Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
K. Chinna Rajanna vs Vice-Chancellor, Osmania University, ... on 31 March, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1998(3)ALD753, 1998(3)ALT485
Bench: Umesh Chandra Banerjee, Syed Saadatulla Hussaini
ORDER
Umesh Chandra Banerjee, C. J.
1. The most accepted methodology of a Governmental working is fairness in the event Governmental action lacks the element of fairness, it will be a plain exercise of judicial power to rise up to the occasion and grant relief to the persons seeking such a relief. Judicial redress ought not to be discarded but ought to be allowed if the merits of the matter so warrant. Public administrative actions are subject to judicial scrutiny, but that does not, however, mean and imply that every public action shall have to be set at naught by the Law Courts.
2. It is now a well settled principle that law Courts while dealing with an administrative action must act as a Public Law Court having due regard to the needs of the Public administration and the observation of Sir John Donaldson in R. v. Monopolies Commission ex parte Argyll. Group, (1986) 1 WLR 763, lend support to such a statement of law. Sir John Donaldson was pleased to record that "good public administration is concerned with substance rather than form.''
3. While it is true that administrative law has developed in the developed countries rather early, but the administrative law, as developed in this country does not, however, lag behind in any way. Justice Venkatachalaiah (as His Lordship then was) in G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, , in no uncertain terms recorded that "the doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with no less important doctrine that the Court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which Parliament appointed to take the decision." The learned Judge went on to observe:
"Within the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has genuinely free discretion. If it passes those bounds, it acts ultra vires. The Court must therefore resist the temptation to draw the bounds too tightly, merely according to its own opinion. It must strive to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choices which me Legislature is presumed to have intended. Decisions which are extravagant or capricious cannot be legitimate. But if the decision is within the confines of reasonableness, it is no part of the Court's function to look further into its merits."
4. A duty is cast, as noted by Sir John Donaldson MR. that public administration is concerned with substance rather than form and the Law Court shall have to approach the problem with proper awareness of the needs of public administration.
5. The Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan, , was candid enough to administer caution as to the limits of administrative jurisdiction of the Courts. The Supreme Court observed:
"7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or Tribunals: these arc cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a rinding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.''
6. Article 226 of the Constitution has undoubtedly conferred a very wide power on the High Court but that does not however mean and imply that Law Court shall have to usurp the function of the administrative authority. The intervention is called for only in the event the administrative action being unreasonable or unfair in nature, since reasonableness ought to be the criteria for sustaining a Governmental action. Fair play thus in a Governmental action is a basic requirement and if there is any lack of it or if the action suffers for not being in consonance with the 'doctrine of fair play' but falls within the mischief of the order being not reasonable, then and in that event the Law Court would be within its jurisdiction to set right the wrong and render justice to its seekers.
7. Law Courts exist to remedy the wrong in accordance with the known principles of law and this remedying the wrong is for the purpose of proper and efficient administration of justice and in the discharge of such function, no doubt, the powers of the Law Court are unlimited, but that does not mean and imply, as noted above, that the Law Courts snail stand as a superior authority of the administration. Administrative action if otherwise can be saved, ought to be saved, but if it cannot, there ought not to be any hesitation in regard thereto.
8. Lord Denning in Healey v. Minister of Health, (1995) 1 QB 221 observed :
"Parliament often entrusts the decision of a matter to a specified person or body, without providing for any appeal. It may be a judicial decision, or an administrative decision. Some times Parliament says its decision is to be final. At other times it says nothing about it. In all these cases, the Courts will not themselves take the place of the body of whom Parliament has entrusted the decision. The Courts will not themselves embark on a rehearing of the matter. But nevertheless, the Courts will, if called upon, act in a supervisory capacity. They will see that the decision making body acts fairly. The Courts will ensure that the body acts in accordance with the law. If a question arises on the interpretation of the words, the Courts will decide it by declaring what is the correct interpretation. And if the decision making body has gone wrong in its interpretation, they can set its order aside."
Lord Denning went on to observe :
"If the decision-making body is influenced by considerations which ought not to influence it or fails to take into account matters which it ought to take into account, the Court will interfere. If the decision-making body comes to its decisions on no evidence or comes to an unreasonable finding - so unreasonable that a reasonable person would not have come to it - then again the Courts will interfere. If the decision making body goes outside its powers or mis-construes the extent of its powers, then too, the Courts can interfere. And, if course, if the body acts in bad faith or for an ulterior object, which is not authorised by law, its decision will be set aside. In exercising these powers, the Courts will take into account any reasons which the body may give for its decisions. It gives no reasons - in a case when it may reasonably be expected to do so, the Courts may infer that it has no good reason for reaching its conclusion, and act accordingly :see Padfield's case, 1968 AC 997."
9. Enunciation of English Law as above has been duly approved by the Supreme Court in a long catena of cases and in one of recent ones Tata Cellular v. Union of India, , the Supreme Court observed:
"Judicial quest in administrative matters has been to find the right balance between the administrative discretion to decide matters whether contractual or political in nature or issues of social policy; thus they arc not essentially justiciable and the need to remedy any unfairness. Such an unfairness is set right by judicial review."
In para 89 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed:
"Observance of judicial restraint is currently the mood in England. The judicial power of review is exercise to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the Court's ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hall-marks of judicial control over administrative action."
In para 90 of the judgment, the Supreme Court further observed that "judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application of judicial review is made, but the decision making process itself."
10. Be it noted that 'judicial review' by no stretch mean and imply an appeal against the decision of an administrative authority. 'Judicial review' is restrictive in its operation and applies to the decision-making process and in the event there is any infirmity in the decision-making process, the Law Court will be within its jurisdiction while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to set right such infirmity. The observations of Lord Brightman in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, 1982 (3) All. ER 141, lend assistance to such an observation.
11. Before adverting, however, to the points in issue and the authority of the Law Court to pass orders in administrative matters or the power for interference, we may remind ourselves once again that a finding or a conclusion reached by an administrative body cannot be interfered with in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution unless of course the finding is such that no reasonable person could come to such a finding. The law is well settled on this score, as noted above, and two decisions of the Patna High Court in the cases of Khadi Gramodyog v. State of Bihar, 1977 Lab. 1C 466, Jukundar Colliery v. Shadeo Thakur, 1974 Lab. IC 417, including the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Tollygunje Club Ltd. v. Fifth Industrial Tribunal and others, 1985 (1)LLJ 258, ought to be noted. In this context, both the Patna High Court as also the Calcutta High Court in no uncertain terms held that the Court shall not be justified in taking the evidence for itself as if sitting in appeal against the order of the inferior Tribunal: Neither the Court has the authority to interfere even if the Court can reasonably arrive at a conclusion different from that of the inferior Court - the principle being a writ Court cannot act as an appellate authority, nor can it reappraise the evidence in order to Judge the action taken administratively.
12, Having discussed the basic and broad features of the powers of the writ Court under Article 226, while deciding an administrative action, let us now advert ourselves to the factual matrix of the situation in brief:
Facts depict that the Osmania University published an advertisement bearing No. 1/93 on 21-1-1993 inviting applications from eligible persons for appointment to various teaching posts. The last date fixed for receipt of the applications by the University was 22-2-1993. Subsequently, however, the tactual matrix depict that a second notification was also issued on 12-7-1993 and the last date fixed for receipt of the applications was 16-8-1993. Be it noted that Writ Appeal No.234 of 1998 is concerned with the post of Professor in Chemistry in the Osmania University. The records depict that there were in fact 26 applicants for such consideration by the University. Incidentally, be it noted that 12 candidates are from Mirzapur and 14 others from Biknur, though there are certain other candidates, but we need not engage ourselves on that score. But the fact remains that about 26 candidates did apply before the University for being selected for the post of Professor of Chemistry. It is on this score that strenuous submissions have been made since the writ petitioner's principal grievance is that quite a number of applicants do not have the requisite qualification to apply for the post. For convenience sake, the qualifications required for the purpose of appointment are as follows:
"Professors:
An eminent scholar with published work of high quality actively engaged in research with ten years of experience in post-graduate teaching and/or research at the University/National Level Institutions, including experience of guiding research at doctoral level;
Or An outstanding scholar with established reputation who has made significant contribution to knowledge.''
13. Be it noted that the applicants did submit their applications alongwith their detailed qualifications and the University upon effective scrutiny did send a list of altogether 24 candidates as being otherwise qualified to appear at the interview before the Selection Board. The records pertaining thereto show that sixteen applicants did appear but eight of the candidates abstained themselves from appearing. Interview, as the records depict, did take place and the University selected, on the basis of the report of the Selection Committee, three candidates viz., Dr. Satyanarayana Reddy, Dr. K. Chinna Rajanna and Dr. C. Papa Rao as Professors of Chemistry. Questioning their selection and appointment, the respondent herein being the writ petitioner filed WP No. 1391 of 1995 and by judgment dated 21-1-1998 a learned single Judge of this Court did quash those appointments as illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional, and hence the appeal. Since all the three appointments as selected by the University stand cancelled and set aside, all the three persons have preferred three separate appeals. But since common question of fact and law are involved, we propose to deal with the same alongwith the appeal filed by the University.
14. Before proceeding with the matter any further, it is to be noted herein that the learned single Judge in the concluding portion of judgment was pleased to record :
"The learned Standing Counsel is right in suggesting that the University may be allowed to regulate such selections in the light of the observations made above in future, in case the Court comes to the conclusion that the whole matter has to be reconsidered."
and it is on this score that there has been a strong criticism on the part of the respondents that the University after having taken the stand as recorded by the learned single Judge, cannot possibly be said to be an aggrieved party entitling it to prefer an appeal. While it is true that some statement has been recorded by the learned single Judge, but we need not attribute that rigidity so as to disentitle a party to exercise the right of appeal. The statement of the learned Standing Counsel cannot but be read that in the event it is held otherwise then and in that event the University may be allowed to regulate selections of teachers and in that perspective we do not see much substance in such a criticism levelled against the University on that score. The University obviously feels aggrieved by reason of the judgment delivered by the learned single Judge since the appointments as effected by the University stand set aside and cancelled. As such, we do place on record that the appeal preferred by the University is also being heard along with the three appeals noted above.
15. The issue thus involved in the matter pertains to the power of the writ Court to interfere with the selection or the decision arrived at by the Selection Committee -whereas it has been strongly contended by the learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner-respondent that while it is true the Court ought not to embark upon an enquiry as to whether the decision is right or wrong so far as the Selection Committee is concerned, but the Court has the authority to make a judicial review of the action of the administrative authority since the decision making process culminates in the final order or the decision. In the event of there being any infirmity in the decision-making process, the Law Court would be well within its jurisdiction to interfere since the order as passed on the basis of such infirmity in the decision-making process cannot be said to be in accordance with law. Several decisions were cited, but we need not deal with the same in extenso. Suffice it to record that the law is well settled that in the event the decision-making process is tainted with illegality, question of lending support to the administrative decision arrived at on the basis thereof does not arise and it is on this score that the facts and circumstances of each case shall have to be noted in its proper perspective as to whether the decision-
making process has suffered some infirmity so as to permit the writ Court to cancel or set aside an order which apparently otherwise is not subjected to judicial scrutiny.
16. It has been strenuously contended on behalf of the appellants that the learned single Judge clearly fell into an error and came to an erroneous conclusion by reason of the factum of assessment of the merits of the matter. It has been contended that the writ Court ought not to embark upon an enquiry into the factual matrix of the situation and it is only a decision making process which is subjected to judicial scrutiny but not the final order as such, passed by the University.
17. The authority of the Law Court in the matter of entertaining such a writ petition is very restricted and limited and the Law Court ought not to usurp the function of the administrative authority. It has been a definite contention on the part of the appellants that as a matter of feet, there is no infirmity in the decision-making process since the question of there being any reason for such a decision on the part of the administration docs and cannot arise. It is on this score, however, a decision of the Supreme Court ought to be noted at this juncture. The Supreme Court in the case of National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. K.K. Raman, AIR 1992 SC 1806, in no uncertain terms observed that the function of the Selection Committee is neither judicial nor adjudicatory. It is purely administrative. The Supreme Court observed that "the selection has been made by the assessment of relative merits of rival candidates determined in the course of the interview of candidates possessing the required eligibility. There is no rule or regulation brought to our notice requiring the Selection Committee to record reasons. In the absence of any such legal requirement, the selection made without recording reasons cannot be found fault with." The Supreme Court finally, however, came to a conclusion that "the administrative authority is under no obligation to record reasons in support of its decision". Indeed, the Supreme Court observed that "even the principles of natural justice do not require an administrative authority or a Selection Committee or an examiner to record reasons for the selection or non-selection of a person in the absence of statutory requirement."
18. While it is true that the decision-making process may be subjected to judicial review or scrutiny, but it cannot also be an unrestricted and unlimited one. The Court cannot substitute its judgment over the final decision taken in respect of selection of persons for those posts. In this context, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case Harpal Singh Chauhan v. Slate of UP., AIR 1993 SC 2436. hi paragraph 17 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed:
"It is true that none of the appellants can claim, as a matter of right, that their terms should have been extended or that they should be appointed against the existing vacancies, but certainly they can make a grievance that either they have not received the fair treatment by the appointing authority or that the procedure prescribed in the Code and in the Manual aforesaid, have not been followed. While exercising the power of judicial review even in respect of appointment of members of the legal profession as District Government Counsel, the Court can examine whether there was any infirmity in the 'decision-making process. Of course, while doing so, the Court cannot substitute its own judgment over the final decision taken in respect of selection of persons for those posts. It was said in the case of Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (supra).
The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court."
19. Judicial reviewability has certain inherent limitations as detailed above more fully, and in that perspective, a right balance between the administrative discretion to decide matters shall have to be struck so as to see that no unfairness exists and unfairness, if any, is set right by judicial review. The factual matrix goes to show that 26 candidates applied for the post, out of that, applications of 24 candidates were scrutinised and were sent to the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee thereafter in terms of the call letters, did call them for interview and did interview all the candidates. The Selection Committee did in fact select the candidates without there being any guidelines for such selection. The records depict that some of the candidates have got an average mark of 60, 63 whereas some others got 71, 73 and 75. It is this award of marks which has also been subjected to severe criticism by the learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner-respondent. It has been contended that there being no guidelines, as a matter of fact, the award of marks by itself shows that the Selection Committee has framed some such regulations for themselves without any basis and in order to give preferential treatment to some as against some others and it is on this score it has been submitted that the action of the Selection Committee is wholly irregular, arbitrary and not in consonance with the known principles of law. The Selection Committee, it has been contended, has acted in a manner which cannot be attributed to be fair and reasonable. The learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner-respondent, further contended that the Selection Committee, as a matter of fact, proceeded in a manner not conducive to the interests of justice but with an element of bias and as such, the whole selection process has become void, capable of being rectified by the Court in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution.
20. The records depict that the Selection Committee consisted of six very eminent personalities, viz., (1) Prof. M Malta Reddy, Vice-Chancellor, Osmania University (Chairman); (2) Prof. V. Veeranagaiah, Chairman, BOS in Chemistry, Osmania University: (3) Prof. K. Seshaiah Sastrv. Head Department of Chemistry, Osmania University; (4) Prof. P.S.R.K. Murthy, Nagarjuna University, Guntur; (5) Prof. K.V. Ramana, Andhra University, Waltair and (6) Prof. P. Lingaiah, Kakatiya University, Warangal. As a matter of fact, the learned single Judge himself on this score has recorded that the members of the Selection Committee are all very highly qualified and are occupying very high posts in the Universities and regarding their expertise, question of there being any challenge does not and cannot arise. The learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner-respondent herein, however, contended that none of the members of the Selection Committee has had the expertise in the field of the post for which the professors were to be selected. Incidentally, the self-same submission before the learned single Judge stands negatived with an observation that there is no material to think that they did not possess the requisite expertise or the qualification to be the members of the Selection Committee. The learned single Judge, however, upon recording such a fact, did, however, go into the factual aspects in detail as regards the qualifications of the candidates together with their teaching experience and by reason therefor, it has been contended by the learned Advocates appearing for the appellants and, in our view, with some substance, that the learned single Judge has exceeded his authority in the matter of exercise of jurisdiction. As noted above, the sphere of reviewability is very restricted and limited. In the event there is some amount of substantial infirmity in the decision-making process, then only the Courts can intervene and interfere, but not otherwise and the decision of the Selection Committee should be final and binding on all concerned. The Court cannot supplement its views, neither the Court has the expertise to supplement its views. A Special Selection Committee has been constituted by the University having due regard to the need of the situation. The Court cannot, either embark upon the efficacy of such appointment, neither the Court can go into the proceedings of the Selection Committee since it is a matter for the Selection Committee to decide as to who should be appointed and who not. Question of there being any bias in the contextual facts does not and cannot arise, neither the submission to that effect has any factual support. No whisper has been made against any one of the members of the Selection Committee, either in the petition or during the course of the submissions. Neither anything has been stated that the University acted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the candidates. The principal grievance is that some of the candidates are not having sufficient Post Graduate teaching experience - In our view, however, question of going into the same by a Court of Law does not and cannot arise. The University is the authority which is to scrutinise the papers and the applications and the University upon scrutiny of the same and having due regard to the alternatives available in the qualifications as required in the notification, selected some candidates for interview and rejected some others. It is the University's decision that these would be the proper candidates and that in our view docs not fall within the sphere of judicial reviewability. We do not find any infirmity in the decision-making process, which however commences with formation of the Selection Committee and comes to an end with the selection of candidates, or the decision taken in any way affected by reason therefor.
21. Some grievances have been made against the failure on the part of the University to provide full details of the papers produced or published by some of the candidates before the Selection Committee. We do not, however, find any such infirmity in the contextual feels. All necessary papers have been presented before the Selection Committee and the Selection Committee on the basis of the papers available and on assessment of the merits of the candidates have selected some candidates and we, therefore, do not see any infirmity in the decision-making process of the Selection Committee muchless in the final order of the University as regards the selection of candidates warranting judicial review. The learned single Judge, in our view, completely fell in error in going into the matter in such a detail which is not otherwise within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the writ Court.
22. In that view of the matter, these appeals succeed : The writ appeals are allowed: The order of the learned single Judge stands set aside. The writ petition is dismissed.
"No order as to costs.