Madras High Court
Prop.G.Sampath vs P.Chandra on 9 July, 2010
Author: G.Rajasuria
Bench: G.Rajasuria
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 09.07.2010 Coram: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.RAJASURIA C.R.P.(NPD).No.1089 of 2009 and M.P.No.1 of 2009 Prop.G.Sampath Devi Laundry Pallavaram Chennai 600 043 ... Petitioner vs. 1. P.Chandra 2. N.Suresh 3. N.Nagarajan ... Respondents This civil revision petition is filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent) Control Act 18 of 1960 as amended by Act 23 of 1973 and Act 1 of 1980 against the judgment and decree dated 13.02.2007 passed by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu in RCA No.27 of 2005 confirming the order and decree dated 24.03.2005 passed by the learned District Munsif, Alandur in RCOP No.45 of 2002. For Petitioner : Mr.P.Gopalan For Respondents : Mr.P.B.Balaji ORDER
Inveighing the judgment and decree dated 13.02.2007 passed by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu in RCA No.27 of 2005 confirming the order and decree dated 24.03.2005 passed by the learned District Munsif, Alandur in RCOP No.45 of 2002, this civil revision petition is focussed.
2. Heard both sides.
3. Niggard and bereft of details the relevant facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this civil revision petition would run thus:
The respondents/landlords filed RCOP No.45 of 2002 as against the tenant for evicting him on the ground of additional accommodation by invoking Section 10(3)(c ) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act. The tenant filed the counter. During enquiry on the side of the landlords, one Suresh was examined as PW1 and Exs.P1 to P9 were marked. On the side of the respondent/tenant RW1 was examined and Exhibits Ex.R1 to R5 were marked. Ultimately, the Rent controller ordered eviction.
4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the same, the tenant filed RCA No.27 of 2005 before the Appellate Authority, who dismissed the same after hearing both sides confirming the order of the Rent Controller. As against which, the revision petitioner/appellant/respondent has preferred this revision on various grounds among others.
5. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner reiterating the grounds of revision would advance his arguments, the gist and kernel of the same would run thus:
i) The Appellate Authority passed an order without adhering to the well settled propositions of law.
ii) The Appellate Court is expected to consider all the facts afresh and arrive at a conclusion but he had not done so.
iii) Both the courts below failed to take into account the alleged bona fide need of the landlords in seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of additional accommodation.
(iv) The courts below also failed to take into account the hardship that would be caused to the tenant in the event of evicting him from the premises.
v) No specific points for determination or consideration were framed in respect of the bona fide requirement of the landlord and the relative hardship that would be caused to the tenant in the event of ordering eviction.
vi) The RCOP was filed by the landlords having in mind the motive that the tenant failed to pay the enhanced advance like other tenants who are occupying the nearby premises under the same landlords.
vii) There are no averments in the Rent Control original petition detailing and delineating, relating to the ingredient 'hardship' as found envisaged under Section 10(3)(c ) of the Act.
Accordingly, he prays for setting aside the orders of both the courts below and for dismissing the RCOP, alternis visibus he prayed for remitting the matter back to the Rent Control Appellate Authority to rehear the matter afresh and to pass a reasoned judgment.
6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents/landlords, by way of contradicting and refuting, challenging and impugning the arguments as put forth on the side of the tenant, advanced his arguments, the warp and woof of them would run thus:
a) The Rent Control proceedings are expected to be summary in nature and it would not be open for the tenant to argue that the authorities concerned have not passed elaborate orders. However, in this case, both the courts below took into account all the ingredients as contemplated under Section 10(3) (c) as well as 10 (3) (e) including the first proviso there under and analysed the evidence and passed orders warranting no interference in revision.
b) There is no hard and fast rule that there should be specific pleadings meticulously pertaining to the ingredients as found set out in those provisions. It is sufficient, if there are averments pointing towards the bona fide requirement of the landlord and the relative hardship, which would outweigh the benefit that the landlord would be getting in evicting the tenant.
7. The learned counsel for the respondents/landlords also would submit that the power of the revisional court is limited and it cannot assume the role of a court of facts like the Appellate court, which is legally expected to be the last court of facts.
Accordingly, he prays for the dismissal of the revision.
8. The points for consideration are as to :-
1. Whether both the courts below failed to analyse or consider the facts and evidence as to whether the landlords were really in bona fide requirement of the additional accommodation as prayed by them?
2. Whether both the courts below failed to consider the tenant's hardship, which would outweigh the benefit that the landlord would be getting in evicting the tenant?
3. Whether the judgment of both the courts below falls foul of they being cryptic?
4. Whether there is any illegality or infirmity in the orders passed by both the courts below?
Point Nos.1 and 2:
9. These two points are taken together for discussion as they are inter-linked and inter-woven with each other.
10. Both sides cited number of decisions and so it is just and necessary to refer to those decisions. The following precedents have been cited by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant concerning the concept 'relative hardship'.
(i) 1997(III) CTC 339 (T.S.Sethuraman vs. J.Nagalakshmi and another)
10. The relative hardship can be decided only on the basis of the facts which should be available in the pleadings and in the evidence. So, only on the basis of the said pleadings and evidence, the Rent Controller can satisfy that the hardship to be caused to the tenant by granting eviction would outweigh the advantage to the landlord and on that basis the eviction petition has to be selected. So, this crucial aspect could be characterised as a special instance in the matters arising out of Section 10(3) (c ) of the Act. There should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting the decree for eviction would out weigh the advantage to the landlord. Such a special prescription has been specifically provided for so as to avoid the unnecessary hardship to the tenant. Therefore, it has become imperative for the authorities under the case arising out of Section 10(3) (c) of the Act to give a specific finding whether the hardship which the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice-versa. Unless it is decided by the authorities the enquiry in regard to the petition arising under Section 10(3) (c) of the Act is vitiated.
11. Admittedly, in this case, no finding has been given by the Appellate Authority or the Rent Controller in this regard. Therefore, the orders of the authorities below cannot be sustained and they have to be set aside. In the normal course, I should have remanded the matter to the authorities below for reconsideration. But, in this case there is no pleading or evidence available on record for such reconsideration. Hence, the order of eviction is set aside and this CRP No.563 of 1997 is allowed. No costs."
(ii) AIR 1998 SC 3235 (B.Kandasamy Reddiar v. O.Gomathi Ammal).
"5. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the respondent we are of the view that the factual aspects of the case need not be gone into as these appeals must be allowed for the simple reason that in disposing of the revision petitions the High Court did not at all take into consideration the following proviso, which finds place under clause (e) of Section 10(3) and reads as under:-
"Provided that, in the case of an application under clause (c), the Controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage of the landlord".
Apart from the fact that while dealing with the question of eviction of a tenant on the ground of requirement of additional accommodation under S.10(3)(c) the consideration of the above proviso is mandatory, in the instant case it is all the more necessary in view of the admitted facts that the respondent has now taken possession of Door No.143, earlier occupied by Co-optex, and that she has also initiated execution proceeding for eviction of the tenant of Door No.147-A. As the mandatory requirement of the above quoted proviso has not at been adverted to by the High Court in the light of the materials already on record and the above subsequent events we set aside the impugned judgment so far as it relates to the three appellants and remand the matter to it for fresh disposal of the three connected revision petitions is accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinbefore" .....
On the side of the learned counsel for the respondents/landlords, the following decisions have been cited on the same concept.
i) (2000) II MLJ 196 (Ameena Beebi alias Jamurthu Begum vs. P.M.Khaja Mohideen) "10. ................................................."My reading of the relevant provisions is justified will be evident from the decisions o the Supreme Court in B.Kandasamy Reddiar v. O.Gomathi Ammal (1998) SCC 138 and in J.Jermons v.Aliammal and others, (1999) 7 SCC 382 where the Supreme Court with particular reference to Tamil Nadu Act after referring to proviso to Sec.10(3)(e) of the Act held that "the consideration of the proviso is mandatory". In the other decision of the Supreme Court, it has been held as follows:
"The authority who considers the eviction petition under clause (c) of Section 10(3) of the Act has to record the finding under the provision and in the absence of such a finding the order of eviction cannot be sustained."
Thus, the emphasis is more on the duty of the authorities than on the pleadings and in any event, after the decision of the Supreme Court in Hiralal's case, AIR 1993 SC 1449, it cannot be held that the specific pleadings regarding comparative hardship is a mandatory requirement. It is therefore unnecessary to refer the matter to a Bench, nor it is necessary to remand the matter to the Appellate Authority to enter a finding as, according to me, the Appellate Authority has also accepted the case of the revision petitioner that the hardship caused to the tenant will not outweigh the advantage to the landlady. ..................................."
ii) (2000) 3 MLJ 127 (Allahabad Bank rep.by its Branch Manager, Coimbatore vs. E.Theivanai)
16. On the basis of above law declared by Hon'ble Supreme Court, I do not think the argument of the learned counsel could be accepted. An eviction can be ordered under Section 10(3) (c), only if relative hardship is considered and a finding is to be entered one way or another. It is a statutory duty on the part of the Rent Controller to enter such a finding even if there is no pleadings. Whether landlord is entitled to get an order of eviction, depends on a consideration of relative hardship. The question before the Rent Controller would not necessarily depend on the pleadings when it is a statutory obligation on the part of the Rent Controller to consider that question. The tenant can prove or take a good defence that if he is evicted, he will be put to great hardship. But, the lack of pleadings or vague pleading by itself will not be a ground to hold that the eviction petition is not maintainable. In paragraph 11 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, further held thus:
"11. There cannot be a pedantic or a dogmatic approach in the matter of analysis of pleadings or of the evidence adduced thereto. It is no doubt true that if the pleadings are clearly set out, it would be easy for the court to decide the matter. But if the pleadings are lacking or vague and if both parties have understood what was the case pleaded and put forth with reference to requirement of law and placed such material before the court neither party is prejudiced. If we analyse from this angle, we do not think that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order made by the Rent Controller" (Italics supplied).
If both parties have understood the case and have adduced evidence, the question of lack of pleadings cannot be raised for first time in revision. From the discussion by the Appellate Authority, I do not find that such a contention was put forward before that court. Appellate Authority considered the question of relative hardship and held against the tenant. The tenant has no case that it was prejudiced by the lack of pleadings. The law is well settled that in regard to Rent Control matters, the pleadings are not much insisted upon as in the case of civil suits. Rent control proceedings are of summary nature. If the parties are aware as to the real matter in controversy and opportunity was given to them to lead their evidence, the Court will not be justified to dismiss the application merely on the ground of lack of pleadings or vagueness in pleading".
iii) (2002) 1 MLJ 522 (M.Meeran Mohideen and another vs. N.Jayaprakash Narayanan (decd) and others)
17. The petitioner has averred in the petition that the petitioner is badly in need of the petition mentioned premises for the purpose of his own case. Even though there is no specific averment in the petition with regard to relative hardship to be caused to the tenants, the parties had understood that the landlord requires the petition mentioned premises for additional accommodation. The tenants have also visited the nearby premises for their occupation. So, there is a clear understanding between the parties with regard to the requirement of the landlord for additional accommodation. In Ram Narain Arora v. Asho Rani, 1998 MLJ (Supp) 18 (SC): (1999) 1 SCC 141, the Apex Court has held that non disclosure by the landlord about his having another accommodation would not be fatal to the eviction proceedings if both the parties understood the case and placed materials before the court and case of neither party was prejudiced. It has also been held in that decision that defective or vague pleadings would not be fatal if both parties understood what the case pleaded was and accordingly placed material before the court and neither party was prejudiced. .............................' The materials available clearly prove that the parties understood the case and the tenants are well aware that the landlord requires the premises for additional accommodation and where there is such clear understanding between the parties is available, with regard to the case pleaded, whether defective or vague, is not at all fatal to the case of the landlord applying the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the decision cited supra.
21. It is significant to note that even though the premises occupied by the landlord and tenants bear separate door numbers, they are occupying the premises in a single building. The landlord is occupying the first floor and the tenants are occupying the ground floor. Separate door numbers have been assigned to the portions occupied by the landlord and the tenants. Even though separate door numbers are assigned for the premises occupied by the landlord and tenants, all those door numbers are in a single building. The landlord is occupying the first floor and the tenants are occupying the ground floor. So, it cannot be said that they are separate buildings and the landlord is not entitled to ask for additional accommodation. The premises occupied by the tenants are in the same building. It is not in a different building. The premises occupied by the tenants and the landlrod are in one and the same building even though separate door numbers have been assigned. So, I find that petition under Section 10(3) (c) of the Rent Control act is very well maintainable. So, I find force in the argument advanced by the counsel for the revision petitioners".
A mere poring over and perusal of the aforesaid judgments would amply make the point clear that it is the duty of the courts exercising their powers under the Rent Control Act to see the relative hardship that would be caused to the tenant, if eviction is ordered.
11. Nowhere in the first proviso appended to clause (e) of Section 10(3) of the Act, hardship of the landlord is contemplated. What is contemplated in the said proviso is the hardship that would be caused to the tenant in the event of ordering eviction and the court has to see whether that hardship will outweigh the benefit, which the landlord as such would be getting on evicting the tenant. On the one hand, the fora concerned under the Act should consider the hardship on the side of the tenant, if eviction is ordered; on the other hand, the courts are not bound to consider the hardship on the side of the landlords. But what the court should consider is the benefit or advantage that the landlord would be getting by evicting the tenant. Ultimately it should be assessed as to which of the two would weigh more and accordingly a decision has to be rendered.
12. If the benefit/ advantage would outweigh the hardship, then eviction could be ordered. In other words, if the tenant's hardship outweighs the advantage of the landlord then no eviction should be ordered and this should be the proper approach. It may appear at first blush, the distinction sought to be made by me is one between tweedledum and tweedledee; between rock and a hard place; between six of the one and half a dozen of the other but in my opinion, the distinction is one between chalk and cheese. From the available evidence, the court should consider what probable benefit that the landlord would be getting by evicting the tenant and it has to be seen what are all the probable hardship to which the tenant would be put into, if he is evicted from the demised premises. As such, hardship of the tenant, vis-a-vis, the benefit/advantage of the landlord should weigh in the mind of the authorities under the Rent Control Act. It has to be seen as to whether in this case, such an exercise has been done by the courts below.
13. The learned counsel for the landlords would correctly invite my attention to para No.7 of the Rent Controller's order and in that the learned Rent Controller considered the evidence on both sides and clearly gave a finding that the requirement of the landlords was bona fide and for that he furnished also reasons based on incontrovertible and indubitable facts that the demised premises is situated just adjacent to the medical shop of the landlord and on the other side of the said medical shop there is a stair case. As such, the lower court correctly held that the landlord had justifiably chosen the adjacent shop for his additional accommodation.
14. The learned counsel for the tenant would elaborate his argument that the demised premises has been picked and chosen by the landlords purely for the purpose of evicting the tenant because he refused to pay more advance like any other tenant.
15. In my considered opinion, such a submission in the wake of clear available evidence on record would not hold water. On the one side of the landlords' medical shop there is a stair case and on the other side of the said medical shop, the demised premises concerned in this case is situated. To put it picturesquely the landlords medical shop is sandwiched by the staircase and the demised premises. The Rent Controller also has correctly pointed out that only a four inch thick wall is separating the landlords' medical shop and the demised premises wherein laundry business is being carried on by the tenant. Either with or without removing the said partition wall the landlords could very well put that demised premises for their own use at their utmost benefit.
16. PW1 also in his evidence would depose that even in the medical shop he himself and his staff could not sit and do business because they are in need of more space. It is common knowledge that a medical shop should not be stuffy and it should not also have a congested atmosphere. Certainly, the medical shop should have enough space and it should be airy also for the purpose of running the business. No doubt, the demised premises is only 96 sq.ft., which is obviously small. It is for the landlord to decide and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms that the space would not be sufficient for the landlords additional accommodation and that they could have chosen some other place to have more area for doing their business.
17. In this connection, I would like to refer a few precedents on this point.
(i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110 S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus:
"14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."
(ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152 RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus:
"21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233, this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant."
A mere perusal of those judgments would amply make the point clear that the tenant cannot dictate terms as to which area should be chosen by the landlord for his additional accommodation and it is for the latter to take a decision on that.
18. I recollect and call up the maxim - Rerum suarum quilibet est moderator et arbiter Everyone is the regulator and disposer of his own property. As such, taking into consideration the aforesaid legal proposition and the factual situation, I am of the view that the findings given by both the courts below that the requirement of the landlords was for bona fide purpose cannot be found fault with.
19. At this juncture, it is just and necessary to find out as to whether there is any substance in the contention put forth by the tenant that owing to personal vendetta, so to say, owing to non payment of enhanced advance at the request of the landlords alone, they went to the extent of filing this petition.
20. No doubt, the rent was enhanced from Rs.450/-per month to Rs.700/- per month from January 2002 onwards. However, the learned counsel for the tenant would submit that hardly after seven months from such enhancement, the eviction petition was filed and that smacks mala fide intention on the part of the landlords. He would also submit that the landlords demanded Rs.25,000/- as advance from the tenant herein as they demanded from other tenants and obtained admittedly from them.
21. I would like to point out that even though in the counter the tenant would state that the landlords demanded a sum of Rs.50,000/- as advance, while cross-examining PW1, he would suggest that a sum of Rs.25,000/- was demanded towards higher advance. There are certain contradictions. Be that as it may, I recollect the logical fallacy post hoc (ergo propter hoc) After this, after this time, hereafter. Simply because seven months anterior to the filing of the RCOP there was some dispute regarding enhancement of advance; the court cannot assure that itself was the cause for the filing of the RCOP. As such, the plea of the tenant falls foul of one other logical fallacy "Non Sequitur" - It does not follow.
22. The lower court also in para No.7 of its judgment clearly held that no evidence was produced, even though the tenant pleaded that he was in receipt of clothes from the nearby hospital for getting them cleaned at his shop. The learned counsel for the tenant would pungently remark that how the Rent controller was justified in expecting any documentary evidence with regard to that.
23. At this juncture, I would like to point out that so far hospitals are concerned, if they are in the habit of sending their clothes for being washed/cleaned by a launderer, naturally, it would be borne by some receipts. So with that idea in mind, the lower court passed such observation. In the case of ordinary individuals, also, leave alone hospitals, such receipts could be expected by the court. It is common knowledge that even in respect of individuals, the launderers are in the habit of issuing receipts. Hence, I do not see that there is any infirmity in the order passed by the Rent Controller on that ground.
24. The Rent Controller considered the relative hardship of the tenant vis-a-vis the benefits that the landlords would be getting in evicting the tenant. He would point out that the tenant is only a launderer and he can shift his business. But on the other hand, the owners of the premises who are running the medical shop cannot for their additional accommodation choose some other places leaving the very adjacent place to their medical shop. As such, this is a peculiar case, in which the principle of res ipsa loquitur The thing speaks for itself, also would be applicable. The very topography of the demised premises and the medical shop of the landlords would speak volumes that for the landlords, except the demised premises, no other premises would be more suitable. But on the other hand the launderer could shift his business to some other place. Hence, on that ground also I can hold that the Rent Controller correctly arrived at the conclusion, considering the pros and cons involved in the matter.
25. The Appellate Authority, in its judgment, once again considered all those facts and rendered its verdict confirming the order of the lower court.
26. The learned counsel for the tenant would cite the decision of this court reported in 1992-1-LW-315 (C.Shnamugham v. N.S.K.Chokkalingam Pillai). No doubt, the last court of facts, so to say, the Appellate court should consider afresh the evidence. But, in this case, a mere perusal of the order of the Appellate court would demonstrate and evince that he once again considered the evidence and furnished his reasons also as narrated supra. It is not as though he simply narrated the facts and cryptically decided that he agreed with the lower court. On his part, the Appellate authority considered the space crunch or paucity of space as pleaded by the landlords and also discussed that the landlords cannot be expected to curtail their own requirement to the benefit of the tenant. He would also add that a launderer can very well have his business elsewhere.
27. The learned counsel for the respondents/landlords would submit catena of decisions as under:
a) (2002) 2 MLJ 102 ( P.Rayen vs. Seyed Ali Fathima) "10. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the Appellate Authority without assigning any reason for its conclusion, has simply confirmed the order of the Rent Controller and that therefore, the order passed by the appellate Authority is liable to be set aside. The fact that the Appellate Authority has passed a cryptic order cannot be a ground to allow the revision as the findings rendered by the Rent Controller were supported by the materials and legal evidence. I hold that the order passed by the Appellate Authority is not liable to set aside for the simple reason that the Appellate Authority has not discussed the evidence and merits of the case. I hold that there are no merit in the revision.
b. 2004-4-L.W.716 (R.Mittalal Jain vs. Johny D'couta
9. As regards the submission that the appellate authority had failed to consider the evidence a perusal of the judgment would show that this is not correct. In paragraph No.14, the appellate authority clearly refers to the non-production of documents to show proof of payment of rent and the lack of oral evidence to show that the payment of rent was made at the proper time. It is not necessary for the appellate court to discuss each document separately so long as it is clear from the order that the evidence has been considered.
c. 2003-2-MLJ-490 (E.I.Velayutham v.Hajeera) "18. ............... It is also held in Vallampati Kalavathi v.Haji Ismail, (2001) 4 SCC 26, that, "revisional court acts not within its jurisdiction in taking a view of such events different from the one recorded by the lower courts, unless such findings suffer from inherent defect, or are based on inadmissible or irrelevant materials or are irredeemably perverse" ....................."
and develop his argument that in summary proceedings under the Act, no elaborate judgments on the part of the fora concerned under the Act is required.
28. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner also would submit that the High Court while exercising its revisional powers is not duty bound to re-assess the evidence and by way of buttressing and fortifying his contentions, he cited the following decision:
2000(I) MLJ 19 (SC) - Mudigonda Chandra Mouli Sastry vs. Bhimanepalli Bikshalu and others.
"4. Coming to the second submission what we find is that, that the Rent Controller and the first appellate authority after assessing the evidence recorded concurrent finding of facts that the need of the landlord was bona fide. It was not pointed out that the said finding suffered from any legal infirmity. Under such circumstances, it was also not open to the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction to have indulged in reassessment of evidence and thereby interfered with the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the two courts below, especially when it was found by the High Court that the tenant's wife had already acquired a vacant accommodation in the town of Tenali and the tenant himself was transferred from Tenali to Marcherly ..."
29. The learned counsel for the respondent/landlord cited the following judgments regarding Scope under Section 25 of the Act.
i) 1997(II) CTC 631 (M.Mohamed Meera Sha, Partner, Goldern Oils vs. E.Hyder Ali) "11. ....... Sitting in revision, as held in the decision in Smt.Rajbir Kaur and another v. M/s.S.Chokosiri and Co.,AIR 1988 SC 1845, this court cannot interfere with the findings of fact unless there is perversity in the appreciation of evidence. To come to such conclusion, I take aid of the Apex court decision of Smt.Rajbir Kaur and another v. M/s.S.Chokosiri and Co.,AIR 1988 SC 1845 stated which reads as follows:
"When the findings fact recorded by the courts below are supportable on the evidence on record, the revisional court must be reluctant to embark upon an independent re-assessment of the evidence and to support a conclusion of its own, so long as the evidence on record admitted and supported the one reached by the courts below. Therefore, in the instant case the concurrent finding as to exclusive possession of sub-tenant was not amenable to reversal in revision by the High Court."
12. In the decision in Dev Kumar (Died) through Lrs.v. Swaran Lata Smt.) and others, 1996(1) SCC 25 it is held as follows:
"The jurisdiction of the High Court under Sub-section (5) of Section 15 of the Act, would entitle the court to examine the legality and propriety of a conclusion of the Appellate Authority and is thus much wider than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But it has to be exercised subject to the well-known limitations inherent in all revisional jurisdictions and cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. Unless there is a perversity in the matter of appreciation of evidence by the Appellate Authority or unless the Appellate Authority has arrived at a conclusion which on the materials, no reasonable man can come to the High Court will not interfere with the same".
(ii) 2001(3) CTC 206 ( Karur Ghee Stores rep.by V.Periasamy vs. N.Palaniappan and another) "10. ................................ In this case, both the authorities have considered in detail all these aspects and have ordered eviction. Above all, one also has to see the extent to which this court can interfere under Section 25 of the Act. It has been repeatedly held the revisional jurisdiction is not akin to a full-fledged appeal and the Judge sitting in revision must be very careful about launching on a independent re-appreciation of the evidence and to substitute the findings of the Rent Control Authorities with another when the materials before the Court equally sustain the conclusion arrived at by the authorities below. Unless there is misapplication of law or a legally wrong approach or grave and substantial injustice, the Revisional Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of the Rent Controller ....................."
30. The learned counsel for the respondents/landlords, inviting the attention of this court to the various portions of the typed set of papers would appropriately and appositely, correctly and convincingly point out that admittedly the tenant is having his own place of residence in Pammal, which is obviously and incontrovertibly nearer to the demised premises. The contention of the tenant that he cannot shift his business to Pammal because there are 200 launderers there, is neither here nor there and I need not further elaborate on that. Because the tenant pleaded all these facts, the court is not bound to take all his pleas for gospel truth and simply hold that the landlords are not entitled to additional accommodation. In fact, the landlords also invited the attention of this court to para Nos.6 and 7 of the RCOP petition and pointed out that even though the word 'hardship' has not been used therein yet the averments in it would spotlight that the tenant's relative hardship would not outweigh the landlords' benefit that they would be getting in evicting the tenant.
31. I would like to agree with his view because it is not necessary that verbatim the ingredients should be reproduced in the petition. It is sufficient, if facts are found spelt out as correctly pointed out by the learned counsel for the landlords. A mere reading of the petition in RCOP would demonstrate and display that the landlords expressed their bona fide requirement and the hardship that would be caused to them, if no eviction is ordered. In para Nos.6 and 7 of the RCOP petition those averments are explicit in highlighting the relevant ingredients contemplated in the aforesaid provisions of law.
32. Hence, I am of the view that there is no infirmity or illegality in the orders passed by both the courts below and there is no mala fide intention on the part of the landlords in seeking additional accommodation and the tenant's hardship will not outweigh the benefits that the landlords would be getting in evicting the tenant.
Accordingly, point Nos.1 and 2 are answered in favour of the landlords and as against the tenant.
33. In view of the ratiocination adhered to deciding point Nos.1 and 2, point Nos.3 and 4 are also decided in favour of the landlords.
34. In the result, this revision petition is dismissed. No costs. However, taking into consideration the fact that the tenant is a launderer, sufficient time could be granted. Accordingly, I would like to grant six months' time to him to vacate the demised premises subject to the condition that the rents should be regularly paid. An affidavit as to the aforesaid condition should be filed by the tenant within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
vj2 To
1. The Principal Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu
2. The District Munsif, Alandur