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[Cites 19, Cited by 7]

Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur

Darshan Singh vs Ghewarchand And Ors. on 17 December, 1992

Equivalent citations: 1993ACJ534, AIR1993RAJ126, 1993(1)WLC342, 1992(2)WLN502

Author: A.K. Mathur

Bench: A.K. Mathur

JUDGMENT
 

K.C. Agrawal, CJ.
 

1. For resolving the conflict as to whether the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a Court subordinate within the meaning of Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure in between two judgments of the Rajasthan High Court, this Bench has been constituted.

2. In Laxmi Narain Mishra v. Kailash Narayan Gupta, 1974 Acc CJ 79 : (AIR 1974 Raj 55) and R.S.R.T.C. v. Kalawati, 1977 Acc CJ 456 : (AIR 1977 Raj 236) this Court took the view that Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was not a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court and, as such, no revision petition under Section 115, C.P.C. lies against an order passed by it.

3. In Dushyant Kumar v. R.S.R.T.C., (1990) 1 WLN 179 : (AIR 1990 Raj 152), the view taken by this Court was that Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was a Civil Court and it is subordinate to the High Court.

4. The controversy centres round a very narrow compass.

5. Ghewar chand-- respondent No. 1 filed a claim petition before the Accidents Tribunal, Rajsamand for Rs. 6,60,000/-against the petitioner, who was the owner of the vehicle and the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The Tribunal passed an order against the petitioner to proceed ex parte. An application was filed by the petitioner for setting aside the said order under Order IX, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The application was rejected by the Tribunal on October 31, 1991. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed the present revision in the High Court.

6. Before the High Court, the controversy was whether the revision lay or not. The argument of the respondent No. 1 was that as the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was not a Court subordinate to the High Court, revision was not competent, whereas the contention of the petitioner was that it was a Civil Court and it is not only subordinate to the High Court in hirerarchy and other administrative matters, but was also subject to its supervision and revisional power.

7. The learned single Judge found a conflict between the three judgments mentioned above and thus referred the same to a larger Bench which has been constituted to answer the question aforesaid.

8. In exercise of the rule making power conferred by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939), the State Government framed rules known 'Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964. Rule 20 reads as under:--

"Rule 20. Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases.
The following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), shall, as far as may be, apply to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, namely, Order V, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30; Order IX, Order XII, Rules 3 to 10; Order XVI, Rules 2 to 21; Order XVII and Order XVIII, Rules 1 to 3."

9. From the above, it would be found that whole of Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure has been applied to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act and, as such, the application filed under Order IX, Rule 7, C.P.C. by the petitioner was maintainable. The learned Judge, however, took the view that as Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure had not been applied, the present revision was incompetent.

10. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:--

"Section 115. Revision-- (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears--
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit:
Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where--
(a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or
(b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto."

11. Under the aforesaid section, a revision would lie to the High Court against an order or judgment of a Court which is subordinate to the High Court.

12. Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure defines the expression 'Court subordinate' which reads as under:--

"Section 3 --- Subordinate of Courts-- For the purposes of this Code, the District Court, is subordinate to the High Court, and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court."

13. At this place, we may also make a mention to Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure which deals with general power of transfer and withdrawal. Section 24(1) reads as under:--

"Section 24(1)--General power of transfer and withdrawal--
(1) On the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties and after hearing such of them as desired to be heard, or of its own motion without such notice, the High Court or the District Court may, at any stage--
(a) transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before it for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same, or
(b) withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any Court subordinate to it, and--
i) try or dispose of the same; or
ii) transfer the same for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same; or
iii) retransfer the same for trial or disposal to the Court from which it was withdrawn."

14. This section confers a general power to transfer, withdraw and transfer suits, appeals or other proceedings at any stage on the application of a party. The Court may also exercise the power suo motu.

15. Section 24 and Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure used the similar expression that is the Court subordinate. The meaning of I which has been given in Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In order that a revision may lie under Section 115, C.P.C. or a transfer application can be filed under Section 24, C.P.C., the Court in either event has to be Court subordinate to the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be.

16. It is settled rule of interpretation that similar words used in the same section or in different parts of the same Act have the same meaning. In other words, where the legislature uses the same expression in the same statute at two places or more then the same interpretation should be given to that expression unless the context requires otherwise, i.e., the same word used in different sections of the statute should have the same meaning. A legislature does not employ expressions of widely different nature to convey the same meaning.

17. The above is an indisputable proposition for which the decisions can be found in Shamarao Parulekar v. District Magistrate, AIR 1957 SC 2326, Ghamandi Ram v. Shankerlal, AIR 1966 Raj 19 (21) and Raghubans Narain Singh v. U. P. Government, AIR 1967 SC 465 (469).

18. Context of the two sections in which the aforesaid expression had been used is also the same. Section 24, C.P.C. confers power of transfer over a subordinate Court to the higher Court i.e. the High Court or District Court whereas under Section 115, C.P.C., an order of the subordinate Court can be set aside or reversed if the same suffers from jurisdictional error.

19. In Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. (1897) AC 22 p. 38, it has been said : --

"...........In a Court of law or equity, what the legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication."

20. When the question is whether Parliament did or did not intend a particular result, the 'intention of Parliament' is what the statutory words means to the normal speaker of English.

21. The question as to whether the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a Court subordinate came up for decision (and) has been considered in several cases by various High Courts.

22. In Barkat Singh v. Hans Raj Pandit, AIR 1985 Punj & Har 263, one line of thinking was that the claims Tribunal acted as a Court when it adjudicated upon a claim for compensation, but it was not a Court in the technical sense of the term and was not part of hierarchy of the Civil Courts recognized by the Constitution. It is only a quasi-judicial Tribunal exercising judicial functions and powers specifically conferred on it. According to the Punjab and Haryana High Court view, the Claims Tribunal while deciding claims applications filed under the Act was not a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In taking this view, the Punjab and Haryana High Court differed with several decisions noted in the same.

23. We respectfully differ with the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the above case. The Tribunal is subordinate to the High Court not only because it is below in hierarchy, but also its judgment amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.

24. The view taken in Laxmi Narain Mishra v. Kailash Narayan Gupta (AIR 1974 Raj 55) (supra) and R.S.R.T.C. v. Kalatati (AIR 1977 Raj 236) (supra) was the same as that of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. For the view taken in R.S.R.T.C. v. Kalawati (supra), reliance had been placed on its previous decision given in Laxmi Narain Mishray. Kailash Narayan Gupta(supra). To the same effect was the view of the Supreme Court in N. I. Insurance Co. v. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237.

25. The Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Darshan Devi, AIR 1979 SC 855 held that the Claims Tribunal had the trappings of Civil Court. Following the said judgment, the Supreme Court in Bhagwati Devi v. I. S. Goel, 1983 Ace CJ 123 held that Claims Tribunal was a Civil Court for the purpose of Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

26. On the basis of these decisions of the Supreme Court, it must be held that the District Judge who functions as a Claims - Tribunal is not only within the administrative control of the High Court, but also subordinate to it under Section 115, C.P.C.

27. While holding that a Claims Tribunal is a Court subordinate to the High Court, the learned Judge, who decided the case in Dushyant Kumar v. R.S.R.T.C. (1990) 1 WLN 179 : (AIR 1990 Raj 152) relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above in support of the view taken by him. Reliance and had been placed on a Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in Smt. Afsari Begum v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co., 1979 All LJ 1168. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act being Civil Court was amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and that the Tribunal was a Court subordinate to the High Court.

28. In Anirudh Prasad Ambasta v. State of Bihar, AIR 1990 Patna 49, the Full Bench of the Patna High Court held that Claims Tribunal is subordinate to the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

29. If we consider the various sections of the Act and the rules framed therein, we find that the working of the Tribunal is like that of a Civil Court. An appeal against the decision of the Tribunal lies to the High Court.

30. For all these purposes, we are of the view that the decisions given in Laxmi Narain Mishra v. Kailash Narayan Gupta (AIR 1974 Raj 55) (supra) and in R.S.R.T.C. v. Kalawati (AIR 1977 Raj 236) (supra) do not lay down the correct law and are overruled. We agree with the decision given in Dushyant Kumar v. R.S.R.T.C. (AIR 1990 Raj 152) (supra).

31. Let the papers of this case be laid before Hon'ble Mr. Justice Milap Chandra Jain with the answer mentioned above.