Allahabad High Court
Ravindra Kumar Singh vs Union Of India And 2 Others on 19 September, 2019
Bench: Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel, Piyush Agrawal
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R. Court No. - 21 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 42225 of 2014 Petitioner :- Ravindra Kumar Singh Respondent :- Union Of India And 2 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- S. Shekhar,V.K. Singh Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,A.S.G.I. 2014/10282,Devendra Kumar,M.C. Tripathi Hon'ble Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel,J.
Hon'ble Piyush Agrawal,J.
This Writ Petition takes exception of an Order dated 05.06.2014 passed by the Competent Authority, the respondent No. 2 under the provisions of The National Highways Act, 1956 (for short 'the Act' ).
The brief facts which are necessary to dispose of this Writ Petition are recapitulated as under.
Petitioners are two in number they are real brothers. Their grievance is that Khasra No. 21, Gata No. 435/1.951 hectare in village Hatisa Tehsil Hathras, was their ancestral property. Their grandfather Laxman Singh was recorded tenure holder. He had four sons, Heera Singh, Megha Singh, Kalyan Singh and Babu Singh. Both the Petitioner are sons of Babu Singh. Heera Singh and kalyan singh died issueless.
The said plot was acquired under the provisions of the Act for widening of National Highway No.93 between 0.000 to KM 79.00 ( Agra-Aligarh Division).
On 6.08.2011, the Central Government made a notification under Section 3-A(1) in two local newspapers inviting objections , if any, from any person interested in the land mentioned in the Notification.
The Competent authority received a large number of objections. After disposing them a report was sent to the Central Government. On 4.07.2012, the Central Government published a Notification in the official Gazette under section 3 D of the Act declaring that land has been acquired for the road widening and it came to vest in the Central government free from all encumbrances a charges.
The competent Authority thereafter proceeded to determine the compensation in terms of sub section (4) of section 3 G of the Act. A notification was issued in two local newspapers by the competent authority. The competent Authority vide order dated 01.03.2013 has determined the compensation. The order is on the record.
Dissatisfied with the Award the Claimants moved the applications under Sub Section (5) of section 3G the Act. The arbitrator by his order dated 17.8.2013 affirmed the award of the competent authority. He held that the compensation for agricultural land shall be awarded at the rate of Rs 625 sq. m . and commercial land at the circle rate prevailing in August 2011.
It is stated that the dispute arose amongst the petitioners and their Cousin Brothers who are co sharer in respect of shares of Heera Singh and Kalyan Singh who died issueless. They filed objections for the apportionment of their share. In their objection they pointed out that several litigation is pending in revenue courts for their claim. Thus they made the prayer that compensation be not be paid to any party till the decisions of Revenue courts where the matters are pending.
Mr. Ravindra Kumar Singh and another, the petitioners herein , filed a Writ Petition No. 68135 of 2013, which was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 21.2.2014, with the consent of parties.
Pursuant to the order of this Court dated 21.2.2014, the matter was sent to the competent authority for release of the undisputed amount amongst the petitioners and other co-owners, however, by the impugned order, the competent authority has reopened the matter on the merit and has re determined the compensation changing the nature of land from commercial to agricultural by a non-speaking and skeletal order.
We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. V. K. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Prakher Tandon, and learned Standing Counsel for the State.
It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the competent authority-respondent No. 2 does not have any authority to review his own order as the Act does not confer any power of review upon the competent authority.
Elaborating his submission it was urged that once an award has become final, the competent authority has no power to reopen the entire issue on merits. It was strenuously submitted by learned Senior Advocate that the Division Bench passed the order dated 21.2.2014 with the consent of parties whereby a direction was issued to the competent authority to release the undisputed amount. The competent authority was bound to release undisputed amount as per direction issued by the Division Bench. But the competent authority has misdirected itself by reopening the entire issue on merits contrary to the direction of the Division Bench of this Court.
Learned Standing Counsel submits that the competent authority found that earlier demand of the compensation on the basis of nature of land was incorrect, hence, he was justified to reopen the entire issue. However, learned Standing Counsel has very fairly submitted that statute of the Highways Act does not confer any power upon the competent authority to review his own order.
Mr. Singh has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court rendered in Chandra Bhan Singh vs. Latafat Ullah Khan1, and Kuntesh v. Management, H.K. Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur2.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material on record.
Indisputably, the petitioner's father was one of the co- sharer of the land and his title has not been challenged in the proceedings. The only dispute was in respect of the apportionment of the four co-owners. The said issue was referred under sub section (4) of Section 3-H of the Act.
At this stage it would be advantageous to set out Section 3-H (4) of the Act .It reads thus:
"3-H(4) If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the principal civil court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated."
As can be seen in the event of any dispute arose between parties in respect of their share in the property and consequently in the amount of compensation the said provision makes it obligatory on the competent authority to refer the matter to the Civil Court for the apportionment of the shares of the co-sharers. We do not find it appropriate to advert the said issue in present proceedings. Concededly, the said dispute is still pending before the District Judge.
The scheme of the Act provides different stages for acquisition, determination and payment of the compensation to the land owner . A combined reading of the Section 3A ,3B ,3C, 3D, 3E ,3 G and 3 H shows that though the provisions of the land Acquisition Act is not applicable but the Legislature has taken care that entire acquisition proceeding may be completed as expeditiously as possible and unnecessary litigation be avoided. At the same time the interest of the land owner has also been taken care of. The scheme of the act has been designed to ensure that amount of compensation be paid to owner of the land without protracted litigation. The sub section (5) of section 3G which provides the Arbitration, clearly shows the intention of legislature for expeditious payment of the compensation to the owners. Section 3G itself cast an duty on the competent authority to safeguard the interest of all the stake holders.
It is apposite to note that the aforesaid sections have been inserted by an amendment Act 16 of 1997(w.e.f. 24.01.197).
It is material to note that the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a direction to the competent authority to release the undisputed amount. The parties concerned stated before the Division Bench that appending determination of the share under Section 3 H (4) by competent Civil Court, the competent authority be directed to release the payment of 1/4 share each to the petitioners as well as to respondent nos. 4 to 9. Thus, the Division Bench having recorded the consent of the parties, directed the competent court to release the undisputed amount.
Relevant part of the judgment of the Division Bench reads thus:
"Learned counsel for the parties are at agreement that pending determination of the share under Section 3 H (4) by competent Civil Court the competent authority be directed to release the payment of 1/4 share each to the petitioners as well as to respondent nos. 4 to 9.
In view of above the competent court is directed to make the payment of 1/4 compensation to both the petitioners jointly and 1/4 to respondent nos. 4 to 9 jointly.
The payment of rest of the compensation i.e. balance 1/2 shall be made as per order of the Civil Court under Section 3H(4). We further observed that the payment in so far as the descendants of Megha Singh respondent nos. 4 to 9 are concerned be made as per their entitlement. The rest 1/2 of the compensation shall be deposited in an interest bearing account in a nationalized Bank.
With these observations, the present petition is disposed of."
The order unmistakably shows that there was a clear direction to the competent authority to release the undisputed amount. The Court has not given any room for redetermination of the compensation amount which was determined earlier by the competent authority which was affirmed by the Arbitrator. Suffice to say that the order was passed after hearing all the parties with their consent.
After the Division Bench passed the aforesaid order dated 21.2.2014, the competent authority has reopened the entire matter and changed the basis of determination of the compensation regarding commercial use of the land by recording a finding contrary to the Award which had attained finality.
Regard being had to the fact that the competent authority in its order dated 3.12.1013 has decided petitioners claim as Claim Number 4. In his order he has determined the compensation on the basis of circle rate prevalent on 01.08.2010. Accordingly he found that market value of commercial land was Rs 4000 sq.m (Rs 4,00,00,000.0 in the words, Four Crore per Hectare) and Agricultural land at the rate of Rs 300 sq.m( Rs. 30,00,000, in the words, Thirty lacs per Hectare) The Arbitrator has not reversed the order rather it has affirmed the award and enhanced the compensation in respect of Agricultural land.
Worthy of mention here is that chart appended with the order of Arbitrator's order clearly mentions the amount of compensation awarded to the petitioners The question, therefore, that falls for consideration is whether if the competent authority has the authority to review the order which has attained the finality.
We find unbroken line of authority to the effect that power of review is not an inherent power .It needs to be conferred by the statute by express or specific provision. In absence of any such power the order simply becomes without jurisdiction. The legal position in this regard is much too well settled to require any reiteration. We may in this regard gainfully refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar3.
The Act does not empower the Collector to review an order passed by him under Section 76-A. In the absence of any power of review, the Collector could not subsequently reconsider his previous decisions and hold that there were grounds for annulling or reversing the Mahalkari's order. The subsequent order dated February 17, 1959 reopening the matter was illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction. The High Court ought to have quashed the order of the Collector dated February 17, 1959 on this ground.
The said judgement has been consistently followed by the Supreme Court, in Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania4 the Supreme Court has made the following observation:
"Review in absence of statutory provisions
12. It is settled legal proposition that unless the statute/rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In the absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (Vide Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh.)
13. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji, Major Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan4, Kuntesh Gupta (Dr.) v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records and Settlement6 and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain this Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either expressly/specifically or by necessary implication and in the absence of any provision in the Act/Rules, review of an earlier order is impermissible as review is a creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, any order of review in the absence of any statutory provision for the same is a nullity, being without jurisdiction."
Applying the said principle, we find that the competent authority has traveled beyond its jurisdiction to review its own order. He has ventured to sit over the order by his predecessor in reopening the Award. Hence, in the absence of any power of review, impugned order passed by the competent authority in the present case is without jurisdiction.
In view of the above, the order passed by the competent authority dated 05.06.2014 needs to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside.
We direct the competent authority to comply with the directions of the Division Bench passed in Writ Petition No. 68135 of 2013 wherein a direction has been issued to release the undisputed amount amongst the co-owners in terms of the chart appended to the order of Arbitrator.
With the aforesaid observations present writ petition is allowed.
Order Date :- 19.9.2019/SY