Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Priyanka Pilania vs The High Court For Judicature For ... on 13 April, 2026
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
[2026:RJ-JD:13482-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2435/2023
Priyanka Pilania W/o Sh. Mahendra Choudhary, Aged About 47
Years, R/o Stadium Road, Nehru Nagar, Barmer, Rajasthan.
(Presently Posted At Additional Judge No. 04 Ajmer District
Ajmer Rajasthan).
----Petitioner
Versus
The High Court For Judicature For Rajasthan, Through Registrar
General Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur.
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. R.N. Mathur, Senior Advocate,
Mr. Lokesh Mathur assisted by
Mr. Hemant
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Pankaj Sharma
Mr. Dhairyadita
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHAH Judgment
1. Date of conclusion of arguments 18.03.2026
2. Date on which judgment was reserved 18.03.2026
3. Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced: Full Judgment
4. Date of pronouncement 13.04.2026 Per Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J:
1. The instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been preferred claiming the following reliefs:
"(i.) It is, therefore, most humbly and respectfully prayed that your Lordships may kindly be pleased to summon the entire record related to A.P.A.R. of the petitioner for the A.P.A.R. Year 2017 and 2018 Part-I and on the basis of the record and submissions, a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ may kindly be issued directly to expunge remarks entered in A.P.A.R. for the year of 2017 which were written by the Reporting Authority and overall grading was given as average by the (Uploaded on 15/04/2026 at 01:37:20 PM) (Downloaded on 15/04/2026 at 08:42:18 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:13482-DB] (2 of 13) [CW-2435/2023] Reporting Authority which has alreay been upgraded to 'Good' suo-moto by the then Hon'ble Chief Justice Rajasthan High Court, and hence the remarks made by the Reporting Authority stood subsumed with the upgradation as 'Good' and further final gradation of the petitioner may be directed to be in the category of "Very Good"/ "Outstanding" considering the performance of the petitioner in the immediately preceding A.P.A.R. Year 2016 and examine the same and allow the writ petition by passing an appropriate writ, order or direction.
(ii.) It is most humbly and respectfully requested that your Lordships may kindly be pleased to issue a writ of Mandamus to expunge remarks enterred in APAR 2018-Part-I [Part-I for the period from 01-01-2018 to 03-04-2018] and may kindly issue directions to upgrade the final grading in the category of "Very Good"/ "Outstanding" for the APAR 2018 Part-I considering her performance.
(iii.) Any other order or direction which this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be passed in favour of the petitioner."
2. The present writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner, a Judicial Officer appointed in the year 2005, against the entries of the remarks in her APARs as well as the orders rejecting her representations thereagainst, in respect of the following periods:
(i.) Insofar as the APAR for the year 2017 (01.01.2017 to 31.12.2017) is concerned, the petitioner seeks upgradation of the overall grading from 'Good' to 'Very Good'/'Outstanding', along with expunction of the remarks recorded in Columns 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, as communicated vide letter dated 26.02.2020 issued by the Registrar General, Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur. The petitioner further assails the rejection of her representations, namely Representation No. 04 dated 15.06.2018, Representation No. 278 dated 19.10.2020 and Representation No. 275 dated (Uploaded on 15/04/2026 at 01:37:20 PM) (Downloaded on 15/04/2026 at 08:42:18 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:13482-DB] (3 of 13) [CW-2435/2023] 31.05.2021, which came to be rejected vide communication dated 01.11.2021.
(ii.) Insofar as the APAR for the year 2018 (Part I) (01.01.2018 to 03.04.2018) is concerned, the petitioner seeks expunction of the remarks recorded therein and upgradation of the grading from 'Average' to 'Good'/'Very Good'/'Outstanding'. The petitioner also challenges the rejection of her representation dated 25.07.2019 against the said remarks, which was communicated vide letter dated 26.02.2020 issued by the Registrar General.
3. Mr. R.N. Mathur learned senior counsel with Mr. Lokesh Mathur and Mr. Hemant, appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that for the year 2017, the petitioner served at two different stations and achieved a work disposal of 203.26%, which, in terms of Circulars dated 08.08.2013 and 23.07.2016, entitled her to be graded as "Outstanding". It was contended that despite such performance, the petitioner was graded otherwise, and her representation dated 15.06.2018 was decided only after an inordinate delay of about 20 months vide communication dated 26.02.2020, wherein adverse remarks were entered in multiple columns. The said remarks were stated to be purely subjective and unsupported by any material on record.
3.1. It was further submitted that the initial grading of "Average" was suo motu upgraded to "Good" by the then Hon'ble Chief Justice, clearly indicating that the original assessment lacked any substantive basis. Learned counsel argued that reliance placed upon a letter dated 05.01.2018 in the APAR of Year 2017, (Uploaded on 15/04/2026 at 01:37:20 PM) (Downloaded on 15/04/2026 at 08:42:18 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:13482-DB] (4 of 13) [CW-2435/2023] pertained to a subsequent period, was wholly irrelevant and extraneous for assessing the petitioner's performance for the year 2017, particularly when the petitioner's reply thereto was not considered. It was also contended that the representations dated 15.06.2018, 19.10.2020 and 31.05.2021 were rejected vide order dated 01.11.2021, which is a non-speaking order passed without assigning any reasons, and thus liable to be set aside. 3.2. With regard to the APAR for the year 2018, learned senior counsel submitted that the assessment was split into two parts, wherein for the period 01.01.2018 to 03.04.2018 the petitioner was graded as "Average", whereas for the remaining and substantially larger period she was graded as "Very Good". It was contended that the major portion of the year having been assessed as "Very Good", the overall grading ought to reflect the same, and undue weight could not have been given to a short period of barely three months.
3.3. It was further argued that the representation submitted by the petitioner against the said grading was rejected vide communication dated 26.02.2020 without assigning any reasons or disclosing any basis, and even a subsequent representation dated 20.04.2021, based on additional material, was rejected without due consideration. Learned counsel also contended that the Reporting Officer assessed the petitioner beyond her tenure, i.e., beyond 03.04.2018 up to 10.04.2018, despite his own transfer on 06.04.2018, which amounted to an unauthorised and impermissible extension of the assessment period.
(Uploaded on 15/04/2026 at 01:37:20 PM) (Downloaded on 15/04/2026 at 08:42:18 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:13482-DB] (5 of 13) [CW-2435/2023] 3.4. It was further submitted that the Reporting Officer again relied upon the same letter dated 05.01.2018 while recording entries for both the year 2017 and part of 2018, despite the said letter having no nexus with the relevant assessment periods, thereby demonstrating clear non-application of mind. Additionally, adverse remarks were also based on a letter dated 06.04.2018, which was never communicated to the petitioner, and therefore could not have been relied upon in the assessment process. 3.5. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that as per settled practice, the overall grading of the entire year is required to be considered, and failure to do so renders any upgradation illusory, as adverse entries continue to operate to the prejudice of the petitioner. On these grounds, indulgence of the Hon'ble Court was sought for appropriate relief.
3.6. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following judgments in support of his submissions:
(i.) Daljeet Singh Grewal vs State of Punjab & Ors. [(2015) 9 SCC 680] (ii.) S.T. Ramesh vs State of Karnataka [(2007) 9 SCC 436] (iii.) U.P. Jal Nigam vs Prabhat Chandra Jain [(1996) 2 SCC 363] (iv.) Dev Dutt vs Union of India [(2008) 8 SCC 725] (v.) Abhijeet Ghosh Dastidar vs Union of India [(2009) 16 SCC 146] (vi.) Ashok Kumar Jain vs High Court of Madhya Pradesh [Writ Petition (S) No. 8932/2006, decided on 28.08.2012] (vii.) M.S. Birda vs Union of India [(1998) 7 SCC 310] (Uploaded on 15/04/2026 at 01:37:20 PM) (Downloaded on 15/04/2026 at 08:42:18 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:13482-DB] (6 of 13) [CW-2435/2023] (viii.)Sarnam Singh vs High Court of Allahabad [1998 (3) AWC 1666]
4. Per Contra, Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the remarks of "Good" recorded in the ACR for the year 2017 were duly communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 21.05.2018, clearly stipulating that any representation was required to be submitted within one month.
4.1. It was contended that although the petitioner submitted a representation dated 15.06.2018, the same was received by the respondents only on 27.09.2018, i.e., after a delay of approximately four and a half months. Notwithstanding such delay, the representation was duly considered by the Sub- Committee in its meeting dated 04.02.2020, and pursuant thereto, the adverse remarks were communicated vide letter dated 26.02.2020.
4.2. Learned counsel submitted that thereafter, subsequent representations dated 19.10.2020 and 31.05.2021 were also considered by the Sub-Committee (meeting dated 30.01.2021) and the Administrative Committee, however, upon due consideration, no merit was found for expunction or upgradation, and the same were rejected, the final decision being communicated on 01.11.2021.
4.3. With respect to ACR for the year 2018 (Part I & II), it was submitted that the remarks were duly communicated vide letter dated 30.05.2019, and the petitioner's representation dated 25.07.2019 was considered by the Sub-Committee in its meeting (Uploaded on 15/04/2026 at 01:37:20 PM) (Downloaded on 15/04/2026 at 08:42:18 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:13482-DB] (7 of 13) [CW-2435/2023] dated 04.02.2020, which, upon evaluation of the record and explanation furnished, found no grounds for interference. The recommendation was approved by the Administrative Committee, and even subsequent representations were considered but rejected as devoid of merit.
4.4. Learned counsel further submitted that the entire process demonstrates due application of mind by the competent authorities, and mere absence of elaborate reasoning in the communication does not vitiate the decision, as consideration of ACR representations is an administrative function. 4.5. It was also contended that ACR/APAR assessment is inherently period-specific, and earlier good entries cannot override the evaluation for the relevant period, nor can different periods be clubbed or "sandwiched" for reassessment. In the present case, the Hon'ble Chief Justice has already exercised discretion and upgraded the grading from "Average" to "Good", and no further upgradation can be claimed as a matter of right. 4.6. Lastly, it was submitted that the assessment of ACR/APAR is based on the subjective satisfaction of the Reporting and Reviewing Authorities, and the scope of judicial review under Article 226 is limited. The petitioner having been afforded adequate opportunity, and her representations having been duly considered at multiple levels, the principles of natural justice stand satisfied. The present petition, in essence, seeks re-appreciation of ACR grading, which is impermissible, and therefore deserves to be dismissed.
(Uploaded on 15/04/2026 at 01:37:20 PM) (Downloaded on 15/04/2026 at 08:42:18 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:13482-DB] (8 of 13) [CW-2435/2023] 4.7. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the following judgments:
(i) Daljeet Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab & Ors., (2015) 9 SCC 680;
(ii) S.T. Ramesh v. State of Kerala, (2007) 9 SCC 436;
(iii) U.P. Jal Nigam v. Prabhat Chandra Jain, (1996) 2 SCC 363;
(iv) Union of India v. Major Bahadur Singh, (2006) 1 SCC 368;
(v) Dev Dutt v. Union of India, (2008) 8 SCC 725;
(vi) Abhijeet Ghosh Dastidar v. Union of India, (2009) 16 SCC 146.
5. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.
6. The core issue that arises for consideration is whether the APAR entries of the petitioner for the year 2017 and APAR 2018 (Part-I), along with the rejection of her representations, are vitiated on account of arbitrariness, reliance on extraneous or uncommunicated material, procedural irregularity, and absence of reasons, thereby warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
7. It is well settled that while assessment in ACR/APAR falls within the domain of the Reporting and Reviewing Authorities, such discretion is not immune from judicial review. Where the decision-making process is shown to be arbitrary, based on irrelevant or extraneous material, violative of principles of natural justice, or suffers from non-application of mind, interference is (Uploaded on 15/04/2026 at 01:37:20 PM) (Downloaded on 15/04/2026 at 08:42:18 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:13482-DB] (9 of 13) [CW-2435/2023] warranted. In Dev Dutt v. Union of India, (2008) 8 SCC 725, and Abhijeet Ghosh Dastidar v. Union of India, (2009) 16 SCC 146, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has emphasized that any entry having a bearing on service prospects must be fair, transparent, and duly communicated. Further, in Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, it has been held that recording of reasons is an indispensable facet of fairness in administrative action. These principles guide the present adjudication.
8. The preliminary objection of the respondents regarding delay in submission of the petitioner's representation does not merit acceptance. It is an admitted position that the representation, though belatedly received, was considered on merits by the competent authorities. Once the representation has been entertained and adjudicated on merits, it is not open to the respondents to non-suit the petitioner on the ground of delay, particularly in the absence of any demonstrable prejudice. The respondents, having waived the objection of limitation by conduct, cannot now rely upon it to defeat the substantive claim.
9. Insofar as the APAR for the year 2017 is concerned, it is not in dispute that the petitioner achieved a work disposal of 203.26%. While this Court does not substitute its own assessment for that of the competent authorities, such exceptional performance constitutes a relevant and significant factor, which could not have been disregarded in the absence of cogent adverse (Uploaded on 15/04/2026 at 01:37:20 PM) (Downloaded on 15/04/2026 at 08:42:18 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:13482-DB] (10 of 13) [CW-2435/2023] material of commensurate weight. No such material is forthcoming from the record.
9.1. This Court further finds that the initial grading of "Average" having been suo motu upgraded to "Good" by the then Hon'ble Chief Justice is not a mere routine administrative exercise, but a supervisory correction indicative of infirmity in the original assessment.
9.1.1.In this context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sukhdev (supra), has held that ACR/APAR entries which affect an officer's career must conform to the constitutional requirements of fairness, transparency, and non-arbitrariness. 9.1.2. Applying the aforesaid principle, once the higher authority itself found it necessary to correct the grading, the underlying remarks forming the basis of the original assessment cannot be mechanically sustained without independent and cogent justification. In the absence thereof, their continuance would be arbitrary and unsustainable in law.
9.2. The reliance on the letter dated 05.01.2018, pertaining to a subsequent period, is wholly extraneous and thus vitiates the assessment. This Court further finds that the rejection of the petitioner's representations vide communication dated 01.11.2021 is ex facie non-speaking. In matters affecting service records and future prospects, the requirement of recording reasons is not an empty formality but a substantive safeguard. The absence of reasons renders the decision arbitrary and unsustainable.
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10. With respect to APAR 2018 (Part-I), the petitioner has been graded "Average" for a short duration from 01.01.2018 to 03.04.2018, whereas for the substantially larger period of the same year, her performance has been assessed as "Very Good". While segmented assessment may be permissible, the ultimate evaluation must reflect a fair and holistic consideration of the entire period. In the absence of cogent reasons, a short-duration assessment cannot disproportionately outweigh sustained performance, as otherwise it would defeat the very purpose of performance appraisal.
10.1.The assessment is further vitiated by the fact that entries were recorded beyond the petitioner's tenure and even beyond the Reporting Officer's transfer, which is procedurally impermissible. 10.2.Further, reliance on the letter dated 06.04.2018, which was not communicated to the petitioner, is in clear infraction of the mandate laid down in Dev Dutt (supra), as any adverse material, to be relied upon, must be duly disclosed to enable an effective representation and the use of such material vitiates the assessment per se, irrespective of any other considerations. The repeated reliance on the letter dated 05.01.2018, which bears no nexus to the relevant assessment periods, further reinforces the conclusion of non-application of mind.
11. Upon cumulative consideration, this Court is of the view that the impugned APAR entries are vitiated on multiple counts, namely: reliance on extraneous material, use of uncommunicated adverse material, procedural irregularity, disproportionate (Uploaded on 15/04/2026 at 01:37:20 PM) (Downloaded on 15/04/2026 at 08:42:18 PM) [2026:RJ-JD:13482-DB] (12 of 13) [CW-2435/2023] evaluation of a limited period, and absence of reasons in the decision-making process. Such infirmities strike at the root of fairness and render the entries legally unsustainable. 11.1.This Court is also conscious of the admitted factual position that the petitioner, while serving at two different stations during the relevant period, achieved a work disposal of 203.26%. Such exceptional performance constitutes a relevant circumstance which cannot be ignored and has been duly borne in mind while arriving at the present conclusion.
12. In view of the aforesaid findings, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned remarks, being founded on legally impermissible considerations, cannot be sustained and are liable to be expunged rather than remitted.
13. Accordingly, the petitioner has made out a case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
14. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed in the following terms:
(i) The adverse remarks recorded in the APAR of the petitioner for the year 2017, including those contained in Columns 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 communicated vide letter dated 26.02.2020, are hereby expunged.
(ii) The adverse remarks recorded in the APAR for the year 2018 (Part-I) for the period 01.01.2018 to 03.04.2018 are also expunged.
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(iii) The overall grading of the petitioner for the APAR year 2017 is directed to be treated as "Good", commensurate with her recorded performance.
(iv) Insofar as the APAR year 2018 (Part-I) is concerned, upon exclusion of the vitiated remarks and having regard to the fact that the petitioner has been graded "Very Good" for the substantial remaining period of the same year, the grading for the said part shall stand upgraded to "Very Good", so as to maintain consistency and reflect a fair and holistic assessment.
(v) The respondent-High Court, through the Registrar General, shall carry out necessary corrections in the service record of the petitioner in terms of the aforesaid directions and extend all consequential benefits.
(vi) The aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
(SANDEEP SHAH),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J SKant/-
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