Delhi District Court
3.Title State vs . Jug Lal Parcha on 12 September, 2013
THE COURT OF SH. SUNIL KUMAR SHARMA :
METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE
TIS HAZARI COURTS : DELHI
1.FIR No. 39/2006
2.Unique Case ID No. 02401R1209652006
3.Title State Vs. Jug Lal Parcha
3(A).Name of complainant Sh. Suresh, s/o Sh. Shambhu, r/o
Uttam Nagar, Krishna Colony, Tea
Camp, Delhi.
3(B).Name of accused Jug Lal Parcha s/o Sh. Ram Ratan
Parcha, r/o D-435, Tagore Garden
Ext. Delhi.
4.Date of institution of challan 10.07.2006
5.Date of Reserving judgment 12.09.2013
6.Date of pronouncement Pronounced on the same day
7.Date of commission of
offence 05.02.2006
8.Offence complained of Under Section 279/338 IPC and u/s
185 MV Act
9.Offence charged with Under Section 279/338 IPC and u/s
185 MV Act
10.Plea of the accused Pleaded not guilty
11.Final order Accused is convicted for the
offence punishable u/s 279/338 IPC
and u/s 185 MV Act
12. Date of receiving of judicial 18.10.2010 file in this court FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.1/27 BRIEF REASONS FOR THE DECISION OF THE CASE:-
1. The case of the prosecution in a narrow compass is that on 05.02.2006 at about 4.00 AM at Najafgarh Road, Ramesh Nagar red light on the way leading to Raja Garden, Moti Nagar within the jurisdiction of PS Moti Nagar the accused has caused grievous injuries to the complainant Suresh s/o Shambu by driving his scooter under the influence of the liquor in a rash and negligent manner.
2. Accordingly, charge sheet was filed u/sec 173 CrPC, copies were supplied to the accused in compliance of section 207 cr.p.c and on the basis of the material on record, notice u/s 279/338 IPC and u/s 185 MV Act was framed against the accused on 23.01.2007, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
3. Prosecution in order to prove its case and to nail the guilt of the accused has examined as many as seven witnesses namely :-
1. PW-1 Sh. Suresh s/o Sh. Shambu, complainant.
2. PW-2 HC Vijender, Emergency Duty.
3. PW-3 HC Kusum, Duty Officer.
4. PW- 4 (inadvertently numbered as PW-3) Ex. ASI FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.2/27 (Tech) Sh. Devender Kumar, Mechanical Inspector.
5. PW- 5 (inadvertently numbered as PW-4) SI Bir Pal Singh, Emergency Duty.
6. PW-6 (inadvertently numbered as PW-5) Roshan Lal, Record Clerk, DDU Hospital.
7. PW-7 (inadvertently numbered as PW-6) Dhananjay Kumar, Medical Officer, DDU Hospital.
PW-1 Sh. Suresh is the Complainant and Injured and has deposed regarding the factum of driving of the scooter bearing no. DL-1SM-2367 by the accused Jug Lal Parcha in a rash and negligent manner and has testified that on 05.02.2006 he was working as Traffic Guard at JMC Project India Ltd., Ramesh Nagar. His duty hours were 08.00 PM to 08.00 AM. At about 04.00 AM the accused came on scooter bearing no. DL1SM2367 inebriated condition and hit the same on his leg. He fell down on the road. The call was made at 100. His owner came on the spot and took him to the DDU Hospital. Police also reached in the Hospital and the complaint Ex. PW2/A was recorded by the police. The police prepared a site plan at his instance. The accused was arrested after his personal search vide memo Ex. PW2/C. FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.3/27 PW-2 HC Virender is the Investigating witness and has deposed that on 05.02.2006 on receipt of DD no. 37A went to the Ramesh Nagar Red Light with ASI Bir Pal and found the scooter bearing no. DL1SM2367 (Bajaj Chetak) in accidental condition. IO ASI Birpal Singh went to the hospital and came back on the spot with the statement of the complainant and a driver of the scooter Jug Lal Parcha (correctly identified). IO prepared the rukka. Present FIR was registered. Scooter, Driving License and its RC was seized vide seizure memo Ex. PW2/A. The site plan was prepared at the instance of the injured who came back from the hospital. The accused was arrested after his personal search vide memo Ex. PW2/B and PW3/C respectively. Section 185 of the Motor Vehicle was also added after medical examination of the accused. His statement was recorded. His scooter was recorded in Malkhana.
PW-3 HC Kusum is the Duty Officer and have proved the registration of the FIR no. 39/06 Ex. PW1/A (OSR) and the endorsement on the rukka of the said FIR as Ex. PW1/B. PW-4 ASI Devender Kumar is the mechanical inspector and has proved the mechanical inspection report of the vehicle bearing no. DL1SM2367 as Ex. PW3/A deposing that FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.4/27 the mechanical inspection of the aforesaid scooter was conducted by him on 11.02.2006 at the request of ASI Birpal. The mechanical inspection revealed dent on the front wheel mudguard and scratches on the right side body of the scooter. The hand break lever was also broken. The vehicle was fit for the road test.
PW-5 SI Bir Pal Singh is the Investigating Officer and has corroborated the testimony of Investigating Witness PW- 2 HC Virender by deposing that on the date of the accident he reached on the accidental spot after the receipt of DD no. 37A and found scooter no. DL1SM236 in the accidental condition. The injured was already removed to the hospital. He went to the hospital. Collected the MLC of the injured Suresh and recorded his statement. The accused Jug Lal Parcha (correctly identified) was also present in the hospital and was under the influence of the liquor. He was tested through alcohol metre. On the basis of the statement of the complainant, MLC and the blood test of the accused he prepared the rukka Ex. PW4/A and gave the same to Ct. Vijender for registration of FIR. Ct. Vijender complied his direction and came back on the spot with copy of FIR and original rukka. The site plan Ex. PW4/B was prepared, offending FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.5/27 vehicle was seized vide memo Ex. PW2/A, Driving license of the accused and the RC of the accused were seized vide memo Ex. PW2/B and PW2/C respectively. The accused was arrested at the identification of the complainant. The offending vehicle was got mechanically inspected vide his application Ex. PW4/C. The MLC result was obtained. Witnesses were examined and the present charge sheet was filed by him.
PW-6 Roshan Lal is the record clerk of DDU hospital and has proved the X Ray report of the injured Suresh by deposing that the same is in the handwriting of Dr. Shruti whom he had seen writing and signing in the course of his duty. The report prepared by Dr. Shruti is PW5/A and the certified copy of the X Ray Department register is Ex. PW5/B. PW-7 Dr. Dhananjay Kumar is the medical officer and has proved the MLC of the injured Suresh by deposing that on 05.02.2006 the injured was examined by Dr. Rajesh Kumar Sha and the MLC is in the handwriting of Dr. Rajesh. The same is Ex. PW6/A. The patient was referred to the Orthopedic Department as the patient Suresh has suffered the fracture of 5th Metafiscal Bone i.e. over the left foot. The nature of injuries was opined as grievous by Dr. S. Bhalla whose handwriting and FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.6/27 signatures were also identified by the witness deposing that the handwriting and the signatures of both the doctors were seen and observed by him during the course of his official duties.
4. It is pertinent to mention that the PW-1 Suresh was not cross examined despite opportunity by the accused at the time of his examination in the court on 29.06.2007. The application of the accused for recalling and cross examining of PW-1 was allowed by the court and the witness was subsequently cross examined at length on 15.04.2013 and discharged. No other Prosecution witness was examined. Prosecution Evidence was closed and Statement of the accused was initially recorded on 01.12.2011. The supplementary statement of the accused was also got recorded on 25.06.2013. In his statement the accused has pleaded his innocence stating that he has not caused any accident and was falsely implicated in the present case only for making the inquiries from the injured regarding the accident under the influence of the liquor. The accused had declined to lead any evidence in his defence.
5. Ld. Prosecutor had argued that the prosecution has proved its case beyond the shadow of the reasonable doubts as the victim Suresh during his deposition as PW-1 in the Court has FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.7/27 not only identified the accused but have also deposed regarding the manner of negligent and rash driving of the accused. Remaining prosecution witness have deposed in corroboration to the testimony of the victim Suresh which leaves no scope for any doubt regarding the involvement of the accused in the present case.
6. Per Contra Ld. Counsel for the accused Sh. B.C. Jain have argued that the accused is innocent and is falsely implicated in the present case as he innocently made the inquiries regarding the alleged accident under the influence of the liquor from the victim. No public witness was joined in the investigation by the prosecution and the accused cannot be convicted on the testimony of the victim being the interested witness in the present case.
7. I have heard Ld. APP for the State and Ld. Counsel for the accused. I have gone through the entire record carefully.
" In a criminal trial, it is for the prosecution to establish its case beyond all reasonable doubts. It is for the prosecution to travel the entire distance from 'may have' to 'must have'. If the prosecution appears to be improbable or lacks credibility the benefit of doubt necessarily has to go FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.8/27 to the accused".
8. Now, the stage has been set to appreciate the evidence on record in the light of the following essential ingredients of the offence u/s 279/338 IPC and u/s 185 MV Act alleged to be committed by the accused.
Essential Ingredients of Offence U/sec 279 IPC and 338 IPC are as follows :
To establish offence Under Section 279 IPC, the prosecution has to satisfy the following ingredients:
a) A person drives any vehicle or rides (any human being)
b) Such driving or riding is on any public way.
c) It is done in a manner so rash or negligent:-
i) as to endanger human life or,
ii) as to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person.
To prove the offence Under Section 338 IPC, the prosecution has to satisfy the following ingredients:
a) That injury has been caused by doing any rash or negligent act.
b) That such injuries are grievous in nature.
Thus basic ingredients of the offence is rash or FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.9/27 negligent act /driving and grievous injury on the person of injured.
So, the requirement for the applicability of section 338 IPC are that the grievous injury to any person, must have been cause by the accused by doing any rash and negligent act. In other words it must be proved that the rash and negligent act of the accused was the proximate cause of injury. There must be direct nexus between injury to the person and rash and negligent act of the accused.
9. Therefore, one of the most common ingredients to be proved by the prosecution for the offence under sections 279/338 IPC against the accused is " Rash and Negligent Driving".
10. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to analysis what section 279 and 338 IPC say about rash or negligent driving. The section 338 IPC does not exactly specify what is meant by word rash and negligence.
As per Straight J. Criminal rashness " is doing a dangerous or Wanton Act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury, but without intention to cause FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.10/27 such injury, or with the knowledge that such injury will probably be caused". The criminality lies in running the risk or doing of such an act with recklessness or indifference as to its consequences. Criminal negligence "is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise reasonable and proper care and precautions to guard against any injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which having regard to all the circumstances out of which the consequences has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused persons to have adopted".
11. These observation won the approval of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bala Chandra Vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1968SC1319). In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed :-
"Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precautions to guard against any injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which having regard to all the circumstances out of which the consequences has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted".FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.11/27
12. The same was again approved by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Meghna Singh vs. State 2012 LE (DEL) 254 and by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Prabhakaran v. State of Kerela AIR 2007 Supreme Court 2376 "....Rashness" consists in hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury. The criminality lies in such a case in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence on the other hand, is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted.
The distinction has been very aptly pointed out by Holloway J. in these words:
"Culpable rashness is acting with the consciousness that the mischievous and illegal consequences may follow, but with the hope that they will not, and often with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happening.FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.12/27
The imputability arises from acting despite the consciousness. Culpable negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him and that if he had, he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the negligence of the civic duty of circumspection".
13. In a case of rash or negligent driving, the test is whether the prosecution has proved that :-
(i)The accused was driving the vehicle in such a manner so as to create an obvious and serious risk of causing physical injury to some other person who might happens to be using the road or of doing substantial damages to the property.
(ii) In driving the vehicle in that manner the accused did so without having given any thought to the possibility of there being such risk or, having recognized that there was some risk involved, had nonetheless gone on to take it.
(iii) The rash or negligent act must be the proximate cause of injury of the injured.
14. In the matter of Chaman Lal Vs State AIR 1954, ALL FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.13/27 186, it was observed that Rashness and negligence are not the same things. Mere negligence cannot be construed to mean rashness. There are degrees of negligence and rashness and in order to amount to criminal rashness or criminal negligence, one must find that the rashness has been of such a degree as to amount to taking hazard knowing that the hazard was of such a degree that injury was most likely to be occasioned thereby. The criminality lies in running the risk or doing of such an act with recklessness and indifference to its consequences.
The Criminal negligence is a gross and culpable neglect, that is to say, a failure to exercise that care and failure to take that precaution which, having regard to the circumstances, it was the imperative duty of the individual to take.
15. The question whether the accused's conduct amounted to rashness or negligence directly depends on the question whether in the given circumstances, the accused has acted prudently and reasonably and has taken the expected care and precaution in the given circumstances.
In Niranjan Singh Vs State (Delhi Administration), FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.14/27 1997 Cri LJ 336, it was observed that the main criteria for deciding whether the driving which lead to the accident was rash and negligent is not only speed of the offending vehicle but deliberate disregard to the obligations of its driver to drive with due care and attention and taking a risk indifferent to harmful consequences resulting from it. In case of this nature, the test is whether the prosecution has prove that :-
(i) The accused was driving the vehicle is such manner as to create an obvious and serious risk of causing physical injury to some other person who might happen to be using the road or of doing substantial damages to the property.
(ii) In driving the vehicle in that manner the accused did so without having given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or, having recognized that there was some risk involved, had nonetheless gone on to take it, and,
(iii) The rash or negligent act of the accused was the proximate cause of the injury of the injured.
" To impose criminal liability under section 338, Indian Penal Code, it is necessary that the injury should have been the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused, and that act must be the proximate and sufficient FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.15/27 cause without the intervention of the author's negligence. It must be the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the causa sine qua non".
16. In Mahammed Aynudin V. state of A. P., AIR 2000 SC 2511, It was also observed:-
Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise duty with reasonable and proper care and precaution for guarding against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular. It is the imperative duty of the driver of the vehicle to adopt such reasonable and proper care and precaution".
17. Now, the stage is set to apply the aforesaid legal position to the facts of present case which shows that the injured/complainant PW-1 Suresh had specifically deposed that the accused Jug Lal Parcha was driving the offending vehicle bearing no. DL-1SM-2367 under the influence of the liquor and in a rash and negligent manner struck against him resulting into the injuries on his leg. Further the material witness has not only identified the accused in the Court but has also deposed that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the accused. The the witness was cross examined at length by the defence counsel but nothing favourable to the accused could be FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.16/27 extracted by the defence and the accused has failed to raise any credible arguments for discrediting and impeaching the credit worthiness of the witness. The remaining prosecution witnesses have also deposed in corroboration to the testimony of PW1, Suresh, the complainant.
18. So far as the arguments raised by Ld. Defence Counsel to the effect that the injured i.e PW1 Suresh is the interested witness and his testimony could not be relied and believed by the Court being the injured himself, In Raja Singh Vs State of Bihar, 2001 (i) PLJR 389, it was observed that witness may be called interested witness only when he or she derives same benefit from the result of litigation, but the witness who is natural one and is the only possible eye- witness in the circumstances of the case, can not be set to be an interested witness.
19. Further in Kadar Behara Vs State 1993 CriLJ 378:
1993 East Cri. C 347 (Ori), it was observed that the label of interested witness is frequently used to throw cloud on the evidence of the prosecution. The probation that when eye witnesses to the occurrences were interested persons there should be corroboration to their evidence by independent FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.17/27 evidence can not be of the universal application. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused to wish to implicate him falsely. There can be no sweeping generalization and foundation must be laid for such a criticism that an innocent person is being unnecessarily dragged to face trial. In Nimai Samal Vs State of Ossisa, 1989 CriLJ 420 (Ori), it was further observed that interested-ness by itself is no ground to discard the testimony of the witness on the other hand, the fact that the witness is relation of the deceased, it would normally be presumed that he would not falsely implicate any other person as assailant except the real assailant.
20. The Court is of the considered opinion that the witness Suresh examined by the prosecution is the natural witness to the accident in fact he is a victim of the accident and his testimony does not suffer from any impeachability.
21. It is further pertinent to mention here that the FIR in the present case was recorded on the statement Ex. PW2/A made by PW1 Sh. Suresh and there is no delay in recording of the said FIR. As per the FIR Ex. PW-1/A the accident took place FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.18/27 at about 4 AM on 05.02.2006 and the FIR was registered on the same date at about 08.45 AM. The same is also substantiated from the MLC Ex. PW6/A of the injured which shows the date and the hour of arrival in the DDU Hospital as 05.25 AM on 05.02.2006 and the date and hour of the report sent to the PS as 08.25 AM at 05.02.2006.
22. Apart from that as far as the arguments raised in respect of non-joining of public witnesses, it is well-settled law that the case of the prosecution cannot be thrown away merely on the ground that public witnesses have not been joined and it is also settled that the testimonies of the other witnesses could be believed if the same have some reliability and inspires the confidence of the court particularly when the complainant has duly proved his complaint ExPW2/A against the accused and have also identified the accused in the course of his deposition in the Court. Reliance is placed upon the judgment titled Ambika Prasad & Anr Vs. State reported in 2002(2) Crimes 63 SC wherein it has been held ' Independent persons are reluctant to be a witness or to assist the investigation. In any case if independent persons are not willing to cooperate with the investigation, prosecution cannot be blamed at and it cannot be FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.19/27 a ground for rejecting the evidence of injured witnesses.
23. Reliance is also placed upon judgment titled Appa Bhai Vs. State of Gujrat reported in AIR 1988 SC 696 wherein it has been held 'These days people in the vicinity where the occurrence took place avoid to come forward to give evidence and civilized persons are insensitive when crime is committed even in their presence and they withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep themselves away from the Court unless it is inevitable. They think that the crime like civil dispute is between two individuals or parties and they should not involve themselves. This kind of the apathy of the general public is indeed unfortunate, but it is there everywhere whether in village life, towns or cities. One cannot ignore this handicap with which the investigating agency has to discharge its duties. The Court, therefore, instead of doubting the prosecution case for want of the independent witnesses must consider the broad spectrum of the prosecution version and then search for the nugget of truth with due regard to the probability, if any, suggested by the accused'.
24. In view of the same the non examination of the public witnesses does not seems to be fatal for the prosecution FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.20/27 case particularly when PW-1 Suresh, the victim in the present case has deposed consistently coupled with the time of the alleged accident i.e. 04.00 AM and the probabilities of the availability of the public witnesses on the spot. The testimonies of the aforesaid examined prosecution witnesses also stands corroborated not only by the deposition of the remaining prosecution witnesses but also by the surrounding circumstances of the case.
25. In fact the injured has painstakingly narrated the entire fact of the accident in a consistent manner being the victim.
26. The next line of the arguments raised by the Ld. Defence counsel is that PW1 Suresh in his testimony no where deposed that the accident took place due to the rash or negligent driving of the accused and the presumption of the rashness and negligence on the part of the accused cannot be drawn in the absence of the specific deposition by the witness and surrounding circumstances.
27. Here it is observed that the law is also well settled to the effect that merely using or non using of the words "rash or negligence" in the testimony would not make any difference as it entirely depends upon the facts and circumstances of each and FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.21/27 every case and the court has to carefully appreciate the evidence on record before adjudicated about the rashness and negligence on the part of the accused. In the instant case the victim PW-1 Suresh has specifically testified that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the accused and has also negated in his cross examination the suggestion of the defence counsel that the accident had not taken place because of the negligent driving of the accused Jug Lal Parcha.
28. As per the deposition made by the victim PW-1, he sustained the injuries as the accused Jug Lal Parcha had struck him with his scooter, by driving the same under the influence of the liquor and the accident took place because of the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by the accused Jug Lal Parcha. The witness was also subjected to cross examination by the accused but nothing favourable to him has come out from the same.
29. It is also well settled law that there is no scope for contributory negligence and from the testimony of PW-1 it is clear that in fact the accused Jug Lal Parcha was rash or negligent in his driving as he struck his scooter under the influence of liquor against the injured who was discharging his FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.22/27 duties as a traffic guard labour.
30. Apart from it the accused himself has admitted in his statement u/s 281/313 Cr.P.C. that he was under the influence of the liquor while driving the vehicle at the alleged time. The fact is also corroborated from the MLC of the accused which discloses the quantum of the alcohol in the blood of the accused as 104mg/100lml BAC. The natural corollary of the same is that the accused was driving his scooter under the influence of liquor and struck the same against the victim as the accused has not only failed to act prudently and reasonably but have also failed to took the expected care and precaution in the given circumstances.
31. It is also argued that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses suffers from the major contradiction particularly regarding the place and the manner of the accident.
32. The claim of the defence that the material contradiction exists in the testimony of the prosecution witness does not find any favour with this Court as the contradiction pointed out by the defence counsel are amply negated in the deposition of the prosecution witnesses. Further there are bound to be some discrepancies between the narration of the different witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.23/27 contradiction are of on material dimensions the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety.
33. It is settled law that the court has to see the quality of the evidence and not quantity. Similarly when the witnesses are examined in the court after a long gap minor contradictions, omissions and discrepancies are bound to occur in the testimony of the witness. Hardly, one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or an exaggeration, embroideries or embellishments. Merely because in one respect it is unsafe to rely on the testimony of a witness it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be discarded in all other respects also. Reliance is placed upon Sukhdev Yadav & Others Vs. State of Bihar (2001) 8SCC 86 wherein it has been held 'Once the trustworthiness of evidence stated in a case stands satisfied, the court should not hesitate in accepting the same. If the evidence in its entirely appears to be trustworthy, it cannot be discarded merely on the ground of presence of minor variations in evidence. When the witnesses are examined after a long gap minor contradictions omissions and discrepancies are bound to occur in the testimony of witnesses' Relying upon an earlier decision in Leela Ram Vs. State of Haryana (1999) 9 FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.24/27 SCC 525 it was observed that there are bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirely. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishments, there may be, but variations by reason therefore should not render the evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence. Relying upon an earlier decision in Ramani Vs. State of M.P. (1999) 8 SCC 649, it was also observed that when an eye witness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can successfully make his testimony totally non- discrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident either as FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.25/27 between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witnesses is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. It was also held that it is a common practice in trial courts to make out contradictions from the previous statement of a witness for confronting him during cross- examination. Merely because there is inconsistency in evidence it is not sufficient to impair/impeach the credit of the witness. No doubt section 155 of the Evidence Act provides scope for impeachment the credit of a witness by proof of an inconsistent former statement. But a reading of the Section would indicate that mere inconsistent statements are not sufficient to impeach the credit of the witness.
34. In view of the aforesaid findings the Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has established his case against the accused beyond the reasonable doubts and has traveled the entire distance from, 'may have', to 'must have' and has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused Jug Lal Parcha had caused grievous injuries upon the injured Suresh by driving his vehicle under the influence of liquor in rash and negligent manner on a public way.
35. Accordingly, the accused Jug Lal Parcha stands FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.26/27 convicted for commission of offences punishable U/s 279/338 IPC and u/s 185 MV Act 1988.
36. Convict be heard separately on the quantum of sentence.
Dictated, Signed and Announced in the (Sunil Kumar Sharma) Open Court on 12.09.2013 Metropolitan Magistrate (West-10)-Delhi Tis Hazari Court, Delhi It is certified that this judgment contains 27 (twenty seven) pages and each page bears my signature.
(Sunil Kumar Sharma) Metropolitan Magistrate (West-10)-Delhi Tis Hazari Court, Delhi FIR NO. 39/2006 State v. Jug Lal Parcha Page No.27/27