next contention raised by the respondent is that the petitioner is also having a flat at 57A, Plot No.11, Una CGHS, Mayur Vihar, Delhi91 and she is not in bonafide need of tenanted premises.
20. It is held by the Hon'ble Court in Navneet Lal v. Deepak Swahney 2010 (120) DRJ 346 that: "The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement and has a complete freedom in the matter and it is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what manner he should live. The Supreme Court deprecated the solicitous approach of the High Court and held that there is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property."
21. From the facts it is clear that the premises in question is required by the petitioner for her bonafide requirement. In the light of above discussion, I observed that the petitioner has successfully explained her bonafide necessities.
22. For the aforestated discussion, the application on the E66/12 Smt. Bimla Devi v. Rajesh Solomon Page 11 of 12 ground mentioned in clause D of Section 14 read with Section 25 B of DRC Act is allowed. An eviction order is passed against the respondent in respect of one room alongwith attach W.C.cum bath situated at fourth/top floor in the property bearing No. 432 G, Top Floor, Pocket II, PhaseI, Mayur Vihar, Delhi110091, more specifically shown in color red the site plan attached.
Announced in the open court (Rakesh KumarII) on 05.01.2013 Additional Rent Controller (East) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
E66/12 Smt. Bimla Devi v. Rajesh Solomon Page 12 of 12