Supreme Court - Daily Orders
Delhi Development Authority vs Sukhbir Singh . on 27 July, 2015
Bench: Vikramajit Sen, Shiva Kirti Singh
1
ITEM NO.41 COURT NO.11 SECTION XIV
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)....../2015
CC No(s). 5569/2015
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 18/11/2014
in WP No. 4375/2014 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi)
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
SUKHBIR SINGH & ORS. Respondent(s)
I.A. 1/2015(with c/delay in filing SLP and office report)
Date : 27/07/2015 This application was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAMAJIT SEN
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHIVA KIRTI SINGH
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Ranjit Kumar, SG
Mr.Dhruv Mehta, Adv.
Ms. Binu Tamta,Adv.
For Respondent(s) Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Sr.Adv.
R.Nos.3-5 Mr.Rishi Agrawala, Adv.
Mr. Vivek Jain, Adv.
Ms. Devika Mohan, Adv.
Mr. Aviskar Singhvi, Adv.
Mr. E. C. Agrawala,Adv.
R.Nos.1 & 2 Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Sr.Adv.
Mr. Hemant Malhotra, Adv.
Mr. Pankaj Malhotra, Adv.
Mr. Sachin Gupta,Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Heard Learned Solicitor General appearing for the Petitioner, Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 and Dr. A.M. Singhvi learned Senior Counsel for Signature Not Verified Respondent Nos.3 to 5.
Digitally signed byUsha Rani Bhardwaj Date: 2015.07.29 17:03:45 IST Reason:
This Court, speaking through several different Benches, has explained the provisions of Section 24 of the Right to Fair 2 Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter Act of 2013). This includes the oft and ubiquitously cited three-Judge Bench decision in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (2014) 3 SCC 183. An adumbration of the law can also be found in the decision of this very Bench in Government of NCT of Delhi v. Jagjit Singh in Civil Appeal No. 2592 of 2015, delivered on 27.2.2015.
At the commencement of the hearing of this SLP, we were of the view that this SLP also deserved similar dismissal. However, the learned Solicitor General has vehemently contended that the facts obtaining in the present SLP are singularly and significantly different to the others, and that the present matter requires detailed consideration. He has emphasized that there is no controversy regarding the fact that the possession of the subject land has been taken over by the Delhi Development Authority (for short “the DDA”) several years ago; the latter asserts that this transpired in January 2000. The learned Solicitor General has painstakingly taken us through the litigation filed by late Khyali Ram and continued by his legal representatives, as also the other Respondents who claim to have purchased these lands from Khyali Ram. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi (2008) 9 SCC 177 in which, in essence, it was concluded that it was legally impermissible for Khyali Ram to have sold the lands to the Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 after the issuance of the Notification 3 under Section 4 on 24.10.1961, followed by the Declaration under Section 6 on 4.1.1969, sequentially followed by the issuance of Section 9 Notification on 26.4.1983 and the publication of the Award. The conveyance of the land by Khyali Ram to Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 before us is beyond cavil.
The dismissal of writ petition filed by Khyali Ram by the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court as well as in Appeal by its Division Bench, followed by the dismissal in this Court is beyond challenge. This is also the position so far as the contentions and prayers in the writ petitions filed on behalf of Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 are concerned. It also appears that Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 had issued notices to the DDA setting up their respectively claims of ownership, in denial of any subsisting ownership of Khyali Ram and/or his legal representatives. Therefore, the dispute inter se the Respondents was well within the knowledge of not only the Land Acquisition Collector (for short “the LAC”) but also the DDA, who avowedly is the beneficiary of this acquisition. The fruitless challenge to the subject acquisition and the Award that has been passed, at the instance of Khyali Ram as also Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 to whom the former endeavoured to convey the land is, as already mentioned, also beyond disputation.
Predicated on these facts, it is contended by the learned Solicitor General that the provisions of Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act are facially attracted; and that the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation as well as several other precedents are inapplicable. Repeated reliance has been made to paragraphs 31 and 38 of Meera Sahni. It is contended that since there was genuinely 4 a controversy as to which party was entitled to compensation, the action of DDA in depositing the compensation pursuant to orders passed by the High Court of Delhi in December 2011 would legitimize this action and complete the acquisition under the old Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, would be of no avail to the Respondents. References to the pleadings in the present SLP proceedings including paragraphs 12 on page 52 and paragraph 6 on page 127 have been drawn by the learned Solicitor General.
Mr. Mehta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents contends that all the postulations in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013 are in place; that DDA being the beneficiary, cannot rely on the disputed question of ownership. In this regard, we may immediately recall to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in U.P. Awas Even Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (1995) 2 SCC 326 which is, inter alia, to the effect that the beneficiary of an acquisition of land is competent and possesses requisite locus standi to raise questions pertaining to any aspect of the acquisition. It is further countered by the Learned Solicitor General that notice is yet to be issued to the LAC whose objections and views have therefore not yet been elicited till this date. The learned Solicitor General has also submitted that an SLP has in fact already been filed by the LAC.
Dr. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 has supported Mr. Mehta in his contentions and has additionally submitted that the defence of the DDA is dishonest and it is patently an after-thought. He has reiterated 5 that it is the LAC who alone can be heard, and DDA should not be permitted to fight a proxy litigation. As we see it, there is only a self serving and temporary truce between these Respondents. Prima facie, there is substance in the contention raised by learned Solicitor General that the impleadment of the subsequent purchasers (Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 before us) in the proceedings in the High Court in which the impugned Order came to be passed is mala fide and perfidious; that the subsequent purchasers had not sought substitution on the strength of their Conveyance Deed etc. We cannot lose sight of the fact that for over five years Late Khyali Ram or his legal representatives had not initiated any action on the premise of their continued ownership. It is in the background of these myriad submissions that we are presently of the view that it is the Land Acquisition Act and not the Act of 2013 that may be relevant, thereby rendering Pune Municipal Corporation as well as Government of NCT of Delhi vs. Jagjit Singh inapplicable.
Delay condoned.
Leave granted.
All Submissions of fact and law left open.
Issue notice to the unrepresented Respondents, namely, Respondent Nos.6 and 7 returnable in six weeks.
Status-quo with regard to possession, title and interest shall be maintained till orders to the contrary.
(USHA BHARDWAJ) (SAROJ SAINI) AR-CUM-PS COURT MASTER