Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Shiv Raj vs The State Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 17 July, 1991
Equivalent citations: AIR1992RAJ99
ORDER B.R. Arora, J.
1. This writ petition and the writ petitions, the particulars of which have been given in the Schedule appended to this judgment, involves a common and identical questions of law, which can be decided by this judgment. The fact of all the writ petitions are similar and common except in regard to parties, route in question and some other consequential details.
2. The petitioners, who are existing operators on the routes mentioned in the writ petitions, are plying their buses on the routes in question on the basis of the non-temporary stage carriage permit granted in their favour by the respective Regional Transport Authorities. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1988') came into force with effect from July 1, 1989. The apprehension of the petitioners is that the respective Regional Transport Authorities will grant limitless number of stage carriage permits on the route, on which the petitioners are operating, as under Section 80(2) of the Act, a direction has been given to the respective Regional Transport Authorities not to ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit "on any ground made for it at any time". According to the petitioners, the Regional Transport Authorities who is a one member body constituted for all the six regions of the State of Rajasthan, has already taken the view, while granting the permit on Chittorgarh Badi-Sadri route that the limitless number of permits can be granted in favour of the applicants in view of the provisions of Section 80(2) of the Act of 1988. As no steps have been taken by the State Government to control the uneconomical competition and no directions, as required under Section 67 read with Section 71(3) of the Act of 1988 have been issued by the State Government, and, therefore, the petitioners have preferred these writ petitions praying therein that the State Government may be directed to issue directions under Section 67 read with Section 71(3) of the Act to avoid the uneconomic and unhealthy competition on the various routes. It has, also, been prayed that the Regional Transport Authorities may be restrained from granting any stage carriage permits on the routes in question till the question of scope is determined by the respective Regional Transport Authorities, and the R.T.A. be directed to first fix the scope and then grant permit.
3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned Additional Advocate General as well as Mr. R.N. Munshi, counsel for the various applicants who have applied for grant of permits on various routes.
4. The question which requires consideration in the present writ petitions is: whether the State Government is competent to issue a direction under Section 67 read with the Section 71(3) of the Act for fixing the limits on the Inter-Regional or intra-regional routes and failed to do its legal duty and whether the Regional Transport Authority can consider the applications far the grant of permits without fixing the scope on the various route and whether the Regional Transport Authority is competent to fix the numbers of permits on a particular route?
5. For the proper appreciation of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties to resolve the controversy, certain provisions of the Act of 1988 and the corresponding provisions in the Act of 1939, are necessary to be considered. Chapter V of the new Act of 1988 deals with the control of transport business. Section 67 of the new Act, whose corresponding provisions are Section 63 of the Act of 1939, deals with the power of the State Government to control the road transport. While enacting this provision Sub-sections (1), (2)(iii), (2) and (3) of Section 43 of the Act of 1939 were omitted and new Sub-section (2) has been added. Section 70 of the Act deals with the contents and application for grant of stage carriage permit. This section corresponds to Section 46 of the Act of 1939 with the difference that Clause (b) of Section 46 has been omitted and new Sub-section (2) in this section has been added, which provides that the applications shall be accompanied by such documents as may be prescribed. Next is Section 71 which deals with the procedure to be followed by the Regional Transport Authority in considering the application for grant of stage carriage permit. Section 71 of the new Act corresponds to Section 47 of the Act of 1939. Material changes have been made in this section from that of Section 47 of the old Act. While considering the application for grant of stage carriage permit, the Regional Transport Authority, under Section 71 of the Act of 1988, has only to pay regard to the objects of the Act while considering the application under Section 47(1) of the Act of 1939, the Regional Transport Authority had to pay regard to the matters enumerated in Clauses (a) to (f) of the Act. Under the old Act, the Regional Transport Authority has, also, to consider the representations made by the existing operations and has, also, to give preference to the applicants who were registered co-operative societies or licenced drivers. There were, also, provisions for reservations with respect to the Scheduled Tribes and economically weaker section as provided under Sub-sections (1)(a) and (1)(g) of Section 47 while in the new Act, this reservation has been limited with respect to the city-buses only. Sub-section (1)(h) of Section 43 of the old Act, also, makes provisions for giving preference to the State Transport Undertakings in respect of permits on inter-Statal routes while there is no such corresponding provisions in the new Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 47 of the Act of 1939, which requires the Regional Transport Authorities first determines the number of permits which has to be granted on the route before considering the applications for grant of permit, has completely been omitted and there is no provision corresponding to that provision. Sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of Section 71 are new provisions and there were no corresponding provisions under the Act of 1939. A condition has, also been imposed under Section 71 of the Act that while considering the application for grant of Stage carriage permit, the Regional Transport Authority has to pay regard to the object of the Act and the permit for route of 50 kms. or less shall be granted only to an individual or a State Transport Undertaking. Section 72 of the Act deals with the grant of stage carriage permit. This section corresponds to Section 48 of the Act of 1939 and is almost identical and there is no material change. Then comes Section 80 and the corresponding provisions in the earlier Act was Section 57. Important changes have been made while enacting Section 80 from that of Section 57 of the Act of 1939. Sub-section (1) of Section 80 prescribes the same time-limit for making the application for all types of permits while Sub-sections (1) and (2) Section 57 of the old Act prescribes different times for making application for different types of permits. The procedure for publication of the applications making the representations and hearing as provided under Sub-sections (3) to (6) of Section 57 of the Act of 1939 have been omitted and the provisions for grant of permits have been simplified. A new Sub-section (2) of Section 80 has been introduced which provides that an application for a permit shall not ordinarily be refused. There was no such corresponding provision in Section 57 of the Act of 1939. There is no provision in Sub-section (3) of Section 80 for increasing the number of permits in a stage carriage permit for a public carrier -- permit while under Sub-section (8) of Section 57, there was such provision. In Sub-section (3) of Section 80, a new proviso as a 2nd proviso, has been added, which provides that in the case of variation, the termini shall not be altered and the distance covered by the variation shall not exceed 24 kilometers and in the case of extension, the distance covered by extension shall not cover more than 24 kilometers from the termini.
6. The case of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the provisions of the new Act are similar to the provisions of the old Act and, therefore, in order to avoid the un-economic competition, the State Government is required to issue directions under Section 67 read with Section 71(1) of the Act and the Regional Transport Authority concerned is first to consider the scope over the route in question and only thereafter he should consider the applications for grant of permit. In support of their case, the learned counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance over the judgments rendered in: Verappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Limited, AIR 1952 SC 192; R. Obliswami Naidu v. S.T.A.T., Madras, AIR 1969 SC 1330; Rameshwar Prasad Etc. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 393 : (1983 All LJ 356); S. V. Sivaswami Servai v. Hafez Motor Transport (Firm), 1990 (4) SCC 459 : (AIR 1991 SC 911); Sardar Kuiwant Singh v. A.A.S.T.A., Rajasthan, 1955 (7) RLW 395 : (AIR 1957 Raj 237); A. Vedachalu Mydoliar v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 Mad 276 : (1952 Cri LJ 616) and C.S.S. Motor Service, Tenkasi v. The State of Madras, AIR 1953 Mad 279. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, mentioned above, are based on interpretation of the provisions of Section 47(3) of the Act of 1939, where in a specific provision in the form of Section 47(3) was made, by which the Regional Transport Authority was required first to determine the scope and number of permits which has to be granted on the routes before considering the applications for permits. But in the Act of 1988, there is no such provision which directs the Regional Transport Authority to first consider the scope over the route in question. A material change has been made in Section 71 from that of Section 47 of the Act. The Regional Transport Authority, while granting the permit under the new Act has only to have in mind the object of the Act while under the old Act, the considerations were as mentioned in Clauses (a) to (f), i.e., the interest of the public generally; the advantage to the public of the service to be provided, including the saving of time likely to be affected thereby and any convenience arising from journey not being broken; the adequacy of other passengers transport services operating or likely to operate in the near future, whether by road or by other means, between the places to be served; the benefit to any particular locality or localities likely to be afforded by the services; the operation by the applicant of other transport services, including those in respect of which applications from him for permit are pending; and the conditions of the road included in the proposed route or area. A new provision as Sub-section (2) in Section 80 has been added in which a mandate has been given to the Regional Transport Authority that it shall ordinarily not refuse an application for grant of any permit on any ground made at any time. The authorities on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, thus, lay down the law only with the reference to the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the Act of 1939. It has been specifically observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rameshwar Prasad's case, AIR 1983 SC 383 : (1983 All LJ 356) that any direction by the State Government under Section 43(a) of the Act should, therefore, be in conformity with all the matters regarding which the statute has made provisions. Under the new Act, no restriction has been imposed on the Regional Transport Authority to grant a fixed number of permits. Similar provisions came for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Hansraj Kehar v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 389. In the case of Hansraj Kehar, the matter relates to Section 43A of the Act, which was inserted in the Motor Vehicles Act by the Uttar Pradesh Act No. 25 of 1972 providing that the State Government may issue such directions of general character as it may consider necessary or expedient in the public interest in respect of any matter relating to the road transport to the State Road Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority and such Transport Authorities shall give effect to all such directions. It was further provided in that section that without prejudice to the generality of the provisions where the State Government is of the opinion that it is in the interest of general public to grant stage carriage permit (except in respect of the route or the area for which the scheme has been published under Section 68(c)) or contract carriage permit or public carriage permit to all the eligible applicants, it may by public notifications in the gazette issue a direction accordingly and thereupon all the transport authorities as well as the State Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under Section 64 of the Act shall proceed to consider and decide all proceedings, applications and appeals in that behalf. The State Government has, thereafter, issued a Notification dated March 30, 1972 that the State Government is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to grant stage carriage permit (except in respect of the route or area for which scheme have been published under Section 68-C of the Act of 1939, contract carriage permit and public carriage permit to all the eligible applicants. The legality of the notification dated March 30, 1972 as well as the provisions of Section 43A which was inserted by the State of Uttar Pradesh Amendment Act, 1972 (Act No. 25/72) were challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. After considering the law on the point, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the provisions of Section 43(e) of the Act as well as the Notification issued by the State Government and observed as under:--
"Perusal of Section 43A shows that the object of legislature in inserting it in the Motor Vehicles Act was to make it easier to secure permits in respect of non-nationalised routes. The section seeks to simplify the procedure for this purpose. It has accordingly been provided that in the case of non-nationalised routes if the State Government is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to grant permits to all eligible applicants, it may by notification in the gazette issue a direction accordingly. Once such notification is issued a number of consequences which have been enumerated in the various clauses of Sub-section (2) of Section 43A follow. One effect of such notification is that the transport authorities shall proceed to consider and decide applications, appeals and revisions (including pending applications, appeals and revisions) as if Sub-section (3) of Section 47 were omitted. Under that sub-section a Regional Transport Authority was required to limit the number of stage carriage generally, or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits might be granted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified route within the region. As a consequence of the omission of that sub-section it would be no longer necessary for the Regional Transport Authority to put a limit on the number of stage carriage permits. The result would be that it would permissible to issue any number of such permits having regard to the interest of the public generally the advantage to the public of the services to be provided, including the saving of time likely to be affected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being broken as also the benefit to any particular Locality or localities likely to be affected by the service."
The provisions of Section 71 of the Act are similar to that of Section 43A of the Uttar Pradesh (Amendment) Act, the validity of which was under consideration before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court has held that the grant of limitless permits in favour of the eligible applicants is in the interest of public at large and, therefore, limitless permits can be granted. While deciding Rameshwar Prasad's case, agreeing with the view taken in Hansraj's case, the Supreme Court observed :--
"Sub-section (Sub-section (2) of the Section 43A of the Act) contains a clear legislative policy which considers that there can be no public prejudice if all the eligible applicants were granted the permit. Without saying any thing more on the point, it may be stated that whatever this Court may have observed while considering the provision, would not apply now as there is a clear departure made by the legislation from the policy which it enacted under Sub-section (2) of Section 43 of the Act. In place of former Section 43, which specifically authorised the State Government when it was satisfied that it was necessary to do so in the interest of general public to issue direction to the transport authority to grant permit to all the eligible candidates while considering the object of the legislature."
The Supreme Court, in Rameshwar Prasad's case, thus, held that the judgment in the case of Hansraj Kehar v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 389 was good at the relevant time. The Supreme Court nowhere doubted the correctness of the earlier judgment rendered in Hansraj's case. Thus, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners have no relevance so far as the present case is concerned and the present case is fully covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hansraj Kehar's case.
7. Thus, as the provisions of Section 47(3) of the Act of 1939 regarding fixing the number of stage carriage permits on the routes, have been omitted from Section 71 of the Act of 1988 and as such now there is no requirement to determine the strength of stage carriage permits on the route except to the extent provided in Clause (c) of Sub-section (3) of Section 71 in respect of city buses in towns with a population of not less than five lacs. To make it relevant to modern days requirement. Section 80 of the Act has been introduced with an object to liberalise the issuance of the permit to all the applicants who are eligible for grant of permits. The language of Section 80 in the light of the purpose and object of the Act itself makes it clear that no limit for the grant of permit on a route can be fixed by the Regional Transport Authority because the Act as it stands today, does not contain any such provision. The language used by the legislature is the true deposer of the legislative intent and if we read Sections 67, 71, 72 and 80 together and construe these provisions in the light of the objects and the purposes of the Act then it is clear that the Act does not impose any restrictions on the number of permits to be granted on a particular route. The consequences of the omission of Sub-section (3) of Section 47 also would be that the authority concerned can issue any number of stage carriage permits. When the Act itself does not impose any restriction on the number of permits to be issued on a particular route then the restriction cannot be imposed by way of issuing the directions by the State Government to the Regional Transport Authority. If we read the provisions of the Act as the petitioners counsel want me to read, then the Act will fail to achieve the object of liberalization of grant of stage carriage permits and for which purpose the provisions contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the Act of 1939 limiting the number of permits, has been deleted. A perusal of Sections 71 and 72 read with Section 80 clearly show that the object of the legislature in enacting those provisions and intentionally omitting the provisions like Sub-section (3) of Section 43 which provides for the fixation of the scope and to limit the number of stage carriage permits on the routes, is to make it easier for the eligible applicants to secure the permits on the desired routes. These sections seek to simplify the procedure provided for the grant of permit and the object of Section 80 of the Act is to do away with the limit on the number of permits to be granted for stage carriage on the route. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it has been clearly stated that the Act proposes to liberalize the grant of permits. Thus, the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, will not apply, as while enacting the Act of 1988, a clear departure has been made by the legislature from the earlier policy of limiting the number. In the light of the new provisions, enacted by the legislature, there is a clear legislative policy behind the provisions which clearly provides that there can be no public prejudice if all the eligible candidates are granted the permits.
8. The next argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that though no limit has been provided for grant of permit on the inter-regional or intra-regional route but limits have been fixed for grant of permits on the inter-Statal route under Section 88(5) of the Act and in the city-buses route under Section 71(1)(c) of the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioners, also, tried to find support from Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 71 wherein it has been provided that not more than five stage carriage permits to be granted to any individual. He has further submitted that as in the earlier Act though no limit was prescribed by the Act on the Inter-Statal and Inter-Regional routes but the Supreme Court, in the case of Mohd. Abhrahim v. S.T.A.T., AIR 1970 SC 1542 observed that before consideration of the application for grant of permit, the authority should comply with the provisions of Section 47(3) of the Act and fix a limit on the number of stage carriage permits to be granted on the routes in question. The learned counsel for the petitioners, have, also, placed reliance over the judgments rendered in : Kamla Devi v. The State of Rajasthan, 1976 WLN (UC) 134 and submitted that in the present case, the Regional Transport Authority has been directed to fix the limit for the grant of permits under Section 71(1)(c) and 88(4) and (5) and, therefore, taking a anology of these provisions, the Regional Transport Authority should fix the number of permits and only then proceed to grant the permits and without fixing the same, the permits cannot be granted. I Have considered this argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners. The decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Abrahim's case is purely on the basis of the consideration of the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 47 while these provisions have been specifically omitted in the present Act and so far as the case of this Court in Kamla Devi's case is concerned, that was decided on the basis that there was no prohibition under the Act of 1939 for fixing the numbers of permits and in consideration that, the Hon'ble Judges of this Court took into consideration the provisions of Section 47(3) of the Act, also. While in the present case, a complete departure has been made from the earlier Act and Sub-section (3) of Section 47 has been omitted and a clear mandate has been given vide Sub-section (2) of Section 80 to the Regional Transport Authority ordinarily not to refuse the grant of permits. Thus, these two cases, on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners do not help the petitioners. The same arguments were raised before the Supreme Court in the case of Hansraj Kehar v. the State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 389 and while repelling that argument, the Supreme Court observed as under (at page 392):--
"Argument has also been advanced that the deletion of Section 47(3) would have the effect of removing the limit on the number of permits for intra-region routes but that fact would not prevent the imposition of limit for the number of permits for inter-region route. We are not impressed by this argument for we find no valid basis for inference that if there is no limit on the number of permits for intra-region routes, limit on number of permits for inter-region routes would have to be imposed. The object of the impugned notification is to liberalise the issue of permits and we fail to see as to how such a liberal measure can have the effect of introducing strictness or stringency in the matter of grant of permits for inter-region routes. Assuming that a different rule is applicable in the matter of inter-region routes, the differentiation is based upon reasonable classification."
9. The argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners on this point, also, has no substance.
10. So far as the question of binding nature of the precedent is concerned, suffice it to say that there is no dispute in the matter that the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India are binding on all the Courts within the territory of India and all Court are bound to follow the decision of the Supreme Court but the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not on the controversy in question and do not support the petitioners' case, rather the present case finds full support from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hansraj Kehar, which is the judgment of the Bench consisting of four Hon'ble Judges.
11. The next argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that it is in the public interest not to grant limitless number of permits on the routes and in support of it, the learned counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance over the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Rameshwar Prasad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 383 : (1983 All LJ 356) wherein it has been observed :--
"Public interest under the Act does not mean the interest of the operators or of the passengers only. Like every other economic activity, the running of stage carriage service is an activity which involves use of scarce of limited productive resources. Motor transport involves a huge capital investment on motor vehicles, training of competent drivers and mechanics, establishment of workshops, construction of safe roads and bridges, deployment of suffecient numbers of policemen to preserve law and order and several other matters. To say that larger the number of stage carriages in any route or area more covenient it would be to the members of the public is an over simplification of a problem with myriad facts affecting the general public."
12. The question of granting of unlimated permits whether it is in public interest or not, came up for consideration before the Bench of four Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of Hansraj Kehar, AIR 1975 SC 389 and the Supreme Court, after considering the law on the point held as under (at page 392):--
"The notification removes the bar created by the limit on the number of permits for buses which could be issued and facilities the issue of such permits to fresh applicants if they satisfy the requirement of eligibility. It hardly needs much argument to show that the larger number of buses operating on different routes would be for the convenience and benefit of the travelling public and as such would be in the public interest. Any measure which results in larger number of buses operating on various routes would necessarily eliminate or in any case minimise long hours of waiting at the bus stands. It would also relieve congestion and provide for quick and prompt transport service. Good transport service is one of the basic requirements of a progressive society. Prompt and quick transport service being a great boon for those who travel, any measure which provides for such an amenity is in the very nature of things in the public interest."
Thus, in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it would be in the public interest to grant permit to all the eligible candidates in unlimited numbers. The larger number of buses operating on various routes would necessarily minimise the long hours of awaiting at the bus stands. There is, thus, two contradictory judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the question deciding the public interest. One is the judgment in the case of Hansraj Kehar, AIR 1975 SC 389, which is a judgment of the Bench consisting of four Hon'ble Judges while the judgment in the case of Rameshwar Prasad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 383, it is a judgment of a Bench consisting of two Hon'ble Judges. The latter decision is of a smaller bench while the earlier decision is of a large bench and, therefore, the decision given by the larger bench will be binding on this Court and in this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the public interest in the present case wilt be in the matter of granting the permits to more and more applicants because the competition is the great regulative force which establishes the control over the economic activities and it is in the best interest of the society as it ensures salvation of the society. The compensation in the present case is a competition for efficiency and not competition by interference with the business of the competitiors. It may further be mentioned that prevention of monopoly and ensuring every competition on the route is in the interest of public and it is for the Government to protect the common man from exploitation by the vested interest which can be done by providing number of services on the routes in question.
13. The next argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that it is incumbent upon the State Government to issue directions under Section 67 read with Section 71(3) of the Act to provide guidelines to the Regional Transport Authorities to check the uneconomic competition amongst the permit-holders and the proposed permit-holders and directions should be issued by the State Government to fix the number of stage carriage permits to be granted by the R.T.A. on the routes in question. Section 67 of the Act clothes the Government with the authority to issue directions to the State Transport Authority and the Regional Transport Authority by Notification in official gazette to control road transport having regard to the provisions contained under Sub-clauses (a) to (d) of Section 67. Sub-clauses (a) to (d) read as under:--
"(a) the advantages offered to the public trade and industry by the development of motor transport.
(b) the desirability of co-ordinating road and rail transport.
(c) the desirability to preventing the deterioration of the road system; and
(d) the desirability of preventing uneconomic competition among holders of permits."
14. The provisions of Section 67, thus, make it clear that the State Government can issue directions only with respect to the field covered by Clauses (i) to (iii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 67 and beyond that area, the State Government cannot issue any direction. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, in Sub-clause (iii) the State Government has been empowered to issue directions in any other matter but a close reading of Sub-clause (iii) of Sub-section (1) makes it clear that any other matter relates to only with respect to giving effect to any agreement entered into with the Central Government and with the State Government, to issue the directions in the matter of fixing the number of permits by fixing the scope of the route in question. As there being no provision in the Act, it is, therefore, not at all permissible for the State Government and not other matter in general. The Act, as it stands today, does not contain any provision authorising the State Government to issue directions in this matter, and, therefore, it will amount to invading the domain of exercising the judicial powers of the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authorities. The direction can be issued by the State Government only in the field covered by Section 67 and not in each and every matter and to interfere in the area left over to the S.T.A. and the Regional Transport Authorities. Thus, Section 6 of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 does not comprehend within its scope the power to issue directions for fixing the limit or the scope for issuing stage carriage permits on the routes in question. The direction can be issued only for the purpose for which the statute has made the provisions.
15. It may further be made clear that the directions under Section 67 of the Act of 1988 can be issued by the State Government only in the administrative matters which fall to be dealt with by the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authorities under the relevant provisions of the Act in their Administrative capacity but these directions cannot be issued to interfere in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions of the S.T.A. or the R.T. As. The State in its discretion of exercising the direction cannot control the quasi-judicial functions of the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authorities and the issuance of such type of directions limiting the scope of fixing the number of permits will be completely inconsistent with the provisions of the Act unaccepted by the judicial norms. If such type of directions are issued by the State Government then these directions will be contrary to the object of the provisions of the Act.
16. The learned counsel for the petitioners have, also, placed reliance over certain provisions of the Rules made by the State Legislature under the powers given under the Motor Vehicles Act for the purpose of interpretation of Sections 67 and 71 of the Act and has taken me through Rules 5.5(3)(c), 5.6, 5.7 and Form RS 5.1 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. It may be stated at the very out set that for interpreting the provisions of the Act, the Rules framed under the Act cannot afford any guidelines though for interpreting the Rules, the provisions of the Act provide necessary guidelines. The Rules made under the Act are made under the delegated powers authorising the authority to make the Rules. The Rules making authority has to act within the limits of powers granted to it. A rule framed under the statute though having the force of law, cannot restrict, narrow down or enlarge the scope of the section and if there being any conflict between the statute or the rule enacted under it then the statute should prevail and the rules cannot provide any guidelines for interpreting the provisions of any section of the statute. A statutory rule cannot enlarge the meaning of the section, and if it goes beyond the section contemplated, the rule must yield to the section. In this view of the matter, the rule cannot provide any guideline for interpreting the provisions of Section 67 or Section 71 of the Act.
17. For the reasons mentioned above. I do not find any merit in the writ petitions and the writ petitions, filed by the petitioners, are, therefore, dismissed without any order as to cost.